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Abstract 
Based on an argument that ‘rational’, consequentialist models have inadequate 
explanatory power to account for problem gambling behaviour, this thesis 
explores the alternative application of a dual-process model and the incentive-
sensitisation theory.  The dual-process model proposes that the human brain 
comprises two distinct, but interacting, processing systems.  One is an automatic, 
affective, and motivational system that is shared with other animals (termed the 
‘automatic system’).  The other is a rational, abstract, problem-solving system 
unique to human beings or higher-order primates (termed the ‘deliberative 
system’).  When making judgments and decisions, the automatic system is 
influenced by motivational responses elicited by stimuli present in the immediate 
environment (motivational responses may be appetitive approach or aversive 
freeze, flight or fight), whereas the rational system can explicitly consider 
possible consequences and long-term goals. This allows the considerable adaptive 
advantage of automatic efficiency with flexible problem-solving. The deliberative 
system can also inhibit an automatic motivational response when negative 
consequences are anticipated.  
It is argued that stimuli relevant to a particular appetitive behaviour can undergo a 
process of incentive-sensitisation (Robinson and Berridge, 1993). This process 
strengthens their ability to automatically attract attention and elicit an automatic 
approach response (termed ‘cue-triggered wanting’). This response then becomes 
more difficult for the deliberative system to inhibit. As a result, the automatic 
system tends to dominate decisions regarding that particular behaviour with the 
result that the behaviour is more likely to be repeatedly elicited, even when 
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negative consequences are anticipated. This may give rise to impaired control and 
addiction.  
This process was originally developed to explain substance dependence. It was 
noted that all addictive drugs act directly on neural pathways that mediate cue-
triggered wanting, which allow incentive-sensitisation. Given the key similarities 
between problem gambling and substance dependence, it is argued in this thesis 
that incentive-sensitisation may also occur for some gamblers, giving rise to 
problem gambling.  
The introduction to this thesis critiques extant theories and models of problem 
gambling, and then re-interprets them from a dual-process/incentive-sensitisation 
perspective. This approach gives rise to some novel predictions that contrast with 
rational, consequentialist assumptions, which underlie much of the gambling 
literature (implicitly or explicitly). These predictions are tested in one qualitative, 
and three quantitative, empirical studies, including during actual gambling.  
The quantitative studies entail an examination of both deliberative and implicit 
gambling-related expectancies (a short bipolar scale developed specifically for 
this thesis was used to examine the former, while a free-association task, and the 
evaluative implicit-association task were used to examine the latter) and various 
measures of cue-triggered wanting (measured via ratings of wanting, urge, and the 
‘action-implicit association task’ which measures appetitive and avoidance 
associations). Moreover, the ability of these measures to predict gambling 
behaviour in general, and the ability of cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward 
to predict gambling behaviour during an actual gambling session (gambling online 
on a simulated slot-machine), was examined.  
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Results suggest that non-problem gamblers (NPGs) tend to exhibit positive 
gambling-related expectancies, and that expectancies, hedonic reward, and cue-
triggered wanting predict their gambling behaviour, consistent with the notion that 
NPGs gamble due to an expectation of positive outcomes, as well as due to 
appetitive processes (cue –triggered wanting). Alternatively, problem gamblers 
tend to exhibit negative or neutral gambling-related expectancies, and cue-
triggered wanting but not expectancies or hedonic reward predicts their gambling 
behaviour.  This challenges the consequentialist view that outcome expectancies, 
which are shaped by experiences during gambling (such as hedonic reward), 
determine gambling decisions. Rather, the findings suggest that, for PGs, 
gambling behaviour may be the result of strong automatic motivational responses 
to gambling-related stimuli, rather than the result of rational appraisals of the 
benefits of gambling. 
It is concluded that the dual-process and incentive-sensitisation theories provide a 
useful framework for understanding problem gambling, which challenges some 
previous assumptions and approaches. Application of this approach to problem 
gambling is novel, and supports the extension of models of substance dependence 
to behavioural addictions, such as problem gambling. 
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Chapter 1. Previous approaches to understanding 
problem gambling 
1.1 Introduction 
“I ate, slept and breathed gambling machines … I couldn’t even 
find time to spend with the people I loved … The machines were 
more important than anything or anyone else.  All I can remember 
is living in a trance for four years … as if I’d been drunk the whole 
time.” (p.193, Griffiths, 2005). 
Gambling in its broadest sense may be seen as risking something of value (for 
example, money, objects, property) for the chance of a greater return (Gray, 2004; 
Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin, & Doucet, 2002).  Most people gamble as a harmless 
form of entertainment:  recreational gamblers find the possibility of winning large 
sums of money exciting and they gamble to have fun, to relax, and to socialise 
(Anderson & Brown, 1984; Griffiths, 1991; Neighbors, Lostutter, Larimer, & 
Takushi, 2002).  However, for those unfortunate enough to be caught within its grip, 
problem gambling can dominate one’s life, giving rise to extremely serious 
consequences.  Problem gamblers (PGs) can have high rates of gambling-related debt 
(Schwarz & Lindner, 1992), a history of gambling-related crime (R. I. F. Brown, 
1987; Schwarz & Lindner; Yeoman & Griffiths, 1996), and higher rates of suicidal 
ideation and attempts than the general population (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; 
Feigelman, Gorman, & Lesieur, 2006; Schwarz & Lindner).   They also have higher 
rates of general medical conditions and psychiatric comorbidities (Pietrzak, Morasco, 
Blanco, Grant, & Petry, 2007), such as depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and 
personality disorders (Blaszczynski & Nower).   
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This thesis aims to apply and test a relatively new model of addictive and excessive 
behaviours to gambling. This is the dual-process model, combined with the 
incentive-sensitisation theory.  These two approaches have not yet been applied to 
gambling, though they provide a convincing explanation of other addictive 
behaviours (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2001).  This model is presented in the next 
chapter. Before presenting this model, previous models of gambling behaviour are 
presented and critiqued in this chapter.  
This chapter will outline the main approaches to conceptualising problem gambling 
that are seen in the literature to date; the next chapter will then summarise the dual-
process and incentive sensitisation theories, and demonstrate how the findings of this 
chapter may be viewed from a dual-process perspective.  The third chapter conveys a 
preliminary qualitative examination of the applicability of a dual-process approach to 
understanding problem gambling. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters are dedicated 
to empirical research that aims to test predictions arising from a dual-process 
approach to problem gambling. The final (seventh) chapter summarises the empirical 
findings, some implications, and suggestions for further research. 
This chapter begins by discussing the nomenclature, definition, and prevalence of 
problem gambling.  The main aetiological models of problem gambling are 
discussed, followed by risk-factors and predispositions to developing a problem with 
gambling. Finally a description of integrated models of problem gambling is 
presented.   
1.1.1 Definition, and identification of, problem gamblers 
Definitions of problem gambling tend to acknowledge disruptive behaviour, and 
harm to the gambler or others.  For example, a study conducted in Australia 
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established a national definition where ‘[p]roblem gambling is characterised by 
difficulties in limiting money and/or time spent on gambling which  leads  to  
adverse  consequences  for  the  gambler,  others,  or  for  the community’ (Neal, 
Delfabbro, & O'Neil, 2005, p. i).  The definitions of the most widely used 
instruments, the Diagnostics and Statistics Manual (5th ed.; DSM-5) criteria 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the South Oaks Gambling Scale 
(SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987) are similar, as is that used by the International 
Classification of Diseases (WHO, 1992). 
Researchers have used many different phrases to refer to gamblers experiencing 
gambling problems, such as ‘compulsive’, ‘addictive’, neurotic’, ‘excessive’, 
‘probable pathological’, and ‘pathological’ gamblers (Blaszczynski, 1998).  In this 
thesis, the term ‘problem gamblers’ (PGs) will be used, as this terms avoids any 
assumptions about underlying pathology associated with problem gambling.  The 
term ‘non-problem gamblers’ (NPGs) will be used to refer to gamblers who gamble, 
but do not meet the diagnostic criteria for problem gambling. Deviation from this 
terminology may occur when discussing studies that employ different terminology.  
Using the DSM (5th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), an individual is 
classified as a PG (which is referred to in the DSM-5 as a ‘gambling disorder’) if 
they meet four of ten criteria covering:  preoccupation with gambling, needing to 
gamble with larger amounts of money, irritability when cutting down gambling, 
history of inability to control gambling, gambling to escape from problems or to 
relieve dysphoria, ‘chasing’ (trying to win back) losses, and various deleterious 
consequences.  The disorder is classified with substance-use disorders as an 
addiction, and it can be seen that the diagnostic criteria are similar to those for 
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substance dependence.  As the classification of problem gambling as an addictive 
disorder is a recent change in the latest DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), there is an absence of research examining this new diagnostic procedure.  
Nonetheless, studies have shown that the items used to diagnose problem gambling 
have a uni-dimensional factor structure (Strong & Kahler, 2007; Zimmerman, 
Chelminski, & Young, 2006b), and good reliability and validity for both community 
and clinical samples (Denis, Fatséas, & Auriacombe, 2012).   
The SOGS was designed as a screening tool to identify possible PGs (who are 
referred to as ‘Pathological Gamblers’) amongst a clinical sample. It is based on the 
DSM-III criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1980; Derevensky & Gupta, 
2000).  As such, important changes to the criteria for a Pathological Gambler 
introduced into the DSM since that edition are neglected (such as the notion of 
gambling to escape from problems or relieve dysphoria; Beaudoin & Cox, 1999).  
The SOGS focuses on ‘family disruption, job disruption, lying about gambling wins 
and losses, defaults on debts, borrowing from others to relieve a desperate financial 
situation caused by gambling, borrowing from illegal sources, and committing an 
illegal act to finance gambling’ (p.466, Strong, Lesieur, Breen, Stinchfield, & 
Lejuez, 2004).  It can be seen that the SOGS focuses largely on borrowing money to 
finance gambling (Stinchfield, 2002).  Research has shown that the SOGS has a 
unified factor structure when used with clinical samples (Strong et al., 2004) but 
several factors when used with a community sample (The Centre for Gambling 
Research, 2004).  Compared to other instruments, the SOGS tends to overestimate 
the prevalence of problem gambling (Dickerson & Baron, 2000; McMillen & 
Wenzel, 2006).  Possibly, this reflects the fact that a central purpose of a screen is to 
avoid missing positive cases (Derevensky & Gupta, 2000; Ferris & Wynne, 2001b; 
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Stinchfield; Stucki & Rihs-Middel, 2007).  For this reason, the use of the SOGS as a 
diagnostic or epidemiological tool, as is widely the case, may be inappropriate 
(Stinchfield). 
Recently, a new instrument, the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI; Ferris & 
Wynne, 2001a), has been developed specifically to determine population prevalence 
of problem gambling.  The instrument comprises nine items, which cover:  chasing 
losses, increasing bet size to maintain excitement, borrowing/selling to get money to 
gamble, betting more than one can afford, feeling guilty, being criticised by others 
for gambling, health-related consequences, financial difficulties, and feeling as 
though gambling is a problem.  The authors state that an emphasis was placed on 
social and environmental factors in constructing the instrument.  Rather than 
identifying only PGs, the instrument categorises gamblers into one of four groups, 
termed ‘non-problem’, ‘low risk’, ‘moderate risk’, or ‘problem’ gamblers, though the 
latter two or three categories are sometimes combined by researchers into one 
category of gamblers with some degree of gambling problems (e.g., Brooker, Clara, 
& Cox, 2009; Cox, Yu, Afifi, & Ladouceur, 2005).  Previous research has shown that 
the CPGI has a uni-dimensional factor structure and is psychometrically more sound 
than the DSM-IV criteria or the SOGS (McMillen & Wenzel, 2006; Wynne, 2003).  
This instrument provides more conservative prevalence estimates of problem 
gambling than do the DSM-IV criteria and the SOGS, but less conservative estimates 
for less severe ‘at-risk’ gambling (Stucki & Rihs-Middel, 2007).  Due to its sound 
psychometric properties, the CPGI is being adopted by increasing numbers of 
researchers prominent in the field (Jackson, Wynne, Dowling, Tomnay, & Thomas, 
2010; Neal et al., 2005). 
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One general criticism of the approaches that have been taken to categorise gamblers 
is their focus on the (harmful) consequences of gambling as indicators of problem 
gambling.  Gambling consequences are numerous and diverse, and can vary for any 
number of reasons.  For example, the negative consequences of gambling – such as 
financial hardship, family breakdown, or illegal activities – may be much greater for 
poorer than wealthy gamblers, even where the aetiology and level of gambling are 
similar.  While the use of consequences to measure problem gambling may be of 
clinical importance, variables of underlying importance to the aetiology of gambling 
may be neglected.  This may make it difficult for researchers to link aetiological 
factors to other variables in a meaningful way.   
It may be more useful to employ indicators that are closely related to the 
hypothesised causes of problem gambling.  Some researchers have posited that 
impaired control over gambling is central to the aetiology of problem gambling, so a 
measure of impaired control may be linked to aetiological processes underlying 
problem gambling (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Dickerson & Baron, 2000; 
Dickerson & O'Connor, 2006).  Blaszczynski and Nower conceptualised impaired 
control as “repeated and unsuccessful attempts to resist the urge [to engage in a 
particular behaviour] in the context of a genuine desire to cease” (p.488) and 
suggested that impaired control is the “central, diagnostic … feature of pathological 
gambling” (p.488).  Impaired control co-varies with measures of gambling 
involvement and severity, and is a continuous dimension along which gamblers vary 
(Dickerson & Baron).  Conceivably, impaired control may provide a unitary, causal 
indicator of gambling severity that can help synthesise the literature.   
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1.1.2 Prevalence 
Estimates of the prevalence of ‘current’ problem gambling (where ‘current’ is 
usually defined as the past 12 months) tend to be one- to two-percent of the general 
population;  this proportion holds for numerous countries (Dickerson, Baron, Hong, 
& Cottrell, 1996; Gill, Dal Grande, & Taylor, 2006; Raylu & Oei, 2002; Stucki & 
Rihs-Middel, 2007).  However, recent studies using the CPGI have reported 
estimates of less than one-percent in a number of countries (Cox et al., 2005; Stucki 
& Rihs-Middel).  Estimates of ‘at-risk’ gamblers, who do not meet the current 
criteria for problem gambling, but are thought to be at risk of eventually doing so, 
tend to be around two-percent of the general population (Stucki & Rihs-Middel).   
Lifetime prevalence tends to be about one and a half to two times greater than current 
gambling prevalence (ACNielson, 2006; Cox, Kwong, Michaud, & Enns, 2000; 
Shaffer, Hall, & Vander Bilt, 1999).  The difference between lifetime and current 
prevalence indicates that, contrary to popular perception, problem gambling is not a 
chronic and irreversible condition:  about one-third to one-half of gamblers recover 
or transition between problem and recreational or non-gambling (Cox et al., 2000; 
Petry, 2006; Shaffer et al., 1999; Welte, Barnes, Wieczorek, Tidwell, & Parker, 
2001).  Recent evidence from longitudinal and retrospective research is consistent 
with this (M. W. Abbott, Williams, & Volberg, 2004; Petry, 2006; Slutske, Jackson, 
& Sher, 2003).  
The prevalence of problem gambling tends to be higher for certain groups, notably, 
adolescents (Adlaf & Ialomiteanu, 1999; Delfabbro, Lahn, & Grabosky, 2005; 
Shaffer & Hall, 1996);  and those with substance abuse disorders (Black & Moyer, 
1998; Westermeyer, Canive, Garrard, Thuras, & Thompson, 2005; Zimmerman, 
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Chelminski, & Young, 2006a), personality disorders (Black & Moyer, 1998), or 
other psychiatric morbidities, particularly depression or anxiety (Black & Moyer, 
1998; Cunningham-Williams, Cottler, & Womack, 2004; Feigelman et al., 2006; 
Westermeyer et al., 2005; Zimmerman et al., 2006a).  In terms of demographic 
factors, males tend to be at greater risk than females (Black & Moyer, 1998), as are 
those from a lower socioeconomic substrate (D. A. Abbott & Cramer, 1993; Moore 
& Ohtsuka, 1999) and minority ethnic groups (Rachel A Volberg & Abbott, 1994; 
Rachel A. Volberg & Abbott, 1997; Wardman, el-Guebaly, & Hodgins, 2001; Zane 
& Huh-Kim, 1998).  
1.2  Behavioural models 
Aetiological models of problem gambling have been drawn from behavioural, 
cognitive, addiction, and neuropsychological/genetic paradigms, which are outlined 
below.  Behavioural models are outlined in this section.   
Behavioural models propose that gambling behaviour persists due to reinforcement 
(Haw, 2008; Petry & Roll, 2001).  Variables can act both within and between 
sessions.  Operant conditioning is said to occur, with a number of reinforcers acting.  
A main potential reinforcer is the money won, or a ‘near miss’, where indicators 
suggest that money was ‘almost’ won (Griffiths, 1990; Kassinove & Schare, 2001).  
Another is the arousal elicited either by a win, or the anticipation of a win 
(Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Ricketts & Macaskill, 2003).  The social nature of 
gambling may act as another reinforcer, as may the desire to feel powerful or achieve 
the status of a ‘big shot’ (Petry & Roll).  Researchers have also pointed to a role for 
negative reinforcement in that gambling may occur in order to reduce, or escape 
from, aversive states such as negative affect or debt (Anderson & Brown, 1984; 
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Blaszczynski & McConaghy, 1989; Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002).  Underlying 
behavioural models is the assumption that individuals engage in behaviours that 
maximise reward, and minimise, punishment.  
Classical conditioning may also act to maintain gambling behaviour. Both internal 
stimuli (such as, gambling-related cognitions, mood, and physiological arousal) and 
external stimuli (such as, the sights and sounds of gambling-related games and 
behaviour) may develop the ability to elicit gambling behaviour (Sharpe & Tarrier, 
1993).  ‘Near misses’ and the lights and sounds of winning (Anderson & Brown, 
1984; Cote, Caron, Aubert, Desrochers, & Ladouceur, 2003; Griffiths, 1999; Parke & 
Griffiths, 2004) may become secondary reinforcers due to their association with 
primary reinforcers (Petry & Roll, 2001).       
However, as the odds of losing outweigh the odds of winning, the frequency of 
punishment is greater than that of reward.  It may be questioned, therefore, why 
gambling behaviour persists.  One answer that has been proposed is that wins occur 
on a random-ratio schedule, which is similar, and may produce behaviour that is 
comparable to, the variable-ratio schedule (Hurlburt, Knapp, & Knowles, 1980). This 
is an important observation as the variable-ratio schedule is known to produce 
behaviours that are especially difficult to extinguish (Blaszczynski & Silove, 1995; 
Sharpe & Tarrier, 1993).  Additionally, as outlined above, other reinforcers may act 
to sustain gambling.   
Moreover, researchers have noted the relevance to gambling behaviour of ‘delayed-
discounting’, in which potential delayed consequences are discounted compared with 
potential immediate consequences when making a decision (Reynolds, 2006).  
Serious losses, such as losing one’s house or job, seem a prospect that might occur 
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only in the distant future, and thus have much less impact on decision-making than 
they would if they occurred more immediately (Madden, Ewan, & Lagorio, 2007).  
Research suggests that PGs may devalue delayed outcomes more rapidly than non-
problem-gamblers (Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003; Petry, 2001a; Petry & Casarella, 
1999), which may help to account for their greater gambling activity.  It must be 
noted, however, that it is unclear whether rapid delayed-discounting is a cause or a 
consequence of gambling.   Rapid delayed-discounting may be a disposition in those 
vulnerable to problem gambling, or it may develop once one becomes involved in 
gambling (Madden et al., 2007).    
In sum, behavioural models propose that reinforcement maintains gambling 
behaviour, via both operant and classical conditioning.  However, given that 
punishment is more frequent than reinforcement, it has been argued that gambling 
should become extinct on such schedules. In response to this, researchers have 
argued that the random-ratio schedule of gambling activity may make gambling 
particularly resistant to extinction. In addition, when making gambling decisions, 
gamblers may value the possibility of immediate gains more greatly than the delayed 
negative consequences of gambling.  
1.2.1 Predictions made by behavioural models about aspects 
of gambling  
Behavioural models have been used to explain and predict several characteristics of 
gambling.  Attention has been drawn to those features of gambling games that will 
encourage or discourage play.  These features, and how they differ across gambling 
games, are outlined in Table 1.  
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Since features differ across games, the likelihood that a game will induce problem 
gambling can, in principle, be predicted.  It must be noted, however, that little 
systematic research has been conducted to identify the precise effect of particular 
features (Haw, 2000).  Workers in the field point to studies showing that electronic-
gaming machines (EGMs) are the most addictive form of gambling (Parke & 
Griffiths, 2006).  It is striking that EGMs involve more features than other gambling 
games that behavioural models view as encouraging gambling (Productivity 
Commission, 1999; Dickerson, 1991; Griffiths, 1993a; A. Parke & Griffiths, 2006).  
For example, the shortest pay-out interval (how quickly reinforcement is received 
after a win; the shorter the interval, the greater the reinforcement), amongst the 
highest win-probability and pay-out ratio (that is, more frequent reinforcement, and 
larger rewards per bet size), the highest event-frequency (the frequency of bets; the 
higher the frequency the more frequent the possibility for reward), a high rate of near 
misses (bets that are almost won, which have been shown to encourage gambling; 
Griffiths, 1990, 1999; Kassinove & Schare, 2001; Parke & Griffiths, 2004), and the 
lowest response-cost (the effort required to overcome barriers in order to gamble; 
Haw, 2000).   
It may be added that the event frequency of EGMs is so high that the game is 
considered to be essentially continuous.  Additionally, further game features have 
been added to EGMs that encourage persistent play (Parke & Griffiths, 2006), and 
EGMs resemble more closely than other games, the laboratory conditions of a 
variable-ratio reinforcement schedule under which response persistence develops.  
Thus, response persistence may be especially likely with EGMs.  
Behavioural models also seem to explain superstitious behaviours that are commonly 
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witnessed in gamblers.  Examples are holding a lucky coin, betting lucky numbers, 
or wearing a lucky shirt (Petry & Roll, 2001; Skinner, 1948).  Skinner (1948) 
demonstrated that, on a variable-ratio schedule, an animal will readily come to repeat 
the behaviour it was performing immediately prior to receiving reinforcement 
(regardless of its actual relevance), until it receives reinforcement again.  Skinner 
also found that superstitious behaviours are very resistant to extinction and are 
maintained over the long-term.  Behavioural models may thus account for the 
development of superstitious behaviours, and suggest they may play an important 
role in the persistence of gambling. 
1.2.2 Systematic studies into the role of reinforcing features 
in gambling 
There have been few studies that have tested the game features important to 
behavioural models outlined in the previous section.  Lewis and Duncan conducted 
multiple studies in laboratory settings, some of which involved risking actual money, 
in which they demonstrated that time to extinction of gambling behaviour is 
inversely proportional to win probability (1956a, 1956b, 1957, 1958, 1961, 1962).  
This is consistent with Skinner’s predictions as noted above. 
Behavioural models were largely ignored in the ensuing decades, until the 1990s, 
when Dickerson and colleagues (Dickerson, 1991; Dickerson, Cunningham, Legg 
England, & Hinchy, 1991; Dickerson, Hinchy, Legg England, Fabre, & Cunningham, 
1992) renewed interest in operant models of gambling behaviour.  They conducted a 
number of field studies to assess the applicability of these models to EGM-gambling.  
Their research suggested an important role for event frequency in encouraging 
automated play.  Recreational and regular gamblers were observed playing in their 
usual setting, and their rate of play in response to wins of varying sizes was recorded.  
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Results showed that rates of play were consistent, rapid and uninterrupted for at least 
two minutes following no wins and small wins, but declined following large wins.  
Dickerson and colleagues argued (Dickerson et al., 1992) that this was due to play 
having become habitual and automatic, and that a large win disrupted this automated 
play.  Moreover, results showed that this pattern of play was more evident for regular 
than recreational gamblers, which Dickerson and colleagues interpreted as indicating 
that automated play is learnt over time, with repeated practice.  Arguably, high 
event-frequency plays an important role in enabling habitual and automatic play.  
Other researchers have found similar results (Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999).     
That a large win resulted in a decline in play rate may appear inconsistent with 
behavioural models, which would seem to predict that the greater the reinforcer the 
greater the play rate.  However, this inconsistency may be more apparent than real.  
The finding may be explained by distinguishing factors that increase play within a 
gambling session from those that increase the number of gambling sessions.  A large 
win may result in disruption to gambling within a session, as the gambler has 
achieved their goal and can contemplate ceasing the session. But having experienced 
a large win in an earlier session is likely to be a powerful incentive for beginning a 
session in future, thereby increasing the number of sessions.  That is, a distinction my 
drawn between ‘within-session’ and ‘between-session’ influences on gambling. 
Haw (2000), a student of Dickerson, tracked and analysed the data on membership 
cards (which are slotted into the machine at each play session) of individual EGM 
gamblers.  He hypothesized that the machine would be played in such a way as to 
attempt to maximise stake size, in order to maximise reinforcement.  To achieve 
maximum stake size, players need to use all bet lines in any one game and stake the 
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maximum possible amount on all lines (EGMs show up to five rows of symbols, and 
players can decide how many rows they will bet on; this is referred to as ‘bet lines’).  
However, Haw found that while players tended to use all lines in each game, they 
staked the minimum amount on each.  He interpreted this as indicating that they were 
attempting to maximise the chance of reinforcement but minimise the response cost 
of playing.  While these findings are only partially consistent with his predictions, 
they are consistent with an operant model that takes into account response-cost (the 
cost of enacting a behaviour in order to seek reinforcement) in addition to 
reinforcement.   
Recently some researchers (Dixon, MacLin, & Daugherty, 2006; MacLin, Dixon, 
Daugherty, & Small, 2007; Zlomke & Dixon, 2006) have begun using the EGM 
simulation that MacLin, Dixon and Hayes (1999) developed.  Using these 
simulations, Dixon, MacLin and Daugherty (2006) found that NPGs preferentially 
chose the EGM that provided more frequent, smaller pay-outs to that which provided 
less frequent, larger pay-outs, even though the pay-out ratio provided by each 
machine was equal.  Hulbert, Knapp and Knowles (1980) had previously made a 
similar observation but their study was subject to criticism (Dixon et al., 2006; Haw, 
2008).  The findings of Dixon and colleagues’ study (Dixon et al.) indicates that the 
pattern of reinforcement may be important in shaping EGM play, not just the 
magnitude of the reinforcement.   
Haw (2008) suggested that it may be the number of non-reinforced trials that is 
important.  The observation that smaller but more frequent reinforcement appears to 
result in greater gambling persistence may be because such a schedule results in less 
non-reinforced trials.   
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Overall, it is seen that the limited research that has been conducted provides some 
support for a relationship between game features important to behavioural models 
and the ways gamblers play EGMs.  Further research into the effect of individual 
game features on EGM gambling would be useful, as would research with gambling 
games other than EGMs. 
1.2.3 Behavioural intervention studies 
The assumption behind behavioural treatments is that operant and classical 
conditioning result in an ongoing desire to gamble, and thus, that such conditioning 
needs to be extinguished (Blaszczynski & Silove, 1995).  Behavioural treatment 
approaches include aversion therapy (in which the gambler is exposed to gambling-
related stimuli or enacts gambling-related behaviours, and then experiences an 
aversive stimulus);  stimulus control (which involves the gambler avoiding or 
developing strategies to deal with stimuli likely to trigger gambling);  in-vivo 
exposure (which involves exposing the gambler to stimuli associated with gambling, 
while preventing a gambling response); covert sensitisation (which is similar to 
aversion therapy, but the aversive outcome is imagined rather than real); imaginal 
desensitisation (which involves relaxing in response to imagined gambling-related 
stimuli); and imaginal relaxation (which involves teaching relaxation strategies the 
gambler can employ when excited and wanting to gamble; Echeburúa, Báez, & 
Fernández-Montalvo, 1996; McConaghy, Armstrong, Blaszczynski, & Allcock, 
1983; McConaghy, Armstrong, Blaszczynski, & Allcock, 1988).   
It must be noted that several criticisms have been made of behavioural intervention 
studies – and, indeed, gambling intervention studies in general (Toneatto & 
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Ladouceur, 2003).   These are now listed.  First, different outcomes and measures 
have been used as indicators of treatment success.  Second, most studies have not 
given consideration to game type.  Conceivably, aetiology and optimal treatment will 
vary with this factor.  Third, high attrition rates have characterised most studies.  
Further, different approaches have been taken to this issue:  some studies have 
treated drop-outs as treatment failures, while others have not.  Fourth, studies 
describing treatment success at long-term follow-up have generally not assessed 
whether any treatment was sought between the study treatment and follow-up.  Fifth, 
few studies have provided process indicators which demonstrate that treatment 
improvement has occurred via the hypothesised mechanisms (Toneatto & Ladouceur, 
2003).   
Perhaps the most important problem with behavioural intervention studies is the 
absence of a control group.  This was particularly so of early studies, which also had 
the problem of small sample sizes (Greenberg & Marks, 1982; Koller, 1972; Seager, 
1970).  More recent studies have used larger sample sizes and a randomised-control 
trial (RCT) design (whereby one group receives treatment while another group either 
receives no treatment or receives an alternative treatment, with the participants being 
randomly allocated to these groups; McConaghy et al., 1983; McConaghy et al., 
1988).  Such a design is often considered the ‘gold standard’ for the field (Chambless 
& Hollon, 1998; Toneatto & Ladouceur, 2003).  Accordingly, the remainder of this 
section focuses on studies of this type.  Table 2 summarises all RCT behavioural 
intervention studies known to me. 
The earliest RCT studies were conducted by McConaghy and colleagues 
(McConaghy et al., 1983, 1988).  Their studies compared imaginal desensitisation to 
19 
 
aversive therapy, and to imaginal relaxation.  They found that imaginal 
desensitisation and relaxation were approximately equally useful treatments (in terms 
of both gambling-related and psychopathological variables) at 12 months follow-up, 
but aversive therapy showed little treatment gain.  However, given the absence of an 
untreated control group in these studies, an alternative interpretation of the results 
may be imaginal desensitisation and relaxation perform no better than natural 
recovery, the rate of which can be high (Hodgins, Currie, & el-Guebaly, 2001; 
Hodgins, Currie, el-Guebaly, & Peden, 2004), while aversive therapy results in a 
recovery rate below that which would be achieved naturally (without treatment).   
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A more recent RCT study was conducted by Echeburúa and colleagues (Echeburúa 
et al., 1996).  It compared the efficacy of:  a behavioural treatment, involving 
stimulus-control, in-vivo exposure, and response prevention; cognitive restructuring; 
both of these together; and a wait-list control.  On some measures, the behavioural 
treatment resulted in the greatest success; on others, the behavioural treatment and 
cognitive restructuring groups fared about equally.  (Interestingly, combining the 
behavioural treatment and cognitive restructuring resulted in a poorer outcome.)  
However, the results were confounded by the use of different delivery methods for 
the different treatments:   the behavioural treatment was delivered individually, while 
the cognitive treatment was administered in groups.   
Most recently, Blaszczynski and colleagues (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, Nower, & 
Sharpe, 2003) compared the ability of imaginal desensitisation and a cognitively-
based intervention to affect perceived gambling urge and self-control, erroneous 
gambling-related cognitions, and psychophysiological variables.   They found that 
both treatments were about equally effective across all variables, though the 
treatment effect of imaginal desensitisation was more attenuated than the cognitive 
intervention at 1-month follow-up.  However, this follow-up time is too short for 
assessing long-term gain.  Also, the study had a small sample (n = 10) and actual 
gambling behaviour was not measured.  Additionally, the absence of an untreated 
control group again makes it difficult to conclude that either treatment is superior to 
natural recovery.  
Overall, it is seen that while RCT behavioural intervention studies have shown some 
promise, they are subject to major criticisms.  They have not been able to clearly 
demonstrate that behavioural treatments provide benefit beyond those of natural 
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recovery and/or non-specific features of therapy (e.g., empathic listening).  While the 
studies do demonstrate a trend towards the utility of behavioural techniques, firm 
conclusions cannot yet be drawn.  
1.2.4 Evaluation of behavioural models 
The most important criticism of behavioural models is that one would expect 
gambling behaviour to be extinguished. This is so, despite delayed discounting. As 
noted above, researchers have argued that the intermittent reward schedule of 
gambling makes the behaviour difficult to extinguish (Aasved, 2002). However, the 
supposed application of the variable-ratio or random-ratio intermittent reward 
schedules to gambling is not accurate, as neither schedule involves frequent 
punishment (in the form of monetary losses) as gambling does. In fact, gambling 
involves more frequent punishment than reward.  In addition, some PGs report being 
unable to stop gambling until all available money has been spent (O'Connor & 
Dickerson, 2003a), so each gambling session results in an overall loss of money, 
regardless of any wins that may have occurred during the session.  Moreover, a 
pertinent feature of problem gambling is that gamblers continue gambling despite 
some serious consequences, such as depression and suicidal ideation, loss of home, 
job, or relationship, and the need to engage in criminal acts, such as theft or fraud, to 
get the resources to continue gambling (Petry, Stinson, & Grant, 2005; Pietrzak et al., 
2007; Schwarz & Lindner, 1992).  Hence, it may be argued that gambling, and 
problem gambling in particular, results in overall punishment, which, according to 
behavioural models, should lead to extinction of gambling behaviour, whereas it 
often does not. 
Furthermore, some forms of gambling do not appear to fit with behavioural models. 
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For example, people continue to play lottery, despite never experiencing 
reinforcement.  Furthermore, according to behavioural models, when playing 
roulette, if a player receives reinforcement for betting on a particular colour, they 
should bet on that colour again (Walker, 1992).  However, research shows that 
roulette players are more likely to bet on the colour that lost the previous bet (J 
Cohen, 1975).  These examples are likely to be accounted for by cognitive factors 
(Gilovich & Douglas, 1986).  As behavioural models neglect the role of cognition, 
they are unable to provide a satisfactory account of gambling behaviour.  
It could also be added that operant conditioning, whereby stimulus-response habitual 
behaviours can be elicited, may not adequately account for impaired control.  While 
strong stimulus-response behaviours may be well learned, they are not motivationally 
compulsive, and so may be relatively easily inhibited.  For example, while driving 
may be sufficiently habitual to be enacted without conscious input, it can be inhibited 
when desired (Robinson & Berridge, 2000).  Hence, there may be a motivationally 
compulsive element to the operant schedules that operate during gambling which 
needs to be added to any behavioural accounts of gambling behaviour. 
Relatedly, the behaviours that need to be enacted to be able to engage in gambling 
are complex and require flexible interaction with the environment.  Stimulus-
response habitual behaviours may be too simplistic to account for problem-gambling 
behaviours (Robinson & Berridge, 2003).  
Nonetheless, one might argue that gamblers can enter trance-like states during 
gambling, where play becomes automatic.  Simple stimulus-response habits may 
account for behaviour at this time.  However, these stages are likely to represent only 
one part of the gambling session.  For example, when one runs out of ‘credit’ during 
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play, they must seek out more money, thereby interrupting automatic play. In 
addition, as noted in Section 1.2.2, the findings of some studies suggest that a big 
win interrupts automatic play for EGM gamblers (S. L. Brown, Rodda, & Phillips, 
2004; Delfabbro, 1998; Dickerson et al., 1992).  Thus, for these reasons, it is argued 
that simple stimulus-response models cannot account for problem gambling 
behaviour.  
In sum, behavioural models cannot explain important aspects of gambling behaviour, 
such as why PGs persist with gambling despite overall punishment.  They also 
appear too simplistic, as they model behaviour according to simple stimulus-response 
relationships, and they neglect important aspects of human functioning, such as 
cognition and affect.  Moreover, their ability to predict aspects of gambling 
behaviour has not yet been convincingly demonstrated.  
1.3 Cognitive models:  irrational beliefs and 
expectancies 
Numerous researchers have proposed cognitively-based models of gambling 
behaviour.  Cognitive models have been dominated by the notion that gamblers hold 
irrational beliefs (referred to as ‘cognitive errors’ in this thesis) that result in the 
perception of gambling as a positive option.  Cognitive errors are the result of 
heuristic processing and/or incorrect probabilistic reasoning (Goodie & Fortune, 
2013).  This is discussed further below. 
Much of the research into such errors has been conducted using the ‘think aloud’ 
method, in which participants are asked to gamble and, at the same time, verbalise all 
thoughts that arise in their mind. In doing so, they are typically asked not to self-
censor in any way (Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; Ladouceur, 2004).  Typically, the 
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verbalisations are then coded as ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’, with the former being 
classified as ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’.  It is commonly found that, among relevant 
cognitions, those that are irrational far outnumber those that are rational.  This 
finding has been obtained for samples of NPGs (Benhsain, Taillefer, & Ladouceur, 
2004; Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Ladouceur & Dube, 1997; Ladouceur, Gaboury, 
Dumont, & Rochette, 1988);  and also for regular gamblers and PGs (Delfabbro & 
Winefield, 2000; Fernandez-Alba Luengo, Labradar Encinas, Ruiz Gonzalez, 
Fernandez Sastron, & Garcia Mendoza, 2000; Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, 
Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997).  Of particular interest, the ratio of irrational to rational 
cognitions has been found to be higher in problem and regular gamblers than in 
NPGs (Baboushkin, Hardoon, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2001; Coulombe, Ladouceur, 
Desharnais, & Jobin, 1992; Griffiths, 1994; Joukhador, Maccallum, & Blaszczynski, 
2003).  This finding is consistent with the proposal that cognitive errors promote 
excessive gambling.  Underlying cognitive models is the assumption that cognitive 
errors make gambling seem a more positive choice, thereby encouraging gambling 
persistence.  However, as will be discussed shortly, for various reasons the evidence 
from think-aloud studies falls short of demonstrating that cognitive errors help to 
cause gambling.  
1.3.1 Types of cognitive errors 
Several different types of cognitive error have been identified.  Based on the work of 
Toneatto and colleagues (Toneatto et al., 1997) and Raylu and Oei (2004a), below is 
a possible classification into three groups: errors due to illusion of control, predictive 
control, and interpretative biases.   
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1.3.1.1 Illusion of control 
Applied to gambling, illusion of control may be defined as gamblers’ overestimation 
of their ability to influence outcomes that are entirely or predominantly determined 
by chance.  Illusion of control may be ‘passive’, where individuals believe that they 
are blessed with luck (either as transitory state or a stable personal trait);  or ‘active’, 
where certain activities believed to influence the outcome of a gamble are enacted 
(Toneatto et al., 1997).  This includes superstitious beliefs, wherein certain unrelated 
behaviours (such as holding a lucky coin, wearing a lucky shirt, or positioning 
oneself in a particular way while betting) are believed to heighten the probability of a 
positive outcome (Toneatto et al.).   
Langer (1975) argued that when elements associated with skill - such as, personal 
choice, manipulation of equipment, or practice - are experienced in games that 
involve only luck, players come to believe that they are developing competence that 
will enable them to win.  This results in an illusion of skill which heightens illusion 
of control.  Research has demonstrated that gamblers often exhibit illusion of skill 
and control (Coventry & Norman, 1998; Coulombe et al., 1992; Delfabbro & 
Winefield, 2000; Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Griffiths, 1994; Joukhador et al., 
2003; Langer; Raylu & Oei, 2004a; Toneatto et al., 1997). 
1.3.1.2 Predictive Control 
Predictive control refers to gamblers’ belief that the outcome of random gambles can 
be calculated or anticipated by other means.  Gamblers perceive (generally non-
existent) patterns in gambling outcomes and, accordingly, develop complex formulae 
or systems to foretell these outcomes (Raylu & Oei, 2004a).  Studies have shown that 
the use of predictive systems or strategies is associated with problem gambling 
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(Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Joukhador et al., 2003; Toneatto et al., 1997).  Errors 
in comprehension of probability are particularly common sources of the formulae or 
systems employed.  One particularly common error involves a failure to understand 
the independence of repeated events.  This leads to the ‘gambler’s fallacy’, in which 
previous outcomes are held to influence future outcomes.  For example, overall, 
tossing a coin will result in 50% heads and 50% tails.  Gamblers apply this 
knowledge incorrectly when they predict that the outcome of the next toss will be 
heads because most previous tosses resulted in tails (in actuality, the outcome of each 
future toss is independent of the outcomes that preceded it).  Such misconceptions 
about probability appear to operate for most gamblers during gambling (Benhsain et 
al., 2004; Gaboury & Ladouceur; Joukhador et al.; Ladouceur & Dube, 1997; 
Ladouceur, Dube, Giroux, & Legendre, 1995; Toneatto et al.).   
1.3.1.3 Interpretative biases 
Interpretative biases occur when gamblers construe events so as to see their gambling 
in a positive light (Gilovich, 1983).  For example, a memory bias may result in wins 
being remembered at the expense of losses (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004; Gilovich 
& Douglas, 1986). Similarly, an attribution bias may cause wins to be attributed to 
‘dispositional’ factors such as skill, or being a lucky person, while losses may be 
attributed to ‘situational’ factors beyond the gambler’s control (Gilovich, 1983; 
Gilovich & Douglas; Toneatto, 1999).  Another bias that may be active is the 
‘confirmation bias’, in which information consistent with preconceptions is 
emphasised at the expense of contrary information.  For example, while holding a 
‘lucky’ coin, the gambler may preferentially focus on the wins that occur, rather than 
the losses (Raylu & Oei, 2004a; Toneatto et al., 1997).  Research has shown that 
such biases are associated with problem gambling (Joukhador et al., 2003; Raylu & 
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Oei).  They may ensure that gambling is seen as a successful and positive past-time, 
so that regular gambling is more likely (Gilovich; Toneatto). 
In sum, many gambling researchers have looked to cognitive errors in an attempt to 
explain how gamblers might re-interpret gambling events in a positive light. This 
allows gambling to be considered reinforcing, or rewarding, even when more often it 
is not.  
1.3.2 Critique of the think-aloud method 
There is some question as to the adequacy of research into cognitive errors.  The 
think-aloud method particularly has been subject to various criticisms.  First, to the 
extent that cognitive errors do help to cause gambling, the relevant errors may not in 
fact be open to conscious introspection.  This may be particularly so when the 
gambling process has become automatised.  For example, research has shown that 
some EGM gamblers report a ‘blank mind’ during the think-aloud procedure, where 
they continue to gamble but experience difficulty reporting any cognitions 
(Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; Griffiths, 1994).  Second, even of those cognitions 
that are conscious, only a subset will be reported in think-aloud studies, as thoughts 
can be fleeting and can occur more rapidly than speech (Ericsson & Simon, 1998). 
Hence, cognitions that are of importance may be missed.  Third, it may be argued 
that the cognitive errors reported may actually be post-hoc rationalisations.  For 
example, a gambler may feel a strong desire to gamble, and so elicits thoughts that 
justify such a choice.  Fourth, research is lacking as to which error is likely to occur 
at any one time, so predictive validity is lacking (Griffiths; Ladouceur & Walker, 
1996).  For these reasons, it has been argued that the think-aloud method may not 
provide insight into the underlying reasons for problem gambling (Delfabbro & 
Winefield;  Dickerson, 1991). 
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1.3.3 Experimental and intervention studies from a cognitive 
perspective 
A general criticism of the research on cognitive errors in problem gambling concerns 
the predominant use of correlational as opposed to experimental research designs.  
Even among those that used experimental designs, appropriate control groups were 
often omitted.  In this section, experimental studies that have tried to test for a causal 
relationship between cognitive errors and gambling behaviour are reviewed, with a 
particular emphasis on those that employed RCT designs.  The results of these 
studies have been mixed.  Some studies found that altering cognitive errors resulted 
in a corresponding change in gambling behaviour, while others did not.  
Dixon and colleagues conducted two studies with non-problem gambling student 
samples playing roulette in a laboratory setting (Dixon, 2000; Dixon, Hayes, & 
Aban, 2000).  One study (Dixon) used a within-group design with a very small 
sample of recreational gamblers.  An attempt was made to first enhance and then 
reduce illusion of control during play.  The ‘enhancement’ condition resulted in 
longer and more risky gambling, whereas the ‘reduction’ condition resulted in less 
time gambling.   
The other study (Dixon et al., 2000) utilised a RCT design, but did not measure 
gambling level.  One group of participants were exposed to inaccurate rules about 
play, another to accurate rules, and another to no rules about play.  Participants 
exposed to inaccurate rules played for longer and played in a more risky manner than 
other participants.  Those exposed to accurate rules played in a less risky manner 
than others.  
Caron and Ladouceur (2003) conducted an RCT study with recreational gamblers 
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playing EGMs in a gaming venue.  They found that those participants who heard 
erroneous verbalisations of a confederate gambling nearby laid more bets than did 
gamblers exposed to no, or correct, verbalisations. However, those who heard correct 
verbalisations did not gamble less than other groups.  
Benhsain and colleagues (Benhsain et al., 2004) conducted a think-aloud RCT study 
with occasional gamblers playing roulette.  The experimental group was taught the 
correct understanding of independence of events and then exposed to a reminder 
message throughout their gambling.  This group verbalised fewer erroneous 
cognitions, and played for less time, compared with the control group.  
The results of all of these studies are consistent with the argument that cognitions 
help to shape gambling behaviour, and may, therefore, be implicated in the 
development of problem gambling.  It must be noted, however, that all of these 
studies utilised NPGs.  
In addition, in the studies summarised so far, the intervention was implemented in a 
single session to recreational gamblers.  Other researchers have examined the impact 
on PGs of cognitive interventions that were implemented over several sessions.  
While Blaszczynski and colleagues’ (Blaszczynski et al., 2003) study employed a 
RCT design, the study had several flaws, as noted above in Section 1.2.3.  The only 
other cognitive intervention studies using a RCT design were those of Ladouceur et 
al (2001) and Ladouceur et al (2003).  Participants in both these studies were PGs.  
Those in the first study predominantly had a problem with EGM gambling, while no 
data regarding game type was reported for the second study.  Each study employed a 
cognitive-treatment group and a wait-list control.  The treatment, implemented 
outside of the gambling situation, was aimed at correcting errors regarding illusion of 
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control, independence of events, randomness, inability to predict gambling outcomes, 
and the odds of losing.  Each treatment group was followed up, for 12 months in the 
first study, and 24 months in the second study.  The control groups were not followed 
up, as they also entered treatment eventually.  In both studies, the majority of treated 
participants reduced their gambling by at least 50% and maintained this reduction for 
the whole follow-up period, whereas less than one-third of either control group 
showed such improvement.  Hence, these results support the proposition that 
cognitive errors impact gambling behaviour.  
However, three studies found evidence to the contrary:  altering cognitive errors does 
not change gambling behaviour.  All studies conducted the intervention outside of 
gambling, and then examined gambling behaviour.  Using a RCT design, and a 
student sample of recreational gamblers playing roulette, Steenbergh and colleagues 
(Steenbergh, Whelan, Meyers, May, & Floyd, 2004) sought to reduce cognitive 
errors immediately before a gambling session and assessed the incidence of such 
errors after the session was over.  When comparing the intervention groups to 
controls, they did not find any reduction in gambling behaviour, even though they 
did achieve a reduction in cognitive errors.  In another study by the same group of 
researchers (May, Whelan, Meyers, & Steenbergh, 2005), a similar design was used, 
but this time enhanced illusion of control for one group, reduced illusion of control 
for another group, and compared these groups to each other and to a control 
condition.  The interventions were implemented before gambling began, but their 
effects were assessed during gambling (as participants expressed their cognitions 
aloud).  It was found that irrational verbalisations were altered only in the ‘reduction’ 
group, and that gambling behaviour remained comparable across all three groups. 
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The third study (R. J. Williams & Connolly, 2006) comprised undergraduate students 
randomly allocated into one of three groups, where one group received instruction on 
probability theory, another received generic instruction on probability theory, and the 
third received no mathematical instruction.  While the intervention groups were 
better able to calculate gambling odds and were less likely to exhibit the gamblers 
fallacy six months after the intervention, they showed no parallel reduction in 
gambling behaviour.  
1.3.4 Reconciling inconsistencies and an overall assessment 
of cognitive error models  
Although it may seem there is an abundance of positive findings regarding the 
relationship between cognitive errors and gambling behaviour, it can be seen that 
some of the studies are subject to criticism.  First, the results of Ladouceur et al. 
(2001) and Ladouceur et al. (2003) may be regarded cautiously as they did not 
include any process variables – variables that measure whether the treatment effect is 
via the hypothesised mechanisms – in this case, cognitive correction (Toneatto & 
Ladouceur, 2003).  As noted above, in Section 1.2.3, treatment success may be 
equally due to non-specific features of therapy, such as the therapeutic relationship.  
So these studies may not be demonstrating conclusively that correcting cognitions 
reduces gambling.  
Another point is that where cognitive interventions are shown to reduce gambling 
behaviour, it does not necessarily follow that cognitive errors caused the gambling 
behaviour.  Just because a strategy serves to correct a problem, it does not mean that 
this strategy caused the problem.  For example, consider a cast fixing a broken leg:  
the cast may help repair the broken leg, but it did not contribute to breaking the leg.  
The same may be true of cognitive errors and gambling.  A gambler may experience 
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a strong desire to engage in gambling, so cognitive strategies to resist this temptation 
are helpful.  However, this does not necessarily mean that cognitive errors 
contributed to initial gambling decisions.  
These criticisms stated, the positive findings of some studies, and the negative 
findings of others, in regards to a causal role for cognitions in problem gambling 
need to be reconciled.  One facet of the studies’ methodology which appears to have 
varied consistently with the results was the time at which the intervention was 
implemented.  In general, where the intervention occurred during gambling it 
appeared to be successful at altering behaviour as well as cognitions (Benhsain et al., 
2004; Caron & Ladouceur, 2003; Dixon, 2000; Dixon et al., 2000).  By contrast, 
where the intervention did not occur during gambling, behaviour was not altered, 
even though cognitions were (May et al., 2005; Steenbergh et al., 2004).  The 
exception to this is the cognitive treatments in which the intervention occurred over 
several sessions (Ladouceur et al., 2003; Ladouceur et al., 2001). In these studies, the 
intervention did not occur during gambling, but still reduced gambling behaviour.   
One possible interpretation of these observations is that cognitive errors are unstable, 
in that they are absent – or at least only present in latent form – outside of the 
gambling context, but present during gambling or in a gambling context.  Support for 
this argument is provided by studies that found that even where participants held a 
correct understanding of probability outside of the gambling situation, they still gave 
evidence of cognitive errors during gambling (Benhsain et al., 2004; Dixon et al., 
2000; Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Pelletier & Ladouceur, 2007).  In effect, outside 
of the gambling context, there may be few cognitive errors to alter, and so an 
intervention that seeks to correct such errors will not ‘make contact’ with them at this 
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time.  Only if a cognitive intervention occurs when the cognitive errors are activated 
would one expect the intervention to be beneficial.  How then, are the results 
obtained by Ladouceur and colleagues’ (Ladouceur et al., 2001;  Ladouceur et al., 
2003) to be explained?  Perhaps the repetition of the cognitive correction (which 
occurred over ten to twenty sessions) that was a feature of these studies strengthens 
the correct beliefs or makes them more salient – to the point that they become 
sufficiently stable as to be activated in the gambling context.  
However, this still does not account for Steenbergh et al’s (2004) findings, wherein 
cognitions were reduced during gambling but behaviour was not.  Hence, another 
possibility is raised.  It may be that gambling behaviour elicits cognitive errors. 
Hence, altering cognitive errors may not always alter gambling behaviour.  These 
possibilities require further research. 
The proposal that incorrect gambling-related beliefs may not be stable recalls a 
distinction that has been made in another field, that of HIV-related sexual risk-
taking.  Gold (1993) distinguished between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ cognitions having 
to do with HIV.  On-line cognitions are those that occur during sexual encounters, 
while off-line cognitions are those that occur in the cold light of day.  Gold outlined a 
number of reasons why on-line and off-line cognitions may differ.  One reason is the 
information-processing ‘pressure’, due to depleted cognitive resources, that is likely 
to be a feature of the sexual situation.  Such pressure would be a result of arousal or 
competing cognitive demands.  Information-processing pressure has been shown to 
change cognitive processing (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Whitney, Rinehart, & 
Hinson, 2008).  Another reason is that stimuli in the sexual situation may trigger 
cognitions that are absent, or merely latent, in the cold light of day (Gold & Skinner, 
37 
 
1992; Gold, Skinner, Grant, & Plummer, 1991).  A third reason is that desires which 
are present in the sexual situation may elicit motivated reasoning, in which 
cognitions are tailored towards the desired outcomes (Kunda, 1990).    
The distinction between on-line and off-line cognitions may be applicable to 
gambling as well.  Several researchers have found that gamblers experience strong 
emotions or arousal while gambling (e.g., Gee, Coventry, & Birkenhead, 2005; 
Griffiths, 1995; Leary & Dickerson, 1985; Moodie & Finnigan, 2005; Wulfert, 
Roland, Hartley, Wang, & Franco, 2005).  Also, most gambling games require rapid, 
repeated decision-making, and sometimes, where a predictive ‘system’ is being used, 
complex calculations may be involved.  Further, knowledge that one is spending 
more than one should is likely to produce stress and thoughts about the debt being 
incurred.  All these features are likely to produce information-processing ‘pressure’.  
Additionally, stimuli in the gambling context may trigger a strong desire to gamble 
and, in turn, pro-gambling cognitions, or motivated reasoning.  In this sense, 
cognitive errors may be elicited particularly during gambling.  Hence, cognitive 
errors may be a result of gambling behaviour, as well as a cause (Griffiths, 1994). 
In sum, while there is an abundance of evidence that gamblers articulate several 
cognitive errors when ‘thinking aloud’ during gambling, there are criticisms of the 
think-aloud approach.  In addition, while some studies provided some evidence that 
cognitive errors may heighten gambling activity, all of these studies were with NPGs 
only.  No study has shown a causational link between cognitive errors and gambling 
activity for PGs.  Thus, it is possible that cognitive errors are present only during 
gambling, where-in gambling activity may elicit cognitive errors rather than, or as 
well as, the other way around (cognitive errors elicit gambling activity).  Given this, 
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further research is required in order to demonstrate a causational relationship 
between cognitive errors and problem gambling.  Finally, there is little evidence 
between particular cognitive errors and gambling activity for any gamblers.   
1.4 Addiction models 
Underlying much of the gambling literature is the notion of problem gambling as a 
form of addictive disorder, similar to substance-use disorders (formerly referred to as 
‘substance dependence’; American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  ‘Gambling 
disorders’ have recently been included in the DSM (5th ed.; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) as an addictive disorder.  This is because several researchers have 
acknowledged many similarities between problem gambling and substance-use 
disorders, including a shared central feature of impaired control (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Dickerson & O'Connor, 2006).   
Addiction has mainly been investigated from the perspective of behavioural 
reinforcement, and a social-learning and outcome-expectancy perspective 
(McCusker, 2006).  These are briefly outlined in relation to substance-use disorders, 
and then applied to problem gambling.  
Reinforcement theories of substance-use disorders assume that the hedonic rewards 
of substance use (such as a “high”, relaxation, dis-inhibition, and escape from an 
unpleasant affective state) reinforce initial substance-use behaviour (Wise & 
Bozarth, 1987).  Such reinforcement causes the behaviour to be repeated frequently 
enough to allow operant and classical conditioning.  This may cause substance-use 
behaviour to come under automatic stimulus-response control, whereby stimuli 
associated with substance use can automatically elicit substance-use behaviour.  As a 
result substance use becomes sufficiently frequent for tolerance to develop, such that 
39 
 
larger doses are required in order to achieve the same ‘high’.  This leads to dose-
escalation, and eventually to withdrawal symptoms if substance use ceases.  Hence, 
substance use must continue in order to avoid withdrawal.  Consequently, negative 
reinforcement perpetuates substance use (Koob, Caine, Parsons, Markou, & Weiss, 
1997).  
Outcome expectancy and social learning models add that expectancies and vicarious 
learning may also be important.  ‘Expectancies’ are the anticipated positive and 
negative outcomes of a choice.  Expectancy theory assumes that decision-makers are 
rational, such that, when making decisions, positive and negative expectancies are 
weighed, and the choice that is perceived to optimise positive, and minimise 
negative, expectancies is selected (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; 
Schoemaker, 1980).  Substances are proposed to be sought due to an expectation of 
positive outcomes (such as euphoria and social disinhibition, or removal of aversive 
affect) and eventually due to avoidance of withdrawal.  In addition, the likelihood 
that an individual will precede to relapse from an initial lapse is proposed to depend 
on attributions about the relapse, self-efficacy, and coping style (Donovan & Marlatt, 
2005; Mackay, Donovan, & Marlatt, 1991; Marlatt, Baer, Donovan, & Kivlahan, 
1988). 
Outcome-expectancy and social learning models also add that individuals develop 
expectancies about the effects of drugs before using them, based on information 
gained from friends, family, and the media.  For example, seeing others use 
psychoactive substances as a coping mechanism, or as a source of fun, leads people 
to develop expectations that they can fulfil these purposes.  Such expectancies may 
lead to initial substance use and may help to shape attributions and expectancies once 
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substance-use commences. Hence, expectancies are shaped by both direct, and 
vicarious, experience (Donovan & Marlatt, 2005).   
Such models of addiction may be equally applied to gambling.  Many gamblers 
report experiencing strong arousal during gambling, and qualitative research has 
shown that gamblers perceive arousal as a strong motivation to gamble (Ricketts & 
Macaskill, 2003; Wood & Griffiths, 2007).  Hence, researchers have argued that 
arousal may create a gambling ‘high’, analogous to the ‘high’ experienced when 
taking psychoactive substances.  As arousal is short-lived, there is a need to continue 
to gamble in order to continue experiencing the ‘high’ (V. de Castro, Fong, 
Rosenthal, & Tavares, 2007; Orford, Morison, & Somers, 1996).  Following repeated 
gambling, cravings may come to be experienced when not gambling.  The findings of 
some studies suggest that this may be the case (Bechara, 2005; Castellani & Rugle, 
1995; I. P. de Castro, Ibanez, Torres, Saiz-Ruiz, & Fernandez-Piqueras, 1997; 
Rosenthal & Lesieur, 1992; Wray & Dickerson, 1981).  Indeed, excessive gamblers 
report feeling stronger cravings than do alcoholics or cocaine users (Castellani & 
Rugle, 1995; V. de Castro et al., 2007; Wray & Dickerson, 1981). 
Some researchers have also attempted to demonstrate the notions of tolerance and 
withdrawal in gambling disorders (Blum, Cull, Braverman, Chen, & Comings, 1997; 
Griffiths, 1993b; Porter & Ghezzi, 2006; Wray & Dickerson, 1981).  Some research 
has shown that excessive gamblers experience an array of symptoms – such as 
irritability and restlessness, insomnia, anxiety, headaches, diarrhoea, physical 
weakness, and loss of appetite – when they try to stop gambling (Rosenthal & 
Lesieur, 1992; Wray & Dickerson, 1981).   These resemble the symptoms often 
experienced on cessation of substance use.  In addition, the cycle of continued 
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gambling in order to relieve debt, resulting in more debt, and therefore more 
gambling, may be considered analogous to the cycle of continuing to use substances 
in order to avoid withdrawal (Hodgins & el-Guebaly, 2004; Orford et al., 1996).  In 
sum, there is some evidence that gambling may fit with reinforcement, social 
learning, and outcome-expectancy models of addiction. 
1.4.1 Criticisms of addiction models 
The main criticism of reinforcement and social learning/outcome expectancy models 
is that they may be unable to satisfactorily account for important features of problem 
gambling.  First, from a reinforcement perspective, the mounting negative 
consequences that characterise problem gambling should result in extinction of 
gambling behaviour.  From an outcome-expectancy / social-learning perspective they 
should lead to aggregate negative gambling-related expectancies, which would lead 
to the choice not to gamble.  Often, however, problem gambling can be chronic and 
persistent despite strong negative consequences (Cantinotti, Ladouceur, & Jacques, 
2009).   
Relatedly, such models have been criticised for being unable to satisfactorily explain 
impaired control.  Reinforcement and social learning / outcome expectancy models 
argue that people engage in gambling because they have positive expectancies 
overall or are receiving reinforcement from the behaviour.  However, a central 
characteristic of impaired control is continuing to engage in a behaviour despite a 
genuine attempt to cease the behaviour (Cantinotti et al., 2009; Dickerson & 
O'Connor, 2006; O'Connor & Dickerson, 2003b).  Presumably, an intention not to 
gamble is formed as more negative than positive consequences are experienced 
(resulting in more negative than positive expectancies, or providing more punishment 
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than reinforcement).  Continuing to gamble despite this suggests that factors other 
than expectancies or reinforcement may be operating (McCusker, 2006).  Thus, it 
seems that reinforcement, social learning, and outcome-expectancy models may not 
adequately account for problem gambling. 
1.5 Genetic and neuropsychological models  
As it is not yet clear whether models based on a particular psychological perspective 
are able to explain why some gamblers, but not others, develop a problem with 
gambling, researchers began to turn to risk factors for problem gambling.  Factors 
researched have included biological factors, such as a genetic predisposition, or a 
distinct biological or physiological response to gambling; environmental factors, 
such as family history;  coping style;  demographic variables;  and, personality 
factors, such as sensation seeking and impulsivity.  These are summarised in 
Sections 1.6 and 1.7.  
Researchers have found genetic and neuropsychological links with gambling 
behaviour. In particular, studies have demonstrated a link between problem gambling 
and dopamine functioning, which is implicated in impulse control (Vallelunga et al., 
2012; Voon et al., 2011), motivation (Nestler & Carlezon, 2006; Robinson & 
Berridge, 2000), reward sensitivity (Davis et al., 2007; Laviolette, Lauzon, Bishop, 
Sun, & Tan, 2008), and associative learning (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Schultz, 
1998; Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001). Some research has linked pathological 
gambling to impairments in dopamine functioning (Bergh, Eklund, Sodersten, & 
Nordin, 1997; Blum et al., 1997; Voon et al., 2011; Voon et al., 2010).  Other 
research has shown that pathological gamblers are more likely to exhibit some 
particular alleles on genes related to dopamine functioning (I. P. de Castro et al., 
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1997; Ibanez, Blanco, de Castro, Fernandez-Piqueras, & Saiz-Ruiz, 2003);  these 
alleles have been related to impulse-control or addictive disorders (Blum et al., 1997; 
Comings, 1997; Comings et al., 1999; Comings et al., 1996).  Finally, some of the 
most compelling evidence for the link between dopamine and problem gambling is 
that Parkinson’s disease patients receiving dopamine agonist therapy show a 
particularly high incidence of problem gambling, which ceases on termination of the 
therapy (Bandini, Primavera, Pizzorno, & Cocito, 2007; Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, 
D'Annucci, & Bellodi, 2002; Grosset et al., 2006; Gschwandter, Aston, Renaud, & 
Fuhr, 2001; Imamura, Uitti, & Wszolek, 2006; Rodriguez-Jimenez et al., 2006; 
Serrano-Duenas, 2002; Zack & Poulos, 2006).  Hence, the research evidence 
suggests that dopamine impairments, or particular dopamine-related genetic profiles, 
are associated with problem gambling.  
There is also research evidence linking problem gambling to serotonin functioning, 
which is implicated in impulse control (W. A. Williams & Potenza, 2008), mood 
modulation (Kishi et al., 2013; Nugent et al., 2013), and the reward system in the 
mid-brain (Blum et al., 1997).  Evidence of serotonin impairment has been found in 
studies comparing excessive gamblers to healthy controls on indicators of the 
presence of serotonin (Blanco, Orensanz-Munoz, Blanco-Jerez, & Siaiz-Ruiz, 1996; 
Carrasco, Saiz-Ruiz, Hollander, Cesar, & Lopez-Ibor, 1994), response to drugs 
known to affect serotonin levels (Grant, Kim, & Potenza, 2003; Pallesen, Mitsem, 
Kvale, Johnsen, & Molde, 2005), the genetic profile for serotonin production 
(Cavedini et al., 2002; I. P. de Castro, Ibanez, Saiz-Ruiz, & Fernandez-Piqueras, 
1999, 2002), and performance on psychometric tests known to assess serotonin-
related impairment (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & Van den Brink, 2004).  
44 
 
There is also some limited evidence linking other neurotransmitters, such as 
norepinephrine and endorphins, to pathological gambling.  For example, several 
studies have found links between elevated levels of norepinephrine and gambling 
(Bergh et al., 1997; Meyer et al., 2004; Roy et al., 1988; Schmitt, Harrison, & 
Spargo, 1998; Shinohara et al., 1999), which has been interpreted as evidence of the 
role of arousal in gambling behaviour.  Additionally, some success in treating 
pathological gambling has been achieved with the use of the opioid antagonist 
naltrexone (Kim & Grant, 2001; Kim, Grant, Adson, & Shin, 2001), which is 
believed to inhibit the effects of endogenous endorphins in the reward centre of the 
mid-brain, and so reduce the pleasure to be gained from gambling (Blum et al., 1997; 
Grant et al., 2003; Pallesen et al., 2005).  This may suggest that endorphin mediated 
pathways in the reward centre play some role in problem gambling (Blum et al., 
1997).  Thus, gambling has been linked to dopamine, serotonin, norepinephrine, and 
endorphins. 
 A relationship between gambling and neuropsychological characteristics does not 
necessarily indicate that these characteristics cause gambling, as it is possible that 
they are a result of gambling.  However, genetic links do provide less ambiguous 
support.  In addition to studies that have shown links between genetic alleles for 
particular neurotransmitters and problem gambling, other studies have also 
demonstrated a strong genetic basis to gambling.  One twin study found that between 
35% and 54% of the variability in each DSM-III-R symptom could be explained by 
inherited factors (Eisen et al., 1998).  Another study, using the same sample, found 
that between 12% and 20% of the variance in problem gambling (depending on how 
it was defined) could be explained by inherited factors (Slutske et al., 2001).  The 
latter study also found that the severity of gamblers’ problems is a function of the 
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number, rather than type, of implicated genes exhibited.   
In sum, research suggests that individuals with particular genetic profiles may be at 
particular risk of developing a problem with gambling. In addition, disturbances in 
neurotransmitter functioning may contribute to, or result from, problem gambling. 
Differences or impairments in dopamine and serotonin functioning appear to link 
problem gambling with impulse-control and motivation.  
1.6 Personality and coping style 
Further risk factors that may account for differences in propensity to develop a 
gambling problem are personality and coping style.  These are discussed in this 
section. 
1.6.1 Sensation seeking 
Some researchers have suggested that PGs seek out games of high risk because they 
are high sensation-seekers (Coventry & Brown, 1993; Coventry & Constable, 1999; 
Coventry & Norman, 1997).  However, early researchers struggled to find evidence 
for such a link (Coventry & Constable, 1999; Coventry & Norman, 1997; Dickerson, 
Hinchy, & Fabre, 1987).  More recently, a distinction has been made between 
gamblers who seek out ‘active’ games and those who seek out ‘passive’ games 
(Bonnaire, Bungener, & Varescon, 2006).  An ‘active’ game is one in which skill or 
intellectual mastery is supposedly required, and which is played in order to seek 
excitement (Bonnaire et al., 2006; Coventry & Brown, 1993; Coventry & Norman, 
1997; Kuley & Jacobs, 1988).  Casino card games and horse-race betting are 
examples.  A ‘passive’ game is one in which little skill is required, and play is often 
reportedly motivated by the desire to relax or escape.  Electronic gaming machines 
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are an example.  Gamblers of active games tend to be male (Balodis, Thomas, & 
Moore, 2014; Petry, 2003) and tend to have high sensation-seeking scores (Bonnaire 
et al., 2006) whereas gamblers of passive games tend to be female (Hing & Breen, 
2001; Petry, 2003), and have low sensation-seeking scores (Coventry & Brown, 
1993; Coventry & Constable, 1999; Dickerson et al., 1987).  Hence, for males who 
play active games, the desire to seek high sensation is proposed to be a possible 
motivation to gamble.   
1.6.2 Impulsivity 
A relationship has generally been found between impulsivity and problem gambling 
(Blaszczynski, Steel, & McConaghy, 1997; Castellani & Rugle, 1995; Clarke, 2004; 
Fuentes, Tavares, Artes, & Gorenstein, 2006; McCormick, 1993; Nower, 
Derevensky, & Gupta, 2004; Petry, 2001b ; Steel & Blaszczynski, 1998; Vitaro, 
Arseneault, & Tremblay, 1999).  Evidence demonstrating a link between problem 
gambling and impairment in serotonin and dopamine functioning, as outlined in 
Sections 1.6.2 and 1.6.3, provides further support for this relationship.     
However, impulsivity has been conceptualised and measured in several different 
ways (Blaszczynski et al., 1997; Brevers et al., 2012; Petry, 2001b ), including 
‘orientation toward the present, diminished ability to delay gratification, behavioral 
dis-inhibition, risk-taking, sensation seeking, boredom proneness, reward sensitivity, 
hedonism, and poor planning’ (p. 64, Petry, 2001b).  Factor analyses have revealed 
that impulsivity is a complex, multi-dimensional construct (Fuentes et al., 2006; 
Petry, 2001b; Rodriguez-Jimenez et al., 2006).  Researchers may thus be referring to, 
and measuring, different processes when assessing impulsivity.   
Impulsivity may act as a risk factor, or mediate other risk factors, for problem 
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gambling.  Impulsive gamblers may be more likely to succumb to aetiological 
processes that lead to further gambling, whereas non-impulsive gamblers may be 
more likely to regulate their behaviour and so prevent a problem from developing.  
For example, an impulsive gambler may lack the ability to inhibit behaviours and so 
may find it more difficult than others to resist an urge to gamble.  Those who are able 
to resist a gambling urge may be more likely to successfully arrest the gambling 
behaviour before it becomes problematic (Barrault & Varescon, 2013). 
PGs often exhibit comorbidities with other psychological disorders for which 
impulsivity is a central feature, such as substance dependence (Blaszczynski et al., 
1997; Fuentes et al., 2006; Lacey & Evans, 1986; Ledgerwood & Petry, 2006; 
McCormick, 1993; Petry, 2001a, 2001b; Petry & Casarella, 1999; Slutske et al., 
2001; Steel & Blaszczynski, 1998) and certain personality disorders (Rodriguez-
Jimenez et al., 2006; Slutske et al.).  Some research suggests that the more impulsive 
a person is, the more comorbidities they exhibit (McCormic; Petry, 2001a, 2001b; 
Petry & Casarella). 
It needs to be determined whether impulsivity contributes to the cause of problem 
gambling, or if it is a consequence.  PGs are more likely to have had childhood 
ADHD (Blaszczynski et al., 1997; Carlton et al., 1987; Rugle & Melamed, 1993) or 
conduct disorder (Slutske et al., 2001), for which impulsivity is a key characteristic.  
This may provide support for the argument that impulsivity precedes gambling 
involvement, but further empirical evidence is required.  
1.6.3 Coping style 
Several researchers have posited that coping style may help to determine whether or 
not a person develops a problem with gambling (Lightsey Jr. & Duncan, 2002; 
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Nower et al., 2004; Scannell, Quirk, Smith, Maddern, & Dickerson, 2000).  
Researchers have distinguished between solution-focused, emotion-focused and 
avoidant-oriented coping (Scannell et al., 2000).  Solution-focused coping refers to 
the use of several flexible strategies that directly address the stressor;  emotion-
focused coping involves strategies to regulate affect in response to the stressor;  and 
avoidant-oriented coping involves distraction, evasion, or engaging in alternative 
tasks (Bergevin, Gupta, Derevensky, & Kaufman, 2006).  The two latter strategies do 
not address the stressor directly.   
Research suggests that solution-focused coping acts as a protective factor against 
becoming a PG, while emotion-focused and avoidant-oriented coping are associated 
with problem gambling (Bergevin et al., 2006; McCormick, 1994; Morasco, 
Weinstock, Ledgerwood, & Petry, 2007; Ricketts & Macaskill, 2003; Turner, 
Macdonald, Bartoshuk, & Zangeneh, 2008; Wood & Griffiths, 2007). PGs often 
report being motivated by an attempt to moderate or suppress emotions, such as 
depression, anxiety, and stress (Bergevin et al., 2006; Gupta, Derevensky, & Marget, 
2004; Nower et al., 2004) or by a desire for escape (Morasco et al., 2007;  Ricketts & 
Macaskill, 2003;  Wood & Griffiths, 2007) by achieving dissociated trance-like 
states (Morasco, vom Eigen, & Petry, 2006; Pietrzak et al., 2007).   
In sum, personality factors and coping style may contribute to understanding why 
some gamblers develop a problem with gambling, while others do not. Highly 
impulsive gamblers, with avoidant or emotion-focused coping, may be more likely to 
develop a gambling problem than gamblers who are less impulsive, and engage in 
problem-focused coping.   
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1.7 Cognitive-behavioural and other integrated 
models 
Cognitive-behavioural models were the first to integrate two different psychological 
perspectives.  Cognitive-behavioural models hold that both behavioural and 
cognitive factors are important in the aetiology of problem gambling (Petry et al., 
2006; Sharpe & Tarrier, 1993).  While several treatment studies have employed a 
cognitive-behavioural approach, I am aware of only two groups of researchers who 
have actually outlined a cognitive-behavioural model of problem gambling.  Sharpe 
and Tarrier (1993) proposed that persistent gambling develops through operant 
conditioning, which sustains gambling long enough for classical conditioning to 
develop (see Section 1.2.1).  Hence, gambling-related cues develop the ability to 
trigger the desire to gamble, so that gambling persists.  Cognitive errors are believed 
to contribute to the maintenance of a gambling session, whether the individual is 
winning or losing (due to, for example, errors in probabilistic reasoning).  Gambling-
related negative life consequences are also thought to contribute to gambling 
persistence.  Sharpe and Tarrier proposed that the crucial factor in distinguishing PGs 
from NPGs is coping ability, involving, for example, the ability to regulate arousal, 
delay decision-making, challenge irrational cognitions, use problem-solving skills, 
and delay reinforcement.   
Ladouceur and colleagues (Ladouceur et al., 2002) proposed a similar model, though 
these authors posited a role for ‘risky cognitions’ that permit a gambling session to 
begin once a desire to gamble has been elicited (e.g., ‘I will just bet $20 and then I’ll 
stop’ or ‘Luck may be on my side tonight.  I should at least check’).  They also did 
not emphasise a role for coping, and did not attempt to account for why some 
gamblers develop a problem and others do not.   
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There have been several RCT treatment studies based on a cognitive-behavioural 
approach.  These have employed the same techniques as studies assessing 
behavioural or cognitive interventions (see Sections 1.2.3 and 1.3.2.3).  They have 
also included additional techniques that, arguably, fit with a cognitive-behavioural 
perspective, including the teaching of coping skills, problem-solving techniques, new 
leisure-time behaviours, mood management, relapse prevention (for example, 
learning to become aware of high risk situations and how to deal with them), and 
social skills.  Studies utilising RCT designs are summarised in Table 3.  It is seen 
that, while many of these studies obtained positive findings, and some obtained 
negative findings, all but one may be subject to major criticisms.  The most common 
important criticism is failure to obtain evidence regarding process variables, and 
failure to include a treatment-control group.  As a result, it is not clear whether 
treatment benefits are due to cognitive-behavioural processes, or due to other more 
general features of treatment, such as empathic listening, and the therapeutic alliance. 
The one study free of any major criticism obtained positive findings (Dowling, 
Smith, & Thomas, 2007), so it may be concluded that there is some limited evidence 
that cognitive-behavioural therapy is a credible treatment for PGs.  In this limited 
sense, CBT treatment studies provide support for CBT models of problem gambling.  
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In recognition of the diversity of possible aetiological pathways to problem 
gambling, more complex bio-psycho-social models have also been proposed.  These 
allow for risk factors that are proposed to account for why some people develop 
gambling problems and others do not.   
Griffiths (1999) distinguished between the acquisition of gambling behaviour and the 
development of an actual problem with gambling.  He argued that the former can 
best be explained by factors such as attitudes learnt from significant others, 
availability of gambling opportunities, and lack of viable alternatives to gambling.  
The latter, by contrast, can be due to the interaction of any number of biological, 
psychological, or social factors. 
Sharpe (2002) expanded her cognitive-behavioural model (Sharpe & Tarrier, 1993, 
described above) by adding factors such as socioeconomic status, familial history, 
and biological disposition, as variables that also influence a person’s ability to self-
regulate their behaviour.  Additionally, she noted that situations which reduce self-
regulation, such as intoxication, stressful life events, heightened emotional arousal, 
or depression, are likely to result in greater vulnerability to problem gambling.  In 
Sharpe’s view, these risk factors reduce a person’s ability to resist developing a 
problem with gambling. 
Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) argued that vulnerability to gambling begins with 
exposure to gambling, and availability and accessibility of gambling venues.  Once 
an individual has been exposed, behavioural conditioning can occur, which causes 
gambling behaviour to increase, until it becomes habitual.  As gambling continues, 
cognitive schemas develop which shape beliefs, attitudes, attributions, perceptions, 
and probabilistic reasoning.  These strengthen as gambling activity increases.  The 
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negative gambling odds result in pressure for the gambler to chase financial losses, 
which results in further losses, and so further gambling, such that a perpetuating 
cycle is established.   
Additionally, Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) distinguished three groups of 
gamblers.  The first group may develop a problem only because they are exposed to 
gambling long enough for behavioural conditioning to occur.  In general, these 
individuals exhibit the least severe gambling problems.  The second group is 
emotionally vulnerable and gamble in an attempt to cope with aversive emotional 
states.  The gambling problems of this group tend to be more severe.  The third group 
are highly impulsive, exhibit other comorbidities, and are likely to have a 
neurochemical imbalance.  This group tends to develop the most severe gambling 
problems, which are often resistant to treatment,   
Integrated models acknowledge that gambling is a complex behaviour that is not 
satisfactorily explained from just a single psychological perspective.  There are many 
possible pathways to problem gambling that are more readily explained by complex 
integrated models.  Arguably, integrated models are better able to explain why some 
gamblers develop a problem with gambling and others do not. Integrated models can 
be difficult to test, however, and still suffer from many of the criticisms that the 
individual models suffer from (for example, cognitive errors may be elicited by 
gambling, rather than being stable beliefs that elicit gambling).   
 
1.8 Conclusion 
Over the last two decades, there has been a considerable increase in research on 
problem gambling.  Early research was mainly from a behavioural perspective 
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(Dickerson et al., 1992; McConaghy et al., 1983, 1988).  Much of the appeal of 
behavioural models was due to the variable-ratio nature of reward schedules in 
gambling.  However, the assumed applicability of this reward-schedule has been 
questioned. In addition, according to behavioural reinforcement schedules, gambling 
should not persist, but rather, should become extinct for PGs. 
Research then began to focus on possible links between cognitive errors and 
gambling behaviour, with an implicit assumption that cognitive errors encourage 
gamblers to view gambling as positive, despite negative pay-out ratios, and other 
negative life consequences (Raylu & Oei, 2004a; Toneatto, 1999).  When examining 
cognitive errors, the main methodology used was to ask gamblers to think aloud 
while they are gambling.  However, very few of these studies attempted to 
demonstrate a causal role for cognitive errors.  Causal research that was conducted 
appeared to show that cognitive errors are present only during gambling.  While this 
seems to undermine a causal role for cognitive errors in eliciting a new gambling 
session, it may still allow for such a role in maintaining a session.  Alternatively, it 
may be that cognitive errors are only present during gambling because they are 
elicited by gambling activity. 
Research turned to risk factors in an attempt to explain why some gamblers develop 
a problem with gambling and others do not.  A causal link to problem gambling may 
have been demonstrated for some of these factors.  For example, a link between 
problem gambling and certain genetic alleles may imply causation as genes precede 
the behaviours which they predispose (da Silva Lobo et al., 2007; Vallelunga et al., 
2012).  However, as neuropsychological and genetic research is in its infancy, such 
links still throw little light on the psychological processes involved.  A causal link 
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seems also to have been demonstrated between impulsivity and problem gambling 
(Blaszczynski et al., 1997; Carlton et al., 1987; Rugle & Melamed, 1993; Slutske et 
al., 2001).  Finally, in recognition of the complexity of gambling, and to allow for a 
diversity of possible aetiological pathways to gambling problems, risk factors have 
been integrated into complex bio-psycho-social models of gambling.   
Overall, this chapter has outlined the approaches taken to understanding problem 
gambling to date. It can be seen that each model is subject to major criticism. Hence, 
this thesis attempts to examine the possible application to gambling of a new 
aetiological model, the dual-process incentive-sensitisation model. This model 
combines the dual-process model with the incentive-sensitisation theory (these are 
described in the next chapter).  
In the next chapter, this new model will be presented and the models outlined in this 
chapter will be reinterpreted from the perspective of this new model. Following this, 
new predictions about gambling behaviour that arise from this new model will be 
presented. The remaining chapters in this thesis will then be dedicated to testing this 
new model.  
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Chapter 2. Outlining an incentive-sensitisation and 
dual-process approach to understanding problem 
gambling 
2.1  Introduction 
In Chapter 1 the predominant approaches used to explain problem gambling were 
reviewed.  In this chapter, a ‘dual-process’ approach (J. Evans & Coventry, 2006; J. 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Toplak, Liu, MacPherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007), 
combined with the incentive-sensitisation theory, will be outlined, and applied to 
problem gambling.  After outlining this model, previous approaches will be 
interpreted from a dual-process perspective.  Finally, some novel predictions about 
gambling that arise from the combined dual-process model and incentive-
sensitisation model (usually referred to as just the ‘dual-process model’ from here-in) 
will be presented.  These predictions will then be tested in the empirical studies 
reported in the remainder of this thesis.   
2.2  An outline of the dual-processes model 
Increasingly, there is evidence for the role of two distinct processing systems that 
underlie psychological functioning (Craigie, 2011; J. Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Loewenstein et al., 2001; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004).  Such 
evidence originally came from cognitive science, neuropsychology / neuroscience, 
and social psychology, but is now being applied more widely, including to clinical 
psychology (e.g., Ames, 2003; J. Evans & Coventry, 2006; Friedman & Whisman, 
2004; Haeffel et al., 2007; Larsen, Engels, Wiers, Granic, & Spijkerman, 2012; 
Rooke & Hine, 2011). Each system has been distinguished according to several 
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different features (shown in Table 4; J. Evans, 2008), but there is disagreement as to 
which features should be used to characterize each of them (for a review see J. 
Evans, 2008).  In general, one is viewed as automatic, while the other is viewed as 
deliberate.  Each system is described in more detail below, using those features that 
are less contentious. 
The automatic system is evolutionarily ancient, and operates within all animals (J. 
Evans, 2003; J. Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999).  As the only system within 
most animals (J. Evans & Over; Stanovich), it evolved to automatically guide 
animals towards behaviours that would optimize their chances of survival (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996; Slovic, 
Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005).  As such, the system responds to some 
environmental stimuli with an automatic motivational response (an action tendency, 
or ‘action readiness’, not necessarily an actual behaviour) that may be characterized 
as defensive or appetitive (Bradley et al., 2001; Frijda, 2010).  The former is 
characterised by a freeze, flight, or fight action tendency to threatening stimuli, and 
the latter is characterised by an approach and attend, or approach and consume, 
action tendency to appetitive stimuli (such as food, offspring, or a potential sexual 
mate;  Berridge & Aldridge, 2009; Frijda, 2010).   
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Table 4. Clusters of attributes associated with dual-process systems of thinking (Evans, 
2008) 
Cluster of attributes  
Automatic processing 
system  
Deliberative processing 
system 
Cluster 1 - 
Consciousness 
 Unconscious  Conscious 
  Implicit  Explicit 
  Automatic  Controlled 
  Low effort  High effort 
  Rapid  Slow 
  High capacity  Low capacity 
  Default process  Inhibitory 
  Holistic, perceptual  Analytic, deliberative 
Cluster 2 – Evolution  Evolutionarily old  Evolutionarily recent 
  Evolutionary rationality  Individual rationality 
  Shared with animals  Uniquely human 
  Nonverbal  Linked to language 
  Modular cognition  Fluid intelligence 
Cluster 3 – Functional 
characteristics 
 Associative  Rule based 
  Domain specific  Domain general 
  Contextualised  Abstract 
  Pragmatic  Logical 
  Parallel  Sequential 
  Stereotypical  Egalitarian 
Cluster 4 – Individual 
differences 
 Universal  Heritable 
  Independent of general 
intelligence  
Linked to general 
intelligence 
  Independent of working 
memory  
Linked by working 
memory capacity 
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Within this system, cognitive processing is cue-governed.  It is fast, automatic, 
affective, effortless, and implicit.  Learning occurs via associative and operant 
conditioning. Several processes can operate concurrently (in parallel), so processing 
capacity is relatively powerful (for a review, see J. Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2004). 
This system has been variously termed the ‘implicit’ system (J. Evans & Over, 1996; 
Reber, 1996), the ‘intuitive’ system (Hammond, 1996), the ‘heuristic processing’ 
system (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; J. Evans, 1984), and ‘System 1’ 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Stanovich, 2004), but will be referred to here as the 
‘automatic system’ (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1984) to 
reflect the cue-governed, non-volitional, and rapid nature of its processing.   
The deliberative system, by contrast, is evolutionarily recent.  It allows analytic and 
abstract reasoning, flexible problem-solving, self-regulation, and the ability to think 
about the future.  Within this system, operations are relatively slow, explicit, 
volitional, rational, effortful, and constrained by working-memory capacity 
(Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2002).  The system has been 
termed, variously, the ‘explicit’ system (J. Evans & Over, 1996; Reber, 1996), the 
‘analytic’ system (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001; J. Evans, 1984, 1989), the ‘rational’ 
system (Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; J. Evans, 1984, 
1989), and ‘System 2’ (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Stanovich, 1999, 2004), but 
will be referred to here as the ‘deliberative’ system (J.S.B.T. Evans, 2007), to 
contrast it with the automatic system, and to suggest explicit, volitional, slow, and 
analytic processing.   
Importantly, models of decision-making differ according to each system.  Decision-
making from the perspective of the automatic system is cue-governed and automatic 
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(J. Evans, 2008).  Current (or recalled) cues automatically elicit inferences and action 
tendencies by activating a motivational response (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 
2000; Bradley et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2005). Such responses are either inherent, or 
learnt through previous experience (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997).  
Decisions are present-oriented and impulsive, and interaction with the environment is 
relatively effortless and efficient (Stanovich, 2004).   
Decision-making from the perspective of the deliberative system involves an explicit 
appraisal of the perceived outcomes associated with each choice (for a review see 
Fishburn, 1982).  Possible outcomes are considered and weighed, and the outcome 
considered optimal is selected.  Hence, deliberative decision-making considers long-
term and overall goals. Such models of decision-making have been termed 
‘consequentialist’ models (Loewenstein et al., 2001), and they have an underlying 
assumption that the decision-maker is ‘rational’ and future-oriented (Fishburn, 1982; 
Loewenstein et al.).  Such models dominated decision-making research in the latter 
half of the last century, until the role of automatic processes became more apparent 
(Kahneman, 2011; Loewenstein et al.; Tversky & Kahneman, 1988). For this reason, 
consequentialist models of decision-making may be regarded as ‘traditional’ models 
of decision-making.   
It is important to note that this thesis is concerned particularly with the impact of the 
appetitive action tendency upon the development of problem gambling.  As this 
tendency is automatically elicited by environmental cues, it is considered to be part 
of the automatic system and will be termed ‘cue-triggered wanting’ from here-in, 
following Berridge and Aldridge (2009).  It must be noted that the use of the term 
‘wanting’ in this phrase differs from the everyday use of the term.  In everyday 
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parlance, the term ‘wanting’ usually refers to an explicit cognitive appraisal of a 
behaviour or item.  Alternatively, the use of the term within the phrase ‘cue-triggered 
wanting’ refers to an implicit and automatic approach action-tendency. When the 
outcome of this process is felt, it may be experienced as an ‘inner drive’, ‘urge’, or 
impulse towards a particular action that is not the result of volitional deliberation 
(Berridge & Aldridge).   
2.3  Interaction of the two systems 
According to the dual-process model, decision-making is the result of an interaction 
between the two systems (e.g., J. Evans, 2008; Goto & Grace, 2008; Hoch & 
Loewenstein, 1991).  Internal or external cues in the environment first elicit a rapid, 
automatic motivational response, which the deliberative system may or may not 
evaluate. Such evaluation may concord with the automatic response, or it may 
attempt to adjust or inhibit it (Slovic et al., 2005). One example (demonstrating 
inhibition) may be illustrated with chocolate.   
As sweet foods often co-exist in nature with important micro-nutrients, the automatic 
system has evolved to automatically elicit cue-triggered wanting in response to them 
(T. Smith & Tasnádi, 2007). However, the deliberative system is aware of the lack of 
nutritious benefits of chocolate, and the potential for aversive future consequences 
associated with weight gain.  Thus, the deliberative system may attempt to inhibit 
automatic cue-triggered wanting elicited by the automatic system in response to 
chocolate; this attempt at inhibition may or may not succeed.  Thus, at least for 
humans, the efficient cue-governed responses of the automatic system may be 
inhibited by the flexible, future-oriented processes of the deliberative system 
(Ostafin, Bauer, & Myxter, 2012; Ostafin, Kassman, & Wessel, 2013).  In this way, 
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the interaction of the two systems allows optimal decision-making, and, importantly, 
endows humans with the considerable advantage of flexible, future-oriented 
problem-solving and interaction with the environment, as well as the efficiency of 
the automatic system (Bechara & Damasio, 2005).  
The ability of the deliberative system to inhibit or adjust automatic responses varies 
(Field & Wiers, 2012; Loewenstein et al., 2001).  Several factors help to determine 
the relative contribution of the two systems to a given decision (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2005; Redish, Jensen, & Johnson, 2008); some of these are as follows.  
First, the strength of cue-triggered wanting may vary (Berridge & Aldridge, 2009; 
Robinson & Berridge, 2004).  This can depend on the type of cues acting, and the 
appetitive state of the individual (for example, variations in the current state of 
hunger, or the level of hormones that determine sexual desire, can cause the strength 
of the appetitive response to vary;  Berridge & Aldridge).  Second, when eating 
chocolate is habitual, cue-triggered wanting may be more difficult to inhibit (Yin & 
Knowlton, 2006). On the contrary, it is likely that when a person is more practised at 
inhibiting cue-triggered wanting, they are more likely to succeed in this task. Third, 
some factors are known to reduce the working memory capacity of the deliberative 
system, and so reduce its ability to moderate automatic responses.  These include 
strong affect or arousal (Fleming & Bartholow, 2013; Minnema, 2010), time 
constraints when making judgements or decisions (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & 
Johnson, 2000), multiple concurrent explicit tasks (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005), 
and explicit determination to influence a particular choice (such as a current focus on 
losing weight and so not eating chocolate; Kahneman & Frederick).  
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Variation in the relative contribution of the two systems can give rise to a different 
decision on each decision-making occasion, despite minimal change in other 
contextual factors; this is termed ‘time-inconsistent decision-making’ (Loewenstein 
et al., 2001). When the automatic system dominates decision-making, the decision is 
more likely to be present-oriented and guided by motivational responses (to take the 
example above, cue-triggered wanting would cause the chocolate to be eaten). By 
contrast, when the deliberative system is able to dominate the decision, the decision 
is more likely to be ‘rational’ and volitional, and to take into account the long-term 
consequences of each choice (to take the chocolate example, concerns about weight 
gain and related health issues may dominate the decision, causing the chocolate not 
to be eaten; Wiers & Stacy, 2006a).   
The phenomenon of time-inconsistent decision-making may help to explain the 
development of impaired control.  It was noted previously (Section 1.1.1) that 
impaired control can be characterized by an inability to cease (or reduce) a behaviour 
in the face of a genuine desire to do so (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002).  When the 
deliberative system dominates judgments and decision-making, the individual may 
recognise that the negative consequences of the behaviour outweigh the positive 
ones, leading to an intention to abstain from the behaviour.  However, once 
addiction-related appetitive stimuli are encountered, strong cue-triggered wanting 
may be elicited, which may cause the behaviour to be enacted, despite a deliberative 
appraisal that it should not be (Berridge & Aldridge, 2009; Wiers & Stacy, 2006b). 
This is an example of time-inconsistent decision-making.   
Hence, addiction may be characterized by the development of excessively strong 
cue-triggered wanting that the deliberative system is consistently unable to inhibit, 
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resulting in repeated instances of time-inconsistent decision-making.  This may 
explain the development of impaired control.  This argument is a central feature of 
this thesis.  The process whereby excessively strong cue-triggered wanting could 
develop is addressed in the next section. 
2.4  The development of excessive cue-triggered 
wanting: the incentive-sensitisation theory 
Robinson and Berridge’s (1993, 2000, 2001, 2004) ‘incentive-sensitisation theory’ 
provides an explanation for the development of excessive cue-triggered wanting, and 
so is presented in this section. It must be noted that the theory was developed 
specifically in regards to substance-dependence, not in regards to problem gambling.  
Thus, after presenting the theory, some arguments will be presented to justify the 
possible application of the theory to problem gambling. 
Animal and human brains have evolved a system which enhances the chance of one’s 
own, or one’s offspring’s, survival. A feature of this system is a positive feedback 
loop between appetitive pathways (which mediate cue-triggered wanting) and 
‘hedonic hotspots’ (which mediate hedonic-reward, or pleasure) in the mid-brain. 
When ‘appetitive behaviours’ (survival behaviours for one’s self and one’s offspring) 
elicit hedonic reward, hedonic hotspots provide positive feedback to appetitive 
pathways. This ‘sensitises’ the pathways (via a process of enhanced dopamine 
transmission) to appetitive cues associated with the appetitive behaviour. 
Sensitisation endows these cues with the ability to automatically attract attention, and 
elicit an automatic approach and consume, or approach and attend, response. Thus, 
the cues are more likely to attract attention, and elicit the appetitive behaviour again 
in the future. 
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An important aspect of this process is that neutral cues that are paired with appetitive 
cues are also attributed motivational salience. Due to their association with appetitive 
cues, neutral cues signal the possibility of appetitive reward. Hence, they too develop 
the ability to attract attention and elicit an automatic approach action tendency. As a 
result, initially neutral cues are endowed with motivational salience in their own 
right. In this way, organisms learn about their environment, and are able to 
automatically ‘read’ and respond to their environment in a way that maximises their 
own, and their offspring’s, chances of survival (Berridge & Robinson, 1995; 
Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000, 2001, 2004). 
All addictive drugs act directly on appetitive pathways in the mid-brain (Everitt, 
Dickinson, & Robbins, 2001; Niehaus, Cruz-Bermúdez, & Kauer, 2009). Previous 
research has shown that each drug-use occasion results in incremental 
neuroadaptation of appetitive pathways (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). Such direct 
action upon these pathways may cause drug-related and associated cues to become 
excessively salient, such that they trigger excessively strong cue-triggered wanting 
that is difficult for the deliberative system to inhibit (McCusker, 2006; Wiers & 
Stacy, 2006b). This can account for the development of impaired control and drug 
addiction. There are individual differences in the propensity to develop excessive 
cue-triggered wanting, which may explain why some people develop impaired 
control more readily than others (Flagel, Watson, Akil, & Robinson, 2008; Kalivas & 
Stewart, 1991; Robinson, 1988; Segal & Kuczenski, 1987).   
It is proposed that the incentive-sensitisation theory may be applied to problem 
gambling.  This substitution requires caution, however, as the lack of a psychoactive 
substance in problem gambling may preclude the application of the theory. That said, 
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evidence is emerging which suggests that, for some individuals, appetitive pathways 
have the potential to become hypersensitive to any stimuli that can activate them, so 
many types of behaviour can be ‘addictive’ (Nestler, 2005; Olsen, 2011; Pitchers et 
al., 2013; T. Smith & Tasnádi, 2007; Thalemann, Wölfling, & Grüsser, 2007), not 
just substance use behaviours.       
Reasons for suggesting that gambling may activate appetitive pathways include the 
following.  First, gambling may take on the status of an appetitive behaviour due to 
the central role of money in most people’s lives. Some limited evidence demonstrates 
that both monetary reward (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Knutson, 
Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 2001; Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen, & 
Winkielman, 2008) and gambling (Lea & Webley, 2006; Linnet, Peterson, Doudet, 
Gjedde & Møller, 2010; Tamminga & Nestler, 2006) do indeed activate appetitive 
pathways.  Hence, gambling behaviour is likely to involve the activation of 
dopaminergic pathways in the mid-brain that mediate ‘wanting’ and incentive-
salience. Indeed, evidence was outlined in the previous chapter that links 
pathological gambling to neurotransmitters relevant to appetitive pathways (such as 
dopamine, serotonin, and endorphins, as outlined in Section 1.5). Dopamine in 
particular, the most important neurotransmitter in the incentive-salience theory 
(Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000), has been closely linked to pathological 
gambling (Bandini et al., 2007; Comings et al., 1996; da Silva Lobo et al., 2007; I. P. 
de Castro et al., 1997; Ibanez et al., 2003).  In addition, the pathways are particularly 
activated in response to unexpected rewards (Fiorillo, 2004; Fiorillo, Tobler, & 
Schultz, 2003; P. Phillips, Walton, & Jhou, 2007; Waelti et al., 2001), which, by 
definition, occur repeatedly during a session of gambling. Finally, individual 
differences in the activation of these pathways (C. Barnes, 1988; Kalivas & Stewart, 
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1991; Robinson, 1988; Segal & Kuczenski, 1987) may cause some individuals to be 
particularly susceptible to incentive-sensitisation, even for non-substance related 
appetitive behaviours (Beaver et al., 2006; Simon et al., 2010).  
These arguments suggest that repeated gambling may indeed give rise to 
hypersensitisation of appetitive pathways for some people.  Thus, the incentive-
sensitisation theory may provide a mechanism by which excessively strong cue-
triggered wanting, and so impaired control, can develop in problem gamblers (PGs). 
This argument is a central component of this thesis. At the end of this chapter, 
testable hypotheses related to this theory are presented. The empirical studies in this 
thesis will examine whether data collected with gamblers are consistent with these 
hypotheses. 
2.5  Dual-process models and the theoretical 
approaches reviewed previously 
In this section, the findings outlined in the previous chapter relating to various 
theoretical approaches will be discussed from a dual-process perspective. It will be 
seen that established findings reported earlier can fit within the approach. 
Additionally, it will be shown that the dual-process model can overcome the 
shortcomings of previous approaches.   
2.5.1  Behavioural models 
The findings presented in Section 1.2 regarding operant and classical conditioning fit 
well within a dual-process perspective, as these processes characterise learning 
within the automatic system (J. Evans, 2008; Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008; see 
Section 2.2). However, behavioural models have been criticized for being unable to 
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account for some issues relating to gambling (see Section 1.2.4). These criticisms 
will be briefly re-iterated, and then it will be shown how the dual-process model can 
overcome them.   
First, some researchers have argued that, according to a behavioural perspective, the 
frequency of punishment during gambling, and the significant negative consequences 
of gambling (such as loss of family, job, or home), should extinguish the behavior 
(Aasved, 2002). Second, behavioural models do not allow for important aspects of 
human psychological functioning, such as the cognitive and abstract reasoning 
processes of the deliberative system (Gilovich & Douglas, 1986), and the role of 
affect (Boden & Berenbaum, 2010). 
A dual-process approach addresses these shortcomings. First, continued gambling 
despite frequent punishment and significant life consequences is explained by the 
development of excessively strong cue-triggered wanting, which may elicit gambling 
behavior despite negative appraisals of the likely outcomes of gambling.   
Second, the hypothesized role of the deliberative system in the dual-process model 
allows for cognitive processes and the agency of the individual. Third, the automatic 
system accounts for affect as affect is an automatic process. Affect is evolutionarily 
remote in origin, present in both animals and humans, and it automatically mobilises 
an organism to respond efficiently to environmental stimuli with an appropriate 
response (Frijda, 2010). The interaction between affect and cognition gives rise to 
the full range of emotions experienced by humans (Russell, 2003).  So, while 
behavioural models have been criticised for their neglect of affect or emotion, the 
dual-process model accounts for this.   
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Overall then, it may be argued that the findings relating to behavioural models 
reported in the previous chapter are consistent with a dual-process account. The dual-
process model is also able to account for observations that a behavioural model 
cannot account for.  
2.5.2  Cognitive models 
The findings relating to cognitive models, which have focused particularly on 
cognitive errors (see Section 1.3), can also be conceived within a dual-process 
framework.  First, research shows that many cognitive errors result from heuristic 
processing (for a review see Kahneman, 2011).  Processing within the automatic 
system has been characterised as heuristic (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; 
Kahneman).  Thus, cognitive errors may result from the activation of automatic 
processes.  
This proposition may also explain specific conclusions arising from the literature 
review on cognitive errors (Section 1.3.4).  A close examination of this literature 
suggests that cognitive errors are present predominantly during gambling, and are 
less evident when not gambling (Benhsain et al., 2004; Caron & Ladouceur, 2003; 
Dixon, 2000; Dixon et al., 2000; May et al., 2005).  By way of explanation, it was 
proposed in Section 1.3.4 that features present during gambling may change 
cognitive processing.  Examples of such features are cue-triggered wanting, arousal, 
time-constraints due to rapid decision-making, and processing of multiple concurrent 
tasks (for example, playing the game, using a ‘predictive’ system, calculating bet size 
and return, and keeping track of overall expenditure and losses).  From a dual-
process perspective, it may be that these features reduce the processing capacity of 
the deliberative system (as described in Section 2.3), so that the automatic system 
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dominates judgments and decisions.  Hence, heuristic processes may govern 
judgments and decisions during gambling, thereby heightening cognitive errors. 
Furthermore, these features may be more evident for PGs compared with NPGs, 
thereby accounting for the comparatively greater prevalence of cognitive errors 
during gambling for PGs. Thus, the dual-process model is able to account for the 
prevalence of cognitive errors during gambling.   
It was also suggested (Section 1.3.4) that the desire to continue gambling may give 
rise to ‘motivated reasoning’, which may also heighten cognitive errors during 
gambling.  Motivated reasoning occurs when biased judgments are elicited because 
only beliefs and information consistent with a predetermined goal are retrieved from 
memory for consideration (for a review, see Kunda, 1990).  For example, if a person 
has a pre-determined goal to gamble, they may recall previous wins more readily 
than previous losses (a memory bias) when they make the decision to gamble, or they 
may attribute wins to skill but losses to ‘bad luck’ (an attribution bias).  From a dual-
process perspective, cue-triggered wanting elicits the desire to continue gambling, 
and so may also elicit motivated reasoning, thereby heightening cognitive errors.  In 
sum, the dual-process model is able to explain research findings related to cognitive 
errors and gambling. 
2.5.3  Addiction 
It was argued in the previous chapter (see Section 1.5) that the predominant model of 
addiction (a combination of reinforcement and social learning / outcome expectancy 
models; for a review, see McCusker, 2006; Orford, 2001) has been unable to 
satisfactorily explain impaired control, and related features, such as relapse 
(McCusker). By contrast, as noted above (Sections 2.3 and 2.4), these features are 
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amenable to explanation by a dual-process approach. The activation of strong cue-
triggered wanting may cause PGs to choose to begin or continue gambling despite a 
previous intention to abstain. This may lead to a sense of impaired control. 
Additionally, evidence suggests that the neuroadaptation characteristic of excessive 
cue-triggered wanting is long-lasting (e.g., Paulson, Camp, & Robinson, 1991; 
Wyvell & Berridge, 2001).  This may account for the chronic and relapsing nature of 
problem gambling. 
2.5.4  Genetic and neuropsychological models 
Evidence associated with genetic and neuropsychological models also fits within a 
dual-process approach. All of the neurotransmitters that were linked to pathological 
gambling in the previous chapter (including research on various alleles of specific 
neurotransmitters; see Section 1.6) are implicated in the functioning of appetitive 
pathways (Bergh et al., 1997; Blanco et al., 1996; I. P. de Castro et al., 2002; Grant et 
al., 2003; Kim & Grant, 2001; Kim et al., 2001; Meyer et al., 2004; Roy et al., 1988; 
Schmitt et al., 1998; Shinohara et al., 1999).  Dopamine, the most important 
neurotransmitter in these pathways (as noted above;  Section 2.4), has particularly 
been linked to pathological gambling (Bandini et al., 2007; Cavedini et al., 2002; da 
Silva Lobo et al., 2007; I. P. de Castro et al., 1997; Grosset et al., 2006; Gschwandter 
et al., 2001; Imamura et al., 2006; Rodriguez-Jimenez et al., 2006; Serrano-Duenas, 
2002). Thus, the genetic and neuropsychological findings reported in the previous 
chapter are consistent with a dual-process account of problem gambling.  
2.5.5  Impulsivity and coping 
Impulsivity and coping may also fit with a dual-process approach. As noted in the 
previous chapter (Section 1.7), a relationship has often been found between problem 
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gambling and both impulsivity and coping.  Since automatic processes encourage 
impulsive, present-oriented decisions, while deliberative processes encourage self-
controlled, future-oriented decisions, it is plausible that inter-individual differences 
in level of impulsivity may reflect differences in the interaction between the two 
systems. The automatic system may more readily dominate decision-making for 
highly impulsive people, whereas the deliberative system may more readily dominate 
decision-making for less impulsive people.  The ability to inhibit behavioural urges 
of the automatic system may distinguish those who develop a problem with gambling 
from those who do not (Dawe, Gullo, & Loxton, 2004; Field & Cox, 2008; Ostafin et 
al., 2012; Ostafin et al., 2013). Effective coping style (Section 1.6.3) may also 
depend on the ability to mediate automatic responses, and to respond to life 
challenges, with deliberative problem solving and self-regulation (Dawe et al., 2004; 
Field & Cox, 2008). Thus, both coping and impulsivity may be accounted for by a 
dual-process approach.  
In sum, it can be seen that previous models which have attempted to explain 
gambling outlined in Chapter 1 fit with a dual-process approach. Moreover, the dual-
process model is able to overcome shortcomings identified with the previous models. 
In the next section, testable predictions arising from the model are outlined.  
2.6  Predictions of the dual-process model 
Several predictions about gambling behaviour arise from the dual-process model.  
Some of these have been examined previously. For example, a relationship has been 
demonstrated between problem gambling and impulsivity (see Sections 1.6.2 and 
2.5.5), delayed-discounting (see Section 1.2), and certain neurotransmitters (see 
Sections 1.5, 2.4 and 2.5.4).  Several novel predictions also arise from a dual-process 
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approach.  These are outlined below.  Such predictions are important as they allow 
the model to be tested and potentially falsified.   
It must be noted that this thesis is concerned with the process of gambling-related 
decision-making.  As decisions determine behavioural choice, some of these 
predictions are causational.  
2.6.1  Implicit cognitive biases 
As automatic processes operate implicitly (see Section 2.2), research on implicit 
cognitive biases is likely to be relevant to the dual-process model. Research shows a 
range of implicit cognitive biases, which can impact on further processes, thereby 
influencing thoughts, judgments, and behavioural choice. Some different types of 
biases will be described, and then research findings and predictions relevant to 
gambling will be discussed.  
Implicit biases include attentional biases, in which attention is automatically drawn 
to gambling-related cues (Boyer & Dickerson, 2003; Kertzman et al., 2006; Molde et 
al., 2010); memory biases, in which gambling-related memories come to mind 
particularly readily (Field & Wiers, 2012; McCusker & Gettings, 1997);  and, 
perceptual biases, in which ambiguous information is interpreted as gambling-related 
stimuli (Wiers & Stacy, 2006a). By way of example, an implicit attentional bias may 
lead a gambler to particularly notice gambling cues, such as an advertisement for a 
gambling venue. A memory or perceptual bias may cause, for instance, an image of 
coins to automatically elicit thoughts of gambling.  
Little research has been conducted on implicit biases and gambling behaviour. The 
limited research that has been conducted suggests that regular gamblers indeed 
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exhibit such biases (Boyer & Dickerson, 2003; Brevers et al., 2013; Field & Cox, 
2008; McCusker & Gettings, 1997; Molde et al., 2010; Yi & Kanetkar, 2010). 
However, on the whole, these processes have been overlooked by gambling 
researchers to date, as the focus has been on explicit cognition (see Section 1.3).     
Due to repeated exposure to gambling, it is predicted that PGs will exhibit greater 
gambling-related memory, attention, and perceptual biases than NPGs. Such biases 
may act as internal cues that either directly elicit cue-triggered wanting, or cause it to 
be elicited (for example, by directing attention towards gambling cues). Thus, 
implicit biases may help to account for the greater gambling activity exhibited by 
PGs.    
2.6.2  Decision-making: cue-triggered wanting, outcome-
expectancies, and hedonic reward 
The dual-process model gives rise to some novel predictions regarding some features 
theorised to influence decision-making, namely, cue-triggered wanting, outcome 
expectancies, and hedonic reward.  These predictions may be explicated by 
contrasting them with those arising from a ‘traditional’ consequentialist approach 
(see Section 2.2).  Predictions arising from a consequentialist approach will be 
briefly outlined and then contrasted in the following sub-sections with those arising 
from a dual-process approach. 
The consequentialist approach focuses on ‘expectancy theory’, as outlined in Chapter 
1 (Section 1.4).  As noted previously, ‘expectancy theory’ assumes that individuals 
examine and weigh the expected outcomes of each possible option (termed ‘outcome 
expectancies; see Section 1.3), and the option considered optimal is selected (see 
Section 2.2; Berridge & Aldridge, 2009; Loewenstein et al., 2001). This has led to 
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the view that gambling behaviour may concord with outcome expectancies, such that 
PGs gamble excessively as they anticipate strongly positive outcomes overall (the 
relative strength of positive and negative outcomes), while NPGs gamble moderately 
as they anticipate moderately positive outcomes overall.  
Related to this is the view that hedonic reward experienced during gambling may 
increase the likelihood of future gambling by strengthening positive outcome 
expectancies. Thus, it has been proposed that PGs may experience stronger hedonic 
reward than NPGs, which leads to a more positive view of gambling. If so, this may 
account for their greater gambling activity (Ladouceur, Serge, Blaszczynski, 
O'Connor, & Lavoie, 2003; Li, Lu, & Miller, 2013).  Alternatively, they may seek to 
gamble as a form of escape from dysphoria (Bergevin et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2004; 
Nower et al., 2004), which would also enhance positive outcome expectancies. 
Finally, outcome expectancies are presumed to be relatively stable over time (as 
there is no allowance, in this approach, for the possibility that outcome expectancies 
may alter on each decision-making occasion as a function of internal or contextual 
factors; Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
As noted above, deliberative processes are considered explicit, analytical, and future-
oriented, and decision-making is proposed to be consequentialist (decisions are made 
by examining the likely outcomes of various options, and choosing that which is 
regarded as optimal; see Section 2.2). The dual-process model differs by adding 
automatic processes which also contribute to decision-making (for a meta-analysis 
review, see Reich, Below, & Goldman, 2010). In particular, cue-triggered wanting is 
proposed to be an important influential factor when making some decisions (namely, 
appetitive ones). This leads to some unique and testable predictions, in regards to the 
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role of cue-triggered wanting in decision-making, and also in regards to outcome 
expectancies and hedonic reward. These are discussed below, in sequence. 
2.6.2.1 Novel predictions regarding cue-triggered wanting 
Cue-triggered wanting will be discussed in relation to PGs, and then in relation to 
NPGs. Before beginning the discussion, it is necessary to make a few notes about 
cue-triggered wanting. First, it must be noted that both internal and external cues can 
elicit cue-triggered wanting. While appetitive and associated cues in the environment 
can elicit appetitive behaviour, internal cues can as well. For example, in relation to 
food, a certain physiological state leads to feeling hungry, which then leads to food 
seeking. Applied to gambling, it is proposed that internal cues, such as affective or 
physiological states, implicit cognitive biases (see previous section), and thoughts 
about gambling, can elicit cue-triggered wanting.  
Second, when cue-triggered wanting reaches conscious experience it may be 
subjectively experienced as an urge (Ostafin, Marlatt, & Troop-Gordon, 2010). Some 
urges may be strong, causing a powerful impulse to engage in a particular behaviour. 
Others may be more subtle, causing a mild impulse or intuition to choose a particular 
course of action (Berridge & Aldridge, 2008; Naqvi & Bechara, 2010). Furthermore, 
at other times cue-triggered wanting may guide behaviour outside of conscious 
awareness. Hence, if cue-triggered wanting is measured by asking participants to rate 
their current urge (as is often the case, including in the empirical studies in this 
thesis), it must be noted that any implicit urge may not be reported.  
Finally, sometimes the trigger for an urge may be experienced implicitly, while at 
other times it may be experienced explicitly. Applied to gambling, sometimes the 
gambler may feel they can explicitly link their urge to a particular trigger (such as 
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driving past a gambling venue, or the end of the working week), while at other times 
they may not be aware of any triggering factor (the triggering cue may have acted 
implicitly). Thus, both the urge, and the cue that triggered the urge, can be 
experienced implicitly or explicitly (Berridge & Aldridge, 2008). 
The proposition that cue-triggered wanting may be experienced as an urge leads to 
the first (and rather obvious) prediction regarding PGs. As their cue-triggered 
wanting is both excessive and readily elicited, it is predicted that they will experience 
frequent and strong urges to gamble. Indeed, previous research has shown that PGs 
may experience stronger urges or cravings to gamble than those experiencing 
substance dependence (Castellani & Rugle, 1995; V. de Castro et al., 2007; Tavares, 
Zilberman, Hodgins, & El-Guebaly, 2005). 
The second prediction is that their excessive cue-triggered wanting will dominate 
their gambling decisions. It is argued that for PGs, once activated, cue-triggered 
wanting is so strong that it is difficult to inhibit (see Section 2.3). This may cause 
gambling to be chosen irrespective of deliberative appraisals (see Section 2.3). For 
example, gambling may proceed even when deliberative processes lead to the 
judgment that it should not. This is likely to heighten the negative consequences of 
gambling, and may account for the sense of impaired control exhibited by PGs. 
Hence, it is proposed that cue-triggered wanting will predict indices of gambling 
behaviour for PGs, and they will exhibit impaired control.  
By contrast, for NPGs, cue-triggered wanting is proposed to be mild to moderate, 
and not as readily elicited as that for PGs.  Thus, NPGs are predicted to experience 
less frequent and milder urges to gamble.  As urges are predicted to be milder, it is 
proposed that deliberative processes can more readily influence their decision-
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making.  For example, on a particular decision-making occasion, deliberative 
appraisals may lead to the conclusion that (further) gambling should not proceed. As 
a result, cue-triggered wanting may be inhibited.  In this way, NPGs are able to 
regulate (and so control) their gambling.  This accounts for the absence of a sense of 
impaired control for NPGs.  
That said, the likelihood of achieving such inhibition varies with occasion and 
context (see Section 2.3). For example, if cue-triggered wanting is strongly activated 
on a particular occasion, and deliberative resources are limited (due to time-
constraints, for example, or concurrent cognitively demanding tasks), inhibition may 
be more difficult to achieve, so (further) gambling would be more likely.  Hence, it is 
predicted that cue-triggered wanting will predict gambling activity for NPGs as well.  
These arguments are consistent with Dickerson’s research (2003), which suggests 
that all gamblers may be vulnerable to reduced control during gambling.  As noted 
previously (see Section 1.3.4 and 2.5.2), task features during gambling may lead to 
cognitive depletion, and cues in the gambling context may particularly strengthen 
cue-triggered wanting.  This may both reduce the contribution of deliberative 
processes, and increase the likelihood that automatic appetitive processes will 
dominate decisions during a gambling session.  Thus, decisions are more likely to be 
appetitive and impulsive during a session, rather than deliberative, and consistent 
with long-term goals.  
In sum, it is predicted that excessive cue-triggered wanting will repeatedly dominate 
the gambling decisions of PGs, such that deliberative appraisals are not able to 
contribute to the decision to gamble.  Thus, even when inhibition is explicitly judged 
to be the best course of action, it is not achieved.  This may lead to impaired control.  
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By contrast, for NPGs, both automatic and deliberative appraisals contribute to their 
gambling decisions, allowing regulation of gambling.  That said, depending on the 
occasion and context, automatic processes may sometimes govern their decisions, 
increasing the likelihood of impulsive and appetitive decisions, and resulting in the 
occasional experience of impaired control.  Hence, it is predicted that cue-triggered 
wanting will predict gambling activity for both PGs and NPGs, but only PGs will 
exhibit impaired control.  
2.6.2.2 Novel predictions regarding aggregate outcome 
expectancies 
A dual-process approach also leads to some novel predictions regarding aggregate 
outcome expectancies.  It is proposed that excessive cue-triggered wanting is 
difficult for deliberative processes to inhibit.  Thus, cue-triggered wanting may elicit 
gambling activity even when aggregate outcome expectancies are negative.  As a 
result negative consequences are experienced, leading to heightened negative 
aggregate outcome expectancies, and a sense of impaired control.  Hence, it is 
predicted that PGs will exhibit negative aggregate gambling-related outcome 
expectancies.  This is a novel prediction that contrasts with the consequentialist 
assumption that PGs exhibit positive aggregate outcome expectancies.   
It is proposed that NPGs may also experience cue-triggered wanting, but it is mild to 
moderate in comparison with that experienced by PGs.  It is proposed that NPGs are 
able to inhibit cue-triggered wanting once it is elicited if they expect negative 
outcomes from gambling.  It follows from this that those who gamble do so in 
anticipation of mostly positive outcome expectancies.  Hence, it is predicted that 
NPGs exhibit positive aggregate gambling-related outcome expectancies.  This 
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prediction is not novel, though the proposition that NPGs exhibit more positive 
outcome expectancies than PGs is novel.   
The second prediction is that outcome expectancies may alter with internal and 
external contextual stimuli.  In particular, differences in automatic processes, such as 
the valence of current affect or the strength of current cue-triggered wanting, may 
cause appraisals to differ across each judgement occasion.  Research has already 
found evidence that current affect can bias evaluative judgements, such that outcome 
expectancies are more likely to concord with the valence of current affect (Boden & 
Berenbaum, 2010).  It is further proposed in this thesis that cue-triggered wanting 
may also bias outcome expectancies, as this may encourage them to concord with the 
impulse to engage with the triggered behaviour.  For example, the activation of cue-
triggered wanting may act as an internal stimulus which elicits motivated reasoning 
(see Section 2.5.2), which in turn may temporarily strengthen positive outcome 
expectancies.  Hence, it is predicted that the stronger the cue-triggered wanting, the 
more positive the aggregate outcome expectancies.  
That said, this positive change may not be sufficient to ensure aggregate outcome 
expectancies are positive for PGs. Aggregate outcome expectancies may remain 
negative even when cue-triggered wanting is strongly active, despite a positive 
change (aggregate outcome expectancies may only become less negative, rather than 
positive).  Nonetheless, as noted in reference to the previous prediction, it is 
proposed that excessive cue-triggered wanting will elicit gambling activity 
irrespective of current outcome expectancies (even if they are negative).  This is 
depicted in Figure 1 below.  Hence, even if aggregate outcome expectancies are 
negative for PGs, this will not prevent gambling activity.  
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Figure 1. The development of impaired control for PGs.  
The final prediction is that aggregate outcome expectancies will predict indices of 
gambling behaviour for NPGs but not for PGs.  As it is proposed that cue-triggered 
wanting dominates the gambling decisions of PGs at the expense of deliberative 
appraisals, it is predicted that outcome expectancies will not influence the gambling 
decisions of PGs.  By contrast, it is proposed that both automatic motivational 
processes, and deliberative appraisals, will influence the gambling decisions of 
NPGs.  Hence, it is predicted that aggregate outcome expectancies will not predict 
indices of gambling behaviour for PGs, but will do so for NPGs.  
Thus, in sum, PGs are predicted to exhibit negative aggregate outcome expectancies, 
and NPGs are predicted to exhibit positive aggregate outcome expectancies. It is 
predicted for both groups that outcome expectancies become more positive as cue-
triggered wanting strengthens. Finally, it is predicted that aggregate outcome 
expectancies will predict indices of gambling behaviour for NPGs but not for PGs.  
2.6.2.3 Novel predictions regarding hedonic reward 
The proposed influence of cue-triggered wanting on decision-making also gives rise 
to novel predictions regarding hedonic reward (euphoria or pleasure).  As noted 
above, in order to account for the greater gambling activity of PGs, it has previously 
been proposed that they may experience stronger hedonic reward during gambling 
Excessive cue-
triggered 
wanting  
Gamble 
irrespective 
of 
deliberative 
appraisals 
Negative 
outcomes 
Aggregate 
negative 
outcome 
expectancies 
Impaired 
control 
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than NPGs, such as a stronger ‘hit’ from an arousal ‘high’, or excitement (Diskin & 
Hodgins, 2003; Linnet, Thomsen, Møller, & Callesen, 2010; Sharpe, Tarrier, 
Schotte, & Spence, 1995).  From a dual-process perspective, by contrast, excessive 
cue-triggered wanting is proposed to elicit greater gambling activity for PGs, rather 
than anticipation of excessive hedonic reward.  For this reason, the dual-process 
model predicts that PGs will exhibit greater cue-triggered wanting than NPGs, but 
the hedonic reward experienced by each gambling group during gambling will not 
differ.  
There is also another reason for making this prediction.  While appetitive pathways 
that mediate cue-triggered wanting undergo hypersensitisation, areas of the brain that 
mediate hedonic reward (termed 'hedonic hotspots'; Aldridge & Berridge, 2010) do 
not (Berridge & Robinson, 1995; Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2001).  Hence, while 
it is predicted that cue-triggered wanting will be greater for PGs than for NPGs, no 
difference is predicted between the groups on hedonic reward.  This also leads to a 
within-groups prediction; namely, that cue-triggered wanting will be greater than 
hedonic reward for PGs, but not for NPGs. 
In sum, the role of automatic processes, and cue-triggered wanting in particular, 
gives rise to some unique predictions regarding factors theorized to contribute to 
decision-making, particularly for PGs.  Excessive cue-triggered wanting is predicted 
to dominate the decisions of PGs, to the extent that deliberative processes are 
repeatedly unable to contribute to decision-making.  By contrast, in the absence of 
such excess, deliberative processes do contribute to the decisions of NPGs, such that 
they can regulate their gambling.  These novel predictions allow the dual-process 
model to be tested, and potentially falsified. 
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2.6.3  Cognitive errors 
Some predictions about cognitive errors also arise from the dual-process model, 
some of which are novel.  Many gambling researchers do not explicitly state whether 
cognitive errors are supposed to be present during gambling only, or whether they 
are relatively stable, and so present outside of gambling as well (e.g., Jefferson & 
Nicki, 2003; Toneatto et al., 1997).  By contrast, it is argued from a dual-process 
perspective that the degree or strength of cognitive errors is changeable, according to 
context and occasion.  This leads to several specific predictions in regards to the 
degree of cognitive errors present outside of gambling or an urge, and the degree 
present during gambling or an urge.  These are presented in this section.  
It is argued from a dual-process perspective that cognitive errors are largely due to 
heuristic processes, which are a product of automatic processes (as noted in Section 
2.5.2; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  As deliberative processes are more likely to 
dominate judgments when individuals are not experiencing cue-triggered wanting, or 
are not currently gambling, cognitive errors are likely to be absent, or relatively mild, 
at this time.  Hence, it is predicted that cognitive errors will be mild outside of a 
gambling session.  Given this, it is predicted that cognitive errors will have little 
influence over gambling decisions (that is, the choice to begin a gambling session), 
so they will not predict the frequency of gambling sessions.  This has not been 
explicitly examined before. 
As also noted previously (Section 2.5.2), cognitive errors are predicted to strengthen 
during gambling.  Features present during gambling (such as arousal, information-
processing pressure, and time constraints) may reduce the ability of deliberative 
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processes to moderate gambling judgements.  Hence, cognitive errors are predicted 
to strengthen during gambling.  
It was also argued above (see Section 2.5.2) that motivated reasoning, elicited by 
cue-triggered wanting, may additionally strengthen cognitive errors during gambling. 
When cue-triggered wanting is active, cognitions may arise that justify gambling. For 
example, previous wins may be more readily recalled than previous losses, or current 
wins may be attributed to skill, whereas current losses may be attributed to ‘bad 
luck’.  In addition, as cue-triggered wanting is an automatic process, its stronger 
activation may increase reliance upon automatic processes when making judgments 
and decisions.  Thus, it is predicted that cognitive errors will strengthen when cue-
triggered wanting strengthens.  
In sum, it is predicted that cognitive errors are mild or absent when not gambling, 
and so will not predict session frequency. However, it is also predicted that cognitive 
errors will strengthen as cue-triggered wanting strengthens, and then will strengthen 
further during a gambling session.  
 
This thesis will test some of the novel predictions arising from the dual-process 
model presented in this chapter, with an overall aim of testing the efficacy of the 
combined dual-process model and incentive-sensitisation theory when applied to 
gambling (and problem gambling in particular). The next chapter describes an initial 
qualitative examination of the applicability of the model to the experiences of 
gamblers. Chapters 4 to 6 describe different empirical examinations of some of the 
novel predictions presented in this chapter.  
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Chapter 3. Study 1: Exploring a dual-process and 
incentive-sensitisation approach to understanding 
the qualitative experiences of gamblers 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter a dual-process approach to understanding problem gambling, 
and related predictions, were presented.  This chapter describes Study 1, which was a 
preliminary qualitative study that aimed to examine whether the self-reported 
experiences of PGs and NPGs are congruent with the dual-process model.  Gamblers 
underwent a semi-structured interview, in which they were asked to describe one or 
two occasions: an occasion when they chose to begin a gambling session despite 
feeling that they should not (Occasion 1); and/or an occasion during a gambling 
session when they chose to continue gambling, or increase their bet size or amount 
spent, despite feeling that they should not (Occasion 2).  Only gamblers who reported 
having done either or both of these in the past six months were included in the study.  
These occasions represent different decision-making contexts that represent impaired 
control, and so contribute to gambling persistence, either between or within sessions.   
Previous qualitative research has attempted to elucidate the causes of problem 
gambling.  In doing so, the approach has been for gamblers to report possible reasons 
for their gambling behaviour (Ricketts & Macaskill, 2003; Wood & Griffiths, 2007).  
However, it is possible that individuals misattribute reasons for their behaviour, for 
example, due to cognitive dissonance, or post-hoc justifications for their gambling.  
That being so, this research chose to focus directly on the thoughts, feelings, and 
contextual factors surrounding each decision-making moment (both before and 
during gambling, as represented by Occasion 1 and 2, respectively) in order to 
qualitatively examine which factors may be important at that moment. Participants 
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were not asked to explain why they think they gamble. This approach is particularly 
relevant to the dual-process model, as decisions to gamble excessively are proposed 
to result partly from features present during decision-making.  
It may be argued that many processes proposed from a dual-process perspective to be 
present during decision-making are implicit and so not open to introspection. Thus, 
using a qualitative procedure as a preliminary examination of the potential 
applicability of the model to problem gambling may provide few insights. However, 
it is argued that, while the processes of the automatic system are implicit, the 
products of these processes can be ‘felt’. PGs may feel an urge to gamble, while at 
the same time evaluating gambling as a poor choice. In addition, gamblers may give 
an indication that their evaluations of gambling ‘change’ during an urge, in 
accordance with the notion of time-inconsistency proposed in the previous chapter. 
Alternatively, if PGs state that they gamble because they ‘love it’, the consequences 
of gambling are worth the benefits, and they evaluate gambling positively overall, 
this may suggest that the dual-process and incentive-sensitisation models do not 
provide a good explanation for problem-gambling behaviour. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants and procedure 
Participants were recruited through advertisements (shown in Appendix 2) placed at 
local gambling help services, betting agencies (Totaliser Agency Board), Returned 
Service League clubs, and metropolitan campuses of Deakin University (Melbourne 
and Geelong, Victoria).  The advertisements sought gamblers who had recently 
begun a gambling session (Occasion 1), or increased their gambling during a session 
(Occasion 2), ‘even though they felt they should not’, and who were willing to 
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conduct a face-to-face interview in exchange for a $20 voucher.  The interview is 
described in detail in Section 3.2.2.  Initial contact with participants clarified the 
details of the study, and a suitable time and place to meet.   
At the meeting, participants were allocated an identifying number, then asked to read 
and complete the Plain Language Statement, the Consent Form, and a shortened 
version of the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI; Ferris & Wynne, 2001b), 
slightly adjusted for the Australian context.  The CPGI (discussion in Section 1.1) 
was developed by the Canadian Centre for Substance Abuse to measure population 
prevalence of problem gambling.  Due to its sound psychometric properties, and its 
ease of administration, it is used frequently by prominent researchers in the field 
(Jackson et al., 2010).  The CPGI has a high test-retest reliability of 0.78 (Ferris & 
Wynne, 2001a) and an internal reliability of 0.84 (Wynne, 2003).  Only three of the 
four sections were included in this study.  One section was the ‘Problem Gambling 
Severity Index’, which provides an aggregate score on how often in the preceding 12 
months participants have exhibited impaired control, health problems, tolerance to 
gambling, chasing, borrowing money, feelings of guilt, and perception of a problem.  
These items were answered on a 4-point scale from ‘Never’ to ‘Very often’.  The 
other sections included were ‘Demographics’ and ‘Gambling Involvement’;  the 
latter assessed game preference, frequency of play, typical monthly expenditure, and 
the most money spent in a single session over the previous 12 months.  In the interest 
of brevity, and because it was less relevant to the study, participants did not complete 
the ‘Correlates’ section. 
Interviews were conducted at a location convenient to the participant and conducive 
to their privacy (and with the interviewer’s safety in mind;  e.g., Deakin University 
campus, a local library).  Participants then underwent a semi-structured interview.  
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Each interview took about half an hour.  All interviews were audio-taped and then 
transcribed (except for two, which, due to distance, were conducted over the 
telephone and transcribed immediately).    
3.2.2 Interview structure 
Participants were first asked if they could think of an occasion when they chose to 
begin a gambling session while feeling that they should not (Occasion 1).  They were 
asked to try to take themselves back and to ‘re-live’ the situation, and to describe the 
situation in their own words.  Following this, in order to ensure all relevant aspects 
were covered, participants were asked to divide the occasion into four parts:  before 
the decision to gamble, during the decision, once the decision was made, and once 
gambling had begun.  A relevant sub-set of the following questions were then asked 
for each part (unless already covered): 
x What were you doing before the thought to gamble? 
x Where were you before the thought to gamble? 
x Who were you with before the thought to gamble / during the decision / 
during gambling? 
x Did you have any plans or goals for the day (before the thought to gamble)? 
x What was your mood like / were you feeling? 
x What were you thinking about? 
x Were you imagining anything? 
x Was anything bothering you? 
x Is there anything that stands out for you? 
 92 
 
x How did your feelings change when you began to think about / were 
deciding / had decided to gamble?  
x Were any pros and cons going through your mind? 
x What were your aims and expectations in gambling? 
x What were your non-gambling thoughts at the time? 
x Were you drinking or taking drugs? 
x What game were you playing? 
x What were you thinking when you began playing? 
The interviewer was free to follow-up any statements made by participants.   
Participants were then asked to think of an occasion on which they continued 
gambling, or increased their bet size or amount spent during a session, while feeling 
that they should not (Occasion 2).  If they had, the same procedure was repeated as 
for Occasion 1 (though, where necessary, some questions were adjusted to suit the 
context of Occasion 2).  After discussing either one or both occasions, participants 
were debriefed and given contact numbers for gambling help, and suicidal risk.  
3.2.3  Sample characteristics 
The sample comprised 26 participants (14 males, 12 females), from a diverse 
demographic (summarised in Table 5), ranging in age from 19 to 79 years (M = 
42.13;  SD = 18.01).  Sixteen participants were identified as PGs (that is, they scored 
≥8 on the Problem Gambling Severity Index; Ferris & Wynne, 2001b) and nine as 
NPGs.  Of the nine NPGs, seven were categorised by the Problem Gambling Severity 
Index as at ‘moderate risk’ (a score of 3 to 7 on the index), and two were categorised 
as at ‘low risk’ (a score of 1 to 2 on the index) for developing a gambling problem 
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(Ferris & Wynne, 2001b).  These nine were grouped together as NPGs for the data 
analysis.   
PGs and NPGs did not show any statistically significant demographic differences.  
Demographic characteristics are thus displayed for the whole sample (other than 
where data are missing) in Table 5.  It can be seen that the sample was drawn from a 
diverse demographic.  However, students were over-sampled, which reflects that fact 
that many participants were recruited through Deakin University.  Additionally, 
several participants were unemployed, which may be expected with a sample of 
problem or ‘at risk’ gamblers (Raylu & Oei, 2009).  
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Data relating to gambling behaviour, for each group and the total sample, are 
displayed in Tables 6 and 7 (note, participants are referred to as P1, P2 etc.).  It can 
be seen in Table 6 that most of the PGs were EGM gamblers, whereas NPGs tended 
to be horse-race gamblers or poker players.  This is consistent with the higher risk of 
developing a gambling problem identified for EGM gamblers (The Centre for 
Gambling Research, 2004).  In Table 7 it can be seen that PGs gambled more 
frequently than NPGs.  However, given that most NPGs were at moderate risk of 
developing a gambling problem, their median typical monthly expenditure and most 
spent during a session was only mildly lower than that for PGs (though the IQR was 
much higher for PGs than for NPGs).   
Table 6. Main game played by each participant 
Game Type n (Participant number) 
EGM 
PGs 
NPGs 
 
12 (P1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 27) 
1 (P6) 
Horse-race betting 
PGs 
NPGs 
 
2 (P10, 17) 
4 (P3, 12, 18, 22) 
Poker 
PGs 
NPGs 
 
0  
2 (P15, 21) 
Other 
PGs 
NPGs 
 
3 (P7, P23, 26) 
2 (P24 as he did not indicate his main game, and 25) 
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All PGs discussed Occasion 1, and 15 of 16 discussed Occasion 2 (P26 did not 
discuss Occasion 2).  Seven of the nine NPGs discussed Occasion 1, and seven of the 
nine discussed Occasion 2.  While many more PGs than NPGs discussed each 
occasion, this is as expected, as PGs are more likely than NPGs to gamble ‘unsafely’ 
(that is, to begin or continue gambling while feeling they should not).  
3.3 Transcript analysis 
3.3.1 Author’s perspective 
I take a post-positivist critical realism approach, in which it is argued that there is a 
measurable and observable objective reality, but it is imperfectly measured, which 
leads to frequent revisions and so changeable perspectives (Guba, 1990).  
Additionally, my view is that there is a relatively direct relationship between 
language, meaning, and experience, so that language communicates the meaning 
attributed to experience.  However, I am also of the belief that individuals are not 
always aware of the reasons for their choices, which can lead to incorrect 
explanations for behaviour (as noted by research;  A. Brown & Marsh, 2008; Tetlock 
& Levi, 1982).  I was mindful of this in conducting the analysis (e.g., being alert to 
contradictory comments, and checking for evidence of claims, such as asking about 
feelings during a previous gambling session when a participant says they gamble 
because they enjoy gambling).   
3.3.2 Methodology 
The data were analysed using theoretical thematic analysis, informed by Braun and 
Clark (2006).  This process focuses on identifying themes and patterns relevant to 
previous knowledge or theory.  Thus, in conducting the analysis particular attention 
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was given to themes and patterns likely to be relevant to the dual-process model 
(e.g., urges to gamble, impaired control, and time-inconsistent judgments and 
decision-making). Transcribed interviews were checked, and then re-read and 
reviewed.  The transcripts were examined for patterns and organised into codes.  
Data not relevant to the dual-process model were also coded, in order to ensure an 
alternative theory did not offer a more convincing organisation or explanation. 
Additionally, as each code was formulated, all subsequent interviews were examined 
for further content pertaining to that code.   
Once all the interviews and codes had been examined and cross-checked, codes with 
related patterns were combined into major themes.  This resulted in only two major 
themes.  These are “Gambling urges and exercising control”, and “Time-inconsistent 
decision-making”.  Each major theme included sub-themes at various levels.  Each 
interview was re-read and summarised (see Appendix 5) to ensure that the chosen 
themes and sub-themes accurately reflect each participant’s experience.   
Once the thematic analysis was complete, participants were grouped according to 
problem gambling status, and a contrast analysis was conducted.  A contrast analysis 
allows the codes in a theme to be compared across groups. The content of each 
theme was compared across the gambling groups to examine similarities and 
differences according to problem gambling status.  The thematic and contrast 
analysis are presented in the next section. Finally, a theoretical analysis, in which 
each theme was examined from the perspective of the dual-process model, was 
conducted.  This is presented in Section 3.5. 
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3.4 Thematic and contrast analysis 
The findings of the thematic and contrast analysis are outlined and discussed in this 
section.  Two participants, Participant 6 (P6) and Participant 12 (P12), were 
identified by the Problem Gambling Severity Index as NPGs.  However, their 
interviews focused mainly on recent occasions on which they felt they did have a 
gambling problem.  Thus, data from their interviews were analysed together with that 
of the PGs (except where indicated).  This meant that a total of 18 problem gambling 
transcripts were analysed for Occasion 1 (instead of 16), and 17 for Occasion 2 
(instead of 15).  In regards to NPGs, this meant that there were now only five non-
problem gambling transcripts for Occasion 1, and five for Occasion 2 (instead of 
seven for each).  
All participants who discussed Occasion 2 focused on a time when they continued a 
gambling session while feeling they should not (rather than a time when they 
increased their bet size, or amount spent during a session;  see Section 3.2.1.1).  The 
one exception to this was Participant 23 (P23), who discussed a time when he 
increased his bet size despite feeling he should not.  
It is important to note that this was a semi-structured interview. Participants were 
given the chance to express each occasion in their own words (see Section 3.2.1.1). 
While the fact that a particular participant mentioned a given point indicates it was 
fairly salient, its absence in the transcript of another participant does not rule out the 
possibility that the theme was relevant to that participant.  Rather, it may be that they 
simply failed to mention that information.  
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3.4.1 Gambling urges and exercising control 
The sub-themes pertaining to ‘Gambling urges and exercising control’ when deciding 
to commence a gambling session despite feeling one should not can be seen in Table 8, 
while the sub-themes pertaining to deciding to continue a gambling session despite 
feeling one should not can be seen in Table 9.  The tables show differences in sub-
themes between gambling groups.  Each theme will be discussed in more detail for 
PGs, and then for NPGs, in the order presented in the table.
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3.4.1.1 Problem gamblers deciding to begin a gambling session 
More than half of the PGs (n=12) explicitly stated that they have a negative view of 
gambling overall, and/or want to stop gambling.  For example: 
 
P10:  “I can’t afford it, it’s a never ending story, it’s caused so much 
pain, it’s something I’m not good at, it’s uncontrollable, but yet I do 
[it]. It’s stupid” … 
Interviewer:  “And you feel like overall gambling is positive in terms 
of you get pleasure?” 
P10:  “Nah, its negative and I hate it” (Quote 1); 
“My gambling history has been so terrible … I have wrecked so much 
about my life, mainly financially, but I will never recover from that …” 
(P1;  Quote 2); 
“I see the damage it has done to my life and know I can’t do it.  It is a 
daily thing that I fight.  I keep telling myself, ‘No you can’t’ ” (P26;  
Quote 3); 
It can be seen from these excerpts that some PGs view their gambling negatively, or 
want to stop, but have difficulty controlling it. 
On Occasion 1, all PGs chose to gamble despite feeling that they should not (as this 
was the criteria for Occasion 1).  More than half (n = 11) explicitly stated that they 
had intended not to gamble, or did not want to gamble.  For example: 
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 “All the good intentions you’ve got fly out the window.  You can 
swear that you will not go up [to the gambling venue] … right up to 
the time that you walk up there” (P4;  Quote 4);   
“I knew the day before that I wanted to stop, but there I was going again” (P5; 
Quote 5) 
“I was telling myself that I wouldn’t [gamble]… but then morning came [when 
I got paid], and I felt powerful knowing that I could go out and do it” (P10; 
Quote 6); 
“I knew I was going to but I didn’t want to” (P16; Quote 7); 
“I’d have been thinking along the lines that I wouldn’t gamble the next day 
[but I did]” (P2; Quote 8). 
More than half (n=11) are troubled by frequent urges or thoughts to begin a gambling 
session, and some (n=6) said that the thought to gamble is frequently present:   
“Every time I go out, I’m in danger of gambling” (P13; Quote 9);   
“The idea to gamble is always there.  It doesn’t leave” (P10; Quote 
10);   
“The thought is there every day” (P11; Quote 11). 
Some PGs (n=6) said that they choose to gamble irrespective of their emotional state.  
For example: 
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“It didn’t really matter, you’d go when you were feeling really good, 
and you’d go when you were feeling really bad.  It didn’t seem to come 
into it so much” (P2; Quote 12);   
“I will gamble when I’m happy and I will gamble when I’m depressed 
… there’s no state I can end up in to say I’m not going down” (P7; 
Quote 13);   
“To have an excuse to feel the way I’m feeling, whether that’s happy 
or down in the dumps” (P6; Quote 14);   
Instead, gambling was initiated with the availability of money and / or free time 
(n=9).  For example: 
“I knew from times past that if I’ve got a certain amount of money in 
my account that I’d be tempted, and so I didn’t want to [gamble] but I 
knew I would” (P16; Quote 15);   
“For me it was about time and money. They were the two things. If I 
had the time and I had the money, then I’d go” (P2; Quote 16);   
“I’m always aware of what money’s at my disposal … It’s an uncanny 
knack of knowing what’s there …  If I had money coming in … it’s 
already spent [on gambling] in my mind” (P10; Quote 17).  
Hence, together, these comments suggest that, rather than gambling in response to a 
particular emotional state, some PGs gamble whenever the resources to do so are 
available.  
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Some (n=7) referred to their urges as difficult or impossible to overcome.  For 
example: 
“Once I got the impulse, once it comes into your mind, which you 
can’t control, that’s the scary bit, it has been impossible to 
overcome” (P1; Quote 18);  
“You give up [trying to resist the urge] because you know that no 
matter what you’re going to go” (P4; Quote 19);  
“When I want to gamble, I gamble.  I have resisted it, but you’re just 
playing with yourself” (P7; Quote 20). 
These quotes suggest that some PGs gamble in response to an urge to do so, even if 
they feel they should not gamble.  
Ongoing urges to gamble, coupled with a negative attitude towards gambling, led 
some PGs (n=8) to experience tension in attempting to maintain control over their 
gambling.  For example: 
 
“It is like your brain is working against you, your brain is 
overpowering you, and that is why you think you are going mad” (P1; 
Quote 21) 
 “I tried really hard to resist it, you can’t, you can’t, you won’t have 
any money for what you need, you won’t have any money for stuff you 
need and everything like that” (P16; Quote 22);   
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“I get very tense because I know I shouldn’t be doing this” (P12; 
Quote 23).  
“I tried really hard to resist it, but the urge was too strong” (P16; 
Quote 24)  
Thus, it can be seen that some PGs report feeling unable to control or inhibit their 
gambling when experiencing an urge.   
 
More than half of the PGs (n=13) indicated that their decision to gamble may have 
been made without deliberative thought.  For example:   
 
 “Even though I said I had that struggle there was a part of me that had 
already made the decision to go.  I knew I was going, I was just trying to 
go through the process” (P6; Quote 25);   
 “There was no thought.  I was just repeating an action that I’d been 
doing for years” (P5; Quote 26);  
“It was just something I did, it was an automatic thing” (P8; Quote 27); 
“It went through my mind the moment I woke up, … I’d pretty much 
decided from the moment I woke up… the decision’s always there, it’s 
already made” (P10; Quote 28); 
“Once you’ve accepted the fact that you are going to gamble…this time I 
accepted the fact straight away” (P14;  Quote 29).  
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Four PGs indicated that the decision to gamble can be made in direct opposition to 
deliberative thoughts during decision-making.  For example:   
 
“Even though you think you’re not going to, you find yourself going” 
(P16; Quote 30);   
“You can swear that you will not go up … even while you’re walking up 
there” (P4; Quote 31);   
“I can just remember in the car, telling myself off all the way:  ‘What are 
you doing this for? You know this isn’t going to solve anything, you know 
you’re going to feel worse when you come out’” (P6; Quote 32).   
Together, these observations suggest that the decision to begin a gambling session 
can be made without deliberative thought, and sometimes despite it.  
 
Overall, the thematic analysis suggests that many PGs experience urges to gamble 
that they find difficult to inhibit. In addition, such urges sometimes contrast with a 
negative view of gambling, or a desire to reduce or stop gambling.  Some 
observations also suggest that PGs gamble when they have the time and money to do 
so, rather than in response to any particular emotional state.  Finally, the comments 
of some PGs suggest that the decision to gamble can arise without deliberative 
thought, or despite it.   
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3.4.1.2 Problem gamblers deciding to continue a gambling 
session 
PGs also appear unable to limit or control their gambling during a session.  Almost 
all (n=16) noted that they have difficulty ending their gambling sessions or limiting 
the amount of money that they spend.  For example:   
“I stay there until I’ve spent all my money” (P14; Quote 33);   
“It’s difficult for me to leave under a certain length of time” (P13; 
Quote 34);   
“I wish I could just say to the person behind me, ‘Would you just take 
me out to my car?’” (P12; Quote 35); 
“I couldn’t stop” (P16; Quote 36);  
“I guess I don’t know when to stop and if you don’t stop then most of 
the time you’ll end up at zero” (P17; Quote 37).     
More than half (n=11) explicitly linked their decision to continue gambling to a 
desire to continue trying to win (or win back) money.  For example: 
 
“I’ve done so well, I can get a little more” (P10; Quote 38); 
“I should move away, but the game is due to come through” (P12; Quote 
39); 
“It’s the chasing of the money. You’re forever chasing it, you’re looking 
for your losses. And that’s probably what you’re trying to achieve when 
you stay there too long” (P14; Quote 40);  
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“If I put this next fifty in I can win back the money that I’ve lost and win 
some more” (P16; Quote 41). 
Additionally, a number of PGs (n=8) conveyed powerful imagery of being ‘taken 
over’ or hypnotised during gambling.  For example:   
 
“My brain was hooked and couldn’t drag itself away” (P1; Quote 42);  
“There’s something about the room, it’s like you can never leave … It 
seems to hypnotise me a bit, it really does” (P16; Quote 43);   
“The machines are mesmerising, hypnotic” (P19; Quote 44); 
“The machines are bright and noisy. They are hypnotising”(P27; 
Quote 45).   
This was linked to feeling irrational.  For example:   
 
“It’s like you were taken over, so I don’t know how you could have any 
rational thoughts …” (P2; Quote 46);  
“The minute you walk in there you’re on autopilot … all reason goes 
out the window” (P4; Quote 47);  
“I don’t think your brain works when you’re in there … it’s like being 
hypnotised” (P11;  Quote 48); 
“I’m mesmerised and not thinking rationally” (P12; Quote 49). 
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Some (n=7) also said that their gambling during a session can proceed without 
deliberative thought, or is automatic.  For example:  
 
“You’ve got no thoughts.  It hooks you.  You’re in there, you’re hooked.  
You’re concentrating on the next spin, or something that’s going to keep 
you there a bit longer” (P5; Quote 50);   
“I don’t feel like I should be stopping because when I’m in the moment 
and it’s happening, you’re not thinking,  you’re not thinking about 
anything” (P7; Quote 51); 
“I was taken over by the machine” (P2; Quote 52).   
Thus, some PGs convey powerful imagery of being under stimulus control during a 
gambling session.  
 
Overall, the findings suggest that PGs experience a lack of control over their 
gambling during a session as well.  This is often linked to a desire to win (back) 
money.  Additionally, several PGs report feeling mesmerised during sessions, and 
that their behaviour is automatic and not guided by deliberative thought.   
3.4.1.3 Non-problem gamblers deciding to begin a gambling 
session 
Overall, NPGs appear to exhibit greater control over their choice to begin a gambling 
session.  Other than P24, who scored one point below the cut-off for problem 
gambling on the PGSI, NPGs did not report experiencing urges to begin a gambling 
session.  Additionally, they report being able to make considered and controlled 
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choices as to whether or not to begin a gambling session (n=6 NPGs, including P6).  
For example: 
 
“I don’t think I’m addicted because some weeks I can’t afford to lose 
$50 on poker, so I’ll just say [to my friends] I’ve got uni homework or 
I’m busy, to try and say, ‘No, I’m not playing’ ” (P15; Quote 53);   
“I’ve never really begun a gambling session when I couldn’t afford it” 
(P18; Quote 54).   
“In my budget I have x dollars a week [with which to gamble] and 
that’s my pocket money … if I lose, I lose, if I win, I build it up and put 
it in reserve [for next time]” (P3; Quote 55). 
However, almost all (n=4) NPGs who began a gambling session despite feeling they 
should not indicated that the decision was linked to a specific trigger (n = 3).  For 
example:  
  
“It was kind of like peer pressure, and I thought I may as well play … 
because everyone else was” (P15; Quote 56); 
Interviewer:  “Was there anything in your environment that made you 
think of gambling?” 
P20: “Other people were playing them [the pokies]” (Quote 57);  
“A friend of mine rang up and asked me if I wanted to go to the casino 
… [which made me feel] excited.” (P21; Quote 58).   
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So, although NPGs were generally able to control their decisions, exposure to a 
specific trigger could sometimes lead to the choice to begin a session when they felt 
they should not.  Such decisions may suggest a degree of impaired control (albeit 
transitory and contextual).    
3.4.1.4 Non-problem gamblers deciding to continue a session 
Similar to when deciding to begin a gambling session, all NPGs (n=5) and P6 
reported some control over their gambling during a session.  For example:  
  
“I normally set a limit, whatever I’ve got.  If it’s not meant to be, it’s not 
meant to be.  I don’t try and push it.” (P18; Quote 59);    
“Once I’ve done those two bets, they’re the only two bets I’ll probably do 
for the day … If I win, I win, I lose, I lose.  I don’t go back to bet more … 
I wasn’t going to lose too much because I was in control” (P3; Quote 
60);   
“The thing that differentiates us from problem gamblers is that you’re not 
betting a hell of a lot of money. People would go and borrow money and 
use credit cards, whereas I don’t” (P22; Quote 61); 
“That was the limit. Spending any more than this final $20 would be the wrong 
thing to do” (P25; Quote 62).   
Other than P24, NPGs did not report feeling “taken over” during gambling.  
However, all NPGs who spoke of continuing gambling while feeling they should not 
(n=5) indicated that they sometimes experience arousal (often anger) during a session 
that impacts on their gambling choices.  For example: 
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“You get angry. … The only way I’m going to feel better is if I win it 
back” (P22; Quote 63); 
“I go back to the car [to get my credit card] chasing losses. … I felt 
angry at the time … It would have made me go back, the anger of walking 
away with no money” (P24; Quote 64).  
Thus, NPGs reported experiencing anger or arousal when making the decision to 
continue gambling despite feeling that they should not.  These excerpts also shows 
that, similar to PGs, NPGs (n=5) often choose to continue gambling as they are 
motivated to continue trying to win money.  Some (n=2) said they were aware that 
their choice was “wrong”: 
 
“I knew that I shouldn’t have, but I did it anyway” (P22; Quote 65); 
“I know I shouldn’t but I am overwhelmed by a sensation to win more money” 
(P24; Quote 66). 
Thus, NPGs reported feeling more in control of their decisions during gambling 
compared with PGs.  However, they still sometimes choose to continue gambling 
while feeling that they should not.  This is reportedly linked to anger or arousal and 
the desire to win money.   
 
Overall, despite their negative view of gambling, PGs reported gambling in response 
to urges, both between and within gambling sessions.  Alternatively, NPGs reported 
feeling more control over their gambling. Nonetheless, they too sometimes made 
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gambling decisions that felt ‘wrong’ which they linked to anger or arousal and 
specific triggers. 
3.4.2 Time-inconsistent judgments and decision-making 
The sub-themes pertaining to “Time-inconsistent decision-making” can be seen in 
Table 10.  Again, there were differences by problem gambling group.  The sub-
themes are discussed in more detail below, separately for each group. 
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3.4.2.1 Problem gamblers’ cognitions in the absence of an urge 
or gambling session 
In the absence of an urge or gambling session, several PGs (n = 12) focused on 
the negative consequences of their gambling, or stated that the negative 
consequences outweigh the positive ones.  For example, Quotes 1 and 2 in 
Section 3.4.1.1, and: 
“The thought that I shouldn’t gamble was there for years” (P5;  
Quote 67); 
“I see the damage it has done to my life and know I can’t do it.  It is 
a daily thing that I fight.  I keep telling myself, ‘No you can’t’ ” 
(P26;  Quote 68); 
“I usually end up getting pretty miserable” (P8;  Quote 69). 
Additionally, some (n = 9) expressed an awareness of their lack of control over 
their gambling.  For example, Quotes 4 to 12, and 18 to 24 in Section 3.4.1.1, and 
Quotes 32 to 37 in Section 3.4.1.2.  Furthermore, some (n=9) explicitly stated that 
they generally do not win when they gamble.  For example:   
 
“You realise you can’t win” (P7; Quote 70);   
 “I very rarely win” (P12; Quote 71) 
“Sometimes I do [win], but I tend not to hang on to it for long, it tends 
to go back” (P10;  Quote 72). 
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Thus, in the absence of an urge or gambling session, PGs appear to have a 
relatively realistic view of their gambling. 
3.4.2.2 Problem gamblers’ cognitions when deciding to begin a 
gambling session  
When experiencing an urge, almost all PGs (n=16) reported cognitions that make 
gambling seem like a good choice, thereby contradicting the more negative 
gambling-related cognitions held in the absence of the urge (as shown in the 
previous section).  These altered cognitions are described in this section.   
First, despite some recognising that they tend to lose when they gamble (see 
Quotes 70 to 72 in the previous sub-section), some PGs (n=12) reported focusing 
on the possibility of winning when experiencing an urge.  For example: 
 “I would say to myself I’m not going to, but then I’d say if I did 
[play] it would be okay because I’m going to win” (P10;  Quote 
73); 
“But maybe because I hadn’t gambled for such a long time you 
might win something” (P12; Quote 74); 
“I talked myself into believing I could win” (P16; Quote 75); 
“I always feel like this time I’ll win, this time I’ll find a way of 
winning … I always try to get an advantage, to beat the system.  
Of course, I realise that the way the system works, you can’t do 
anything, but in moments like that you think maybe you can” 
(P17; Quote 76). 
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“I was going to win nothing with the money I was going to allow 
myself, or I’d win something. I didn’t allow myself to think, 
‘Well, what you usually do is go on to lose several hundred and 
then you feel terrible” (P1;  Quote 77).  
Similarly, some (n=9) focused on the possibility of controlling or limiting their 
gambling, despite recognising in the absence of an urge that they generally fail to 
do this (see Quotes 3 to 12, and 21 to 24;  Section 3.4.1.1).  For example:   
 
“I thought this time I’ll do it differently, I won’t spend much, I 
won’t do high bets, and I’ll take winnings, and for once I won’t feel 
bad ... I don’t know why I thought that (laughs)” (P1; Quote 78); 
 “I felt that I can control what happens” (P10; Quote 79);   
“You say $5 [to yourself] but you know you’re going to spend more 
than that” (P27; Quote 80); 
“You spend the money in small amounts, you don’t tell yourself 
you’re going to spend $60” (P27;  Quote 81). 
These excerpts suggest that, when deciding to gamble, some PGs may try to 
convince themselves of the likelihood of controlling their gambling.  
Additionally, negative thoughts are sometimes ignored or suppressed (n=8).  For 
example, Quote 74 and:   
 
“[The negative thoughts] go through your mind, but they’re 
quickly ignored or overridden” (P4; Quote 82); 
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“Get up and go to the pokies, no thought of what was going to 
happen afterwards” (P5; Quote 83); 
“It’s not that I wasn’t aware [of the negative thoughts], I was 
aware, but I paid no heed to it” (P8; Quote 84).   
Thus, when deciding to begin a gambling session, PGs report either ignoring 
negative thoughts, or thoughts arise about the possibility of winning, and/or being 
able to control gambling.  Some PGs (n=9) explicitly noted that during an urge 
they try to convince or “trick” themselves into gambling.  For example, see Quote 
74, and the following: 
“You convince yourself every time” (P26; Quote 85); 
“The thoughts that come into your head, you trick yourself” (P2; Quote 
86);  
“[The thoughts] are triggered by the desire to gamble.  You justify 
anything” (P14; Quote 87). 
Despite positive gambling-related cognitions during an urge to gamble, some PGs 
(n=8) explicitly stated that the choice to gamble felt wrong at the time that it was 
made.  For example, see Quotes 23, and 32 (Section 3.4.1.1). Also, the following 
quotes provide some examples:     
“I knew I shouldn’t be doing it, I was saying to myself, ‘I shouldn’t 
be doing this’” (P12; Quote 88);   
“I knew it was a stupid decision, but I made up my mind for some 
reason” (P23; Quote 89) 
 122 
 
Interviewer: “Can you think of a time in the last 6 months when 
you began a gambling session even though you felt you 
shouldn’t?” 
P14: “Every single one of them” (Quote 90). 
Thus, PGs reported altering their thoughts when experiencing an urge to 
gamble, so that gambling appears a more justifiable choice.  This was so 
even when the decision to gamble felt ‘wrong’. 
3.4.2.3 Problem gamblers’ cognitions when deciding to 
continue a gambling session 
When making decisions during gambling, the cognitions appear to change again. 
As just noted, when deciding to gamble, PGs (n=17) reported cognitions about the 
possibility of winning and controlling or limiting their gambling. When deciding 
to continue gambling during a gambling session, PGs reported cognitions contrary 
to the notion of winning money or limiting their gambling. For example, some 
PGs (n=7) reported cognitions that permit winnings to be re-spent, as can be seen 
in Quote 38 (Section 3.3.1.2), and the following: 
“I was winning well so that gave me money to play with. And again, 
when I’d gone I thought if I was winning I would take it [the wins].  It 
justifies it” (P1;  Quote 91); 
“You know you’ve won a little bit, and then you say, I think I should 
bet this just in case I win a little bit extra. The world outside doesn’t 
exist” (P11;  Quote 92); 
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“If I’m winning and I’ve got more than I came with, significantly more, I 
say I should stop, but then I think, I’ve done so well I can get a little bit 
more” (P10;  Quote 93).   
Cognitions also arose (n=13) that permitted time or spending limits to be re-set.  
For example: 
 “I kind of couldn’t stop.  I put the first $50 in, and I was thinking, oh, 
I’ll just put the bet up … I only wanted to spend $40” (P16;  Quote 
94); 
“I thought this is good, this is not doing me any harm financially for once.  
But of course it did, because I then played away all the money that I had 
and then I obtained more” (P1;  Quote 95); 
 “Going into any session I feel I’ll be able to limit myself to a pre-set 
amount [of] $30 … [on] that one day I probably spent 6 or 7 times 
$30, always the  minimum amount though [$30] because I thought I 
was trying to limit it” (P17;  Quote 96); 
“I’d just work out ways of accessing money while I was in there at 
the machines … even down to borrowing money off friends and all 
of that … It all makes perfect sense at the time.  It’s quite 
extraordinary because if you took yourself out of there in the real 
world you wouldn’t have those thoughts, and it would not make any 
sense. And then the cold hard reality is that when you do come out, 
and that little scenario that you had worked out, that you were 
going to borrow money from such and such, well then you had to 
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go and ask them.  It’s an awful thing to be confronted with” (P2; 
Quote 97). 
These cognitions are necessarily in opposition to those present when deciding to 
gamble, as the focus then is on winning money (rather than re-spending wins), 
and maintaining control, in order to justify the choice to begin gambling (see 
Quotes 73 to 77 in the previous sub-section).  During gambling, cognitions 
change, in order to justify the desire to continue gambling.   
Some PGs (n=9) expressed awareness that they convince or “trick” themselves 
when deciding to continue gambling.  For example: 
“I would kid myself [that I would win]... but I knew in my heart it 
wouldn’t happen” (P1;  Quote 98);   
“[I thought] this time I’ll win … [but] deep down I know I usually end 
up down” (P17;  Quote 99);   
“Usually the hope of winning more money [kept me gambling], but it 
was usually the other way around anyway, and I kind of knew that” 
(P8;  Quote 100);  
“Maybe this might be lucky because I haven’t been doing it for a very 
long time … I get tense, because I know I shouldn’t be doing it, that I 
can’t win, that I very rarely win”  (P12; Quote 101). 
Others (n = 7) made explicit comments indicating that their choice had felt wrong 
at the time of making it.  For example, Quote 94 to 97, and the following:   
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“I knew I shouldn’t be there, I knew I shouldn’t be there” (P16; Quote 
102);   
Finally, there is evidence (n=5) of cognitive errors while making decisions during 
a gambling session. For example, see Quote 95 and 97, and the following: 
 
“I felt close to winning, because there’d been close calls” (P27; Quote 
103). 
Such errors may be indicative of heuristic processing or motivated reasoning 
during gambling.  
 
Overall, the cognitions of PGs appear to alter when experiencing an urge or 
deciding to gamble, and then again, during gambling.  In the absence of an urge 
or gambling session, PGs expressed thoughts that recognise the predominance of 
negative consequences from gambling, and their lack of control over it.  However, 
during an urge or gambling, PGs exhibit altered cognitions that contradicted those 
present previously, thereby justifying the choice to begin or continue gambling.    
 
3.4.2.4 Non-problem gamblers’ cognitions in the absence of an 
urge or gambling session 
In the absence of an urge or gambling session, NPGs (n=5) appear to have a 
positive view of gambling.  They (n=5) report believing that they tend to win 
when they gamble.  For example:   
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“I’m pretty sure the money I spend on poker with my mates I make up 
anyway.  I end up on top” (P15; Quote 104); 
“In roulette you can remove the house edge, like the dealer’s 
signature … [so] I win more often than I lose” (P25; Quote 105).   
They (n=4) also indicated that they enjoy gambling.  For example:   
 
“I probably can stop but I don’t want to stop because I enjoy it” (P3; Quote 
106);   
“I get pleasure from playing” (P24; Quote 107);   
“I have a good time spending time with my mates [playing poker]… I was 
happy spending more time with them” (P15; Quote 108).   
Additionally, unlike PGs, they did not report negative views about their gambling 
(except P24, who scored one point below the cut-off for problem gambling on the 
PGSI).  Thus, overall, NPGs tend to express a positive view of gambling. 
3.4.2.5 Non-problem gamblers’ cognitions when deciding to 
begin a gambling session 
NPGs (n=5) maintained their positive view of gambling when deciding to begin a 
gambling session.  They reported choosing to gamble in expectation of enjoyment 
or leisure (n=4), and due to the possibility of winning (n=3).  For example:   
 “The pros were having fun, going out, all the lights, it’s entertaining, 
stimulation, and it’s exciting” (P21; Quote 109);   
 “I was thinking about the excitement and feeling good” (P22; Quote 110); 
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“I thought I may as well play, because it was either that or sit and watch 
television” (P15; Quote 111); 
“You’ve got a fair chance of making $100 straight up” (P15; Quote 112); 
 “I went with the intention to profit or make money” (P24; Quote 113).   
Thus, NPGs appear to gamble in the expectation of positive outcomes.   
However, consistent with this study’s focus on an occasion in which participants 
felt they should not gamble, some NPGs (n=4) explicitly reported negative 
expectations of their choice to gamble.  These were mostly financial.  For 
example:   
 “I had to get up early and I figured if I went to the casino I’d be there 
until four in the morning” (P21; Quote 114);   
“Money was tight and I couldn’t afford to lose” (P22; Quote 115); 
“That’s $25. That’s nearly half a tank of petrol” (P15; Quote 116) 
“The next morning I might regret going, especially if I lost money, 
cause I’d have less money and I don’t have a lot of it” (P21; Quote 
117).   
Despite these negative thoughts, exposure to gambling triggers led to the decision 
to gamble while feeling that they should not (see Section 3.3.1.3).  
When comparing the kinds of thoughts exhibited by NPGs and PGs when 
deciding to gamble, there appears to be a qualitative difference. It can be seen that 
NPGs expect particular benefits from their gambling, such as fun or excitement. 
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By contrast, PGs primarily experienced thoughts about the possibility of winning, 
and controlling their gambling, despite previous thoughts that they generally do 
not win or control their gambling. However, given the focus of the study, NPGs 
can also begin a session despite feeling they should not.  This choice is attributed 
to a particular environmental trigger, such as peer pressure or being in the 
presence of EGMs.    
3.4.2.6 Non-problem gamblers’ cognitions when deciding to 
continue a gambling session 
It was noted in the previous section (3.4.1.4) that while NPGs are able to maintain 
control much of the time during gambling, they experience some arousal during a 
session that impacts on their decision-making.  It was also noted that during the 
decision to continue gambling while feeling they should not, the predominant 
thoughts are about winning money or chasing losses (n=5).  Some (n=2) also 
experience thoughts about winning that focus on self-image.  For example: 
“If you lose the bet you were confident on, you feel shattered … it’s a 
blow to your ego.  … Sometimes you might try to win it back, and 
sometimes you’re smart enough to walk away” (P22;  Quote 118);   
“I don’t want to feel a loser” (P24;  Quote 119).   
So, while NPGs are motivated to continue gambling “unsafely” due to a desire to 
obtain (or win back) money, some are also motivated by other factors.   
Thus, NPGs are more likely than PGs to exhibit a stable positive view of 
gambling.  Nonetheless, gambling triggers and the desire to continue trying to win 
money could also lead to the choice to begin or continue gambling even when 
they feel they should not.   
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3.5 Theoretical analysis 
In this section, the findings outlined in the previous section will be discussed from 
a dual-process perspective. In doing so, a precautionary note must be made. In 
conducting the theoretical analysis, the data are not being used as evidence to 
confirm or falsify particular predictions, but rather to see if the dual-process 
model might fit with the qualitative experiences of gamblers. If so, it is intended 
that Study 1 be followed up with quantitative research that will actually test 
predictions. Thus, this study is preliminary only.  
3.5.1 Gambling urges and exercising control for problem 
gamblers 
It was predicted in the previous chapter (see Section 2.6.1) that PGs would exhibit 
predominantly negative gambling expectancies.  During the interview, several 
PGs reported a negative view of gambling, and/or expressed a desire to stop 
gambling (see Section 3.4.1.1).  Hence, the data suggest that PGs may indeed 
exhibit a negative view of gambling overall.  
It was noted in the previous chapter that cue-triggered wanting may be 
experienced as an urge.  Thus, it was predicted that PGs would exhibit frequent 
urges to gamble that may be difficult to override with deliberative reasoning.  
Some PGs reported experiencing frequent gambling urges that they felt unable to 
inhibit, and this was linked to impaired control over gambling decisions (see 
Section 3.4.1.1).  Hence, the data suggest that this prediction may fit with the 
gambling experiences reported by PGs. 
It was also predicted in the previous chapter that strong cue-triggered wanting 
may cause PGs to choose to gamble irrespective of deliberative processes.  The 
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findings in this study suggest that the decision both to begin, and to continue, 
gambling can feel automatic for several PGs, and some report beginning a 
gambling session in direct opposition to explicit, deliberative thoughts that they 
should not (Section 3.4.1.1).  Additionally, as noted above, some PGs said that 
they are unable to resist the urge to begin gambling, and some said that they felt 
‘taken over’ during a gambling session (Section 3.4.1.2).  These observations 
suggest that the decision to begin or continue gambling may sometimes be made 
automatically, or despite deliberative processes in opposition to the decision.  If 
so, this would be consistent with the dual-process prediction that strong cue-
triggered wanting would lead to the choice to gamble irrespective of deliberative 
reasoning.  Additionally, it would contrast with the consequentialist view that 
outcome expectancies guide behavioural choice.  
Some PGs state that the availability of time and, in particular, money, are the 
main factors that lead to thoughts about gambling, and the subsequent decision to 
begin a gambling session (Section 3.4.1.1).  Furthermore, when some PGs are 
deciding to begin or continue gambling, their thoughts appear to focus primarily 
on the possibility of winning money (Sections 3.4.2.1 and Section 3.4.2.2).  This 
is consistent with the notion that money is appetitive, so it can elicit action 
readiness (cue-triggered wanting) which influences decisions.  Such cue-triggered 
wanting may momentarily dominate gambling decisions, leading to impaired 
control.  Alternatively, it may suggest that cue-triggered wanting is active much 
of the time, but lack of resources prevents gambling most of the time.  Hence, 
when the resources are available, gambling occurs.  However, as noted several 
times, this study is preliminary, and this is one possible interpretation of the 
interview data.  Importantly, this interpretation does not act as evidence.  
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It is also notable that when reporting cognitions present when making gambling 
decisions, PGs report few cognitions related to other factors cited in the literature 
as important reasons for gambling (such as a desire for escape, arousal, or fun).  
In addition, PGs report that their urges to gamble are unrelated to any particular 
feeling or emotional state.  This contrasts with theories which argue that a 
primary motivation to gamble for many PGs is a desire to escape from aversive 
emotions (Beaudoin & Cox, 1999) and with some qualitative studies which show 
that some PGs endorse this view (Ricketts & Macaskill, 2003; Wood & Griffiths, 
2007).  However, in these prior qualitative studies, PGs are reflecting on possible 
reasons for their gambling.  By contrast, in Study 1, rather than reflecting on 
possible reasons for their gambling, PGs are directly considering the thoughts that 
are present when they make gambling decisions.  Hence, the lack of evidence that 
thoughts about escape are present at this time may suggest that gambling as an 
escape is a post-hoc interpretation of the reason for gambling, rather than an 
actual motivation that is present at the time of making gambling decisions.  This 
possibility requires further research. 
Alternatively however, it must be noted that Study 1 focused on ‘unsafe’ 
gambling decisions only, which are defined as decisions to begin or continue 
gambling despite feeling one should not.  Perhaps when deciding to gamble in 
order to ‘escape’, PGs do not have a concurrent feeling that they should not 
gamble.  If so, this may account for the absence of thoughts about escape in Study 
1.  However, it is argued that impaired control characterises problem gambling, 
which in turn is characterised by unsafe gambling.  Hence, if gambling to escape 
does not contribute to unsafe gambling, then it may be argued that it does not 
contribute to problem gambling.  
 132 
 
In addition, when reporting thoughts, it is difficult to report all of them, so the 
absence of particular thoughts does not provide evidence for their absence when 
making gambling decisions.  That said, it is notable that almost all participants 
failed to report any thoughts about gambling in order to escape.  This is 
particularly remarkable given that some researchers argue that this is a strong 
motivation to gamble that can account for gambling persistence.   
Finally, statements made by some PGs suggest that, when making the decision to 
gamble, cognitions may tend to focus on the immediate environment, rather than 
focusing on future outcomes.  These observations are consistent with the view 
that automatic appetitive processes govern gambling decisions, at the expense of 
more future-oriented deliberative processes.  This is discussed further below. 
3.5.2 Time-inconsistent judgments and decision-making for 
problem gamblers 
Findings outlined in Section 3.4.2 are consistent with the notion of time-
inconsistent judgments and decision-making. As noted above, in the absence of a 
gambling urge or session, PGs hold a negative, and probably more realistic, view 
of their gambling, and some report wanting to stop gambling.  However, when 
experiencing an urge to begin or continue gambling, PGs report thoughts that 
facilitate the choice to gamble (for example, thoughts about winning, or being 
able to control gambling ‘this time’), and they also report that negative thoughts 
are ignored or suppressed.  This is consistent with the notion of time-inconsistent 
judgments / decision-making (see Sections 2.3 and 2.6.1), and the notion that 
motivated reasoning may cause gambling to be viewed more positively during an 
urge to begin, or continue, gambling (see Section 2.6.1).   
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Overall, the observations relating to PGs are consistent with the dual-process 
model.  The findings show that some PGs exhibit a negative view of gambling in 
the absence of a gambling urge or session, and some PGs report frequent and 
strong urges that prevent rational and volitional deliberative processes from 
contributing to gambling decisions.  Urges are often linked to money, consistent 
with the notion that money (or thoughts about obtaining money) may be 
appetitive, and so may elicit cue-triggered wanting (as argued in Section 2.4). 
Additionally, judgments appear to alter when experiencing an urge, consistent 
with the notion of time-inconsistent decision-making. However, the observations 
and interpretations made in this study are preliminary only and do not constitute 
evidence. Hence, further (controlled) research is required. 
3.5.3 Theoretical analysis for non-problem gamblers 
As there are few NPGs, the theoretical analysis of both themes will be combined, 
in order to avoid repetition.  As expected, NPGs appear to exhibit control over 
many of their gambling decisions. Additionally, for the most part, they report 
choosing to gamble in expectation of positive outcomes, consistent with the 
notion that aggregate positive expectancies, and deliberative processes, largely 
determine their gambling decisions.  That said, in keeping with the design of 
Study 1, they did occasionally decide to begin or continue gambling while feeling 
that they should not.  This was linked to arousal or anger, gambling triggers, or 
the desire to win money.  These are discussed briefly. 
Arousal may suppress deliberative processes and so may encourage impulsive 
automatic processes to govern decision-making (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; 
Bouffard, 2002).  Additionally, research suggests that anger can be appetitive and 
can lead to an automatic approach action tendency (Frijda, 2010; Harmon-Jones, 
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Gable, & Peterson, 2010; Rutherford & Lindell, 2011).  Hence, the experience of 
anger during gambling may encourage further gambling.  Furthermore, as for 
PGs, gambling triggers and the desire to win money may activate cue-triggered 
wanting (albeit, not as intensely as for PGs), causing it to momentarily dominate 
gambling decisions.  Together, these features may cause NPGs to experience 
some loss of control over their gambling decisions some of the time.  If so, this 
would be consistent with Dickerson’s (2003) research which showed that the 
conditions present during gambling lead most gamblers to experience some loss 
of control during a session. 
3.6 General Discussion 
This research is the first of its kind.  To my knowledge, no other research has 
qualitatively examined the factors present specifically during gambling-related 
decision-making.  Further, a previous qualitative examination of the dual-process 
model is not known to me.   
Overall, many observations from Study 1 appear to fit with a dual-process 
account of gambling behaviour, particularly for PGs. For example, PGs tend to 
report a negative view of gambling overall, but also report frequent urges that 
they can find difficult to inhibit. Moreover, some statements suggest that 
gambling decisions can be made without the input of deliberative processes, and 
sometimes despite such input. Furthermore, the data are consistent with the notion 
of time-inconsistent decision-making and judgments. Thus, the findings of Study 
1 suggest that further quantitative examination of the predictions outlined in 
Section 2.5 is warranted.  
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A precautionary note must be made however.  While a dual-process model does 
appear to provide a useful organisation of the data, other models may also do so.  
Relatedly, while the comments that participants made may fit with a dual-process 
model, there may well be other explanations for such comments.  This is one 
reason that Study 1 is preliminary only, and so is not interpreted as providing 
evidence for the model.  
There are several possible strengths and limitations to Study 1 that require 
discussion.  Consistency was fostered across interviews with the use of an 
interview guide, and the same interviewer.  The latter also allowed an iterative 
process, whereby themes identified in previous interviews could be explored in 
future ones.  However, there was some variability in the questions asked across 
interviews, which is likely to lead to biases and inconsistencies. This is another 
reason why qualitative findings are considered preliminary only.  
As this work examined decision-making at a time when the decision was felt to be 
wrong, findings may not be generalisable to other times.  However, some PGs 
said that every choice to begin or continue their gambling felt ‘wrong’, so 
findings relating to some PGs may indeed characterise their general gambling 
experience. In addition, it may be argued that gambling sessions that commence 
or continue despite a feeling they should not are the sessions that characterise 
impaired control and problem gambling. Hence, the features that surround these 
decisions may be crucial to understanding the development of impaired control 
and problem gambling.  
The research only comprised 26 gamblers, most of whom were PGs.  While this is 
a relatively large number according to the standards of qualitative research, only 
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seven were NPGs, and only three NPGs discussed both occasions being 
examined.  Additionally, most NPGs were considered at moderate risk of 
developing a gambling problem, so there were only two low-risk NPGs.  This 
seriously limits conclusions in regard to this group. It also limits comparisons 
between PGs and NPGs.  That said, given the focus on beginning, or continuing, a 
gambling decision despite feeling one should not, few low-risk NPGs would be 
expected in the sample. Hence, the small number of low-risk NPGs, and NPGs 
generally, may accurately reflect the proportion in the population that would fit 
the inclusion-criteria for the study.   
Finally, retrospective interviewing can lead to recall bias, inaccurate recall, 
interference in recall, and re-interpretation of events (Schacter, 1999).  For 
example, previous researchers have found evidence of a recall bias for gamblers 
in regards to the number of wins versus losses (Fortune & Goodie, 2012).  This 
could be overcome by questioning people at the time of making the decision to 
gamble, or during gambling. This may be a limitation of the current study design. 
That said, questioning people at the time of making their gambling decisions may 
alter their decision-making process and so lead to findings that cannot be 
generalised to usual decision-making occasions.  
  
Overall, Study 1 allowed a preliminary exploration of whether the self-reported 
‘unsafe’ decision-making experiences of gamblers may be consistent with the 
dual-process model.  As several observations appear to fit with a dual-process 
approach, further quantitative examination of the model with gamblers is 
justified.  The next three chapters present some empirical studies that aim to test 
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some of the predictions arising from the dual-process model that were outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4. Study 2: A first examination of the 
valence of outcome expectancies, cue-triggered 
wanting, and cognitive errors 
4.1 Introduction 
The preliminary qualitative analysis conducted in Study 1 showed that the self-
reported experiences of PGs might fit with a dual-process approach.  The 
following three chapters describe studies that quantitatively examine predictions 
arising from the application of the dual-process model and the incentive-
sensitisation theory to gambling (see Section 2.6).  This chapter describes Study 
2, which aims to examine differences in aggregate outcome expectancies (Section 
2.6.2), and cognitive errors (Section 2.6.3), as a function of both problem 
gambling status and cue-triggered wanting. Note that the predictions outlined in 
Section 2.6 concern changes in outcome expectancies and cognitive errors over 
time. By contrast, Study 2 uses a between-groups design, so outcome 
expectancies and cognitive errors are examined as a function of differences 
between individuals experiencing different levels of cue-triggered wanting.   
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the specific predictions that are 
examined in Study 2 are outlined. This is followed by a discussion of some 
methodological issues that impact on the operationalisation of the predictions into 
testable hypotheses. Then the actual hypotheses to be tested are presented. The 
remainder of the chapter follows the usual format of an empirical psychological 
report, whereby the methodology, the results (including statistical analyses), and 
the discussion of the results are presented, in that order.   
The predictions presented in Chapter 2 that are examined in Study 2 are: 
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1. NPGs will exhibit aggregate positive gambling-related outcome 
expectancies, while PGs will exhibit aggregate negative gambling-related 
outcome expectancies (see Section 2.6.2).  
2. Aggregate outcome expectancies will become more positive as cue-
triggered wanting strengthens (see Section 2.6.2); 
3. PGs will exhibit stronger cue-triggered wanting than NPGs; 
4. In the absence of cue-triggered wanting, cognitive errors will be weak or 
absent for both PGs and NPGs (see Section 2.6.3); 
5. Cognitive errors measured outside of gambling will show minimal 
relationship with gambling frequency (see Section 2.6.3).  
6. Cognitive errors will strengthen as cue-triggered wanting strengthens (see 
Section 2.6.3);  
7. Cue-triggered wanting but not outcome expectancies will predict gambling 
activity for PGs, whereas both cue-triggered wanting and outcome 
expectancies will predict gambling activity for NPGs (see Sections 2.6.2 
and 2.6.3). 
Before operationalising these predictions into testable hypotheses, some 
methodological considerations are addressed.  
4.1.1  Methodological considerations 
The study is conducted over the internet.  This allows participants to be recruited 
from all English-speaking countries around the world.  When designing the study 
for the internet it was reasoned that a lack of social pressure to complete the study 
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might lead to a high attrition rate.  Hence, in order to discourage drop-outs, the 
measures used are brief.  As well as discouraging drop-outs due to boredom or 
time commitments, it is hoped that brevity might allow any cue-triggered wanting 
experienced by participants to be maintained throughout the study.   
Another point to note is that the Scale of Gambling Choices is used to categorise 
participants as PGs or NPGs, even though this scale was not devised for clinical 
use in determining problem gambling status.  This decision was made for two 
reasons.  Firstly, from a dual-process perspective, impaired control is a central 
feature of problem gambling. Thus, to divide the sample according to degree of 
control over gambling seems the most aetiologically relevant approach. Secondly, 
other problem gambling scales focus largely on harmful consequences that result 
from gambling (e.g., the South Oaks Gambling Screen and the Canadian Problem 
Gambling Index; Ferris & Wynne, 2001a; Lesieur & Blume, 1987).  While this 
may be clinically relevant, it is not theoretically relevant to the dual-process 
model or the aetiological development of gambling. Thus, to group gamblers 
according to harms experienced would be less useful in examining the dual-
process model than to group them according to their degree of control. For these 
reasons, the Scale of Gambling Choices was used rather than more common 
diagnostic instruments.   
Note also that cue-triggered wanting is measured as degree of current urge. 
Previous research has used ratings of urge to examine cue-triggered wanting 
(Ostafin et al., 2010).  Participants indicate the level of urge they are feeling 
currently, from no urge at all, to a very strong urge (see Section 4.2.3).  For some 
analyses, urge is used as a continuous variable (e.g., in Section 4.3.4).  For others, 
participants are divided into a ‘mild urge group’ and a ‘strong urge group’ (e.g., in 
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Section 4.3.3).  In operationalising predictions, those in the mild urge group 
represent participants experiencing no (or minimal) cue-triggered wanting, while 
those in the strong-urge group represent participants experiencing strong cue-
triggered wanting. 
When measuring outcome expectancies, two measures are used.  One is modelled 
on the free-association task used by Leung and McCusker (2001). For this task, 
participants list words or phrases that come to mind automatically when thinking 
about how their gambling makes them feel (see Section 4.2.3.4).  Note that, as the 
task is conducted over the internet, it differs from Leung and McCusker’s task in 
a few ways.1 
The other measure is a more typical questionnaire format.  Participants are 
presented with specific outcome expectancies, and they indicate the degree to 
which they endorse each (see Section 4.2.3.5 for more details).  The free-
association task is included as it is likely to primarily measure automatic 
evaluations of gambling, while the questionnaire is included as it is likely to 
measure deliberative responses as well (it is theorised that automatic processes 
would respond automatically, and then deliberative processes would endorse or 
adjust automatic responses; see Section 2.3).  Caution is taken, however, in 
making assertions about the relative contribution of the different processes to each 
task, as it is unknown exactly what these are.  It is predicted that these measures 
will be related.  
                                                          
1 In Leung and McCusker’s (2001) task, participants continue writing down words related to 
smoking for up to four minutes, whereas in Study 2, participants only write down the first words 
that come to mind. In addition, in Leung and McCusker’s task, participants indicated the last word 
written after each 30-second interval, which contributed to the analyses they conducted. Such 
timing is difficult to implement uniformly for an internet study, so this aspect of their study is not 
replicated. 
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Research has shown that cognitive evaluations can be influenced by affect (Boden 
& Berenbaum, 2010).  Hence, it is argued that the influence of current affect may 
disguise the relationship between urge level and outcome expectancies when 
examining whether outcome expectancies become more positive as cue-triggered 
strengthens.  For this reason, affective valence is measured in Study 2, and is 
statistically controlled when examining the relationship between urge level and 
outcome expectancies. 
4.1.2  Hypotheses 
In this section, the predictions stated above are re-stated as testable hypotheses.  
The predictions and operationalized hypotheses are shown in the Table 11.  Note 
that the terms ‘outcome expectancies’ and ‘expectancies’ are used 
interchangeably for the remainder of this thesis.  Note also that Prediction 3 is not 
mentioned in the list of initial predictions in Section 4.1, but is added due to 
methodological considerations discussed in the previous section.  
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Table 11. The predictions and operationalized hypotheses examined in Study 2. 
Number Prediction Hypothesis 
1. 
NPGs will exhibit aggregate 
positive gambling-related 
outcome expectancies, while PGs 
will exhibit aggregate negative 
gambling-related outcome 
expectancies (see Section 
2.6.2.2).  
NPGs will exhibit a 
positive mean score on 
each expectancy task 
whereas PGs will 
exhibit a negative mean 
score on each 
expectancy task.  
2. 
Aggregate outcome expectancies 
will become more positive as 
cue-triggered wanting 
strengthens (see Section 2.6.2.2). 
Scores on each expectancy 
measure will tend to be more 
positive for those who report a 
stronger urge.  
3. The expectancy measures will be related (Section 4.1.1). 
Scores on each expectancy 
measure will correlate. 
4. 
PGs will exhibit stronger cue-
triggered wanting than NPGs 
(Section 2.6.2). 
PGs will exhibit a stronger 
mean urge than NPGs, and a 
greater proportion of PGs will 
exhibit a strong urge than 
NPGs. 
5. 
In the absence of cue-triggered 
wanting, cognitive errors will be 
mild or absent for both PGs and 
NPGs (Section 2.6.3). 
When experiencing a mild urge, 
both PGs and NPGs will exhibit 
either disagreement, or mild 
agreement, overall on a 
cognitive-errors scale.  
6. 
Cognitive errors will strengthen 
as cue-triggered wanting 
strengthens (see Section 2.6.3).  
The mean score on a cognitive 
errors scale will be higher for 
those who report a stronger 
urge than for those who report a 
mild urge.  
7. 
Cognitive errors measured 
outside of gambling will show 
minimal relationship with 
gambling frequency (Section 
2.6.3).  
Cognitive errors measured 
outside of gambling will not 
predict gambling frequency for 
either gambling group. 
8. 
Cue-triggered wanting, but not 
expectancies, will predict 
gambling activity for PGs, 
whereas both cue-triggered 
wanting and expectancies will 
predict gambling activity for 
NPGs (see Section 2.6.2). 
Urge ratings will predict indices 
of gambling activity (session 
length and gambling frequency) 
for PGs, but free-association 
and expectancy-questionnaire 
scores will not; urge ratings, 
free-association scores, and 
questionnaire scores will predict 
gambling activity for NPGs. 
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The methodology section is now outlined. This will follow the format of a typical 
empirical psychological report (in which the sample, measures, and procedure are 
described, in that order). 
4.2  Methodology 
4.2.1 Sample recruitment 
Participants were recruited through various gambling help services from major 
English-speaking countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Australia, 
South Africa, and New Zealand), and over the internet via internet gambling 
forums, Google AdWords, and Facebook advertising (targeted at gamblers). Of 
466 initial respondents, 275 participants completed the study.  Hence, 41% of 
initial respondents did not complete the study.  This is consistent with the higher 
attrition rate reported for internet research (Birnbaum, 2004).  The advertisement 
used in recruiting participants can be seen in Appendix 7.   
4.2.2 Procedure 
The study was conducted over the internet. It was hosted on a secure Deakin 
University web-site.  After reading the advertisement, participants could navigate 
to the Plain Language Statement on the web-site.  After reading the statement, 
interested participants could click to start the study (they were informed that 
consent was inferred from doing so).  At the end of the study, participants were 
given the chance to provide feedback or comments.  They were also provided 
with contact information for gambling help services (where available) in countries 
whose main language was English. No identifying information was collected.   
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4.2.3  Measures 
The measures used are described in this section. Those measuring independent 
variables are described first, followed by those measuring dependent variables.  
4.2.3.1  Scale of Gambling Choices 
The Scale of Gambling Choices (Baron, Dickerson, & Blaszczynski, 1995) was 
originally developed with 18 items, but was refined to 12 items (Kyngdon, 2002; 
O'Connor & Dickerson, 2003a).  The 12-item version has good internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s α =.94; O’Connor & Dickerson, 2003), and a single factor structure 
(Kyngdon). Items are either positively or negatively worded (the latter items are 
reverse scored).  The items ask participants to rate how often in the previous six 
months they have successfully enacted specific behaviours that reflect degree of 
control over gambling.  These are presented either in temporal terms (e.g., “Even 
for a single day I have found it difficult to limit how much I gamble”), in regards 
to specific situations (e.g., “I have been able to stop gambling before I spent all 
cash available to me”), or in general (e.g., “I have found it difficult to limit how 
much I gamble”).  Participants answer on a 5-point Likert scale, anchored by 
‘Never’ and ‘Always’.  Items are scored from 0 (‘Never’) to 4 (‘Always’), and 
totalled to give an overall score.  Those who score 24 or more, which is consistent 
with an average score of ‘sometimes’ to all items, are categorised as PGs, while 
those who score less than 24 are categorised as NPGs.  
It must be noted that participants also have the option of answering ‘Does not 
apply’ when they have not attempted to exercise control in the way described by 
an item.  In the 18-item version, the scoring of a ‘Does not apply’ response 
depends upon the participant’s responses to other questions in the scale.  
However, to my knowledge, no other author has described how they have scored 
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a ‘Does not apply’ response when using the 12-item version of the scale.  Thus, in 
order to decide how to score the item, the frequency of this response across each 
item of the scale in Study 2-was examined.  This is outlined in Section 4.3.1. 
4.2.3.2  Urge level  
As noted in Section 4.1.1, each participant’s rating of urge is used to measure 
their degree of cue-triggered wanting during Study 2. The Gambling Urge Scale 
(Raylu & Oei, 2004b) is not used in Study 2 as it is argued that it essentially asks 
the same question in four different ways. As brevity is a concern, only one item is 
used to measure urge.  West and Ussher (2010) have provided evidence for the 
validity of using one item to assess current urge.  Hence, in Study 2, participants 
are asked to rate their current urge on a 7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = “No 
urge to gamble” and 7 = “Very strong urge to gamble”.  Thus, urge is scored from 
1 to 7. 
4.2.3.3  Current affective valence 
Current affective valence is measured with one bipolar item on a 15-point visual-
analogue scale (or feeling thermometer), with scores ranging from -7 to 7.  The 
item is anchored by the antonyms ‘sad’ (-7) versus ‘happy’ (7), with neutral (0) in 
the middle of the scale.  Participants are asked to rate how they feel ‘right now’. 
Note that the terms ‘affective valence’ and ‘affect’ are used interchangeably in 
this thesis.  
4.2.3.4  Free-association task 
Participants are asked:  ‘Please type as many words (or short phrases) as you can 
that describe how your gambling makes you feel’. Participants are asked not to 
think too deeply about the question, but rather, to immediately write down the 
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words in the order that they arise.  All words are categorised as negative or 
positive (the occasional word is categorised as neutral or too difficult to 
categorise, and so not included in analyses;  for example, ‘young’, ‘careful of 
time and money’, and ‘intense’ are not included).  A free-association score is 
calculated for each participant by subtracting the number of negatively-valenced 
words (or short phrases) from the number of positively-valenced words they 
listed.  Thus, a positive score indicates that more positive words are listed, and a 
negative score indicates that more negative words are listed.  This score is then 
used in analyses as an indication of the overall valence of expectancies that 
automatically come to mind when thinking about gambling.  
4.2.3.5  Expectancy questionnaire 
As existing expectancy questionnaires are developed for specific populations 
(e.g., adolescents, and the prison population; Gillespie, Derevensky, & Gupta, 
2007a, 2007b; Walters & Contri, 1998; Wickwire, Whelan, & Meyers, 2010), 
they are inappropriate for use in Study 2.  Moreover, one that may have been 
appropriate (Tiell, 2005) is very long.  Given that Study 2 aims to use brief 
measures, this scale is also not suitable.  For these reasons, a brief questionnaire is 
specifically designed for use in Study 2.  As this thesis is focused particularly on 
decision-making, the valence of aggregate expectancies is of particular interest.  
When considering the response-scale on item in the questionnaire, it is proposed 
that a bipolar format may provide a better indication of the valence of aggregate 
expectancies than a unipolar format (e.g., Russell & Carroll, 1999; J. L. Smith, 
1996; Sparks, Hedderley, & Shepherd, 1991).  Thus, a brief, bipolar expectancy 
questionnaire is constructed for Study 2.  
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The questions included are modelled on those used in previous gambling-related 
expectancy questionnaires (Gillespie et al., 2007a, 2007b; Tiell, 2005; Wickwire 
et al., 2010).  The questionnaire contains five items, each anchored by two 
antonyms.  A 15-point visual-analogue scale is used for each item, anchored by -7 
for negative adjectives, and 7 for positive adjectives, with ‘neutral’ (0) in the 
middle.  Two of the items ask participants if they feel that, overall, their gambling 
is ‘constructive’ versus ‘destructive’, and ‘exciting’ versus ‘boring’.  The other 
three items ask participants if they feel that, when they gamble, they mainly ‘win’ 
versus ‘lose’, ‘feel relaxed’ versus ‘feel tense’, and ‘feel happy’ versus ‘feel 
sad/depressed’.  The mean of all items is used to provide an overall expectancy 
score.  Thus, the overall score for each participant varies from -7 to 7.  A positive 
score indicates positive expectancies overall, and a negative score indicates 
negative expectancies overall. 
4.2.3.6  Cognitive errors 
Cognitive errors are measured with a questionnaire developed specifically for this 
study, using items drawn from previous scales (R. Breen & Zuckerman, 1999; 
Jefferson & Nicki, 2003; Raylu & Oei, 2004b; Toneatto et al., 1997). Previously 
developed scales are not used as they are long, some items are difficult to 
understand, and some items are repetitive (e.g., ‘One’s chances of winning are 
better if he or she gambles on a machine that has not paid out in a long time’ and 
‘I have personally avoided playing on a machine that has paid out a lot of money 
recently’; Jefferson & Nicki, 2003).    
The devised questionnaire comprises 14 items, answered on a 7-point Likert 
scale, anchored by ‘Strongly disagree’ (0) and ‘Strongly agree’ (6); with ‘Neither 
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agree nor disagree’ in the middle (a score of 3).  Some questions are simplified 
from their original form.  In addition, where necessary, questions are altered to 
suit any game type, and both internet and non-internet gambling.  The questions 
examine superstition (e.g., ‘Having a particular object can increase my chance of 
winning’), illusion of control (e.g., ‘I have some control over when I win’), 
predictive control (e.g., ‘I can win if I use a certain strategy or system’), 
interpretative biases (e.g., ‘My wins are usually due to my skill/ability’), denial of 
independence of events (e.g., ‘Having one win makes another more likely’), near 
misses (e.g., ‘Having a near miss means I am likely to win soon’), and chasing 
(e.g., ‘If I have lost money it is better to keep playing so I can try to win it back’). 
The questions are scored from 0 to 6.  The item average is taken as the overall 
score for each participant, so scores range from 0 to 6, with a high score 
indicating stronger cognitive errors.   
4.2.3.7  Demographic characteristics and gambling activity 
Participants are asked to indicate their gender, education level (‘Elementary / 
Primary school’, ‘High school’, ‘Trade’, or ‘Bachelor or Postgraduate’), ethnicity 
(‘Asian’, ‘African’, ‘Caucasian’, ‘Hispanic’, ‘Arab’, or ‘Other’), country of 
residence (typed in), and age (typed in).  Participants are also asked to indicate 
their main gambling game (typed in), how often they gamble (‘Most days’, ‘More 
than once a week’, ‘More than once a month’, or ‘Less than once a month’), how 
long a usual gambling session lasts (typed in), and whether they predominantly 
play their main game on the internet or not.  Information about gambling 
expenditure is not collected as participants come from several countries which use 
different currencies, so it is difficult to compare such expenditure meaningfully.  
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4.3 Results 
First, the scoring of a ‘Does not apply’ response on the Scale of Gambling 
Choices is determined.  Then the characteristics of the whole sample, and each 
gambling group, are summarised and discussed. This is followed by a description 
of the data for each dependent variable (e.g. distributions, reliability analyses, 
factor analyses) and an analysis of the hypotheses outlined above (in Section 
4.1.2).   
4.3.1  Scoring the Scale of Gambling Choices 
As noted in Section 4.2.3.1, it is not clear from previous research how to score a 
‘Does not apply’ response on the 12-item version of the Scale of Gambling 
Choices.  Hence, in order to determine the best way to code this response, its 
distribution across each item of the scale is examined.  This is now described.  
The percentage of participants who endorsed a ‘Does not apply’ response for each 
item is examined.  This is shown in Table 12 (the item with the highest proportion 
of the response is at the top of the table).  The percentage of participants who 
endorsed ‘Does not apply’ to a given number of items is shown in Table 13. 
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Table 12. The percentage of participants endorsing ‘Does not apply’ for each item. 
Items 
‘Does not 
apply’ 
response  
(%) 
7. I have been able to stop gambling easily after a few bets. 5.9 
6. When I have made up my mind not to gamble, I have stuck to it. 5.2 
9. I have been able to stop gambling before I got into debt. 5.2 
5. I have been able to stop gambling before I spent all cash available to 
me. 4.8 
8. I have been able to gamble less often when I have wanted to. 4.5 
10. When I have wanted to, I could stop gambling for a week. 4.1 
4. Even for a single day, I have found it difficult to resist gambling. 3.0 
12. When I have wanted to, I have been able to gamble less.  3.0 
1. I have found it difficult to limit how much I gamble.  2.6 
2. Once I have started gambling, I have an irresistible urge to continue. 2.6 
11. I have been able to resist the opportunity to start gambling. 2.6 
3. When I have been on or near a gambling venue or the internet, I have 
found it difficult to resist gambling.  2.2 
 
Table 13. The proportion of 
participants endorsing ‘Does not apply’ 
to a given number of items 
Number of 
items with 
‘Does not 
apply’ response 
Participants 
(%) 
0 81.9 
1 10.4 
2 3.7 
3 1.1 
>3 2.9 
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Given the low rate of the response across items and participants, the ‘Does not 
apply’ response will be considered invalid, and so not scored.  Eight participants 
(2.9%) who endorsed the response more than three times are considered to have 
an invalid Scale of Gambling Choices score, and so are excluded from analyses.  
For 42 participants (15.2%) who endorsed the response one to three times, their 
score on the valid items is averaged, and multiplied by 12, to give a total Scale of 
Gambling Choices score (out of 60).  
It must be noted that the Scale of Gambling Choices is used in Study 2 to 
categorise participants into gambling groups (PGs and NPGs).  That being so, the 
scoring of a ‘Does not apply’ response may impact on how some participants are 
categorised.  As noted in Section 4.2.3.1, those who score 24 or more are 
categorised as PGs.  There are only four participants (0.7%) who scored near the 
cut-off (a score from 20 to 28) who also endorsed a ‘Does not apply’ response. 
Thus, few participants in Study 2 are actually affected by the way in which the 
‘Does not apply’ response is scored.  
4.3.2  Characteristics of the whole sample and for each 
gambling group 
It was noted in Section 4.2.3.1 that eight participants are excluded from analyses 
due to more than three ‘Does not apply’ responses on the Scale of Gambling 
Choices.  A further five participants are excluded due to more than three invalid 
responses on the scale.  This left 262 participants in the study.  
The distribution of scores on the Scale of Gambling Choices is examined.  The 
values for skew and kurtosis are 0.10 and -1.10, respectively.  According to 
Curran and colleagues (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996), parametric tests are robust 
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to violations of normality provided that the values for skewness are between -2 
and 2, and values for kurtosis are between -7 and 7 (this will be referred to as the 
‘robust range’ from here-in).  Thus, the assumption of normality may be regarded 
as satisfied.  The internal reliability of the scale was also examined, and shown to 
be very high (Cronbach’s alpha = .97).  
As noted in Section 4.2.3.1, the Scale of Gambling Choices is used to categorise 
participants into PGs (those who score 24 or more) and NPGs (those who score 
less than 24). The mean on the scale for the whole sample is 22.44 (13.64), while 
for PGs it is 34.31 (6.19); and for NPGs it is 10.92 (7.69).  
The demographic characteristics of the whole sample, and problem gambling 
group, are shown in Table 14.  It can be seen that almost three-quarters of the 
sample are men.  This fits with the higher rate of gambling for men than women 
observed in the general population (Petry, 2003; Stark, Zahlan, Albanese, & 
Tepperman, 2012).   
Additionally, about three-quarters of the sample are Caucasian, and almost all are 
from Western countries.  This may be expected given that recruitment procedures 
targeted English-speaking countries.  
More than half the sample have a Bachelor’s degree or higher, compared with 40 
percent or less in the Australian population (Linacre, 2007) and 30 percent or less 
in the US (United States Census Bureau, 2012).  Thus, the sample appears to be 
more highly educated than the general population.  This may be the result of 
recruiting participants over the internet.  Individuals who use the internet may be 
more likely to have a higher level of education than those who do not. 
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Nonetheless, a large portion of the sample are not university educated (42.8%), 
indicating sampling from a broad socioeconomic spectrum.  
Table 14. Demographic characteristics for the whole sample, and by gambling group. 
Characteristics 
Non-
problem 
gamblers 
(n = 131) 
Problem 
gamblers 
(n = 131) 
Whole 
sample  
(n = 262) 
Age Mean (SD) 37.10 (16.81) 38.22 (13.73) 37.49 (15.42) 
Gender  
Male (%) 
n = 131 
77.9 
n = 127 
68.5 
n = 258 
73.3 
Education (%) * 
Primary / Elementary and Other 
High school 
Trade certificate or Diploma 
College / University – Undergraduate 
College / University – Postgraduate 
n = 131 
3.9 
13.0 
14.5 
38.1 
30.5 
n = 127 
6.3 
30.7 
18.9 
30.7 
13.4 
n = 258 
5.1 
21.7 
16.7 
34.4 
22.1 
Country (%)* 
North America  
United Kingdom  
Australia or New Zealand  
Continental Europe  
Asia  
Other 
n = 127 
52.9 
12.6 
14.6 
7.9 
3.1 
7.9 
n = 121 
53.6 
21.5 
15.0 
2.5 
4.1 
3.3 
n = 248 
53.8 
16.9 
14.9 
5.2 
3.6 
5.6 
Ethnicity (%) 
Caucasian  
Other  
n = 129 
83.7 
16.3 
n = 122 
74.6 
25.4 
n = 251 
79.3 
20.7 
*Significant difference between PGs and NPGs at p ≤ .001 
 
 
Possible differences between PGs and NPGs on demographic variables are 
examined.  Age is the only continuous demographic variable, so an independent 
samples t-test is used to examine any difference in age between the groups.  As 
the remaining variables are categorical, possible differences are examined using a 
chi-square test of independence.  
Before running chi-square analyses, any violation of the minimum number of 
cases required per cell (at least five cases in all cells for a 2 x 2 analysis, and at 
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least five cases in 80% of cells for an analysis with more than 2 x 2 cells;  Pallant, 
2010) is examined.  All analyses conformed to these criteria, except ethnicity and 
highest level of education.  For these variables, some categories are collapsed.  As 
there are few participants in all ethnic groups other than Caucasian, ethnicity is 
collapsed into ‘Caucasian’ and ‘Other’.  For highest level of education, there are 
less than five participants in the ‘Primary / Elementary’ and the ‘Other’ 
categories, so they are combined into one category (‘Primary / Elementary and 
Other’).   
In addition, as five tests are conducted concurrently, alpha is adjusted to reduce 
inflation of Type-I error.  As a Bonferroni adjustment is believed to be too 
conservative (Simes, 1986), a Holm-Bonferroni adjustment is used (Holm, 1979). 
This adjustment is conducted as follows.  After conducting the analyses, the p-
values for each test are ordered from smallest to largest.  For the smallest p-value, 
alpha is adjusted as for a Bonferroni adjustment.  That is, the conventional alpha 
(.05) is divided by the total number of tests conducted.  For these analyses, this 
was five, so the smallest p-value was compared to .01 (as .05 divided by 5 is .01).  
If the smallest p-value is significant, the procedure is repeated for the remaining 
tests.  Thus, the second smallest p-value is compared to alpha divided by the 
number of remaining tests, which is four.  So the second-smallest p-value is 
compared to .0125 (as .05 divided by 4 equals .0125).  If the second-smallest p-
value is significant, the procedure is repeated again for the remaining tests.  There 
are three remaining tests, so the third smallest p-value is compared to alpha 
divided by three (which is .0167).  If this is significant, the procedure is repeated 
again for the fourth-smallest p-value, and so on, until all p-values have been 
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examined, or until one p-value is not significant.  Once one p-value is not 
significant, all the remaining (larger) p-values are also regarded as not significant. 
Using the adjusted alphas, results show that the only significant difference 
between PGs and NPGs is education level, F2 (4, N = 258) = 20.92, p < .001.  It 
can be seen in Table 14 that the proportion of PGs in categories representing a 
lower-level of education (‘Primary / Elementary and Other’, and ‘High school’) is 
greater than that for NPGs, and the proportion of PGs in categories representing a 
higher-level of education (‘College / University – Postgraduate’) is lower than 
that for NPGs.  This is consistent with research which suggests that those from 
lower socioeconomic backgrounds are at greater risk of developing a gambling 
problem (G. Barnes, Welte, Tidwell, & Hoffman, 2013; Rintoul, Livingstone, 
Mellor, & Jolley, 2013).  
Possible differences in gambling variables between PGs and NPGs are also 
examined.  Table 15 presents data pertaining to the gambling variables for the 
whole sample, and for each gambling group.  All variables other than session 
length are categorical (gambling frequency, game type, and internet gambling 
status), so a chi-square analysis of independence is used to examine possible 
differences between the gambling groups.  An inspection of cell frequencies 
shows satisfaction of the assumptions regarding minimum cell frequencies (see 
Section 4.3.2.1).  
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One variable, session length, is continuous.  Note that four NPGs stated that their 
typical session length is zero minutes.  These participants are excluded from the 
variable, and so excluded from analyses with session length. In addition, there 
appears to be a rendering error in which ‘nonsense’ data (long strings of 
seemingly random numbers) has been provided for session length for eight 
participants; hence, these participants are also excluded from the variable.  
Finally, there are four univariate outliers on the variable.  As these outliers are 
severe, they are recoded to one unit from the next highest value on the variable 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013). This is done separately for PGs and for NPGs. 
Altogether, three values are recoded for PGs, and one value is recoded for NPGs.  
Examination of the distribution of session length for each gambling group after 
the removal of outliers shows that skewness the distributions are still skewed 
(skewness is slightly greater than 2 for each group; for NPGs, skewness = 2.04, 
and for PGs skewness = 2.01).  Thus, the distributions still do not fit within the 
‘robust range’.  Hence, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test is conducted to 
compare session length between the gambling groups.  
Before inspecting the results of these comparisons, it must be noted that a Holm-
Bonferroni adjustment of alpha (described in Section 4.3.2) is applied to the four 
analyses.  Results show that PGs gamble for longer, on average, than NPGs, 
during a gambling session, Z = 4.95, N = 236, p <.001.  In addition, the groups 
differ on how frequently they gamble, χ2 (3, N = 256) = 17.36, p = .001, and on 
the main gambling game played, χ2(7, N = 243) = 32.87, p < .001.  In regards to 
the former, it is seen in the table that PGs are over-represented in the most 
frequent gambling categories (gambling ‘most days’ or ‘more than once a week’), 
and NPGs are over-represented in the least frequent gambling categories 
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(gambling ‘less than once a month’ or ‘more than once a month’).  In regards to 
game type, it is seen in the table that more PGs play EGMs than any other game, 
whereas more NPGs play poker than any other game.  These findings are 
consistent with research which shows that EGM players are at greater risk of 
developing a gambling problem than players of other game types (see Section 1.3; 
Delfabbro, 2008).   
4.3.3  Describing data on each variable 
In this section, a preliminary inspection of each measure in the study is presented. 
For each measure, the preliminary analyses are presented in the following order. 
First, the proportion of invalid data (which includes missing data) is examined.  
As systematic patterns of invalid data can affect the generalisability of results 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013), possible differences between those with, and without, 
a valid score are examined for any variable with more than five percent of invalid 
data.  Following this, the assumption of normality is examined for each variable. 
For questionnaire data, internal reliability is assessed, and a principal components 
analysis is conducted.  Finally, aggregate data (e.g., means and standard 
deviations) are compared between gambling groups. 
Before beginning the analysis, the inter-correlations between all measures in the 
study are presented for each gambling group.  Table 16 shows the correlation 
matrix.
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Other than a few moderate correlations (≥.30), most correlations are weak or 
negligible (<.30; Cohen, 1988).  Considering only moderate correlations, and starting 
from the Scale of Gambling Choices column for each group and moving across the 
table from left to right, it can be seen that the Scale of Gambling Choices correlates 
significantly and moderately with urge and cognitive errors for NPGs only.  Urge, 
the main IV in Study 2, correlates moderately with the BGBQ for both gambling 
groups, but with cognitive errors for NPGs only.  For both gambling groups, 
affective valence (which is included as a covariate in some analyses in Study 2) 
correlates moderately only with the BGBQ for both gambling groups.  Finally, the 
expectancy measures (the free-association task and the BGBQ) correlate moderately 
with each other, as predicted by Hypothesis 3.  Overall, there are stronger 
relationships for NPGs than for PGs.  In the next section, urge and affective valence 
are described in more detail.  
4.3.3.1  A description of data relating to urge and affective valence  
There are few invalid data for either urge or affective valence (less than two percent 
on each item), so participants with invalid data (n = 2) are excluded from subsequent 
analyses.  This left N=260.  
The values for data skew and kurtosis are shown in Table 17.  All values are within 
the robust range, so the assumption of normality may be regarded as satisfied for 
both items in each gambling group. 
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Table 17. Skewness and kurtosis for 
urge and affective-valence by 
gambling group. 
Gambling 
group Urge 
Affective 
valence 
NPGs   
skewness  0.54 -0.68 
kurtosis -0.85 0.03 
PGs   
skewness  0.02 -0.77 
kurtosis -1.45 -0.10 
 
Mean (SD) urge and affective valence for each gambling group are shown in Table 
18.  In accordance with expectation, urge is stronger for PGs than for NPGs.  As 
homogeneity of variances is violated, mean urge is compared using the unequal-
variances t-test.  This shows that this difference is significant, t (252.04) = 3.64, p < 
.001.  Using the average unweighted variance for each group to calculate effect-size 
(Kesselman, Algina, Mix, Wilcox, & Deering, 2008), the effect-size is .45, which is 
moderate.  In addition, mean affective valence for PGs is negative, while that for 
NPGs is positive.  An independent-samples t-test shows that this difference is also 
significant, t (256) = 9.59, p < .001, and the effect-size is large (Cohen’s d = 1.22; 
Cohen, 1988). 
Table 18. Mean (SD) urge and affective valence for each 
gambling group. 
 NPGs PGs 
Measures N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) 
Urge 131 2.99 (1.93) 129 3.93 (2.22) 
Affective valence 130 2.09 (3.43) 127 -2.21 (3.85) 
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Urge and affective valence are also compared across the gambling groups separately 
for participants who predominantly play different gambling games.  There are too 
few participants (only three to 12) in most of the game-type by gambling groups, so 
separate comparisons are conducted only for the EGM, poker, and sports-betting 
groups.  For each of these groups, skewness and kurtosis scores are within the robust 
range for both PGs and NPGs.  However, there are more than double the number of 
EGM-PGs than EGM-NPGs, and more than double the number of poker-playing 
NPGs than poker-playing PGs, so a Mann-Whitney U-test is used instead of an 
independent-samples t-test.  As sample sizes are small, power is low.  Hence, no 
adjustment of alpha is applied, as this would reduce power further.  The results are 
shown in Table 19.   
Table 19. Mean (SD) urge and affective valence for each gambling group. 
 NPGs PGs    
Measures N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD)    
EGM gamblers 19  52     
Urge  2.58 (1.74)  4.08 (2.17) 2.71 69 .009 
Affective valence  2.24 (3.27)  -2.00 (4.10) 4.23 69 <.001 
Poker players 40  18     
Urge  3.50 (1.78)  4.72 (2.22) 2.24 56 .030 
Affective valence  2.20 (3.28)  -1.89 (3.12) 4.45 56 <.001 
Sports bettors 19  14     
Urge  2.47 (1.68)  3.93 (2.37) 2.07 31 .13 
Affective valence  2.53 (2.76)  -3.00 (4.10) 4.37 31 <.001 
 
The table shows that the results for each gambling group are consistent with those for 
the whole sample, with the exception that there is insufficient evidence for a 
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difference in urge level by gambling group for sports bettors.  For all game-type 
groups, mean affect is positive for NPGs, but negative for PGs.  For gamblers who 
primarily play EGMs or poker, mean urge is stronger for PGs compared with NPGs.  
Overall, both urge and affect comprise few cases with invalid data, and all 
distributions can be regarded as normal.  Additionally, urge tends to be stronger, and 
affective valence more negative, for PGs compared with NPGs.  The next section 
provides a similar description for the free-association task. 
4.3.3.2  A description of data relating to the free-association task 
Before describing the data on the free-association task, the inter-rater reliability when 
rating the words provided by each participant as positive or negative is examined.  
Using Pearson’s correlation co-efficient, inter-rater reliability between two raters is 
.97 for the positive words, and .97 for the negative words, which may be regarded as 
satisfactory.   
Data are considered invalid if no words are written for the free-association task, or if 
the words that are written cannot be categorised as either negative or positive (e.g. 
‘blah, blah, blah’).  Following these criteria, there are invalid responses for 36 
(13.8%) participants.  Given that this is a substantial proportion of participants, 
analyses are conducted to see if there are any differences between those with valid 
and invalid scores.  Possible differences are examined on the following variables: 
demographic variables (age, gender, ethnicity, highest level of education, and usual 
country of residence); gambling variables (gambling group, game type, session 
length, gambling frequency, time since last gamble, and mainly internet gambler or 
not); and on urge, and affective valence. 
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In conducting these analyses, a non-parametric test is used, as the samples sizes for 
those with a valid score (n = 224) differ markedly from those with an invalid score (n 
= 36).  The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U Test is used to examine differences on 
the continuous variables (age, session length, urge, and affective valence), and a chi-
square test of independence is used to examine differences on all of the remaining 
categorical variables (gender, ethnicity, highest level of education, usual country of 
residence, game type, gambling frequency, time since last gamble, and mainly 
internet gambler or not).  Before conducting analyses, assumptions regarding 
minimum cell numbers for the chi-square test are examined.  The same categories of 
the same variables are combined as in Section 4.3.2.  In addition, for the ‘Usual 
country of residence’ variable, there are fewer than five cases in cells for the ‘Asia’ 
and ‘Other’ categories.  Thus, these categories are combined into one ‘Asia and 
Other’ category.  
Given that multiple analyses are conducted, a family-wise Holm-Bonferroni 
adjustment of alpha (as explained in Section 4.3.2) is applied.  The six gambling 
variables are considered one family of analyses, the five demographic variables are 
considered another family of analyses, and urge and affective valence are considered 
an additional family of analyses.  Using the adjusted alpha for each family, there are 
no significant differences between those with, and without, valid scores on the free-
association task.  Thus, it can be concluded that there is no systematic pattern to the 
invalid data.  While participants with invalid data could not be included in analyses 
of the free-association task, they are retained in the data-set for inclusion in analyses 
with other DVs.  
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Next, the values of skewness and kurtosis for the distribution of free-association 
scores for each gambling group are examined.  These are within the ‘robust range’ 
for each gambling group (for skewness: -0.03 for NPGs and -0.52 for PGs; for 
kurtosis: 1.41 for NPGs and 0.43 for PGs).  Thus, the distributions can be regarded as 
sufficiently normal to justify the use of parametric analyses.  
The mean number of total, positive, and negative words reported in the free-
association task for each gambling group are now examined, as is the mean free-
association score (number of negative words subtracted from the number of positive 
words).  These are shown in Table 20.  It can be seen that each gambling group 
reported an approximately equal number of words in the task, but PGs reported more 
negative words, while NPGs reported more positive words.  An independent-samples 
t-test shows that these differences are significant, t (223) = 4.56, p < .001 for positive 
words, t (223) = 4.66, p < .001 for negative words, and their effect-sizes are 
moderate (Cohen’s d = 0.58 and 0.59, respectively).  
Table 20. Mean (SD) number of words reported in 
the free-association task, and the free-association 
score, for each gambling group. 
Measures 
NPGs 
n = 110 
PGs 
n = 115 
Positive words  3.17 (2.50) 1.83 (1.87) 
Negative words 1.90 (2.13) 3.66 (3.37) 
Total words 5.41 (3.35) 5.64 (3.62) 
Free-association score 1.27 (3.42) -1.85 (4.16) 
 
This led to a negative free-association score for PGs, and a positive one for NPGs. 
Results show violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance between the 
 167 
 
groups.   Hence, an unequal-variances t-test is used to compare the mean free-
association score across the gambling groups.  This shows that the gambling groups 
exhibit significantly different mean scores, t (216.82) = 6.14, p < .001, such that PGs 
exhibit a negative mean score, and NPGs exhibit a positive mean score.  Using the 
average unweighted variance (Kesselman et al., 2008), the effect-size is large (0.82). 
In sum, while there is considerable invalid data on the free-association task, no 
systematic pattern to this data is identified.  In addition, for both gambling groups, 
the distribution of free-association scores can be regarded as normal.  Both groups 
report an equal number of words on the free-association task, but, as each group 
predominantly reported words of a different valence, the mean free-association score 
is positive for NPGs, and negative for PGs.  These differences are significant.  A 
similar description of the data for the BGBQ is provided in the next section.  
4.3.3.3  A description of data relating to the Bipolar Gambling-Beliefs 
Questionnaire 
A preliminary inspection similar to that provided for other variables is conducted for 
the Bipolar Gambling-Beliefs Questionnaire (BGBQ), as well as an examination of 
the internal reliability and factor structure of the items in the questionnaire.  For 
BGBQ, a score is deemed invalid if more than one of the five items that comprise the 
questionnaire is unanswered.  Following this criterion, only three participants have 
invalid BGBQ scores.  Hence, no further examination of the missing values is 
necessary.  While participants with invalid data cannot be included in analyses with 
the BGBQ, they are retained in the data-set for inclusion in analyses with other DVs.  
In regards to the distribution of scores, the values for skewness and kurtosis are 
within the robust range for each gambling group (skewness: -0.69 for NPGs and 0.38 
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for PGs; kurtosis: 0.99 for NPGs and 0.03 for PGs).  Thus, the distributions can be 
regarded as sufficiently normal to permit parametric analyses.  
An analysis of the internal reliability of the six items that comprise the questionnaire 
shows a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of .74.  In order to establish the factorial 
structure of the five items, an exploratory principal components analysis is 
conducted.  Preliminary analyses of the assumptions for the analysis shows that inter-
item correlations are mostly above the recommended value of .3, the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin value is above the recommended value of .6, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity is 
significant (Pallant, 2010).  Thus, the data are suited to principal components 
analysis.    
Results show only one component with an eigenvalue exceeding one, and a clear 
‘break’ in the scree plot after Component 1.  Cattell (1966) recommends that all 
components below this break should be discarded, as they explain little of the 
variance.  Thus, only Component 1 is retained.  Component 1 explains 57.4% of the 
variance, and all five items load strongly (≥0.6) onto it. Overall, the items show good 
internal reliability, and they form a single factor.  
Using the mean of the five items (each item is scored from -7 to 7) to provide each 
participant with a score on the questionnaire, NPGs exhibit a positive mean score 
(1.67, SD = 2.40), and PGs exhibit a negative mean score (-1.75, SD = 3.02).  An 
independent-samples t-test shows that this difference is significant, t (242.68) = 
10.11, p < .001, and the effect-size is large (Cohen’s d = 1.06; Cohen, 1988).  
  
In conclusion, there are minimal invalid data and the psychometric properties of the 
BGBQ are sound. PGs exhibit a negative mean score on the BGBQ, whereas NPGs 
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exhibit a positive mean score.  In the next section, a similar examination of data for 
cognitive-errors questionnaire is presented.    
4.3.3.4  A description of data relating to cognitive errors  
The data for the cognitive errors questionnaire underwent the same preliminary 
inspection as that for the BGBQ.  For the invalid data analysis, a score is deemed 
invalid if no answer is provided on more than three of the 14 items comprising the 
questionnaire.  Using this criterion, only two participants exhibit invalid data.  Hence, 
no further examination of missing values is conducted.  While participants with invalid 
data cannot be included in analyses with the cognitive-errors questionnaire, they are 
retained in the data-set for inclusion in analyses with other DVs. 
The values for skewness and kurtosis in the distribution of cognitive-errors scores are 
within the robust range for each gambling group (skewness: 0.54 for NPGs and 0.07 
for PGs; kurtosis: 0.51 for NPGs and -0.49 for PGs).  Thus, the distributions can be 
regarded as sufficiently normal to permit parametric analyses. 
An analysis shows that the internal reliability of the 14 items is high (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .89).  Preliminary analyses show that the data are suited to factor analysis.  Hence, a 
principal components analysis is conducted.  The results show three components with 
an eigenvalue above one.  These explain 43.14%, 16.15%, and 7.58% of the variance, 
respectively. As the eigenvalue for the third component is only slightly above one 
(1.07), further analyses are conducted to decide whether to retain or discard the factor.  
Using Cattell’s scree test (1966), an examination of the scree plot shows a clear break 
after Component 2, suggesting that Component 3 should be discarded.  However, this 
test is open to subjective interpretation (Pallant, 2010), so further analyses are 
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conducted before making a decision about the third component.  By conducting a 
principal components analysis on several randomly generated datasets of equal-size, 
Horn’s (1965) Parallel Analysis shows whether or not a component and corresponding 
eigenvalue is likely to be obtained by chance.  Hence, a Parallel Analysis is conducted 
with 100 randomly generated datasets of size 260 x 14.  The average eigenvalues of 
resulting components are compared to the corresponding values from the principal-
components analysis with the cognitive-errors questionnaire.  Only components with 
eigenvalues larger than those generated randomly are retained.  As only Components 1 
and 2 meet this criterion, Component 3 is discarded.  
Upon discarding Component 3, the principal components analysis is conducted again 
in order to extract only two components. The item loadings for each component are 
displayed in Table 21.  These are examined in order to decide which items to retain on 
each component.  
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Table 21. Indices of gambling behaviour for the whole sample and by gambling group. 
Items 
Component 
1 2 
3. Having a particular object can increase my chance of winning.  .76 -.24 
2. Betting on particular numbers or colours (or something similar) can increase 
my chance of winning.  .76 -.25 
4.  Certain behaviours or rituals can increase my chance of winning.  .76 -.20 
13. Having a near miss means I’m likely to win soon. .74 -.10 
7.  Having one win makes another more likely. .73 .03 
8.  I am more likely to win if I feel lucky. .73 -.03 
5.  After losing many times I am more likely to win. .72 -.22 
14. If I have lost money it is better to keep playing so I can try to win it back.  .70 -.19 
10.  I have more chance of winning if I keep to the same numbers / colours / 
choices for each bet. .69 -.12 
1.  Praying can help me win. .64 -.32 
6.  I can learn how to win from the losses I have. .54 .53 
12. I can win more if I use a certain strategy or system. .53 .67 
11. My wins are usually due to my skill/ability. .39 .78 
9.  I have some control over when I win. .34 .74 
 
The criterion for retaining an item on a component is set at an item-loading of.4 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013).  Table 21 shows that all items, except Items 9 and 11, 
load at least .4 on Component 1, and four items (including Items 9 and 11) load at 
least .4 on Component 2.  Hence, two items (Items 6 and 12) cross-load on both 
components.  In order to maintain simple structure, these items are discarded 
(Thurstone, 1947).  This leaves ten items with satisfactory loadings on Component 1, 
and two items (9 and 11) with satisfactory loadings on Component 2.  However, as 
components with only two items are unstable (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001), 
Component 2 is discarded.  Hence, the principal components analysis is repeated, 
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using only the twelve items that load more than .4 on Component 1, and extracting 
only one component. 
The results show similar item loadings to those in Table 21, though they are slightly 
stronger (an additional loading of .01 to .03 for each item).  Given this similarity, the 
loadings are not shown again.  Further examination shows that the internal reliability 
of the twelve items is high (Cronbach’s alpha  = .92).  Overall, the items load 
strongly (>.6) on one factor, and show good internal reliability.  Given these sound 
psychometric properties, the twelve-item questionnaire is termed the ‘Cognitive 
Errors Scale’ from here-in. 
Using the mean of the twelve retained items (each item is scored from 0 to 6) to 
provide each participant a score on the questionnaire, the mean (SD) score on the 
Cognitive Errors Scale is higher for PGs (2.65, SD = 1.56) than for NPGs (1.42, SD 
= 1.36).  An independent-samples t-test shows that this difference is significant, t 
(258) = 5.93, p < .001, and the effect-size is medium to large (Cohen’s d = .68; 
Cohen, 1988).  
Overall, there are few cases with invalid data, and the distribution of cognitive errors 
for each group can be regarded as normal.  Additionally, the psychometric properties 
of the Cognitive Errors Scale are sound.  The mean score on the scale is significantly 
higher for PGs than for NPGs.  
In conclusion, with the exception of the free-association task, there are minimal 
invalid data across all variables.  In addition, there is no obvious pattern to the 
missing data on the free-association task.  Furthermore, the distribution of scores for 
all continuous variables other than session length can be regarded as normal for each 
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gambling group, and the psychometric properties of the questionnaires are sound. 
Finally, there appears to be significant differences between PGs and NPGs on all 
DVs.  In the next section, further analyses are conducted to examine the hypotheses 
outlined in Section 4.1.  
4.3.4  Examining Hypothesis 1: Valence of expectancies 
In this section, the hypotheses outlined in Section 4.1.2 are examined.  Hypothesis 1 
is that scores on each expectancy measure are positive for NPGs, but negative for 
PGs.  This has already been demonstrated in Section 4.3.3.2, and in 4.3.3.3, where it 
was shown that the effect-sizes for the differences are large.  
Given that the second hypothesis is that expectancies will tend to be more positive 
for those experiencing a strong urge compared with those experiencing a mild urge, 
additional analyses are conducted to examine the valence of expectancies according 
to urge level.  Hence, separate analyses are conducted for mild- and strong-urge 
participants in each gambling group.  In order to be conservative when categorising 
urge-level groups, only those who score 1 or 2 on the urge item are categorised into 
the mild-urge group, and only those who score 5 or more are categorised into the 
strong-urge group.  All other participants are excluded from these analyses.  
Before conducting the analyses, an examination of the distributions on each 
expectancy measure shows that skewness and kurtosis are within the robust range for 
each urge-level by gambling group (skewness = 1.39 and kurtosis = -0.27 for mild-
urge NPGs, and skewness = 0.86 and kurtosis = -1.34 for mild-urge PGs;  for strong-
urge NPGs, skewness = 0.61 and kurtosis = -1.49, and for strong-urge PGs, skewness 
= -0.25 and kurtosis = -1.64).  Hence, the mean scores on each expectancy measure 
are compared to zero for each of these groups, using one-sample t-tests.  A Holm-
 174 
 
Bonferroni adjustment of alpha is applied to the four analyses for each gambling 
group.  The results are shown in Table 22 (note the means are not repeated in this 
table, as they have already been provided in Section 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2). 
Table 22. Results of one-sample t-test comparing scores on each 
expectancy measure to zero, by urge-level and gambling group 
(significant results are bolded). 
Expectancy measures 
Mild-urge group Strong-urge group 
t df p t df p 
Non-problem gamblers 
BGBQ 
3.64 60 .001 
 
9.26 
 
31 
 
<.001 
Free-association task 1.81 52 .057 4.43 25 <.001 
Problem gamblers 
BGBQ 
4.13 41 <.001 
 
-3.32 
 
53 
 
.002 
Free-association task 3.16 33 .002 -2.57 51 .013 
 
With the exception of mild-urge NPGs on the free-association task, the mean scores 
on each expectancy measure differ significantly from zero for all groups, and in the 
predicted direction.  Mild-urge NPGs exhibit a positive mean-score on the free-
association task, as predicted.  However, it does not quite differ significantly from 
zero (p = .057).  Overall, the data support Hypothesis 1, though when dividing the 
gambling groups further into urge-level groups, there is insufficient evidence 
regarding the valence of expectancies for mild-urge NPGs.  
As the sample comprises different type of gamblers, the valence of expectancies are 
also examined for those who primarily play different gambling games.  Due to the 
number of invalid cases on the free-association task, there are only enough EGM and 
poker players to examine the valence of expectancies separately for PGs and NPGs. 
Hence, the mean valence on the free-association task and the BGBQ is compared to 
zero using a one-sample t-test for PGs who primarily play EGMs, NPGs who 
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primarily play EGMs, PGs who primarily play poker, and NPGs who primarily play 
poker.  The results are shown in Table 23.  
Table 23. Comparing mean scores on each expectancy measure by 
gambling group and game type using a one-sample t-test (significant 
results in bold). 
EGM-players Statistics 
Free-association task Mean (SD) t df p 
NPGs 0.28 (5.37) 0.22 17 .83 
PGs -2.54 (4.58) -3.84 47 <.001 
BGBQ Mean (SD) t df p 
NPGs 0.88 (2.91) 1.32 18 .20 
PGs -1.98 (2.51) -5.68 51 <.001 
Poker players Statistics 
Free-association task Mean (SD) t df p 
NPGs 1.26 (2.39) 3.08 33 .004 
PGs -1.13 (3.81) -1.18 15 .26 
BGBQ Mean (SD) t df p 
NPGs 2.39 (2.02) 7.45 39 <.001 
PGs -0.94 (3.37) -1.19 17 .25 
 
Using a Holm-Bonferroni adjustment for four analyses for NPGs, and for four 
analyses for PGs, it can be seen that expectancies on both tasks are significantly 
negative for EGM-playing PGs, and significantly positive for poker-playing NPGs. 
There are no other significant differences.  Hence, it may be that the significantly 
negative expectancies for the whole PG-sample are primarily due to the EGM-
gamblers, and the significantly positive mean expectancies for the whole NPG-
sample are primarily due to the NPGs who primarily play poker.  
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4.3.5  Examining Hypothesis 2: Relationship between 
expectancies and ratings of urge 
The second hypothesis is that scores on each expectancy measure will become more 
positive as urge strengthens.  Hence, a linear regression analysis with urge as a 
predictor variable and either free-association scores, or BGBQ scores, as the outcome 
variable is conducted.  It cannot be assumed that the relationship between urge and 
expectancies is the same for each gambling group as hypotheses tend to differ by 
gambling group.  Hence, separate analyses are conducted for each gambling group.  
Before conducting the regressions, preliminary analyses are conducted to determine 
the suitability of the data to regression analysis.  It is recommended that there is 
some relationship between predictor and outcome variables when conducting 
regression analysis.  More specifically, a moderate bivariate correlation (r = .30) is 
recommended (Pallant, 2010).  In this thesis, predictors are included in a regression 
if they show a bivariate correlation of at least .20, which is slightly lower than the 
recommended correlation of .30.  The reason for this is that the strength of the 
observed relationship between two variables often differs when other predictors or 
covariates are included in the regression analysis, so the relationship might be 
stronger after controlling for other variables.  In addition, at times the absence of a 
relationship is hypothesised.  Hence, where the correlation between the predictor and 
outcome variables is at least .20, it seems prudent to conduct further analyses to 
ensure that the relationship is minimal even after other covariates have been 
included.  
Hence, the first step to examining Hypothesis 2 is to examine the strength of the 
correlation between urge and each expectancy measure for each gambling group.  
The correlation matrix in Table 16 (in Section 4.3.3) shows that these correlations are 
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less than .20 for the free-association task for each gambling group (r = .19 for NPGs, 
and r = .11 for PGs), and for the BGBQ for PGs (r = .16).  Hence, for the free-
association task, and for PGs on both tasks, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  Given 
this, further examination of Hypothesis 2 using a regression analysis is conducted 
only for NPGs, and only for the BGBQ.  This analysis is now described.  
It was noted in the introduction (Section 4.1.1) that research has shown that current 
affect can bias evaluative judgements (Boden & Berenbaum, 2010).  Hence, affect is 
considered for inclusion as a possible covariate.  Inspection of the correlation matrix 
in Section 4.3.3 shows a moderate correlation (r = .32) between affect and the BGBQ 
for NPGs, so affect can be included in analyses.  Hence, a hierarchical linear 
regression is conducted, with affect entered in the first step.  
In addition, those with higher Scale of Gambling Choices may also be experiencing a 
stronger urge during the study.  Hence, any relationship between urge and 
expectancies observed may also be explained by the relationship between the Scale 
of Gambling Choices and expectancies.  For this reason, the Scale of Gambling 
Choices is also considered as a possible covariate.  However, inspection of the 
correlation matrix in Section 4.3.3 shows a weak correlation (r = -.17) between the 
Scale of Gambling Choices and the BGBQ that is less than .20, so the Scale of 
Gambling Choices are not included as a covariate in the regression.   
Further preliminary analyses show that inspection of the normal probability plots, 
residuals scatterplots, and Mahalanobis Distance (using a criterion of .001) satisfy 
the assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of 
residuals.  Furthermore, there is no evidence of residual outliers.  The results are 
shown in Table 24.  
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Table 24. Results of a hierarchical linear regression predicting scores on the BGBQ 
for NPGs (steps with a significant ' R2 are in bold). 
Variables 'R2 
Zero-
order sr2 B E 
p-value 
for 
predictor F 
p-value 
for step 
Step 1 
affective valence 
.11 
 
 
.32 
 
.08 
 
.23 
 
.29 
 
<.001 
14.50 <.001 
Step 2 
affective valence 
urge 
.21  
.32 
.32 
 
.11 
.11 
 
.19 
.50 
 
.33 
.33 
 
<.001 
<.001 
16.86 <.001 
 
The table shows support for the hypothesis that expectancies on the BGBQ tend to be 
more positive for NPGs experiencing a stronger urge.  It can be seen that urge 
accounts for an additional 11% of the variance in BGBQ scores, after controlling for 
affect.  Using Cohen’s (1988) estimates (small 'R2= .02, medium 'R2= .13, and 
large 'R2= .26), urge may be regarded as accounting for a moderate proportion of 
variance in BGBQ scores.  Hence, the data show support for Hypothesis 2 only for 
NPGs, and only on the BGBQ.  
4.3.6  Examining Hypothesis 3: Relationship between the 
expectancy measures 
The third hypothesis is that the two expectancy measures will correlate.  It has 
already been shown in the preliminary analyses in Section 4.3.2 that the measures 
correlate moderately and significantly with each other for each gambling group. 
However, given that the PGs tend to view gambling negatively, whereas NPGs tend 
to view gambling positively, examining the correlation for each gambling group 
separately is likely to limit the strength of the correlation.  Hence, the relationship 
between the measures is also examined for the whole sample.  For the whole sample, 
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the expectancy measures show a strong and significant correlation, r = .52, n = 222, 
p < .001.  Hence, the data support Hypothesis 3.  
4.3.7  Examining Hypothesis 4: Strength of concurrent urge 
Hypothesis 4 is that PGs will exhibit a stronger mean urge than NPGs, and a greater 
proportion of PGs will exhibit a strong urge than NPGs.  Preliminary analyses in 
Section 4.3.2 have already shown that PGs exhibit a significantly stronger mean urge 
than NPGs, which supports Hypothesis 4.  In this section the proportion of those in 
the strong-urge group is compared across the gambling groups;  the proportions are 
shown in Table 25. 
Table 25. The proportion of participants in 
each urge-level group for each gambling 
group. 
Urge-level group NPGs PGs 
Mild-urge group 65.6% 42.4% 
Strong-urge group 34.4% 57.6% 
 
It can be seen in the table that there is a greater proportion of PGs than NPGs in the 
strong-urge group.  A chi-square test of independence shows that this difference is 
significant, α2 (1) = 10.35, n = 192, p = .001.  Hence, Hypothesis 4 is supported.  
4.3.8  Examining Hypothesis 5: Strength of cognitive errors  
The fifth hypothesis is that both mild-urge NPGs and mild-urge PGs will exhibit 
either disagreement with cognitive errors overall (as indicated by their mean score), 
or mild agreement.  As noted in Section 4.2.3.6, a mean score of 4 on the Cognitive-
Errors Scale is indicative of mild agreement, a mean score of 3 indicates neither 
agreement nor disagreement, and a mean score of 2 or less is indicative of mild to 
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strong disagreement.  Hence, the mean score on the Cognitive-Errors Scale is 
compared to at least one of these points to establish the mean level of (dis)agreement 
with cognitive errors overall for mild-urge participants in each gambling group.  
Preliminary analyses show satisfaction of the assumption of normality for both 
groups, as skewness and kurtosis are both within the ‘robust range’ (skewness = .40 
and kurtosis -1.17 for mild-urge NPGs and skewness = -0.92 and kurtosis = 0.90 for 
mild-urge PGs).  Inspection of the mean score on the Cognitive-Errors Scale shows 
that mild-urge NPGs exhibit a mean score of 1.69 (SD = 1.28), whereas mild-urge 
PGs exhibit a mean score of 2.72 (SD = 1.49).  As the mean score for mild-urge 
NPGs is slightly less than 2 (indicating moderate disagreement overall), a one-
sample t-test is conducted to see whether the mean score is significantly lower than 
2.  Results show that it is, t (60) = 3.79, p <.001.  Hence, the mean score on the 
Cognitive-Errors Scale indicates moderate disagreement overall for mild-urge NPGs. 
The mean score on the scale for mild-urge PGs is slightly lower than 3, so a one-
sample t-test is conducted to see whether it is significantly lower than a score of 3 
(which indicates neither agreement or disagreement with cognitive errors overall).  
This test shows that the mean score is significantly lower than 3 for mild-urge PGs, t 
(41) = 3.59, p =.001.  Hence, the mean score on the Cognitive-Errors Scale is 
significantly lower than ‘neither agrees nor disagrees’ which suggests that the mean 
score is somewhere between mild disagreement overall, or ambivalence.  Thus, the 
findings for both mild-urge gambling groups are consistent with Hypothesis 5, which 
argues that cognitive-errors are mild in the absence of gambling activity.   
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4.3.9  Examining Hypothesis 6: Cognitive errors strengthen 
as urge strengthens 
The sixth hypothesis is that scores on the Cognitive-Errors Scale will tend to be 
greater for those with a stronger urge.  Hence, a linear regression is conducted, with 
urge as the predictor and Cognitive-Errors Scale as the outcome variable.  
Preliminary analyses show that urge shows a correlation with the Cognitive-Errors 
Scale of at least .20 (r =.31, p <.001).  Further preliminary analyses show satisfaction 
of the assumptions for linear regression (as outlined in Section 4.3.5).  The results of 
the regression show that urge is a significant predictor of scores on the Cognitive 
Errors Scale, R2 = .09, E = .31, F = 26.58, p < .001, consistent with Hypothesis 7.  A 
moderate portion (9%) of the variance in cognitive errors can be accounted for by 
ratings of current urge.  Hence, the data support Hypothesis 6. 
4.3.10  Examining Hypothesis 7: Predicting gambling 
frequency from cognitive errors 
Hypothesis 7 is that cognitive errors measured outside of gambling will not predict 
gambling frequency.  As the decision-making process is likely to differ for PGs and 
NPGs, this is examined separately for each gambling group.  In order to examine this 
prediction, a regression analysis needs to be conducted.  Preliminary analyses are 
conducted in order to establish whether the Cognitive Errors Scale shows a 
correlation with gambling frequency of at least .20.  As gambling frequency is a 
categorical variable with unequal intervals (‘Most days’, ‘More than once a week’, 
‘More than once a month’, and ‘Less than once a month’), parametric analyses 
cannot be conducted (as unequal intervals violates the assumption that the data are 
distributed normally).  Hence, the non-parametric Spearman’s rank-order co-efficient 
is used to examine any correlation between gambling frequency and cognitive errors 
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for each gambling group.  For both gambling groups, the correlation between 
cognitive-errors and gambling frequency is less than .20 (NPGs: Spearman’s r = .12, 
p = .19;  PGs: Spearman’s r = .18, p = .04).  Hence, the data are not suited to 
regression analyses for either gambling group.  It must be noted, however, that 
Spearman’s rank-order co-efficient is significant for PGs.  Hence, the data provide 
evidence that the relationship between cognitive errors and gambling frequency for 
PGs is indeed very weak, which may be regarded as supporting Hypothesis 7.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 7 is supported for both gambling groups.  
It must be noted, however, that examining this prediction separately for each 
gambling group may limit the size of the correlation, as truncating the range of the 
independent variable tends to limit the size of the correlation (Francis, 2013).  Hence, 
the correlation for the whole sample is also examined.  This is also less than .20 
(Spearman’s r = .19, p = .003), though again, Spearman’s rank-order co-efficient is 
significant.  Hence, no follow-up regressions are conducted, as the data show a weak 
relationship between cognitive errors and gambling frequency for the whole sample.  
This relationship is so minimal that Hypothesis 7 may be regarded as supported.  
4.3.11  Examining Hypothesis 8: Predicting gambling activity 
Hypothesis 8 is slightly different for each gambling group.   For PGs it is proposed 
that urge will predict gambling activity, but expectancies (free-association task and 
the BGBQ) will not.  For NPGs on the other hand, it is proposed that both urge and 
expectancies will predict gambling activity.  As noted previously, the gambling 
activity variables are ‘gambling frequency’ and ‘session length’.  Hence, a regression 
analysis is conducted for each gambling group to examine the ability of urge and 
each expectancy measure to predict session length and gambling frequency.  
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The first step to these analyses is to examine the strength of the correlation for each 
predictor (urge and each expectancy measure) with each measure of gambling 
activity, in order to determine if it is at least .20.  As gambling frequency is a 
categorical variable, Spearman’s non-parametric rank-order co-efficient is used to 
examine the correlations with potential predictors (see Section 4.2.3.6).  Spearman’s 
non-parametric rank-order co-efficient is also used to examine the correlations for 
session length, as the distribution of session length violates the assumption of 
normality, even after some outliers are recoded (as noted in Section 4.3.2).  The 
correlation matrix for these variables is shown in Table 26. 
Table 26. Spearman’s rank-order co-efficient between predictor 
variables and ‘gambling activity’ outcome variables for each 
gambling group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen that for PGs each gambling activity variable shows a correlation 
greater than .20 with urge, but less than .20 with each expectancy measure.  Thus, the 
expectancy measures are not included in further regression analyses.  Moreover, the 
data support the proposition that expectancy measures will not predict gambling 
activity variables for PGs.  
Outcome variables Urge 
Free-
association 
task 
BGBQ 
NPGs  n = 131 n = 110 n = 131 
Session length .25*** .15 .21** 
Gambling frequency .36*** .06 .18* 
PGs n=129 n=114 n=129 
Session length .27** .07 .07 
Gambling frequency .23* -.03 .03 
*<.025; **<.01; ***<.001 
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For NPGs, on the other hand, correlations greater than .20 are observed between urge 
and each gambling-activity variable on the one hand, and between the BGBQ and 
session length, on the other hand.  There are no further correlations greater than .20. 
Thus, so far, Hypothesis 8 is also supported for NPGs, though only for session length 
and only with the BGBQ, but not with the free-association task.  Further analyses 
examining how well urge and the BGBQ predict session length, and how well urge 
predicts gambling frequency, are conducted below for NPGs.  
For each gambling group, follow-up regressions are conducted for each gambling 
activity variable.  As suggested by the correlation matrix, for PGs, two regressions 
are conducted, one with gambling frequency as the outcome variable, and one with 
session length as the outcome variable, and each with urge as the predictor.  For 
NPGs, the regression is the same for gambling frequency as that for PGs, but for 
session length, both urge and BGBQ scores are included in the regression.  
The regressions with session length are described first.  Although session length is 
skewed for each group, examination of the assumptions for a linear regression 
(outlined in Section 4.3.5) show that they are sufficiently satisfied (the assumptions 
for linear regression require that the residuals are normally distributed, rather than 
the outcome variable, so skewness on session length does not undermine the use of 
linear regression; Francis, 2013).  Inspection of the residuals scatterplot shows some 
skew in the distribution of residuals at each predicted value for NPGs, and some 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals for PGs.  This will weaken the strength of the 
findings, but it will not invalidate the analysis (Tabachnik & Fiddell, 2013). Given 
this reduction in power, a greater ratio of predictors to cases is required (Francis, 
2013).  Hence, the ability of urge and BGBQ scores to predict session length is 
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examined separately for NPGs, rather than together.  The results of analyses for each 
regression are shown in Table 27. 
Table 27. Results of linear regressions for each gambling group 
predicting scores on session length (steps with a significant 'R2 are 
in bold). 
Gambling 
group Variables 'R2 B E F 
p-value 
for 
model 
NPGs Urge .11 .54 .33 14.65 <.001 
BGBQ .06 .15 .09 7.72 .006 
PGs urge .07 .60 .28 8.67 .004 
 
It can be seen that urge and BGBQ scores both significantly predict session length 
for NPGs, consistent with Hypothesis 8.  Urge accounts for 11% of the variance in 
session length, and BGBQ scores account for 6% of the variance in session length.  
In this sample, for every additional unit in urge level, session length is about half an 
hour longer (32 minutes), on average, whereas for every additional unit on the 
BGBQ scale, session length is only nine minutes longer, on average.  Hence, urge is 
a stronger predictor than BGBQ scores for NPGs.  
For PGs, it can be seen that urge significantly predicts session-length, as predicted.  
Urge accounts for 7% of the variance in session length.  In this sample, for every 
additional unit in urge level, session length is about half an hour longer (36 minutes) 
on average (B = .60).  In sum, the data on session length is consistent with 
Hypothesis 8 for both groups.  
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In regards to gambling frequency, a linear regression cannot be used, as the DV is 
not metric.  Hence, instead, a non-parametric bootstrapped regression is used.  The 
way in which this differs from linear regression is now discussed.   
In traditional inferential hypothesis testing, an analytical approach is used, whereby a 
formula is applied to the sample-data to estimate population parameters.  By contrast, 
bootstrapping uses a non-analytical data-driven approach to estimate population 
parameters, where the sample is treated as a perfect replica of the population, and 
repeated sub-samples are taken from the sample.  The regression is conducted with 
each sub-sample.  The results of these repeated analyses provide the sampling 
distribution, which is used to estimate the population parameters. Hence, bootstrap 
uses a data-driven empirical approach to estimate population parameters, as opposed 
to the traditional analytical approach used in inferential statistics. 
As no formulas are used to estimate the population parameters, there are no 
assumptions about the underlying distribution of the data. Hence, bootstrap analysis 
is appropriate when the assumptions of parametric analyses are not met, for example, 
when an underlying normal distribution cannot be assumed due to an ordinal 
outcome variable, as is the case for gambling frequency.  Thus, bootstrap regression 
provides a suitable alternative to non-parametric regression, which overcomes some 
limitations of traditional inferential techniques.  A bootstrap regression is conducted 
for each gambling group, using urge to predict gambling frequency.  
For each bootstrap regression, 2000 iterations are conducted (that is, 2000 sub-
samples are taken, and a regression is conducted with each sub-sample).  For both 
analyses, solutions are found for all 2000 iterations (that is, none of the sub-samples 
resulted in a singular covariance matrix, in which an inverse covariance matrix could 
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not be found, leading to no solution).  The results are shown in Table 28.  Note that, 
when calculating associated p-values, the bias-corrected percentile method is used. 
This corrects for the fact that the sampling-distribution is calculated empirically 
using sub-samples from a sample of the population, rather than using samples from 
the actual population (Efron, 1987).   
Table 28. Results of bootstrap-regression 
predicting urge for each group. 
Group R2 
B-
weight β p 
NPGs .08 .16 .28 .001 
PGs .07 .10 .27 .001 
 
The results show that urge significantly predicts gambling frequency for each 
gambling group.  Urge accounts for 8 percent of the variance in gambling frequency 
for NPGs, and for 7% of the variance in gambling frequency for PGs.  In sum, 
Hypothesis 8 is supported on gambling frequency for PGs, whereas for NPGs, only 
urge predicts gambling frequency, but expectancies do not, which contrasts with 
Hypothesis 8.  
Overall, the hypothesis is supported for PGs, and partially supported for NPGs.  For 
PGs, only urge predicts indices of gambling activity, consistent with Hypothesis 8 
for PGs.  For NPGs, both urge and expectancies predict session length, consistent 
with Hypothesis 8 (though only one of the expectancy measures - the BGBQ – 
significantly predicts session length).  However, the findings in regards to gambling 
frequency contrast with Hypothesis 8 for NPGs, as only urge is a significant 
predictor, whereas both urge and expectancies were hypothesised to be significant 
predictors.  In sum, Hypothesis 8 is partially supported.  
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4.4 Discussion 
In this section, the findings pertaining to expectancies and cognitive errors are 
discussed in turn.  The findings are frequently discussed in terms of whether they are 
consistent with traditional consequentialist or the dual-process model of decision-
making presented in this thesis.  To facilitate this discussion, the models are briefly 
re-iterated.  
Consequentialist models posit that decisions are determined by weighing the positive 
and negative outcome expectancies related to each choice, and making a decision in 
line with optimal aggregate outcome expectancies (Fishburn, 1982; Loewenstein et 
al., 2001).  Thus, in regards to gambling, it would be assumed that exceptionally 
strong positive aggregate expectancies are the cause of excessive behaviour.  Hence, 
the model would predict exceptionally strong positive aggregate expectancies for 
PGs.  
By contrast, the dual-process model posits that excessive behaviour is the result of 
impaired control, due to excessive cue-triggered wanting. As loss of control causes 
poor decision-making, negative consequences are experienced, causing aggregate 
outcome expectancies to become negative.  Nevertheless, due to impaired control, 
the addictive behaviour continues (Berridge & Aldridge, 2009).  Thus, in contrast to 
consequentialist models, aggregate expectancies are predicted to be negative for PGs.  
Figures 2 and 3 depict both models of decision-making for PGs. 
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Figure 2. Applying a consequentialist model of decision-making to PGs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Applying a dual-process model of decision-making to PGs. 
Note that, for the different models, predictions regarding NPGs are similar.  For both, 
NPGs are predicted to gamble due to positive aggregate outcome expectancies.  
From a consequentialist perspective, the moderate gambling of NPGs is due to 
moderately positive aggregate expectancies.  From a dual-process perspective, NPGs 
maintain control over their gambling (as cue-triggered wanting is not excessive), so 
they tend not to gamble unless aggregate expectancies are positive.  That said, they 
too experience cue-triggered wanting (albeit not as strongly as PGs), which, when 
experienced, makes gambling more likely. 
The models differ in regard to their assumptions about the stability of expectancies, 
as well as in regards to valence.  Consequentialist models assume that aggregate 
expectancies are relatively stable, as experiences must accumulate over time for 
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aggregate expectancies to change, which takes time (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  
Hence, in the short to medium term, the outcomes expected on each decision-making 
occasion are very similar, so similar decisions are expecting across decision-making 
occasions.  There is no allowance for the possibility that expectancies may alter on 
each decision-making occasion as a function of internal or contextual factors that 
influence the immediate decision-making context (Loewenstein et al., 2001).   
By contrast, the dual-process model posits that both automatic and deliberative 
processes contribute to judgements, and their relative contribution varies according 
to internal and external factors. Hence, judgements and decisions are time-
inconsistent, so aggregate expectancies may be unstable (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  
In particular, it is predicted that aggregate expectancies will undergo a positive 
change when cue-triggered wanting is activated, which may allow any choice to 
gamble to be cognitively justified.   
There are also some unique predictions in relation to cognitive errors.  Most of the 
gambling literature has been silent about whether cognitive errors observed during 
gambling in think-aloud studies are stable, and so evident outside of gambling.  
Alternatively, it is hypothesised from a dual-process approach that features present 
during gambling (e.g., cue-triggered wanting, arousal, concurrent information-
processing tasks) elicit cognitive errors because these features cause automatic 
heuristic processing to dominate judgments, which, in turn, elicits cognitive errors.  
As these features are absent outside of gambling (or, at least, are less present), it is 
predicted that cognitive errors will be absent or only mild then as well.  However, 
even in the absence of gambling, the activation of cue-triggered wanting may cause 
cognitive errors to increase somewhat (not as much as they would be expected to 
increase during actual gambling).   
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The findings pertaining to expectancies will be discussed in the next section, and the 
findings pertaining to cognitive errors will be discussed in the section following. 
Before commencing a discussion of the findings, it must be noted that the term ‘urge’ 
is used when presenting findings.  Alternatively, when relating the findings back to 
the original theory, the term ‘cue-triggered wanting’ is used.  
4.4.1  Expectancies 
In this section, the results relating to expectancies are outlined, and then examined 
from a dual-process perspective.  Possible alternative explanations are then 
presented.  Finally, limitations and criticisms of the study are considered.  
4.4.1.1 Briefly reiterating the results 
The results for each expectancy measure are similar, and so are discussed together, 
except when specifically stated.  The results are outlined first, and then a dual-
process interpretation of the results is presented.  
The first prediction is that aggregate expectancies are positive for NPGs, and 
negative for PGs.  The results show support for these predictions on both expectancy 
measures, regardless of whether concurrent urge is mild or strong, though the 
positive mean score on the free-association task for mild-urge NPGs does not quite 
differ significantly from neutral.  
The second prediction is that aggregate expectancies will become more positive (or 
less negative) as cue-triggered wanting strengthens.  After controlling for affect and 
degree of impaired control (Scale of Gambling Choices), this prediction received 
support only for NPGs and only on the BGBQ.  
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The third prediction is that the expectancy measures will correlate.  This prediction is 
supported for both gambling groups. 
4.4.1.2 A dual-process perspective: discussing the findings 
relating to expectancies 
In this section, the findings related to expectancies are discussed from a dual-process 
perspective. 
Expectancies and cue-triggered wanting for PGs 
The finding that mean aggregate expectancies are negative for PGs, even during a 
strong urge, suggests that strong positive expectancies do not lead to an urge to 
gamble, as predicted by a consequentialist approach.  Rather, the data suggest that 
PGs tend to hold a negative view of gambling even when concurrent cue-triggered 
wanting is strong.  This is consistent with the dual-process prediction that PGs 
gamble in response to strong cue-triggered wanting, regardless of whether they 
expect positive or negative consequences to result from the decision.  Thus, the data 
pertaining to Hypothesis 1 provides support for the dual-process model. 
In contrast to Hypothesis 2, expectancies do not differ as a function of concurrent 
urge on either expectancy measure for PGs.  However, this lack of support for a dual-
process prediction does not necessarily contradict the model.  Expectancies may still 
change in response to some internal or external features, as proposed by the dual-
process model, but they may not change in response to changes in concurrent cue-
triggered wanting specifically.  For example, it may be that expectancies alter with 
concurrent affect for PGs rather than with concurrent urge.  In support of this 
possibility, both mean affect and mean expectancies (as measured on both 
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expectancy tasks) are negative for PGs, and affective valence shows a mild to 
moderate correlation with affect for PGs. 
It must also be noted that, even though overall expectancies do not appear to alter as 
a function of concurrent cue-triggered wanting, this does not discount the possibility 
that PGs focus on one positive expectancy when strong cue-triggered wanting is 
present.  For example, in Study 1 (Chapter 3), some PGs reported that, when they 
experience an urge to gamble, they focus on the possibility that they may win money 
if they gamble.  This thought may help to encourage the decision to gamble.  The 
expectancy measures used in Study 3 may not capture the presence of one 
particularly strong expectancy as they focus on overall gambling-related 
expectancies.  Hence, further research is required before drawing conclusions.  
Expectancies and cue-triggered wanting for NPGs 
For NPGs, mean scores on both expectancy tasks are positive as predicted by the 
dual-process model.  In addition, scores on the BGBQ tend to be more positive for 
those with a stronger urge than for those with a milder urge, as predicted.  However, 
contrary to predictions, this is not the case on the free-association task.  It was argued 
above (in Section 4.1.1) that the free-association task may primarily measure 
automatic evaluative responses to gambling, whereas the BGBQ may measure both 
automatic and deliberative evaluative responses.  Hence, the data may suggest that 
only deliberative evaluations, but not automatic ones, tend to be more positive for 
NPGs experiencing a stronger urge than for NPGs experiencing a milder urge.  
This is consistent with the dual-process prediction (Section 2.6.2.2) that cue-
triggered wanting may bias deliberative evaluations in order to make the decision to 
gamble more likely.  When a non-problem gambler experiences a strong desire to 
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gamble, they may alter their thoughts about gambling in order to encourage decisions 
that allow gambling to proceed, thereby concurring with the choice to gamble.  By 
contrast, the lack of difference in scores on the free-association task suggests that 
cue-triggered wanting does not bias automatic evaluative processes, so automatic 
evaluative judgments are left unaltered by the activation of cue-triggered wanting.  It 
may be that automatic evaluative processes are so rapid that they are not able to be 
altered by concurrent cue-triggered wanting. 
Alternatively, it may be that cue-triggered wanting does alter automatic evaluative 
processes, but the free-association task failed to detect this.  The number of words 
each participant wrote for the free-association task differs markedly, which 
contributes to difference in scores across participants.  For example, even when all of 
the words written are of the same valence, scores may differ markedly.  A participant 
who wrote three positive words would score three on the free-association task, while 
a participant who wrote ten positive words would score ten on the task, even though 
it is not clear whether the latter participant views gambling any more positively than 
the former participant.  This may introduce error into the free-association task, which 
may render the task insensitive to differences in ratings of current urge.  Hence, the 
finding that deliberative expectancies, but not automatic expectancies, differ 
according to concurrent cue-triggered wanting for NPGs requires replication.  
A further point that requires discussion is the lack of evidence regarding free-
association scores for mild-urge NPGs.  The mean score on the test is positive, and 
the p-value was close to significant, but the mean score does not differ significantly 
from zero, making inferences about mean free-association scores for mild-urge NPGs 
inconclusive.  It is likely that, with only 52 participants in the sample, the analysis 
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lacked power.  If the analysis is repeated with more participants, the mean free-
association score may be positive, albeit less positive than that for strong-urge NPGs. 
That said, however, it may alternatively be that mild-urge NPGs exhibit a mean free-
association score that is close to neutral, and so therefore does not differ from zero. 
Further research is required before any conclusion can be made.  
Overall, while not all findings are exactly as predicted, but they are explicable in 
terms of a dual-process account.  In the next section, possible alternative 
explanations are examined.  
4.4.1.3 Possible alternative explanations for the findings 
While the findings are consistent with dual-process predictions, some alternative 
explanations may be possible.  First, some PGs may gamble as a strategy for coping 
with their negative affect.  Negative affect may simultaneously elicit negative 
appraisals and a gambling urge, consistent with the findings from Study 2.  Although 
it may seem irrational to gamble when predominantly negative outcomes are 
expected, temporary escape from negative affect may be a strong motivation, despite 
aggregate negative outcome expectancies.  
If the dominant reason for choosing to gamble is to cope with negative affect, words 
to this effect (e.g. ‘escape’, ‘relief’, ‘better’, ‘cope’ etc.,) would be expected on the 
free-association task (when participants are asked to ‘describe how gambling makes 
you feel’).  To the contrary, only 3% of the words reported by PGs belonged to the 
category ‘escape, relax, or relief’ (and the word ‘cope’ never appeared).  Instead, the 
most common words reported on the task suggest that PGs mostly experience 
negative consequences and impaired control when they gamble.  The most common 
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categories of words for PGs (comprising more than half of the words reported by 
them) were (in order, from the most numerous to the least numerous words): 
x sad, depressed, and tired;  
x anxious, stressed, worried, and afraid;  
x fun, good, happy, enjoy, pleasure; 
x excited; 
x crazy, reckless, and lost control;  
x guilty, remorseful, regret, ashamed, and embarrassed; and  
x foolish, stupid, careless, wasteful. 
It can be seen that five of these seven categories are negative. The categories suggest 
that, rather than emotional regulation or escape, PGs tend to report negative affect 
and impaired control when asked to report automatic thoughts related to their 
gambling.  
 
In conclusion, it seems that the results are more consistent with a dual-process 
explanation than the alternative explanations which have been considered.  It must be 
noted however, that the study is subject to possible limitations, which suggest 
caution in the interpretation of the findings.  These are discussed below.  Prior to 
this, however, the results relating to the ability to predict gambling behaviour, and 
cognitive errors, are discussed.   
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4.4.2  Cognitive errors 
There are three different predictions for cognitive errors, all of which apply to both 
gambling groups.  First, it is predicted that cognitive errors will be absent or mild 
when cue-triggered wanting is not active.  This is operationalised into Hypothesis 5. 
Second, it is predicted that cognitive errors will become stronger as cue-triggered 
wanting strengthens.  This is operationalised into Hypothesis 6.  Third, it is predicted 
that, as cognitive errors are mild or absent, on average, outside of gambling, so they 
will not predict gambling choices outside of gambling (that is, they will not predict 
the choice to begin a gambling session, which is measured as gambling frequency).  
This is operationalised into Hypothesis 7.  The relevant findings are discussed in this 
section.  As the findings regarding Hypothesis 5 and 7 relate to each other, they are 
discussed together first, followed by the findings relating to Hypothesis 6.    
The findings support all three of these hypotheses.  These have two important 
implications, which relate to each other.  One is that cognitive errors observed 
outside of gambling are mild, and so are likely to contribute little to the choice to 
begin a gambling session.  The other is that cognitive errors are unstable.  These 
arguments are now discussed.  Following this, possible criticisms of these arguments 
are presented. 
The notion that cognitive errors outside of gambling are mild, and that cognitive 
errors measured outside of gambling do not predict session frequency, may suggest 
that cognitive errors do not precede, and elicit, gambling sessions, as it may 
previously have been implicitly assumed.  Furthermore, this may also challenge the 
assumption that the stronger cognitive errors observed for PGs compared with NPGs 
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during think-aloud studies are stable, and so may account for their greater gambling 
frequency (Baboushkin et al., 2001; Coulombe et al., 1992; Joukhador et al., 2003).  
The possibility that cognitive errors are unstable, and present during gambling 
activity, but not in the absence of gambling activity, may suggest that cognitive 
errors are elicited during gambling because features present at that time (such as cue-
triggered wanting, affect, physiological arousal, time-constraints, and information 
processing ‘pressure) encourage automatic heuristic processing, which in turn 
encourages cognitive errors.  Hence, rather than assuming that cognitive errors elicit 
gambling activity, it may be that gambling activity elicits cognitive errors.  Perhaps 
features that give rise to cognitive errors are present more strongly for PGs than for 
NPGs, thereby accounting for the greater cognitive errors observed during think-
aloud studies for PGs than for NPGs.  
There are some criticisms of these arguments however.  First, a between-groups 
design is used in Study 2.  Hence, change in cognitive errors is not examined over 
time as cue-triggered wanting changes.  Given this, it may be differences other than 
cue-triggered wanting that account for differences in cognitive errors between 
gamblers.  Alternatively, it may be that cognitive errors elicit a stronger urge, rather 
than that cue-triggered wanting elicits stronger cognitive errors (note that the word 
‘urge’ is used here as, presumably, if cognitive errors elicit a desire to gamble, that 
desire is cognitively mediated, rather than due to an automatic motivational response; 
hence, the phrase cue-triggered wanting is avoided).  These points provide an 
alternative interpretation of the findings in Study 2.  Thus, the study should be 
repeated using a longitudinal design, in order to ascertain the causational direction 
between cue-triggered wanting and cognitive errors.  
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It is proposed that the data in Study 2 show more support for the argument that cue-
triggered wanting elicits cognitive errors than for the argument that cognitive errors 
elicit an urge.  An implicit assumption of the latter argument is that cognitive errors 
strengthen the urge to gamble because they make the outcomes of gambling seem 
more positive.  For example, a memory bias, wherein previous wins are recalled 
more readily than losses encourages gamblers to believe that wins are likely.  If so, 
one would expect to observe stronger positive expectancies for those with a stronger 
urge.  By contrast, in Study 2, expectancies are negative for PGs experiencing a 
stronger urge.  Given this, it is proposed that it is more likely that the urge represents 
cue-triggered wanting, which elicits cognitive errors, than that cognitive errors elicit 
an urge.  This argument is tenuous, however, and further research is required.   
There is a second criticism of Study 2 relevant to the interpretation of the findings 
relating to cognitive errors.  The differences in the rate of cognitive errors observed 
outside of gambling in Study 2, and the rate of cognitive errors observed during 
gambling in think-aloud studies, may be a function of the different measures used. 
The think-aloud procedure may enhance information processing ‘pressure’ during 
gambling, thereby strengthening cognitive errors.  By contrast, in Study 2, cognitive 
errors are measured using a questionnaire format, which may encourage deliberative 
consideration, thereby weakening cognitive errors.  These different methodologies 
may account for the greater rate of cognitive errors observed during think-aloud 
studies compared with those observed in Study 2.  If so, this may undermine the 
argument that weak cognitive errors are observed in Study 2 (where participants are 
not gambling) due to the absence of features during gambling that enhance automatic 
processes.  Further research is required to investigate this proposition. 
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There is a final criticism of Study 2, which concerns the lack of evidence for a 
relationship between cognitive errors and gambling frequency.  It may be that there 
is actually a relationship but Study 2 failed to detect it.  For example, the lack of 
relationship detected may be because of the way gambling frequency is measured. 
Gambling frequency is measured as a categorical variable.  Using a categorical 
measure for a continuous construct necessarily entails loss of information, and so 
loss of accuracy in measurement.  This may account for the lack of relationship 
between cognitive errors and gambling frequency.  If so, cognitive errors may 
actually be able to predict gambling frequency, thereby suggesting that they do 
impact on the decision to gamble.  However, it was noted above that an assumption 
implicit in the argument that cognitive errors influence the decision to gamble is that 
they do so by making gambling seem like a more positive choice.  Hence, stronger 
positive expectancies would be expected for those with a stronger urge, which is not 
observed. Thus, the data may not support this criticism.  
However, the lack of relationship between gambling frequency and cognitive errors 
may be because nuisance variables caused too much variation in gambling 
frequency, making it difficult to detect a relationship with cognitive errors.  For 
example, differences in income may prevent some participants from gambling as 
often as they would like.  Hence, an external factor (income) may influence gambling 
frequency, which may make it difficult to observe a relationship between gambling 
frequency and cognitive errors.  In support of this argument, previous studies have 
also failed to observe a relationship between gambling frequency and other variables 
(Ostafin & Palfai, 2006; van den Wildenberg, Beckers, van Lambaart, Conrod, & 
Wiers, 2006).  In addition, Study 2 included participants who play lots of different 
game types, which may act as an additional nuisance variable on gambling 
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frequency.  Hence, the study should be repeated with gamblers who primarily play 
the same type of game.  
 
In sum, the findings in Study 2 regarding cognitive errors show that cognitive errors 
are mild in the absence of gambling activity, and tend to be stronger for those 
experiencing stronger cue-triggered wanting.  This challenges the assumption that 
cognitive errors are stable, that they precede and elicit gambling activity, and that 
differences in the strength of cognitive errors between gambling groups may 
therefore account for differences in gambling frequency.  These arguments stated, 
there are some criticisms of Study 2 that suggest the study should be repeated before 
drawing firm conclusions.  
4.4.3  Predicting gambling activity: expectancies and cue-
triggered wanting 
In this section, the hypotheses regarding the predictive utility of different 
psychological processes in relation to gambling activity are reviewed.  For PGs, the 
hypothesis that cue-triggered wanting (measured as urge), but not expectancies 
(measured on the BGBQ and the free-association task), will predict gambling 
behaviour is supported for both session length and gambling frequency.  This finding 
supports the proposition that cue-triggered wanting contributes to gambling decisions 
for PGs, whereas expectancies do not.  
For NPGs, the hypothesis that cue-triggered wanting and expectancies will both 
predict gambling behavior is supported for session length only.  For gambling 
frequency, only cue-triggered wanting is a significant predictor;  neither expectancy 
measure predicts gambling frequency.  Nonetheless, in regards to session length, the 
findings support the proposition that automatic motivational processes (namely, cue-
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triggered wanting) and evaluative processes contribute to gambling decisions for 
NPGs.  Hence, there is evidence in support of the dual-process propositions for both 
PGs and NPGs.  
The lack of evidence for a relationship between expectancies and gambling 
frequency for NPGs requires some discussion.  This may be because nuisance 
variables caused too much variation in gambling frequency, making it difficult to 
detect a relationship between gambling frequency and expectancies.  For example, 
differences in income may prevent some participants from gambling as often as they 
would like.  Hence, an external factor (income) may heighten variation in gambling 
frequency, which may make it difficult to observe any relationship with 
expectancies.   
Alternatively, it may be because gambling frequency is a categorical variable, 
whereas session length is a continuous variable.  Converting a continuous variable 
such as session frequency into a categorical variable necessarily entails loss of 
information, and so loss of accuracy in its measurement.  This may account for the 
lack of relationship between expectancies and gambling frequency, even though a 
relationship was observed between expectancies and session length.  Finally, it may 
just be that there is no relationship between gambling frequency and expectancies.  
Further research is required to clarify which possibility provides the best explanation.  
In sum, for PGs, the findings suggest that cue-triggered wanting, but not 
expectancies, predict indices of gambling behavior, as predicted by a dual-process 
interpretation of gambling.  For NPGs, the findings show support for the prediction 
that both cue-triggered wanting and expectancies predict gambling activity for 
session length only, which also supports a dual-process approach to gambling. 
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However, cue-triggered wanting, but not expectancies, predicts gambling frequency 
for NPGs, which contrasts with the dual-process prediction in Chapter 2. This lack of 
relationship may be because gambling frequency has too many nuisance variables, or 
because gambling frequency is measured as a categorical variable.  Further research 
is required to test these propositions. 
4.4.4 Possible methodological limitations 
There are some additional limitations to Study 2 that have not yet been discussed. 
First, the observation that expectancies become more positive only for NPGs (though 
only on the BGBQ) but not for PGs may be an artefact.  Research shows that it is 
more difficult to distinguish degrees of negativity than degrees of positivity (Forjaz 
et al., 2012).  Thus, the lack of change in expectancies for PGs compared to NPGs 
may be due to a different response style according to the valence of responses.  
However, this is only able to explain why expectancies did not become less negative 
for PGs as urge strengthens.  It does not explain why their expectancies did not 
become positive.  Hence, perhaps it can be assumed that mean expectancies remain 
negative regardless of the degree of concurrent cue-triggered wanting for PGs, but 
whether or not this degree of negativity alters as cue-triggered wanting changes is not 
clear.   
Additionally, the reliability of the free-association task may be questioned.  Its 
internal reliability cannot be examined (as there are no scale items), and the task may 
show poor test-re-test reliability (as the valence of words reported by participants 
may change over time).  That said, the valence of scores on the free-association task 
appear similar to that on the BGBQ, which may suggest the task is reliable.  
Additionally, there is a moderate correlation between the two expectancy measures, 
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which suggests that they are measuring a similar construct.  A large correlation 
would not be expected, because the two measures are proposed to be measuring 
slightly different processes (the BGBQ is proposed to measure deliberative and 
automatic processes, whereas the free-association task is proposed to measure 
predominantly automatic processes). 
It must also be noted that while this study examined the ability of cue-triggered wanting to 
predict gambling behaviour, the reverse causational direction could equally have been 
examined; that is, the ability of gambling behaviour to predict cue-triggered wanting. This 
may come about because the incentive-sensitisation model argues that sensitisation increases 
with each gambling episode so there is a positive-feedback loop between cue-triggered 
wanting and gambling behaviour.  Hence, both causational directions are hypothesised to 
operate, and either direction of causation is equally plausible.  This study examined the 
former in order to show that the strength of cue-triggered wanting is linked to gambling 
behaviour. However, it must be noted that regressions in a cross-sectional study design do 
not test for causation. Thus, evidence can only be interpreted as consistent with causation, 
but not actual evidence of causation. A longitudinal study design is required for such a 
conclusion. 
There are also some potential issues in regards to the measures used in the study. 
Only one of the measures (the Scale of Gambling Choices) has been examined and 
psychometrically validated by previous researchers.  The BGBQ and cognitive-errors 
scale are constructed specifically for Study 2.  This is due to lack of measures 
appropriate to the subject material and sample.  Fortunately, the measures show 
acceptable internal reliability and unified factor structures (see Section 4.3.4.1 and 
4.3.5.1).  In regards to face-validity, the items used were drawn from previous 
validated scales.  One criticism that applies to the scales is that test-re-test reliability 
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has not been examined, so the results may differ with other samples.  Hence, caution 
must be applied when making inferences from the samples to the broader population 
of PGs and NPGs, as the research needs to be replicated.  
In addition, the Scale of Gambling Choices is not typically used to determine 
problem-gambling status.  Scales such as the Problem Gambling Severity Index 
(from the Canadian Problem Gambling Scale), the South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS), or the DSM criteria, are usually used to measure problem-gambling status. 
As noted in Section 4.1, the Scale of Gambling Choices is chosen due to its 
theoretical relationship with the dual-process model and impaired control.  However, 
while the use of the scale is justified, it is not clear whether those identified as PGs 
would be identified as such using more typical measures.  I know of no studies that 
have made comparisons between the Scale of Gambling Choices and more typical 
problem-gambling measures.  
Finally, there are several possible limitations to recruiting participants and collecting 
data over the internet.  The anonymity of internet research may reduce the social 
pressure to complete the research honestly or with the effort required to answer 
questions with due consideration.  That said, participation requires effort and time 
without any reward or incentive to participate, so the likelihood of completing the 
study without a genuine interest in doing so may be low.  In addition, the research is 
kept as brief as possible in order to reduce attrition, and to ensure maximum attention 
for the whole study.  That said, the attrition-rate is relatively high compared with 
traditional recruitment methods, though this is expected with internet research 
(Birnbaum, 2004).  
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A participant may also misidentify themselves with ease over the internet (Birnbaum, 
2004).  For example, a male may report themselves as being female.  The comments 
section was examined in an attempt to identify misrepresentations.  This resulted in 
identification of two participants who provided misleading data (this data was to be 
deleted anyway due to many unanswered items).  Furthermore, it is also possible for 
one participant to submit their answers multiple times.  This is particularly so with 
the research design used in Study 2, where no identifying information is collected 
from participants.  That said, no obvious multiple submissions were identified.   
There may also be a sampling bias when recruiting participants over the internet, 
such as under-sampling participants from a certain demographic (Birnbaum, 2004).  
However, in English speaking countries, where recruitment was targeted, other 
research shows that the majority of the population (77.3% to 85.4%) use the internet 
(Linacre, 2007), so this problem is not as great as it used to be.   Additionally, the 
demographic characteristics of the sample recruited in Study 2 are diverse.  
Nonetheless, research shows demographic differences among those who use the 
internet and those who don’t, such that the latter tend to be from a lower 
socioeconomic status (Willis & Tranter, 2006).  Hence, the data may be slightly 
biased.  
Overall, there are some measurement issues that merit caution when interpreting the 
findings.  In addition, data collected over the internet may differ from data collected 
in other ways.  However, the limitations of the study are not so great as to undermine 
the basic findings of Study 2.  Nonetheless, the study should be replicated with other 
samples.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
Overall, the findings in Study 2 suggest that NPGs exhibit a positive evaluation of 
gambling, which becomes more positive as cue-triggered wanting is activated.  PGs, 
on the other hand, appear to exhibit a relatively stable negative evaluation of 
gambling, that remains negative even when cue-triggered wanting is activated.  This 
suggests that it is not positive expectancies that cause a strong desire for PGs to 
gamble.  This is consistent with a dual-process approach to problem gambling which 
suggests that excessive cue-triggered wanting leads to gambling despite negative 
expectancies.  The findings show that cue-triggered wanting predicts gambling 
activity for both PGs and NPGs.  Additionally, for NPGs, expectancies may also 
influence gambling decisions during a gambling session, as measured by session 
length.  
The data show minimal cognitive errors in the absence of a gambling session, as 
predicted, and that cognitive errors outside of gambling do not influence gambling 
decisions at that time (as measured by gambling frequency).  This challenges the 
assumption that the numerous cognitive errors observed during gambling for PGs 
compared with NPGs are stable, and so may account for their greater gambling 
activity.  The data also suggest that cognitive errors may be strengthened by 
automatic processes, such as cue-triggered wanting.  This is consistent with the dual-
process proposition that cognitive errors are not stable, but rather, are elicited by cue-
triggered wanting, and factors present during gambling.  
As there may be issues with the free-association task, and several different types of 
gamblers are included in Study 2, Study 3 measures expectancies again, using a more 
typical task, and with a sample comprising EGM gamblers only.  In addition, cue-
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triggered wanting is also examined using some different measures.  Finally, in Study 
4, some dual-process predictions are examined during actual gambling.  
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Chapter 5. Study 3: Examining expectancies and cue-
triggered wanting with EGM-gamblers using the IAT 
5.1 Introduction 
Study 2 examined dual-process predictions associated with expectancies and 
cognitive-errors.  Most of the predictions are supported.  Study 3 aims to re-examine 
automatic expectancies with a task that is more commonly used to do so, the 
‘evaluative implicit-association task’ (‘evaluative IAT’; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998).  This is a reaction-time task, and is explained briefly below, and 
then in more detail in the Methodology section.  More importantly, a modification of 
this task is used in Study 3 to examine predictions regarding cue-triggered wanting 
that have not yet been examined in this thesis.  This modification is also explained in 
detail below.  Finally, both Study 3 and 4 examine only gamblers who primarily play 
EGMs, whereas Study 2 included gamblers of many different game types.  This is 
because EGM-gamblers are known to be most at risk in Australia of developing a 
problem with gambling (ACNielson, 2006; A. Parke & Griffiths, 2006; Queensland 
Household Gambling Survey, 2007), and, for methodological reasons outlined 
below, it is preferable to include gamblers of only one particular game type.  For this 
reason, the gambling groups in this sample used in Study 3 are referred to as EGM 
non-problem gamblers (EGM-NPGs) and EGM problem gamblers (EGM-PGs), in 
order to make it clear that Study 3 differs from Study 2 in this way.  
The evaluative IAT compares reaction time to target versus non-target stimuli (e.g., 
alcohol versus soda cues) when each is paired with contrasting evaluative attributes, 
such as positive and negative words.  This is summarised in Table 29.  Participants 
respond to stimuli either with their right hand (using a specified key on the right side 
of their keyboard) or with their left hand (using a specified key on the left side of the 
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keyboard).  Attribute and target or non-target stimuli are deemed to be ‘paired’ for a 
block of trials if participants are asked to use the same response-key to respond to 
them.  
Table 29. Outline of a conventional evaluative IAT 
Block 
number Left response key* Right response key 
Block 1 Positive + target Negative + non-target 
Block 2 Negative + target Positive + non-target 
*Note: The positive + target may be assigned with the right response 
key on the first block; this choice varies and is random 
 
For one block of trials, the target stimuli (e.g., alcohol-related words or images) are 
paired with positive words, and the non-target stimuli (e.g., soda-related words or 
images) are paired with negative words (Block 1 in Table 29).  This pairing then 
swaps for the next bloc of trials, so the target stimuli are paired with negative words, 
and the non-target stimuli are paired with positive words (Block 2 in Table 29).  
Average reaction-time across these contrasting blocks is then compared.  The 
premise is that, if the automatic association with the target stimuli is positive 
compared with the non-target stimuli, then reaction-time will be fastest when the 
target stimuli are paired with positive words (Block 1 in Table 29).  By contrast, if 
the automatic association with the target stimuli are negative compared with the non-
target stimuli, then reaction-time will be fastest when the target stimuli are paired 
with negative words (Block 2 in Table 29).  Hence, the IAT allows one to compare 
the target stimuli relative to the non-target stimuli on a pair of contrasting attributes.  
For many target categories, such as gambling, it is difficult to find a suitable 
contrasting non-target category.  Hence, researchers have modified the conventional 
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IAT to create the single-category IAT (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) or the single-
target IAT (Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2006) in which non-target 
stimuli are omitted, as summarised in Table 30.  Thus, on each block, the target 
stimuli takes turns being paired with opposing attribute stimuli, such that reaction-
time for the paired block is compared to reaction-time for the non-paired block.  
Table 30. Outline of a single-target or single-category 
evaluative IAT. 
Block 
number Left response key* Right response key 
Block 1 Positive + target Negative 
Block 2 Negative + target Positive 
*Note: The positive + target may be assigned with the right 
response key on the first block; this choice varies and is random 
As reaction-time to respond to the target stimuli is not compared to the non-target 
stimuli in the single-category or single-target IAT, the absolute automatic evaluative 
association with the target stimuli can be observed, rather than the relative automatic 
evaluative association of the target stimuli compared to the non-target stimuli.  The 
former can be of greater theoretical and clinical interest to the researcher (Karpinski 
& Steinman, 2006).  Additionally, the non-target stimuli can be ambiguous, and can 
vary across studies (Wigboldus et al., 2006), making it difficult to interpret and 
compare findings on the conventional IAT.  For these reasons, the IAT used in Study 
3 is modelled on the single-target IAT.  Further methodological details, and 
justifications, are outlined in Section 5.1.6. 
Note that, as noted above, only Electronic Gambling Machine (EGM) gamblers are 
included in Study 3.  This is because gambling stimuli presented in the IAT format 
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need to be specific to one particular gambling game.  If responses to multiple games 
are included, participants who primarily play different gambling games are likely to 
have vastly different responses to the stimuli, which would increase error-variance. 
Hence, gamblers who primarily play one particular game type are selected.  As noted 
above, EGM-gamblers are chosen, because they are known to be the most likely in 
Australia to develop a problem with gambling (ACNielson, 2006; Queensland 
Household Gambling Survey, 2007), and so are an important group to study.   
5.2  Expectancies and the evaluative IAT 
In this section, some terminology is discussed, and the predictions are presented.  
Previous relevant research is then examined.  
5.2.1  Some comments about terminology 
Before outlining the predictions for Study 3, a brief note about terminology is 
necessary.  The term ‘automatic’ has been used to refer to processes in the automatic 
system in this thesis, whereas the term ‘implicit’ is normally used in the context of 
IATs.  Although processes in the automatic system are characterised as both 
automatic and implicit (J. Evans, 2008), the terms are not entirely mutually exclusive 
(De Houwer, 2006).  However, in order to retain consistency, the term ‘automatic’ 
will be used here.  
There is a second issue that requires clarification.  In Chapters 2 and 4, reference is 
made to automatic ‘expectancies’.  By contrast, the evaluative IAT is often referred 
to as measuring automatic (or implicit) ‘attitudes’.  These terms are thus discussed 
here, with particular attention to their suitability as terms to describe the processes 
measured by the evaluative-IAT. 
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Expectancies may be regarded as evaluative beliefs about the predicted outcomes of 
a particular behaviour (Gillespie et al., 2007a; Loewenstein et al., 2001).  By 
contrast, attitudes may be seen as an evaluative disposition towards an object, issue 
or behaviour (Fazio, 1995).  Hence, attitudes may be regarded as more general, and 
expectancies as more specific.  Despite this difference, it may be argued that the 
same automatic evaluative (or affective) component underlies each construct, 
whereas the cognitive processes that characterise each construct may differ.  It is the 
shared evaluative component that the IAT is designed to measure (Greenwald et al., 
1998).  Hence, either term (automatic ‘expectancies’ or automatic ‘attitudes’) may be 
suitable when referring to the processes measured by the IAT.  In order to show that 
it is only the automatic evaluative component that is being measured, the phrase 
automatic ‘evaluative associations’ will be used to refer to the processes measured by 
the IAT in this thesis.  
Despite these comments, it must be noted that the type of words selected as stimuli in 
the IAT may be influenced by whether the researcher believes they are measuring 
expectancies or attitudes.  For example, when measuring positive expectancies, the 
researcher may be more likely to choose words representing predicted behavioural 
outcomes, such as ‘fun’, ‘enjoyable’, or ‘pleasant’, as opposed to words describing 
positive disposition, such as ‘good’, ‘marvellous’, or ‘great’.  I know of no research 
that has compared the usefulness of selecting words of either type.  However, 
previous research has shown that the more closely related a word is to the behaviour 
being examined, the stronger the observed relationship with the behaviour (Houben, 
Nosek, & Wiers, 2010).  Hence, as expectancies are more specific, the use of 
expectancies rather than attitudes may strengthen IAT findings.  Thus, words 
representing gambling-related expectancies are used in the evaluative-IAT in Study 
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3.  A further reason for this selection is that the predictions in this thesis are focused 
on expectancies, rather than attitudes.  
5.2.2  Outlining the major predictions pertaining to 
expectancies 
So far, it has been stated that the evaluative IAT will be used in Study 3 to examine 
automatic expectancies, rather than the free-association task that was used in Study 
2.  Before outlining predictions, it must also be added that the Bipolar Gambling 
Beliefs Questionnaire (BGBQ) that was used in Study 2 is also included in Study 3.  
It has been noted previously that the BGBQ may measure both automatic and 
deliberative expectancies.  Hence, inclusion of the BGBQ allows the relationship 
between automatic expectancies (measured on the evaluative-IAT) and deliberative 
expectancies (measured on the BGBQ) to be examined.  It also allows the BGBQ to 
be re-administered with another sample (in particular, one that is EGM-only).  Note 
that the BGBQ is altered slightly, in order to add some expectancies that may be 
important but were overlooked in Study 2, and to improve one of the items.  Details 
of such changes are outlined in Section 5.6.3.1.  
The predictions relating to expectancies are now outlined.  The predictions are 
similar to those outlined in Chapter 2, though some are slightly adjusted to 
incorporate the findings from Study 2 (Chapter 4).  Note that changes made to 
predictions in response to findings from Study 2 remain consistent with the dual-
process model, as noted in Section 4.4.1.2.  Given these minor changes, the Study-2 
findings are briefly re-iterated, and then the predictions for Study 3 are presented.  
Before doing so, the theoretical justification for each prediction is briefly re-
presented.  
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The theoretical justification for the first predictions, which concern the valence of 
aggregate expectancies for each gambling group, are now briefly re-outlined.  It has 
been argued throughout this thesis that mild to moderate cue-triggered wanting and 
positive expectancies contribute to the decision to gamble for NPGs.  By contrast, for 
PGs, it has been argued that excessive cue-triggered wanting leads to impaired 
control, and so initiation of gambling activity, regardless of the valence of concurrent 
aggregate expectancies.  Hence, PGs gamble even when they expect negative 
consequences overall.  As a result, negative consequences are heightened, and so 
negative expectancies are strengthened.  Hence, positive aggregate expectancies were 
predicted for NPGs in Study 2, while negative aggregate expectancies were predicted 
for PGs.  The findings from Study 2 are consistent with these hypotheses for both 
groups, regardless of whether concurrent cue-triggered wanting is mild or strong.  
The one exception is that for NPGs experiencing mild cue-triggered wanting, mean 
expectancies did not differ from neutral on the free-association task, in contrast to 
predictions.  Thus, for Study 3, the predictions remain the same as for Study 2, 
except that for mild-urge EGM-NPGs, mean expectancies on the evaluative IAT may 
be neutral, instead of positive, in line with the findings from Study 2. 
It has also been predicted throughout this thesis that expectancies are time-
inconsistent, such that they differ according to internal and contextual factors.  Thus, 
it was predicted in Study 2 that expectancies will be more positive when cue-
triggered wanting is strongly active than when it is mild or absent.  This prediction 
was supported for NPGs only, and only on the BGBQ.  Thus, for Study 3, this 
prediction is proposed for EGM-NPGs on the BGBQ only.  For EGM-PGs, it is 
predicted that there will be no evidence of a change in expectancies on either 
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expectancy task as cue-triggered wanting strengthens, and neither for EGM-NPGs on 
the evaluative IAT. 
Finally, the dual-process model theorises that automatic and deliberative processes 
interact when making a judgment.  Hence, it was predicted in Study 2 that scores on 
the free-association task (which are proposed to primarily measure automatic 
expectancies) and the BGBQ (which is proposed to measure automatic and 
deliberative expectancies) will correlate.  Study 2 found support for this prediction.  
Thus, this prediction remains the same for Study 3.   
Table 31 summarises the main predictions pertaining to expectancies.  In the table, 
each prediction is also operationalised into a testable hypothesis.  Note that, as in 
Study 2, cue-triggered wanting is measured in Study 3 as current urge to gamble.  In 
addition, once again, Study 3 is a between-groups design, so the operationalised 
hypotheses are worded to reflect this.   
  
 217 
 
Table 31. Predictions and operationalised hypotheses relating to expectancies in Study 3. 
 Predictions Operationalised hypothesis 
1. Aggregate deliberative 
expectancies will be positive for 
EGM-NPGs, and negative for 
EGM-PGs, whether concurrent 
cue-triggered wanting is mild or 
strong. 
EGM-NPGs will exhibit a positive 
mean score, and EGM-PGs will 
exhibit a negative mean score, on the 
BGBQ under both mild- and strong-
urge conditions.  
 Aggregate automatic expectancies 
will be negative for EGM-NPGs 
experiencing strong concurrent 
cue-triggered wanting, whereas 
they will be negative or neutral for 
EGM-NPGs not currently 
experiencing strong cue-triggered 
wanting. For EGM-PGs, 
automatic expectancies will be 
negative regardless of concurrent 
cue-triggered wanting. 
Strong-urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit 
a positive mean score, whereas mild-
urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit a 
positive or a neutral mean score, on 
the evaluative IAT. EGM-PGs will 
exhibit a negative mean score on the 
evaluative IAT under both mild- and 
strong-urge conditions. 
2. For EGM-NPGs deliberative 
expectancies, but not automatic 
expectancies, will tend to be more 
positive for those experiencing 
stronger cue-triggered wanting 
compared to those experiencing 
weaker cue-triggered wanting. For 
EGM-PGs, neither deliberative 
nor automatic expectancies will 
differ as a function of degree of 
concurrent cue-triggered wanting. 
For EGM-NPGs, ratings of urge will 
positively predict BGBQ scores but 
not scores on the evaluative IAT. For 
EGM-PGs, ratings of urge will not 
predict scores on the BGBQ or the 
evaluative IAT.  
3. Automatic and deliberative 
expectancies are related. 
A correlation between scores on the 
evaluative IAT and the BGBQ will 
be observed. 
  
Now that the predictions have been outlined, in the following section the findings 
from previous relevant research will be discussed.  
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5.2.3  Examining previous relevant research 
Only two prior studies are known to me that have examined the evaluative-IAT with 
gamblers (Brevers et al., 2013; Yi & Kanetkar, 2010).  Both studies examined the 
valence of expectancies for gambling groups of differing problem-gambling severity 
(similar to Prediction 1), and the strength of the relationship between automatic and 
deliberative expectancies (Prediction 3).  However, neither study examined 
expectancies as a function of concurrent cue-triggered wanting (Prediction 2).  The 
findings in relation to Prediction 1 are discussed first, followed by those relating to 
Prediction 3.  Finally, the studies will be critiqued.  
One study (Yi & Kanetkar, 2010) used the single-target IAT and categorised 
gamblers using the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 
2001b).  They found a positive mean score on the PGSI, indicative of positive 
associations on average for all groups of gamblers, regardless of their degree of 
problem gambling (that is, for 51 ‘non-gamblers’, defined as those who scored 0 on 
the PGSI; for 30 ‘low-risk gamblers’, defined as those who scored 1 to 2 on the 
PGSI, and for 17 ‘moderate- to high-risk gamblers’, defined as those who scored 3 
upwards on the PGSI).  The findings with low-risk gamblers may be regarded as 
providing support for the Study-3 prediction that EGM-NPGs will exhibit positive 
automatic gambling associations.  
By contrast, the findings with moderate-to-high risk gamblers may be regarded as 
providing evidence against the Study-3 prediction that EGM-PGs will exhibit 
negative associations with gambling.  That said, however, the moderate-to-high-risk 
group comprised only four high-risk gamblers (a score of 8 or above on the PGSI).  
According to the PGSI manual (Ferris & Wynne, 2001b), only this group are 
 219 
 
expected to be PGs who experience impaired control over, and adverse consequences 
from, their gambling (whereas the moderate-risk group may not experience any 
adverse consequences, and are not expected to exhibit impaired control).  Given this, 
the findings for all groups in this study may be regarded as applying primarily to 
EGM-NPGs.  Thus, the study may provide evidence for the first prediction that 
EGM-NPGs exhibit positive associations with gambling.  
The latter study (Brevers et al, 2013) used unipolar (as opposed to bipolar) IATs, 
wherein positive and negative associations are measured in separate IATs (that is, 
rather than comparing positive to negative attributes in one IAT, positive attributes 
are compared to neutral in one IAT, and negative attributes are compared to neutral 
in another separate IAT).  They found that non-gamblers exhibit neither positive nor 
negative associations with gambling, while EGM-PGs exhibit positive, but not 
negative, associations.  This contrasts with the Study-3 prediction that EGM-PGs 
will exhibit negative associations with gambling.  However, 40% of participants 
categorised as EGM-PGs scored only 3 or 4 on the South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS), whereas usually gamblers are not considered EGM-PGs unless they exhibit 
a score of 5 or more on the SOGS (Lesieur & Blume, 1987).  This may particularly 
be a problem as previous researchers have shown that the SOGs over-estimates the 
proportion of PGs in a population when a cut-off of 5 is used (that is, the rate of false 
positives is high; Ladouceur et al., 2000; Stinchfield, 2002).  As gamblers who 
scored both above and below 5 on the SOGS were examined together, the study does 
not provide evidence about the gambling associations of either EGM-NPGs or EGM-
PGs.  
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In regards to Prediction 2, both Yi and Kanetkar (2010) and Brevers et al (2013) 
examined the relationship between the evaluative IAT and the Gambling Attitudes 
and Beliefs (GABS; R. Breen & M. Zuckerman, 1999) questionnaire, and both found 
a negligible correlation.  However, most of the items on the GABS measure 
cognitive errors as opposed to expectancies.  Hence, examining the relationship 
between the GABs and the evaluative IAT does not sufficiently address Prediction 3.  
Both studies also suffer from two other major criticisms. One is that neither seems to 
have measured the gaming preferences of gamblers in their sample, so participants 
may primarily play different games.  Furthermore, and relatedly, when selecting the 
gambling images used in the IAT, both studies seem to have used a mixture of cues 
from different gambling games (Brevers et al 2013 explicitly stated that this was the 
case, whereas Yi and Kanetkar, 2010, stated that they used ‘gambling images’, with 
no further detail).  As noted above, if the gamblers in a sample primarily play 
different gambling games, they are likely to respond differently to cues of different 
games.  For example, a problem EGM gambler may have a strong negative response 
to images of an EGM, but a mildly positive response to images of roulette.  By 
contrast, a problem roulette gambler may have a strong negative response to images 
of roulette, but a mildly positive response to images of an EGM.  These criticisms 
render the findings from both studies difficult to interpret.  
Additionally, the findings in both studies may represent cultural rather than personal 
views. The IAT was originally developed to examine culturally ingrained, socially 
unacceptable views that participants might not readily admit to, such as racism 
(Greenwald et al., 1998).  Hence, the conventional bipolar-IAT may measure 
cultural, rather than personal, views of the target.  When IATs are ‘personalised’ (by 
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removing error-feedback, and by re-naming the attribute-categories from ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ to ‘I like’ and ‘I don’t like’), the IAT-effect (the difference in reaction-time 
between contrasting blocks) is smaller, but shows a larger correlation with 
deliberative expectancies (Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Olson and Fazio interpreted this as 
evidence for the argument that personalising the IAT reduces automatic cultural bias 
in responses.  If so, since the IATs used in the gambling studies above were not 
personalised, the positive associations observed may represent cultural, rather than 
personal, views.  However, it should also be noted that this assumes that current 
cultural views of gambling are positive, which may or may not be the case.  Hence, 
further research using personalised IATs is required before conclusions can be made 
about associations with gambling.  For this reason, the single-target IAT used in 
Study 3 is personalised (further methodological details are presented in Sections 5.15 
and 5.16). 
5.3  Cue-triggered wanting, urge, and the action IAT 
As stated above, some predictions regarding cue-triggered wanting outlined in 
Chapter 2 are examined in Study 3.  As also already noted, cue-triggered wanting is 
measured as urge level (as in Study 2), and it will also be examined using the action 
IAT.  The action IAT is a modification of the evaluative IAT developed to measure 
automatic motivational associations; specifically, automatic approach and avoidance 
associations (Palfai & Ostafin, 2003).  
The rationale for the action IAT is that motivational responses are proposed to be 
encoded as cognitive-motivational neural networks, whereby appetitive cues are 
associated with approach-related stimuli (such as words representing approach 
responses, like ‘approach’, ‘urge’, ‘seek’, ‘consume’, ‘engage’), and threatening cues 
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are associated with avoidance stimuli (like avoidance words, such as ‘avoid’, ‘away’, 
‘leave’, ‘cease’ etc; Ostafin & Palfai, 2006; Palfai & Ostafin, 2003).  As cue-
triggered wanting is proposed to elicit automatic approach action tendencies, 
approach associations measured on the action IAT may vary as a function of the 
degree of concurrent cue-triggered wanting;  hence, approach associations may 
provide a measure of cue-triggered wanting.  Similarly, avoidance associations may 
differ as a function of current flight and freeze avoidance action tendencies; hence, 
avoidance associations may provide a measure of current avoidance action 
tendencies.   
The structure of the action IAT is similar to the structure of the evaluative IAT, 
except approach and avoidance attributes are contrasted, instead of positive and 
negative attributes.  The (single-target) action IAT to be used in Study 3 is 
summarised in Table 32.  Similar to the evaluative IAT, the premise of the action 
IAT is that, if automatic approach associations with gambling are stronger than 
automatic avoidance associations, reaction-time will be faster when gambling cues 
are paired (the response key is shared) with approach words (Block 1 in Table 32), 
than when gambling cues are paired with avoidance words (Block 2 in Table 32).  By 
contrast, if automatic avoidance associations are stronger, then reaction-time will be 
faster when gambling cues are paired with avoidance words (Block 2 in Table 32). 
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Table 32. Outline of a single-target action IAT 
Block 
number 
Share left response 
key* Right response key 
Block 1 Approach + target Avoidance 
Block 2 Avoidance + target Approach 
*Approach + target are not necessarily assigned the left-response key 
for Block 1; they may equally be assigned the right-response key 
Relevant predictions to be examined in Study 3 are summarised and discussed in the 
next section.  These are then operationalised into testable hypotheses.  
5.3.1  Outlining predictions regarding cue-triggered wanting  
Predictions to be examined in Study 3 are now outlined.  As EGM-PGs are proposed 
to exhibit strong cue-triggered wanting, and EGM-NPGs are proposed to exhibit 
mild to moderate cue-triggered wanting (as outlined in Section 2.6.2.1), it is first 
predicted that EGM-PGs will exhibit stronger cue-triggered wanting than EGM-
NPGs.  The process of operationalising this prediction into testable hypotheses 
differs for ratings of urge and the action IAT.  For the former, the process is 
relatively straightforward, as urge-ratings provide a measure of approach only.  For 
the latter, operationalising the prediction into testable hypotheses is more 
complicated, as the action IAT measures both approach and avoidance associations, 
rather than approach associations only.  Hence, predictions regarding urge ratings are 
presented first, followed by those related to the action IAT.  
In regards to urge ratings, it is hypothesised that EGM-PGs will exhibit a stronger 
mean urge than EGM-NPGs.  Additionally, as EGM-PGs are more likely to 
experience strong cue-triggered wanting than EGM-NPGs, it is also hypothesised 
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that a greater proportion of EGM-PGs than EGM-NPGs will exhibit a strong urge.  
These predictions are the same as those tested in Study 2. 
Operationalising the prediction for the action IAT is more complicated.  This is 
because it is proposed that approach associations will differ as a function of cue-
triggered wanting, and that avoidance associations will differ by gambling group.  
Furthermore, it is proposed that the action IAT measures more than just automatic 
response action tendencies.  These propositions are now discussed. 
First, it is predicted that, for both gambling groups, approach associations will be 
strong when cue-triggered wanting is strong, whereas approach associations will be 
minimal when cue-triggered wanting is mild or absent.  Hence, approach associations 
are predicted to differ as a function of the degree of concurrent cue-triggered 
wanting.  
Predictions regarding avoidance associations are now explained.  As already noted, 
the action IAT measures approach and avoidance associations with the target 
category.  It is proposed that these associations reflect the strength of automatic 
motivational responses (approach and avoidance) to the target category.  However, 
while people are likely to exhibit approach action tendencies to appetitive cues such 
as gambling, they are unlikely to exhibit automatic avoidance action tendencies to 
appetitive cues, as such responses are elicited by threatening cues.  However, it is 
proposed that associations may arise for other reasons (not just due to automatic 
response action-tendencies).  In particular, it seems likely that EGM-PGs would 
exhibit avoidance associations with gambling as well as approach associations.  This 
is because a central feature of impaired control is an inability to meet limitation 
goals, which is likely to lead to strong emotional responses, coupled with rumination 
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about a desire to stop or reduce gambling.  EGM-NPGs, on the other hand, are not 
proposed to experience such impaired control, so they are not predicted to exhibit 
avoidance associations with gambling.  
These predictions regarding approach and avoidance associations are combined into 
predictions about overall scores on the action IAT.  For EGM-PGs, strong avoidance 
associations are predicted, so these effectively ‘cancel out’ the strong approach 
associations predicted when cue-triggered wanting is strong; hence, neutral scores 
are predicted for EGM-PGs when cue-triggered is strong.  When cue-triggered 
wanting is mild, approach associations are also mild, so the strong avoidance 
associations will primarily determine scores on the action IAT, leading to negative 
scores.  To my knowledge, the action IAT has not been used with gamblers, so these 
predictions are novel. 
For EGM-NPGs, avoidance associations are predicted to be minimal, so predicted 
approach associations will determine scores on the action IAT.  Hence, when EGM-
NPGs exhibit strong cue-triggered wanting, strong approach associations are 
predicted to lead to positive scores, whereas when cue-triggered wanting is mild, 
neutral scores are predicted, as it is proposed that neither approach nor avoidance 
associations are evident.  Predictions for each gambling group on the action IAT are 
summarised in Table 33. 
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Table 33. Predictions on the action IAT for each gambling by urge-level group. 
 
Avoidance Approach 
Predicted 
score on 
action IAT 
EGM-PGs 
Cue-triggered wanting mild or absent 
 
Strong 
 
Mild 
 
Negative 
Cue-triggered wanting strong Strong Strong Neutral 
EGM-NPGs 
Cue-triggered wanting mild or absent 
 
Mild 
 
Mild 
 
Neutral 
Cue-triggered wanting strong Mild Strong Positive 
 
Finally, it is hypothesised that, due to avoidance associations, both EGM-PG-groups 
will exhibit more negative scores on the action IAT than the corresponding EGM-
NPG-group (who are predicted to exhibit minimal avoidance associations).  This is 
so, even though EGM-PGs are hypothesised to exhibit stronger cue-triggered 
wanting (and so a stronger mean urge) than EGM-NPGs.  Predictions and hypotheses 
are summarised in Table 34.  Note that the numbers for each prediction start from 4, 
as the predictions for expectancies are numbered 1 to 3. 
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Table 34. The predictions and operationalised hypotheses to be examined in Study 
3. 
Number Prediction Hypothesis 
4 EGM-PGs will exhibit stronger 
cue-triggered wanting than 
EGM-NPGs 
EGM-PGs will exhibit a stronger 
mean urge than EGM-NPGs 
A greater proportion of EGM-PGs 
will exhibit a strong urge 
compared with EGM-NPGs 
5.1 EGM-PGs experiencing strong 
concurrent cue-triggered 
wanting will exhibit approach 
and avoidance associations  
The mean score on the action IAT 
for strong-urge EGM-PGs will not 
differ significantly from neutral  
5.2 EGM-PGs experiencing only 
mild concurrent cue-triggered 
wanting will exhibit strong  
avoidance and mild approach 
associations 
Mild-urge EGM-PGs will exhibit 
a negative mean score on the 
action IAT 
6.1 EGM-NPGs experiencing strong 
concurrent cue-triggered 
wanting will exhibit strong 
approach associations and 
minimal avoidance associations 
Strong-urge EGM-NPGs will 
exhibit a positive mean score on 
the action IAT 
6.2 EGM-NPGs experiencing only 
mild concurrent cue-triggered 
wanting will exhibit neither 
approach nor avoidance 
associations 
The mean score on the action IAT 
for mild-urge EGM-NPGs will 
not differ significantly from 
neutral 
7 EGM-PGs will exhibit more 
negative scores on the action 
IAT than EGM-NPGs, 
regardless of whether concurrent 
cue-triggered wanting is mild or 
strong 
EGM-PGs will exhibit more 
negative scores on the action IAT 
than EGM-NPGs, under both 
mild- and strong-urge conditions 
 
In the next section, previous research relevant to the action IAT is examined.  This is 
followed by a close look at the methodological decisions, and their justifications, 
when constructing the IAT used in Study 3.  
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5.3.2  Previous research relevant to the action IAT 
There has been no research using the action IAT with gamblers, so there is no 
research either in support of, or in opposition to, the predictions outlined. There are 
two studies which have examined the action IAT with ‘hazardous drinkers’ and one 
study that examined the action IAT with smokers. However, neither of these studies 
took concurrent cue-triggered wanting into account when examining findings, so the 
findings are difficult to interpret in light of the Study 3 predictions. Nonetheless, the 
findings are briefly presented. 
Of the two studies with hazardous drinkers, recent drinking activity and scores on 
measures of alcohol dependence suggest that participants in one study (van den 
Wildenberg et al, 2003) were more likely to be experiencing substance-dependence 
than those in the other study (Palfai & Ostafin, 2003).  Hence, the findings of the 
former study may be applicable primarily to those experiencing impaired control, 
and so may be applicable to EGM-PGs, whereas the findings of the latter study may 
be applicable primarily to those experiencing minimal impaired-control, and so may 
be applicable to EGM-NPGs.  Results of the former study found neither positive nor 
negative scores on the action IAT, which indicates that neither approach nor 
avoidance associations are stronger (van den Wildenberg et al.).  If the findings on an 
alcohol action IAT for those experiencing alcohol dependence are relevant to the 
performance of EGM-PGs on a gambling action IAT, then the findings are consistent 
with the Study 3 prediction that EGM-PGs will exhibit both strong approach and 
strong avoidance associations on the action IAT.  
The latter study found positive scores, which indicates that approach associations are 
stronger than avoidance associations (Palfai & Ostafin, 2003).  This is consistent 
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with the Study 3 prediction that EGM-NPGs exhibit moderate approach but minimal 
avoidance associations.  Hence, the findings of both studies may be regarded as 
providing support for Study 3 predictions.  
The smoking study (de Houwer et al, 2006) compared the smoking associations of 
non-smokers and smokers, and found that non-smokers exhibit avoidance, and 
smokers exhibit approach.  However, while some information was provided about 
the smoking activity of the smokers, the degree of dependence of the smoking 
sample was not assessed.  Hence, it is difficult to determine whether the findings 
support Study 3 predictions or not.  
Overall, while researchers have not considered concurrent cue-triggered wanting 
when examining the action IAT, previous findings may be regarded as consistent 
with Study 3 findings.  Some final predictions are presented in the next section.  
5.4  Predicting gambling activity  
As noted above, the dual-process model theorises that both expectancies and cue-
triggered wanting contribute to decision-making for EGM-NPGs, whereas cue-
triggered wanting, but not expectancies, contributes to decision-making for EGM-
PGs.  Hence, it is predicted that the expectancy measures (the evaluative IAT and the 
BGBQ), and measures of cue-triggered wanting (the action IAT and ratings of urge), 
will predict gambling behaviour for EGM-NPGs, whereas only measures of cue-
triggered wanting will predict gambling behaviour for EGM-PGs.  
Although the predictive utility of IATs has been examined in relation to some 
appetitive behaviours, no studies have examined the ability of the evaluative or the 
action IAT to predict gambling behaviour.  Brevers et al. (2013) examined whether 
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the evaluative IAT predicts problem gambling severity (rather than actual 
behaviour), where degree of problem gambling was determined with the South Oaks 
Gambling Scale (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987).  They found that the evaluative 
IAT does not predict problem gambling severity.  However, the study is subject to 
major criticisms, as outlined above (Section 5.2.3).  One of these criticisms is that the 
sample used supposedly to examine PGs appears to comprise both NPGs and PGs. 
As there are distinct (and differing) predictions for these groups in Study 3, the 
results of Brevers et al.’s study cannot be generalised to either group.  In conclusion, 
there is no current research that can inform Study 3 predictions regarding the 
predictive utility of the evaluative or the action IAT.  Hence, the research conducted 
in Study 3 is unique.  
5.5  Study 3 predictions summarised 
Together the predictions and operationalised hypotheses are (note that the number 
corresponding to each prediction does not necessarily match that in the prediction-
tables in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.1): 
1. EGM-NPGs will exhibit a positive mean score, and EGM-PGs will exhibit a 
negative mean score, on the BGBQ under both mild- and strong-urge 
conditions; 
2. Strong-urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit a positive mean score, whereas mild-
urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit a positive or a neutral mean score, on the 
evaluative IAT;  EGM-PGs will exhibit a negative mean score on the 
evaluative IAT under both mild- and strong-urge conditions; 
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3. For EGM-NPGs, ratings of urge will positively predict BGBQ scores but not 
scores on the evaluative IAT;  for EGM-PGs, ratings of urge will not predict 
scores on the BGBQ or the evaluative IAT; 
4. A correlation between scores on the evaluative IAT and the BGBQ will be 
observed; 
5. EGM-PGs will exhibit a stronger mean urge than EGM-NPGs and a greater 
proportion of EGM-PGs will exhibit a strong urge compared with EGM-
NPGs; 
6. Neutral scores are predicted on the action IAT for EGM-PGs when cue-
triggered is strong, whereas negative scores are predicted when cue-triggered 
wanting is mild;  positive scores are predicted for EGM-NPGs when cue-
triggered wanting is strong, whereas neutral scores are predicted when cue-
triggered wanting is mild;  
7. EGM-PGs will exhibit more negative scores on the action IAT than EGM-
NPGs, under both mild- and strong-urge conditions;  
8. The expectancy measures (the evaluative IAT and the BGBQ) and measures 
of cue-triggered wanting (the action IAT and ratings of urge) will predict 
gambling behaviour for EGM-NPGs, whereas only measures of cue-triggered 
wanting will predict gambling behaviour for EGM-PGs. 
These predictions are examined below.  Before doing so, some comments on 
calculating IAT scores are presented in the next section, and then the methodology of 
Study 3 is discussed in detail. 
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5.5  Calculating the IAT effect 
As noted previously, the ‘IAT effect’ is calculated as the difference in average 
reaction-times for contrasting blocks.  There are several different ways to calculate 
this, and there are many issues to consider in terms of data treatment prior to the 
calculation.  Conventionally, many of the latency data are recoded or excluded, and 
the latencies for each block are transformed before taking the difference in average 
latencies for contrasting blocks (Greenwald et al., 1998).  However, Greenwald and 
colleagues’ recent seminal study (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) shows that 
most recoding and data exclusion is unnecessary.  Additionally, the study shows that 
a new way of calculating the IAT effect (using the ‘D-score’) out-performs other 
forms of calculation (using several different criteria, outlined below).  Conventional 
data treatment prior to calculating the IAT effect is discussed in this section, 
followed by a discussion of the different ways of calculating the IAT effect and the 
D-score.  
Conventionally (Greenwald et al, 1998), practice blocks and the first few trials in 
each block are excluded from IAT calculations due to their typically longer latencies.  
Trials that are shorter or longer than some specified latency are recoded to that 
specified latency (usually 300ms and 3000ms, respectively).  Participants with at 
least ten-percent of trials beyond these boundaries are excluded from analyses 
altogether.  Before calculating the IAT-effect, latency data for each block undergo a 
logarithmic transformation, in order to correct for the long upper tails in the 
distribution caused by some longer latencies.   
However, using a large database with thousands of participants worldwide (the 
sample size across five studies ranges between 4 908 and 11 549 participants), 
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Greenwald et al. (2003) compared possible variations in the treatment of IAT data 
(focusing on the bipolar evaluative IAT).  When considering IAT performance, 
several features were taken into account, including the correlation between the 
evaluative IAT and explicit self-report attitudes or beliefs, internal consistency, and 
sensitivity to methodological artefacts and order effects.  The general trend in their 
findings was that the fewer data that are excluded or recoded, the better the 
performance of the IAT.  More specifically, performance is optimised when the 
following is included in scoring: practice blocks, the first-few trials in each block, 
error trials, and latencies shorter than 300ms or longer than 3000ms.  Only latencies 
longer than 10 000ms are recoded (to 10 000ms), and only participants with more 
than 10 percent of trials shorter than 300ms are excluded from analyses. 
 All of these findings are incorporated into Study 3, except that the practice blocks 
are not included in the scoring.  This is because the instructions given to participants 
are minimal (and therefore simple and brief; see Section 5.6.3.1), so a short unscored 
practice is considered necessary.  Each practice block comprises only ten to 14 trials, 
as compared with conventional practice blocks which are 50 trials long.  
Additionally, for each target-attribute pair, there are conventionally two or three 
practice blocks, whereas there is only one in Study 3.  Methodological details are 
outlined in Section 5.6.3.4. 
Greenwald et al. (2003) also compared five different ways of calculating the IAT 
effect (using the criteria just outlined).  These authors compared the following 
possible measures of the IAT effect:  the difference in means between contrasting 
blocks, the difference in medians between contrasting blocks, the difference in means 
using a reciprocal measure (computed as 1000 divided by the mean latency for each 
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block), log-transforming latencies before taking the mean, and the D-score.  The D-
score divides the difference in means for the contrasting blocks by the standard 
deviation of their pooled latencies.  Their study, and another study since (Sriram, 
Greenwald, & Nosek, 2007), shows that the D-score out-performs all other measures 
on the criteria used.  Due to its superior performance, the D-score is used as a 
measure of IAT effects in Study 3.  
5.6 Methodology 
5.6.1 Participants 
The sample comprises 92 gamblers (25 EGM-PGs and 67 EGM-NPGs).  Nine 
participants are excluded as they responded to more than ten-percent of stimuli in 
either IAT in less than 300ms.  A further six participants are excluded as they 
endorsed ‘Does not apply’ on the Scale of Gambling Choices more than three times 
(see Section 4.3.1 for details regarding the treatment of a ‘Does not apply’ response 
on the Scale of Gambling Choices).  This left 77 participants (53 EGM-NPGs and 24 
EGM-PGs) with a mean age of 48.59 years (s = 11.31), of whom 70.5% are female.  
5.6.2 Procedure 
Study 3 is conducted over the internet using Millisecond Software’s ‘Inquisit’ 
program, and hosted on their secure server (www.millisecond.com).  Upon viewing the 
advertisement for the study, participants click to view the Plain Language Statement 
(the advertisement and the Plain Language Statement can be seen in Appendix 10).  
After reading the statement, they click to start the study (they are advised that, by 
doing so, their consent is assumed).  Once participants click to start the study, the 
necessary ‘Inquisit’ files are temporarily downloaded and installed on their computer 
(participants receive prior warning of this before clicking).  Following this, the first 
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page of the study appears.  This, and the following few pages, contain questions 
about current gambling urge, current affect, gambling-expectancies (the BGBQ), the 
Scale of Gambling Choices, and recent gambling activity.  Details about these 
questions are provided in Section 5.6.3.  
Once these questions are complete, participants click to start the first IAT (details of 
this are outlined in the next section).  The first IAT may be either the evaluative or 
the action IAT, as the order in which the IATs are complete is randomly assigned to 
each participant.  This allows the IAT-order to be counterbalanced, which is 
considered necessary as other research shows order effects when more than one IAT 
is completed (Bluemke & Friese, 2008).  
Upon completion of the first IAT, participants answer some demographic questions.  
As well as collecting information about participants, these serve as a break before the 
next IAT begins.  Participants then complete their second IAT.  Once complete, 
participants are thanked for their participation, and given the contact details of 
gambling-help services in major English-speaking countries worldwide (where 
available).  No identifying information is collected from participants. 
5.6.3. Measures 
The measures used in Study 3 are outlined in this section.  Some of the measures 
used are the same as those used in Study 2, and so are not described again.  These are 
the demographic questions and the Scale of Gambling Choices.  Some other 
measures differ slightly, and so are outlined again.  These are the current urge item, 
the BGBQ, current affect, and the gambling-activity questions.  The evaluative and 
action IATs are also described in detail below.  
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5.6.3.1 Deliberative expectancies 
The BGBQ, developed for use in Study 2 (see Section 4.2.3.5), is used again in 
Study 3 to measure deliberative expectancies, though with some alterations.  Instead 
of using a 15-point visual-analogue scale (VAS), a 100-point VAS scale is used (the 
numbers on the scale are not visible to participants).  Each item is again anchored by 
antonyms (there is a negative adjective on the left end of the scale at a score of 1, and 
a positive adjective on the right end of the scale at a score of 100).  Additionally, 
when indicating the valence and strength of each expectancy, participants move a 
cursor, initially placed at the mid-point of the scale (a score of 51).  The cursor can 
be moved to the left or the right, towards one of the anchoring antonyms (as opposed 
to ‘checking’ one of the blank circles underlying each of the 15-points, as in Study 
2).  The further the cursor is moved, the more strongly that antonym is endorsed (that 
is, the further to the left the cursor is moved, the lower the score, and the stronger the 
endorsement of the negative antonym;  by contrast, the further to the right the cursor 
is moved, the higher the score, and the stronger the endorsement of the positive 
antonym).  A 100-point response scale is used in Study 3 because previous 
researchers have shown that scales with more points or gradations allow participants 
to answer more accurately without compromising psychometric validity (Funke & 
Reips, 2012; Reips & Funke, 2008). 
Some items are also slightly altered, and some items are added to the BGBQ.  The 
item ‘feel happy’ versus ‘feel depressed’ is changed to ‘feel elated’ versus ‘feel 
depressed’.  It is argued that elated is a better antonym for depressed than happy.  
‘Depressed’ encompasses both lack of arousal and negative affect (Russell, 2009), so 
a term suitable as an antonym will be the opposite in terms of both affect and arousal.  
Arguably, the term ‘elated’ comprises positive affect and arousal, whereas the term 
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‘happy’ comprises primarily positive affect with only minimal arousal (Russell, 
2009).  Hence, ‘elated’ may be a more suitable antonym for ‘depressed’ than 
‘happy’.  
Additionally, the items ‘feel in control’ versus ‘feel out of control’, and ‘feel good’ 
versus ‘feel bad’ are added to the scale.  These items are added as they may be 
important items that were overlooked in Study 2.  Furthermore, they may enhance 
any difference in scores on the BGBQ between EGM-PGs and EGM-NPGs.  Due to 
the addition of these items, the BGBQ in Study 3 is termed the ‘lengthened-BGBQ’ 
(L-BGBQ) to distinguish it from the scale used in Study 2.  
With these new items, there are now eight bipolar items in the L-BGBQ.  These are 
‘constructive’ versus ‘destructive’; ‘enjoyable’ versus ‘not enjoyable’; ‘win’ versus 
‘lose’; ‘feel relaxed’ versus ‘feel tense’; ‘feel elated’ versus ‘feel depressed’; ‘feel 
good’ versus ‘feel bad’; and ‘feel in control’ versus ‘feel out of control’, ‘feel 
pleasant’ versus ‘feel unpleasant’.  As previously, the mean of all items is used as an 
overall expectancy score (rather than summing items together), as the mean will, by 
definition, fall somewhere within 1 to 100, and so is easily interpreted in relation to 
the response scale (for example, if a participant scores a mean of 80, it can be readily 
seen that, on average, they exhibit moderate to strong positive gambling-related 
expectancies).  
5.6.3.2 Gambling activity 
Many of the gambling activity questions are the same as those used in Study 2, but 
the response options differ slightly.  For ease of comparison, any question asked in 
both Study 2 and 3 is shown in Table 35, together with the response options provided 
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in each study.   Where there are differences in response options in the two studies, an 
explanation for the change is also provided in the table.
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As can be seen in the table, gambling expenditure is not examined in Study 3 (it 
wasn’t examined in Study 2 either) as the study is conducted worldwide, making it 
difficult to compare expenditure across different currencies.  Additionally, gambling 
expenditure is not a reliable indicator of gambling activity as people have different 
expendable incomes, so the subjective value of cash spent on gambling is likely to 
vary between individuals.  
One gambling activity question is added in Study 3.  Participants are asked ‘When 
did you last gamble?’, to which they could endorse either ‘Within the last hour’, 
‘Today’, ‘Yesterday’, ‘Within the last fortnight’, ‘Within the last month’, and ‘More 
than a month ago’.  This question is added in order to help ascertain how regularly 
participants gamble, and if they are currently active gamblers or not.  
Additionally, given that Study 3 is focused specifically on EGM gambling, there are 
a few additional questions in Study 3 about EGM gambling. These are ‘How often do 
you gamble on slot machines?’, to which participants can select, ‘Most days’, ‘More 
than once a week’, ‘More than once a month’, ‘More than once a year’, ‘Once a year 
or less’, or ‘Never’; and, ‘Where do you mostly play slot-machine games?’, to which 
participants can choose from, ‘Internet’ or ‘Not on the internet’.  All gambling 
activity variables are coded so that more frequent, more recent, and longer sessions 
score more positively than less frequent, less recent, and shorter sessions.  
5.6.3.3 Measuring urge and affect 
The first question in the study asks participants to rate their current urge to gamble.  
As in Study 2, only one item is used to measure current urge, as brevity is a concern 
(it is hoped that brevity will reduce attrition, as there is very limited social pressure 
to complete studies conducted over the internet; Birnbaum, 2004).  Previous research 
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has provided evidence for the psychometric validity of measuring urge with only one 
item (West & Ussher, 2010).   
Participants rate their current urge to gamble on a 50-point unipolar VAS, anchored 
by ‘No urge’ (a score of 1) to ‘Very strong urge’ (a score of 50).  Note that the scale 
comprises only 50 points, as compared to the 100-points used for items on the 
BGBQ, because urge is unipolar, whereas items on the BGBQ are bipolar.  A cursor 
is placed in the middle of the response range (at a score of 26), and participants are 
able to move the cursor to the point that best represents their current gambling urge.  
Thus, participants could leave the cursor where it is, or move it to the left (towards 
‘No urge’) or to the right (towards ‘Very strong urge’).  The further the cursor is 
moved to the left, the lower the score, and the milder the urge that is reported;  the 
further the cursor is moved to the right, the higher the score, and the stronger the 
urge that is reported.  
Affective valence is also measured with a single bipolar item on a100-point VAS, 
anchored by ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’.  This deviates from Study 2, where the item 
was anchored by ‘happy’ versus ‘sad’.  The reason for this change is that the term 
‘sad’ arguably represents negative affect and some lack of arousal, whereas the term 
‘happy’ arguably represents positive affect and some arousal (though only minimal 
arousal, as noted above in Section 5.6.3.1).  The terms ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’, 
by contrast, arguably measure valence only, without measuring arousal (or lack of 
arousal; Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998).  
5.6.3.4  Implicit Association Test 
In this section the structure of the IAT used in Study 3 is described in detail.  The 
overall design is presented first, followed by a description of the blocks, then 
 242 
 
individual trials, and then the stimuli used in each IAT.  The structure and procedure 
is the same for both IATs, except that the attributes differ (as already noted, the 
attributes are positive and negative for the evaluative IAT, whereas they are approach 
and avoid for the action IAT).  Hence, when describing the IAT, no distinction will 
be made between the evaluative and the action IAT, unless explicitly stated.  
Overall design of the IAT  
The IATs are developed and run using Millisecond’s web-version of Inquisit (version 
3.0.3.2), a program designed to record reaction-times to the millisecond over the 
internet.  As already noted, the IAT used in Study 3 is modelled on the single-target 
IAT (ST-IAT), so it comprises a target category (gambling), but no (contrasting) 
non-target category.  This is for the reasons noted in Section 5.1.  Previous 
researchers have shown that the ST-IAT is a valid and reliable alternative to the 
conventional IAT (Bluemke & Friese, 2008; Friese, Bluemke, & Wänke, 2007; 
Wigboldus et al., 2006).  
It must be noted further that the IATs used in Study 3 are also modelled on the Brief-
IAT (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).  The Brief-IAT is shorter than other IATs, and the 
instructions are simpler (the specific points that make the Brief-IAT simple and brief 
are outlined below, when describing the IATs used in Study 3).  As in the previous 
studies in this thesis, brevity is considered important in Study 3, in order to 
discourage attrition, as there is no social pressure to complete studies conducted over 
the internet.  An additional reason that brevity is important is that participants are 
required to complete two IATs, and several other questions, so fatigue and boredom 
are a concern.  Simplicity is also considered desirable as participants do not have the 
opportunity to clarify task instructions over the internet.  In sum, it is hoped that 
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brevity and simplicity may help to minimise attrition, fatigue, and boredom, and 
heighten comprehension of task instructions.  It has previously been shown that the 
Brief-IAT is valid and reliable (Sriram & Greenwald).  
As also noted previously, Greenwald et al’s (1998) D-score is used as a measure of 
the IAT effect.  Moreover, any response that is longer than 10 000ms is recoded to 
10 000ms and any participant with more than ten-percent of trials shorter than 300ms 
in either IAT is deleted from the study.  This is because 300ms is considered too 
short a time to perceive the stimulus and respond according to task instructions 
(Greenwald et al., 2003).  
IAT blocks 
In this section, the number and type of blocks, their presentation order, and the 
number of trials in each block, are outlined.  This is followed by a description of the 
response keys assigned to the target and attributes for each block, and a presentation 
of the task instructions.  
Participants will complete four blocks altogether.  These four blocks comprise two 
blocks for each gambling-attribute pair.  One of these is a short non-scored practice 
block (comprising ten or 14 trials), and the other is a longer scored test block 
(comprising 24 trials).  The test block is completed immediately after the associated 
practice block.  A summary of the IAT procedure is shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. The IAT procedure 
used in Study 3. 
 
It is apparent in the figure that the first practice block comprises ten trials, while the 
second comprises 14 trials.  Often more errors occur at the beginning of the second 
test block compared with the first test block because participants take some time to 
become accustomed upon switching to the new gambling-attribute pairing 
(Greenwald et al., 2003).  Research has shown that the addition of a few extra 
practice trials before the second test block can minimise such errors (Greenwald et 
al.).  
The order in which participants complete each pair of blocks is random.  For 
example, for the evaluative IAT, some participants will complete the blocks for the 
gambling-positive pair before the blocks for the gambling-negative pair, whereas 
other participants will complete these in the opposite order.  Such counterbalancing 
is considered necessary to control for order effects, whereby the IAT-effect differs 
according to which gambling-attribute pairing is completed first (Greenwald et al., 
2003; Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).  
Overall instructions 
Instructions for Practice Block 1 
Practice Block 1 (ten trials) 
Instructions for Test Block 1 
Test Block 1 (24 trials) 
Instructions for Practice Block 2 
Practice Bock 2 (14 trials) 
Instructions for Test Block 2 
Test Block 2 (24 trials) 
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Note that the test block comprises fewer trials in each block (24) than the ST-IAT 
(which comprises 32 trials in each block) and the conventional IAT (which 
comprises 50 trials in each block).  This is in line with the Brief-IAT (Sriram & 
Greenwald, 2009) which comprises only 20 trials in each block, and remains 
psychometrically sound.  
It must be noted, however, that when Sriram and Greenwald (2009) tested the Brief-
IAT, they presented each test block twice.  They then calculated the D-score twice 
(the first test block for each target-attribute pair was used to calculate one D-score, 
and then the second test block for each target-attribute pair was used to calculate a 
second D-score), and the average of these two scores was used as the final D-score.  
Thus, even though each test block comprises only 20 trials, there were 40 trials 
altogether for each target-attribute pair in the original Brief-IAT.  
However, Sriram and Greenwald (2009) note in their publication that the use of two 
test blocks for each target-attribute pair is not necessary.  However, they also argue 
that two test blocks may increase reliability and sensitivity.  Despite this, their data 
show that internal consistency is constantly higher for the first pair of test blocks 
than for the second pair.  Furthermore, Greenwald et al’s (2003) research shows that 
the IAT-effect tends to be stronger in the earlier trials than in the later trials 
(presumably because practice at the task overrides automatic associations), which 
suggests that additional trials may undermine the underlying premise of the IAT (that 
it measures pre-existing automatic associations).  Hence, for these reasons, and given 
that brevity is desirable, only one pair of shorter blocks is presented for each IAT 
used in Study 3.  
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The key assigned to a given attribute remains the same throughout all blocks of the 
IAT in Study 3 (for example, the key for positive responses is always the same, and 
the key for negative responses is always the same), whereas the key assigned to 
gambling stimuli switches.  This allows the gambling-attribute pairing to swap across 
blocks.  Note that previous researchers have found no difference in the IAT-effect 
according to which hand (left or right) responds to which target-attribute pair 
(Greenwald et al., 1998), so it is not considered necessary to counterbalance this.  
As noted above, due to their simplicity, the instructions to participants are modelled 
on those used in the Brief-IAT (the way in which these differ to conventional 
instructions is discussed below; Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).  The ‘overall’ task 
instructions are presented, followed by the specific instructions for each block. The 
overall task instructions (which participants view on the first page of the IAT) are: 
‘In this task, images and words will appear. 
You will press the 'D' or the 'L' key on your keyboard AS SOON AS you see each 
word/image. 
You will be told which key to press for which images/words. 
If you press the wrong key, press the other key as quickly as you can. 
Keep your left middle or index finger on the 'D' key and your right middle or index 
finger on the 'L' key. 
You will start off with some practice trials to get used to the task format. 
Press the 'D' or the 'L' key to view the instructions for the first few trials.’ 
After pressing the ‘D’ or ‘L’ key, participants read the following instructions before 
each block (this is altered slightly from block to block as the key assigned to the 
gambling images changes): 
‘Press the ‘L’ key when you see the following images: 
[Gambling images displayed] 
 247 
 
Or words: 
[paired attribute words displayed] 
Press the ‘D’ key when you see any other words. 
GO AS FAST as you can without making mistakes.  
If you press the wrong key, rapidly press the other key. 
Keep your fingers on the ‘D’ and the ‘L’ key. Press either to continue.’ 
The Brief-IAT instructions differ from conventional ones because, rather than 
providing details about the target and both attributes, participants are only provided 
with details about the target and paired attribute.  Instead of also providing details 
about the non-paired attribute, participants are asked to respond to all ‘other’ stimuli 
with the other assigned response key.  This simplifies the instructions. 
The instructions differ from convention in another way as well, representing a 
departure from both conventional- and Brief-IAT instructions.  Usually, participants 
are presented with the category names for the target and attributes (e.g., ‘EGM 
gambling’, ‘good’, and ‘bad’), and are asked to respond to stimuli belonging to each 
category (with an assigned key).  Participants are not usually shown any of the 
stimuli belonging to any of the categories.  By contrast, in the instructions used for 
Study 3, participants are shown all of the gambling stimuli and words for the paired 
attribute when provided with the instructions, but they are not provided with any 
category names.  Previous researchers have found that presenting category names 
may cause cultural rather than personal associations to be elicited (Olson & Fazio, 
2004), so they are not presented at all in Study 3.  This is a novel approach to this 
aspect of the IAT.  Participants are given a chance to view each stimulus and respond 
according to task instructions in the practice block, before they begin a test block.  
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The lack of category names means that response-key reminders, where category 
names are typically displayed at each side of the screen throughout each block, are 
not displayed in the IATs used in Study 3.  Given the simplicity of the instructions, 
and the brevity of the task, these reminders are not considered necessary.  
Additionally, as just noted, category names are best avoided.  Furthermore, as it is an 
ST-IAT (where one hand responds to both a target and an attribute, while the other 
hand only responds to an attribute), displaying such reminders would require two 
reminders on one side of the screen, and only one reminder on the other side of the 
screen, which may lead to a re-coding strategy unrelated to the processes (pre-
existing automatic associations) proposed to be measured by the IAT.  
Trials  
Each trial begins with the appearance of a stimulus (this will be a gambling image, or 
one of the attribute words).  Although participants are asked to respond to stimuli as 
quickly as possible, the stimulus remains on the screen until the correct response is 
provided (in order to personalise the IAT, no error-feedback appears when 
participants provide an incorrect response, as previous researchers have shown that 
such feedback may encourage cultural associations; Olson & Fazio, 2004).  After 
providing the correct response, the next trial begins.  The inter-stimulus interval is set 
at 250ms.  
In order to counterbalance order effects that may result from a particular stimulus 
order, during each block, the presentation order of the stimuli is random.  However, 
each trial must display a stimulus of a different type (that is, two gambling images 
cannot be displayed in a row, and neither can two words of the same attribute).  This 
is to avoid several consecutive trials with stimuli of the same type.  
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There is an issue with this constraint, however.  One hand responds to gambling 
images and the paired attribute (this will be termed the ‘paired hand’ from here-in), 
while the other hand responds only to the non-paired attribute (this will be termed the 
‘non-paired hand’ from here-in).  Hence, the constraint means that the paired hand 
may be required to respond to consecutive trials (e.g., a gambling image, then a 
paired attribute, then a gambling image), while the non-paired hand will not (as, 
according to the constraint, the type of stimulus must switch on the next trial).  In 
order to correct for this issue, an exception to the constraint is created, which allows 
consecutive trials of non-paired attributes only.  As a result, either hand may be 
required to respond to consecutive trials. 
Relatedly, throughout each block, there is an issue with the number of trials that each 
hand responds to.  If all categories entail an equal number of trials (e.g., six gambling 
trials, six trials of the paired-attribute, and six trials of the non-paired attribute), then 
the paired hand responds to double the number of trials (12 trials) than the non-
paired hand (six trials).  Hence, participants may learn that a response is more likely 
from one hand, and so reduce the response time on that hand.  One way to correct for 
this is by doubling the number of non-paired attribute trials, so that each hand 
responds to the same number of trials.  This option is used in Study 3.  
Stimuli 
The selection of stimuli for each category is now discussed.  In regards to the 
gambling category, both words and images related to EGM gambling are considered. 
As EGM gamblers are recruited from different countries around the world, EGM-
related terminology is likely to differ.  Hence, the use of words as gambling stimuli 
may introduce error when measuring gambling associations.  As a result, words are 
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not used as gambling stimuli;  images are used for gambling stimuli instead.  As well 
as avoiding these issues, EGM gambling is a particularly visual activity that requires 
continuous engagement with bright images (reels and features, as discussed in 
Section 1.3) on EGM screens (Parke & Griffiths, 2006).  Hence, different images of 
EGM screens are used as gambling stimuli for the IATs in Study 3.  Both Yi and 
Kanetkar (2010) and Brevers et al. (2013) used gambling images in their gambling 
IATs.  
The gambling images used for the IATs can be seen in Appendix 12.  Each image 
comprises 30 percent of the height and 30 percent of the width of the screen upon 
which it is viewed (stimuli on web pages are defined in terms of screen percentage, 
rather than actual height, so that all stimuli will be placed in the correct position 
relative to other stimuli, regardless of screen size).  
The selection of words for the attributes in each IAT is now discussed.  In relation to 
the evaluative IAT, it is noted above that previous researchers have found that words 
that are specifically related to the behaviour show a stronger IAT-effect than general 
positive or negative words, such as, love, peace, war, disease (Houben et al., 2010).  
Hence, when choosing attribute words for the evaluative IAT, positive and negative 
words related to gambling are drawn from gambling-related expectancy measures 
(Gillespie et al., 2007a; Wickwire et al., 2010), the L-BGBQ used in Study 3, and the 
qualitative analysis in Study 1.  The positive words used in the evaluative IAT are: 
x pleasure 
x enjoy 
x excite  
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x like 
x relax 
x fun  
x content 
x friendly. 
The negative words used in the evaluative IAT are: 
x hate  
x upset  
x shame  
x sorrow 
x distress 
x worry 
x sad 
x tragic. 
In regards to the action IAT, most of the approach and action words used are drawn 
from previous research with the action IAT, though sometimes the words are slightly 
adjusted (Ostafin & Palfai, 2006; van den Wildenberg et al., 2006).  The remaining 
words are selected due to their association with approach and craving for the 
approach attribute, and their association with avoidance and attempting to inhibit 
gambling behaviour for the avoidance attribute. For the action IAT, the approach 
words used are: 
x want 
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x obtain 
x desire 
x approach 
x yearn 
x eager 
x choose 
x crave. 
The avoidance words used are: 
x avoid 
x deny 
x away 
x refuse 
x abstain 
x inhibit 
x forbid 
x cease.  
Each word comprises 10% of the screen on which it is displayed.  
5.7 Results 
First, the demographic characteristics and gambling activity for the whole sample, 
and for each gambling group, are described.  This is followed by a preliminary 
description of the data for each dependent variable.  Finally, each hypothesis is 
examined.   
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Before doing so, however, a brief analysis of the Scale of Gambling Choices is 
conducted.  The distribution of scores on the Scale of Gambling Choices shows 
satisfaction of the assumption of normality, as skew and kurtosis are within the 
robust range.  A factor analysis revealed two factors with eigen values greater than 1 
(7.18 and 1.10).  However, using Scree’s test, there is a clear break after the first 
factor, so only the one factor is retained.  All items load strongly on this factor 
(greater than .60), and this factor explains 59% of the variance in the items.  The 
items on the scale also show satisfactory internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .94; 
Cronbach, 1951).  Hence, the scale shows sound psychometric properties.  
A correlation matrix comprising all IVs and DVs is presented in Table 36.  It must be 
noted that, due to the relatively small sample-size for EGM-PGs, correlations as high 
as .39 are not significant.  Thus, in order to be consistent across both groups, any 
correlation that is moderate (≥.3; Cohen, 1988) is considered notable (and is bolded 
in the table), regardless of whether it is significant or not.  Note, however, the 95% 
confidence intervals for non-significant correlations will be broad, and will include 
zero.  Hence, such correlations must be regarded with caution.  
Table 36. The correlations between IVs and DVs for each gambling group. 
Variables 
  Non-problem gamblers 
n = 53 
  Problem gamblers 
n = 24 
 1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
1. SGC  1      1     
2. Current urge  .32* 1     .30 1    
3. Affective valence  -.29* -.20 1    -.08 .01 1   
4. L-BGBQ  -.25 .21 .31* 1   -.10 .17 .52* 1  
5. Action IAT  .04 .29* .01 .02 1  <.01 .34 -.12 -.09 1 
6. Evaluative IAT  .12 -.16 .03 .13 .27*  .18 .10 .33 .39 .08 
SGC = Scale of Gambling Choices; *p < .025; **p < .01. 
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The third prediction regarding expectancies specifically predicts that the L-BGBQ 
(which is proposed to measure gambling-related expectancies) and the evaluative 
IAT (which is proposed to measure automatic gambling-related evaluative 
associations) will correlate.  It can be seen in the table that EGM-PGs exhibit a 
moderate correlation between these two measures, but EGM-NPGs do not.  In 
addition, affective valence shows a significant correlation with the L-BGBQ for both 
EGM-NPGs and EGM-PGs that is moderate and strong (Cohen, 1988), respectively.  
Possible explanations for these findings are discussion in Section 5.8.1.  Note that 
some of these correlations are not significant for EGM-PGs, and so the actual 
population-correlation may differ considerably from that in the sample (and may be 
zero). 
In regards to the remaining variables, current urge (which is proposed to measure 
cue-triggered wanting) correlates moderately with the Scale of Gambling Choices 
(which is proposed to measure gambling-related impaired control, and is used to 
categorise NPGs and PGs in most studies in this thesis) and with the action IAT 
(which is proposed to measure automatic approach and avoidance associations with 
gambling) for both gambling groups.  Again, however, the correlations for PGs are 
not significant, and so need to be considered with caution.  The only other correlation 
of at least .3 is that between affective valence and the Scale of Gambling Choices for 
EGM-NPGs but not for EGM-PGs. Possible reasons for this observation are not 
clear.  
5.7.1  Preliminary analysis of data 
Before beginning the preliminary analysis, a brief note about missing cases is 
necessary.  A default setting when using the ‘Implicit’ software is that participants 
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must complete all questions (participants cannot continue to the next page until all 
questions on the current page are answered).  As a result there are no missing values 
on any measure.  That said, there is one exception to this.  One file containing 
responses to the demographics questions for one participant could not be located on 
the Millisecond server (which hosted the Inquisit program used to run the IATs 
online), so there is one missing case on all demographics questions.  
5.7.1.1  Demographic characteristics and gambling involvement 
Analyses are conducted to compare demographic characteristics (age, gender, highest 
level of education, ethnicity, and usual country of residence) across the gambling 
groups.  An independent-samples t-test is used to compare the groups on age (the 
only continuous variable), while a chi-square test of independence is used to compare 
the groups on the remaining categorical variables.  A preliminary analysis of age 
shows satisfaction of the assumptions of normality, as skewness and kurtosis are 
within the robust range (see Section 4.3.1);  and satisfaction of equality of variances, 
as Levene’s test is not significant (p = .68).  
Preliminary analyses for the chi-square test shows that all variables fail to meet the 
minimum number of cases per cell required (as noted in Section 4.3.2, chi-square 
analysis requires at least 5 cases in all cells for variables with 2 x 2 categories, and in 
80% of cells for variables with more categories;  Pallant, 2010).  Hence, where 
possible, some categories in each variable are collapsed.  For the ‘Highest level of 
education variable’, ‘Some high-school’, and ‘High-school graduate’ are collapsed 
into ‘At least some high-school’, and ‘Some university’ and ‘Bachelor’s degree or 
higher’ are collapsed into ‘At least some university’.  Similarly, for ‘Usual country of 
residence’, ‘United States of America’ and ‘Canada’ are collapsed into ‘North 
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America’, ‘Australia’ and ‘New Zealand’ are combined into ‘Australia/New 
Zealand’ and all other countries (Malaysia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom) 
are collapsed into an ‘Other’ category. 
For ethnicity, the vast majority of participants (84.7%) are Caucasian, so all other 
responses are collapsed into ‘Other’.  However, this still does not result in the 
minimum required cases per cell.  Similarly, gender does not contain the minimum 
cases per cell, and there are no categories to collapse in order to achieve this (as it’s a 
2 x 2 variable).  Hence, for these variables, Fisher’s Exact Test (Fisher, 1922) is 
used, instead of chi-square analysis.  
The distribution of participants for gender, and for the collapsed variables, is shown 
in Table 37.  Additionally, the mean age in each gambling group is shown.  
Table 37. Demographic characteristics by gambling group and for the whole sample. 
Characteristics 
EGM-NPGs 
n = 53 
EGM-PGs 
n = 24 
Whole sample 
n = 77 
Age Mean (SD) 50.94 (11.09) 43.79 (10.32) 48.59 (11.31) 
Gender: Females % 74.1 62.5 70.1 
Highest level of education % 
At least some high school or graduate 
Vocational training 
At least some university  
 
22.6 
7.6 
69.8 
 
50.0 
16.7 
33.3 
 
21.2 
10.4 
57.2 
Ethnicity % 
Caucasian 
Other 
 
84.9 
15.1 
 
87.5 
12.5 
 
64.4 
35.6 
Usual country of residence % 
North America 
Australia/New Zealand 
Other 
 
68.0 
9.4 
22.6 
 
58.3 
25.0 
16.7 
 
64.5 
14.5 
21.0 
 
Results of analyses show that age differs significantly by gambling group, t (75) = 
2.68, p = .009, such that EGM-PGs tend to be slightly younger than EGM-NPGs.  
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Additionally, ‘Highest level of education’ also differs significantly, α2 (2, 77) = 9.05, 
p =.011, such that EGM-NPGs are more likely than EGM-PGs to have attended 
university.  This is consistent with previous research, and with the findings in Study 
2, which suggest that PGs tend to be less well educated than NPGs (Raylu & Oei, 
2009).  
5.7.1.2  Gambling activity  
The gambling activity variables are also compared across the gambling groups.  As 
the variables are categorical, the chi-square test of independence is used to run such 
analyses.  In order to meet the minimum required cases per cell for the chi-square 
test, many categories for each variable are collapsed, as shown in Table 38. 
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Table 38. Collapsing of variable categories to meet 
minimum cell numbers for chi-square analysis 
Gambling frequency Gambling frequency 
collapsed  
Most days 
More than once a week 
More than once a week 
More than once a year 
Less than once a year 
Less than once a month 
Less than once a month 
Session length Session length collapsed 
Less than 15 minutes 
15 to 30 minutes 
30 minutes to an hour 
Less than one hour 
2 to 3 hours 
3 to 4 hours 
2 to 4 hours 
More than 4 hours 
I gamble more or less 
continuously 
4 hours or more 
Time since most recent gamble Time since most recent 
gamble collapsed 
Today  
Yesterday 
Within the last 48 hours 
Within the last fortnight 
Within the last month 
Within the last month 
 
The distribution of participants across these collapsed variables is shown in Table 39.  
Chi-square analysis shows that none of the variables differ significantly across the 
gambling groups.  However, EGM-PGs tend to gamble for longer during a session 
than do EGM-NPGs, and this difference trends towards significance, α2 (3, 78) = 
7.23, p =.065.   
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Table 39. Gambling activity by gambling group 
Gambling activity EGM-NPGs EGM-PGs 
Internet gambling status % 
Internet 
Not on the internet 
 
51.9 
58.1 
 
50.0 
50.0 
Gambling frequency % 
Most than once a week 
More than once a month 
Less than once a month 
 
55.6 
24.1 
20.4 
 
58.3 
25.0 
16.7 
Usual session length % 
Less than 1 hour 
1 to 2 hours 
2 to 3 hours 
4 hours or more 
 
35.2 
20.4 
25.9 
18.5 
 
8.3 
20.8 
33.3 
37.5 
Time since most recent gamble 
% 
Within the last hour 
Today 
Yesterday 
Within the last fortnight 
More than a fortnight ago 
 
 
27.8 
14.8 
16.7 
14.8 
25.9 
 
 
20.8 
16.7 
25.0 
16.7 
20.8 
 
The lack of difference in gambling frequency between the two groups is unusual (and 
contrasts with Study 1 and 2).  However, a power analysis indicates that the analysis 
in Study 3 lacked power.  With df = 75, there is only approximately 60% chance of 
detecting a moderate effect size of η2 = .06, whereas researchers conventionally 
consider 80% power acceptable (Francis, 2013).  Lack of power can result in an 
increased chance of making a Type II error, where the null hypothesis is accepted 
even though there is a relationship in the population, and so it should be rejected.  
Hence, lack of power may explain the lack of difference on session length between 
the gambling groups. 
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5.7.1.3  The IATs 
In this section the internal reliability and distribution of scores on each IAT is 
examined.  Additionally, possible differences on each IAT according to IAT- and 
block-order are examined.  Finally, the proportion of errors, and mean reaction-
times, for each block are examined on each IAT for each gambling group.  
Data cleaning, examining the distribution, and internal reliability 
According to Greenwald et al’s (2003) seminal study, when calculating the IAT-
score for each participant, optimal data treatment entails no treatment of extreme 
values, except deletion of individual response-latencies which are longer than 10 
000ms.  Following these guidelines, only two responses across all participants are 
deleted (note that each participant provided 48 responses on each IAT, excluding 
practice trials).  
The distribution of D-scores on each IAT for each gambling group are examined.  
This shows that all distributions are within the ‘robust range’ and so can be 
considered normal (for the evaluative IAT, skewness = -2.7 and kurtosis = -.40 for 
EGM-NPGs, and skewness = .06 and kurtosis = -1.19 for EGM-PGs;  for the action 
IAT, skewness = -.36 and kurtosis = 1.21 for EGM-NPGs, and skewness = -.18 and 
kurtosis = -.49 for EGM-PGs).   
The internal consistency of each IAT is then examined.  Different authors have used 
different ways of measuring this statistic.  Some have examined consistency between 
response-latencies for each block (Bluemke & Friese, 2008; Yi & Kanetkar, 2010). 
Others have examined the internal reliability of the whole IAT, by splitting each IAT 
effectively into separate IATs, then taking the IAT-score, and calculating the average 
inter-correlation between the different scores (De Houwer, 2003; Karpinski & 
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Steinman, 2006; Wigboldus et al., 2006).  As these measures provide different 
indices of internal consistency (one provides an indication of consistency for each 
block, while the other provides an indication of consistency across the whole IAT 
and for the actual IAT-score) both measures are examined for Study 3. 
In order to examine consistency within each block, Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 
1951) is used.  This is displayed in Table 40, for the approach and the avoidance 
blocks on the action IAT, and for the negative and positive blocks on the evaluative 
IAT.  It can be seen in the table that Cronbach’s alpha is high for all blocks. 
Table 40. Different measures of internal consistency for each IAT 
 
Cronbach’s alpha 
Correlation between D-
score for split-halves** 
Action IAT  .59* 
Gambling-approach block .88  
Gambling-avoid block .84  
Evaluative IAT   .58* 
Gambling-positive block .91  
Gambling-negative .88  
* p < .001; **with a Spearman-Brown adjustment (W. Brown, 1910; Spearman, 1910) 
In order to examine consistency of the IAT-score across the whole IAT, the trials in 
each block are partitioned into parallel subsets (specifically, into Trials 1, 3, 5, 7 etc, 
and Trials 2, 4, 6, 8 etc) and the D-score is calculated for corresponding sub-sets of 
contrasting blocks.  The correlation between the two resulting D-scores is shown in 
Table 40.  Note that a Spearman-Brown (1910) correction is then applied to these 
correlations to compensate for the underestimation of consistency that occurs when 
using only half of the trials in each sub-set (Nunnally, 1978).  These adjusted 
estimates of internal consistency are conceptually equivalent, and directly 
comparable, to Cronbach’s alpha (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006).  
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The table shows that, for each IAT, the adjusted correlations between the D-scores 
for split-halves are significant.  Although these are somewhat low, they are in line 
with that achieved by other IAT measures (Wigboldus et al., 2006; Yi & Kanetkar, 
2010).  Hence, the internal consistency of each block, and the internal consistency of 
each IAT, may be regarded as adequate. 
Examining methodological- and order-effects 
As noted above, when participants are presented with the gambling and paired-
attribute stimuli, they are instructed to respond to such stimuli with a particular 
assigned key.  This is termed the ‘focal’ stimuli.  Instead of presenting the remaining 
non-paired attribute stimuli as well, participants are asked to respond to all ‘other’ 
stimuli with a different assigned response key (without being shown the stimuli).  
This is termed the non-focal stimuli.  When examining the psychometric properties 
of the Brief IAT, Sriram and Greenwald (2009) noted that participants provided 
correct responses faster, on average, to focal than non-focal stimuli.  Hence, suitable 
analyses are conducted to see if this is the case for the IATs used in Study 3.  
In order to examine this, the mean of all focal responses, and the mean of all non-
focal responses, across both IATs is calculated for each participant.  These means are 
then compared using a paired-samples t-test.  The results show that participants do 
respond significantly faster, on average, to focal stimuli (mean = 960.73ms, SD = 
326.44ms) than to non-focal stimuli (mean = 1032.39ms, SD = 256.22ms), t (77) = 
3.22, p = .002.  This issue does not undermine the logic of the study, however, as the 
IAT-effect compares reaction-times across contrasting blocks, and both contrasting 
blocks would be affected by this issue equally. 
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As noted above (Section 5.6.3.4), researchers have found an order-effect in regards 
to both block-order and IAT-order (when more than one IAT is conducted in a study; 
Greenwald et al., 1998).  Hence, possible differences according to block- and IAT-
order are examined.  As differences are also predicted according to gambling group, 
the Scale of Gambling Choices score is statistically controlled when conducting these 
analyses.  Thus, a two-way ANCOVA is conducted for each IAT, with ‘IAT-order’ 
and ‘block-order’ entered as grouping variables, Scale of Gambling Choices entered 
as a covariate, and the D-score for each IAT entered as the DV.  Preliminary analyses 
show satisfaction of the assumptions of covariate reliability, linearity, and 
homogeneity of regression slopes.  Results are shown in Table 41.  
Table 41. Results of 2 x 2 ANCOVAs examining differences in D scores on each 
IAT according to block- and IAT-order. 
IAT- and block-order 
Mean 
(SD) 
Grouping variables 
in ANCOVAs 
F 
(1, 77) p 
Evaluative IAT First 
Positive first 
Negative first 
 
.24 (.48) 
.04 (.40) 
IAT order 
Evaluative block order 
IAT order * Block 
order 
.06 
.08 
3.52 
.81 
.78 
.07  Evaluative IAT Second 
Positive first 
Negative first 
 
.10 (.39) 
.25 (.39) 
Action IAT first 
Approach first  
Avoidance first 
 
.20 (.60) 
.30 (.40) 
 
IAT order 
Action block order 
IAT order * Block 
order 
 
2.11 
.37 
.11 
 
.15 
.55 
.74 
Action IAT second 
Approach first 
Avoidance first 
.09 (.44) 
.08 (.42) 
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It can be seen in the table that there are no significant differences in either IAT 
according to IAT- or block-order.  Hence, there is no need to control for either of 
these variables when examining predictions.  
Examining errors 
The number of errors when completing each IAT is inspected for each gambling 
group, and is displayed in Table 42 for each block of 24 trials.  The table shows that 
the mean number of errors on the evaluative IAT is fairly low (approximately one in 
every twelve trials), while that on the action IAT approaches one error every four 
trials, on average.  The better performance on the evaluative IAT may be due to the 
greater familiarity and salience of the concepts compared with the action IAT.   
Table 42. Mean number of errors for each block in each IAT. 
IAT block 
EGM-NPGs 
Mean (SD) 
EGM-PGs 
Mean (SD) 
t df p 
Evaluative  
Positive-gambling  
Negative-gambling 
 
2.04 (3.43) 
2.25 (3.15) 
 
1.91 (3.10) 
2.04 (3.91) 
 
0.19 
0.22 
 
76 
75 
 
.86 
.82 
Action 
Approach-gambling 
Avoidance-gambling  
 
5.35 (4.38) 
5.83 (4.55) 
 
6.17 (4.43) 
6.33 (4.00) 
 
1.62 
0.71 
 
74 
74 
 
.11 
.48 
 
The table also shows that the number of errors are similar for each gambling group.  
Using a Holm-Bonferroni adjustment for four analyses, a series of independent-
samples t-test confirms that there are no significant differences in error-rates by 
gambling group for either IAT.  
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Examining mean reaction-times 
Although the D-score is used as the IAT-score in Study 3, mean reaction-time on 
each IAT for each gambling group are also briefly examined. This is displayed in 
Table 43 for each block. 
Table 43. Mean reaction-time (ms) for each block, and difference in mean reaction-
time for contrasting blocks, by gambling group. 
IAT 
EGM-NPGs 
Mean (SD) 
EGM-PGs 
Mean (SD) t df p 
Evaluative  
Gambling-positive 
Gambling-negative 
 
910.73 (587.65) 
896.89 (315.11) 
 
910.73 (200.17) 
949.53 (220.33) 
 
-.01 
-.74 
 
75 
75 
 
.995 
.46 
Action  
Gambling-approach 
Gambling-avoidance 
 
1055.02 (506.62) 
1152.34 (546.64) 
 
1173.93 (430.58) 
1156.57 (429.54) 
 
1.00 
.03 
 
75 
75 
 
.32 
.97 
 
The table shows that mean reaction-times are generally faster for the evaluative IAT 
than for the action IAT, as may be predicted by the greater salience and familiarity of 
the attributes in the evaluative IAT (noted above in this section), compared with 
those on the action IAT.  Additionally, it can also be seen that reaction-times are 
generally slightly faster for EGM-NPGs than for EGM-PGs.  However, using a 
Holm-Bonferroni adjustment for each pair of analyses for each IAT, a series of 
independent-samples t-tests shows no differences in mean reaction-time between the 
gambling groups on corresponding blocks on either IAT.  These results can be seen 
in Table 43. 
5.7.1.4  Deliberative expectancies 
As noted previously (in Section 5.2.2 and 5.6.3.2), explicit expectancies are 
measured using the L-BGBQ.  Preliminary analyses of the questionnaire are 
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conducted in this section.  This entails a principal components analysis, examination 
of the distribution of scores, and a preliminary examination of the mean-score for 
each gambling group.  As noted above, for each participant, their item-mean on the 
L-BGBQ is taken as their score on the measure. 
Prior examination of the assumptions for principal components analysis shows that 
inter-item correlations are mostly above the recommended value of .3, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin value is above the recommended value of .6, and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity is significant (Pallant, 2010).  The subsequent principal components 
analysis reveals only one component with an eigen value greater than one, which 
explains 51% of the variance.  All eight items load at least .6 on the component.  
Hence, the questionnaire shows a unified factor structure.  Additionally, Cronbach’s 
alpha shows that internal reliability is sound (α = .86).  Overall, the psychometric 
properties of the questionnaire appear satisfactory.  
The distribution of scores for each gambling group are examined for normality.  For 
both groups, skewness and kurtosis are within the ‘robust range’ (skewness = -0.79 
and kurtosis = 2.58 for EGM-NPGs; skewness = 0.23 and kurtosis = -.05 for EGM-
PGs).  Thus, the assumption of normality is satisfied.  
The mean L-BGBQ score for each group is compared.  That for EGM-PGs is lower 
(mean = 52.74, SD = 20.89) than that for EGM-NPGs (mean = 58.82, SD = 15.94).  
However, an independent-samples t-test shows that the mean scores do not differ 
significantly, t (75) = 1.40, p = .16.  This lack of difference contrasts with Study 2, 
where significant differences are observed on the shorter version of the questionnaire 
(the BGBQ).  Given this, each item on the L-BGBQ is examined further.  The mean 
score on each item is compared across the gambling groups using a series of 
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independent-samples t-tests, with a Holm-Bonferroni adjustment of alpha for eight 
analyses.  The results are shown in Table 44. 
Table 44. A comparison of each item on the Lengthened-Gambling 
Beliefs Questionnaire by gambling group. 
Item 
EGM-NPGs 
Mean (SD) 
EGM-PGs 
Mean (SD) 
Enjoy vs not enjoy 73.78 (23.86) 77.50 (22.66) 
Win vs lose 51.69 (22.76) 47.25 (28.02) 
Relaxed vs tense 58.43 (25.37) 51.42 (27.32) 
Elated vs depressed 57.00 (16.36) 57.29 (23.76) 
In control vs powerless* 64.89 (22.28) 47.17 (27.99) 
Good vs bad 56.26 (22.06) 46.67 (26.90) 
Pleasant vs pleasant 61.40 (25.24) 52.92 (28.24) 
Constructive vs 
destructive 
47.69 (15.07) 41.71 (29.20) 
*Item differs significantly between gambling groups 
using a Holm-Bonferroni adjustment 
The table shows that none of the items differ significantly, other than the ‘In control 
versus powerless’ item, t (75) = 2.93, p = .005.  Hence, EGM-PGs and EGM-NPGs 
do not differ on any items other than that which measures their perceived degree of 
control over gambling.  
5.7.1.5  Describing urge and affective valence 
The distribution of urge and affective valence is examined for each gambling group. 
For both groups, skewness and kurtosis are within the robust range, so the 
distributions can be considered sufficiently normal to justify the use of parametric 
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analyses.  The means for urge and affective valence for each gambling group are 
displayed in Table 45.  Note that urge is measured on a 50-point unipolar VAS 
anchored by ‘No urge’ and ‘Very strong urge’.  By contrast, affective-valence is 
measured on a 100-point bipolar VAS, anchored by ‘Unpleasant’ and ‘Pleasant’. 
Table 45. Mean (SD) urge and affective valence for each 
gambling group. 
 
EGM-NPGs 
(n=53) 
EGM-PGs 
(n = 24) 
Measures 
(Response-scale) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Urge (1 to 50) 20.04 (11.56) 34.75 (11.57)  
Affective valence (1 to 100) 65.77 (20.13) 55.29 (24.83) 
 
It can be seen in the table that mean urge is stronger for EGM-PGs than for EGM-
NPGs.  An independent-samples t-test shows that this difference is significant, t (75) 
= 5.17, p < .001.  Hence, it can be concluded that EGM-PGs exhibited a stronger 
mean urge when completing Study 3 than did EGM-NPGs.  This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 4, that EGM-PGs will exhibit stronger mean cue-triggered wanting than 
NPGs.  
In regards to affective valence, it can be seen that the mean score is higher for EGM-
NPGs than for EGM-PGs.  However, an independent-samples t-test shows that this 
difference is not significant, t (75) = 1.97, p = .053.  As no further analyses are 
conducted with affective valence when examining predictions below, one further 
analysis is conducted here.  The mean score for each group is also compared to 
neutral (a score of 51) for each gambling group, using a one-sample t-test.  This 
shows that mean affective valence is significantly positive for EGM-NPGs, t (52) = 
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16.77, p < .001, but does not differ significantly from neutral for EGM-PGs, t (23) = 
1.24, p = .23.    
In sum, EGM-PGs exhibited a significantly stronger mean urge than EGM-NPGs 
during Study 3, but affective valence did not differ significantly between the groups. 
However, EGM-NPGs exhibited a significantly positive mean affective valence 
while completing the study, whereas that for EGM-PGs did not differ significantly 
from neutral.  
5.7.2 Expectancies: Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding expectancies and the evaluative IAT (outlined in 
Section 5.1) are examined in this section.  Hypothesis 4, which postulates a 
correlation between the L-BGBQ and the evaluative IAT, has already been examined 
in Section 5.7.1, within the correlation matrix with all IVs and DVs.  It was noted 
then that the hypothesis is supported for EGM-PGs only.   
5.7.2.1  Hypotheses 1 and 2: Valence of expectancies 
The first two hypotheses are that mild-urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit a neutral or 
positive mean score on the evaluative IAT, whereas they will exhibit a positive mean 
score on the L-BGBQ.  Also, it is hypothesised that both mild-urge and strong-urge 
EGM-NPGs will exhibit a positive mean score on the evaluative IAT.  For both mild-
urge and strong-urge EGM-PGs, a negative mean score on both the evaluative-IAT 
and the L-BGBQ is hypothesised.  
As noted in Section 5.6.3.1, urge is measured on a 50-point visual-analogue unipolar 
scale, anchored by ‘No urge’ and ‘Very strong urge’.  Participants are presented with 
a cursor placed in the middle of the scale (at a score of 26).  Those who move the 
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cursor towards ‘No urge’ (a score less than 26) are categorised into the ‘mild-urge 
group’, whereas those who left the cursor where it is, or moved the cursor towards 
‘Very strong urge’, are categorised into the ‘strong-urge group’.  This leaves only 
three EGM-PGs in the mild-urge group.  Hence, analyses are not conducted for this 
group.  
For the remaining groups (mild-urge EGM-NPGs, strong-urge EGM-NPGs, and 
strong-urge EGM-PGs), the mean score on each measure for each group is compared 
to a neutral score (a score of zero for the evaluative IAT, and a score of 50 for the L-
BGBQ) using one-sample t-tests.  Preliminary analysis of the distribution of scores 
shows that skewness and kurtosis are within the robust range for each urge-level by 
gambling group.  The results are shown in Table 46.   
Table 46. One sample t-tests comparing the mean score on the 
evaluative-IAT and L-BGBQ to neutral for each gambling by urge-
level group. 
 Mean (SD) df t p 
Mild-urge EGM-NPGs     
Evaluative IAT 0.15 (.56) 32 1.46 .16 
L-BGBQ 59.33 (16.54) 32 2.26 .032 
Strong-urge EGM-NPGs     
Evaluative IAT 0.29 (.31) 16 3.73 .002 
L-BGBQ 61.24 (10.61) 16 2.84 .009 
Strong-urge EGM-PGs     
Evaluative IAT 0.09 (.36) 18 1.05 .31 
L-BGBQ 53.73 (23.26) 20 .24 .82 
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It can be seen in the table that the mean score on the evaluative-IAT is significantly 
positive for strong-urge EGM-NPGs, while that for mild-urge EGM-NPGs is neutral 
and does not differ significantly from zero. Given the small sample-size, the analysis 
lacked power, so the non-significant finding provides no evidence about the broader 
population of mild-urge EGM-NPGs.  Alternatively, mean scores on the L-BGBQ 
are significantly positive for both urge-level EGM-NPG groups, as hypothesised.  
For strong-urge EGM-PGs, on the other hand, mean scores do not differ significantly 
from neutral on either expectancy task, which contrasts with the hypothesis that they 
will exhibit a negative mean score.  Again, power is lacking in these groups so no 
conclusions can be drawn. Hence, there is evidence in support of the hypotheses for 
EGM-NPGs only.  
5.7.2.2  Hypothesis 3:  Expectancies and concurrent urge 
Hypothesis 3 is that scores on the evaluative IAT will not differ according to 
concurrent urge for either gambling group, and neither will scores on the L-BGBQ 
for EGM-PGs.  For EGM-NPGs, however, it is predicted that scores on the L-BGBQ 
will differ according to concurrent urge (consistent with the findings in Study 2).   
The first step to examining this hypothesis is to review the degree of correlation 
between ratings of urge and each expectancy measure in the correlation matrix in 
Table 36.  As noted previously, only predictors that correlate at least .20 with the 
outcome variable are included in the regression.  
The correlation matrix in Table 36 (Section 5.7) shows that the correlation between 
urge and the evaluative-IAT is negligible or weak for both gambling groups (r = -.16 
for EGM-NPGs, and r = .10 for EGM-PGs), as is the correlation between the L-
BGBQ and urge for EGM-PGs (r = .17), consistent with predictions.  By contrast the 
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correlation between the L-BGBQ and urge is greater than .20 (r = .21) for EGM-
NPGs.  Hence, a regression to examine the relationship between urge and L-BGBQ 
scores is conducted for EGM-NPGs only.  This is now described. 
Both affective valence and Scale of Gambling Choices scores correlate more than .20 
with L-BGBQ scores for EGM-NPGs, and so are included as covariates in the 
regression.  Hence, a hierarchical linear regression analysis is conducted, with 
affective valence and Scale of Gambling Choices scores entered in the first step, urge 
in the second step, and L-BGBQ scores entered as the outcome variable.  Inspection 
of the normal probability plots, and residuals scatterplots, shows satisfaction of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of 
residuals.  Two outliers are identified on the scatterplot, but Mahalanobis distance 
(using a criterion of .001) and Cook’s leverage (using a criterion of 1.0) suggests that 
these do not have undue influence on the analysis, and so do not need to be recoded 
in any way.  Results are shown in Table 47. 
Table 47. Results of hierarchical linear regression using urge to predict L-BGBQ 
scores for EGM-NPGs. 
Variables 'R2 
Zero-
order sr2 B E F 
Step 1 
affective valence 
Scale of Gambling Choices 
.12 
 
 
 
.31 
-.23 
 
.07 
.02 
 
.21 
-.37 
 
.27 
-.16 
3.40* 
Step 2 
affective valence 
Scale of Gambling Choices  
urge 
.09  
.31 
-.23 
.19 
 
.09 
.04 
.09 
 
.25 
-.50 
.37 
 
.32 
-.21 
.30 
4.23** 
*p < .05; **p ≤ .01 
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It can be seen in the table that, after controlling for affective valence and the Scale of 
Gambling Choices, urge significantly adds to the prediction of L-BGBQ scores for 
EGM-NPGs.  Using Cohen’s (1988) estimates (small 'R2= .02, medium 'R2= .13, 
and large 'R2= .26), a small to moderate proportion of variance in L-BGBQ scores is 
accounted for by concurrent urge ('R2 = .09).  Hence, overall, the data support the 
hypothesis that urge predicts L-BGBQ scores for EGM-NPGs only. 
5.7.3 Cue-triggered wanting: Hypotheses 5 to 7 
All predictions regarding cue-triggered wanting were outlined in Section 5.2.  In this 
section, the operationalised hypotheses arising from these predictions (Hypotheses 5 
to 8) are examined.  
5.7.3.1  Hypothesis 5: Urge level by gambling group 
Hypothesis 5 is that EGM-PGs will exhibit a stronger mean urge than EGM-NPGs, 
and that a greater proportion of EGM-PGs than EGM-NPGs will exhibit a strong 
urge.  Mean urge has already been compared across gambling groups (in Section 
5.7.1.5), when a preliminary analysis of each variable was conducted.  This showed 
that EGM-PGs do indeed exhibit a stronger mean urge than EGM-NPGs, consistent 
with Hypothesis 5.  Hence, in this section, only the latter half of the hypothesis needs 
to be examined.  In order to do so, the proportion of EGM-PGs that reported a strong 
urge during Study 3 is compared to that for EGM-NPGs.  These proportions are 
shown in Table 48. 
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Table 48. Proportion of EGM-PGs 
and EGM-NPGs experiencing a mild- 
and a strong-urge during Study 3. 
Urge-level 
EGM-
NPGs 
EGM-
PGs 
Mild-urge .53 .12 
Strong-urge .47 .88 
It can be seen in the table that there are a greater proportion of EGM-PGs than EGM-
NPGs in the strong-urge group.  A chi-square analysis of independence with 
gambling- by urge-level group shows that this difference is significant, α2 = 11.17, n 
= 77, p = .001.  Hence, the data are consistent with Hypothesis 5.  
5.7.3.2  Hypotheses 6 and 7: Action IAT by gambling group 
Before outlining Hypothesis 6, it is briefly re-iterated that a positive score on the 
action IAT is indicative of automatic approach associations with gambling cues, 
whereas a negative score is indicative of automatic avoidance associations. A neutral 
score suggests that approach and avoidance associations are roughly equal. 
According to De Houwer et al.’s (2002) guidelines, a positive score is any score 
above 0.15, a negative score is any score below -0.15, and a neutral score is between 
-0.15 and 0.15. , 
Hypothesis 6 is that strong-urge EGM-PGs will exhibit a neutral mean score on the 
action IAT (as it is proposed that, when cue-triggered wanting is active, EGM-PGs 
will exhibit approximately equal avoidance and approach associations with gambling 
cues), whereas mild-urge EGM-PGs will exhibit a negative mean score on the action 
IAT (as it is proposed that, in the absence of cue-triggered wanting, EGM-PGs will 
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exhibit automatic avoidance associations with gambling cues).  However, as there are 
only three mild-urge EGM-PGs, no analyses are conducted with this group. 
Hypothesis 6 also states that strong-urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit a positive mean 
score on the action IAT (as it is proposed that, when experiencing cue-triggered 
wanting, EGM-NPGs will exhibit automatic approach associations with gambling 
cues), whereas mild-urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit a neutral mean score (as it is 
proposed that, in the absence of cue-triggered wanting, EGM-NPGs will exhibit 
neither avoidance nor approach associations with gambling cues).  These hypotheses 
are examined in this section.  
A series of one-sample t-tests are conducted to compare the mean D-score on the 
action IAT to zero for each urge-level by gambling-group.  As a neutral score is 
predicted for strong-urge EGM-PGs and mild-urge EGM-NPGs, it is predicted that 
their mean scores will not differ significantly from zero.  By contrast, a positive 
mean-score is predicted for strong-urge EGM-NPGs.  Preliminary analyses show that 
skewness and kurtosis are within the robust range for both EGM-NPG-groups, and 
for strong-urge EGM-PGs.  Hence, for these groups, the distribution of D-scores can 
be considered sufficiently normal to justify parametric analysis.  
The results of the one-sample t-test for the each group are shown in Table 49.  A 
Holm-Bonferroni adjustment of alpha for several analyses is not applied.  This is 
because the samples are small, so although adjusting alpha would reduce the chance 
of a Type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it should not be rejected), it 
would further reduce power and so increase the chance of a Type II error (failure to 
reject the null hypothesis when it should be rejected).  
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Table 49. The D-score for the single-target action IAT by 
concurrent urge-level and gambling group. 
Gamblers D df t p 
EGM-NPGs 
Mild urge 
Strong urge 
 
0.11 (.55) 
0.46 (.45) 
 
27 
24 
 
2.01 
2.74 
 
.027 
.001 
EGM-PGs 
Strong-urge 
 
0.08 (.39) 
 
20 
 
0.35 
 
.38 
 
The table shows that the mean D-score for strong-urge EGM-PGs is neutral (between 
-0.15 and 0.15), and does not differ significantly from zero.  While this is close to 
neutral, consistent with Hypothesis 6, the small sample lacks power, so the actual 
population mean is unknown.  It can also be seen in the table that the mean D-score 
for strong-urge EGM-NPGs differs significantly from zero in the positive direction, 
consistent with the hypothesis.  For mild-urge EGM-NPGs, the mean D-score is 
neutral, and differs significantly from zero, also consistent with the hypothesis.  
Hence, overall, the data provide support for Hypothesis 6 for EGM-NPGs only. 
Hypothesis 7 is that strong-urge EGM-PGs will exhibit less positive scores on the 
action IAT than strong-urge EGM-NPGs, and mild-urge EGM-PGs will exhibit less 
positive scores on the action IAT than mild-urge EGM-NPGs.  As there are too few 
mild-urge EGM-PGs to run separate analyses for each urge-level group, all EGM-
PGs are compared to all EGM-NPGs using an independent-samples t-test.  The 
results show that EGM-NPGs exhibit a more positive mean D-score (mean = .22, SD 
= .48) than EGM-PGs (mean = -.04, SD = .44), consistent with Hypothesis 8, t (75) = 
2.26, p = .026.  In sum, the data are consistent with Hypotheses 6 and 7, with the 
exception that there are too few mild-urge EGM-PGs to run relevant analyses.  
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5.7.4  Hypothesis 8: Predicting gambling activity 
Hypothesis 8 is that the expectancy measures (the evaluative IAT and the L-BGBQ) 
and measures of cue-triggered wanting (the action IAT and ratings of urge) will 
predict gambling behaviour for EGM-NPGs, whereas only measures of cue-triggered 
wanting will predict gambling behaviour for EGM-PGs.  Hence, in this section, 
regression analyses are conducted to examine this hypothesis.  As the hypotheses 
differ for each gambling group, separate regressions are conducted for each group.  
As noted previously, only variables that correlate at least .20 with the outcome 
variable are included in any regression analysis.  Thus, a correlation matrix with each 
gambling-behaviour variable (gambling frequency, session length, and time since 
most recent gamble) and each IAT is shown in Table 50.  
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Table 50. Spearman’s rank-order correlations between IATs and gambling activity 
variables for each gambling group. 
 Action IAT Urge 
Evaluative 
IAT L-BGBQ 
EGM-NPGs (n = 53)     
Gambling frequency .08 .33* .23 .25 
Session length -.07 .23 -.19 -.02 
Time since most 
recent gamble 
-.02 .37** .09 .17 
EGM-PGs (n = 24)     
Gambling frequency .20 .04 .21 .14 
Session length -.37 -.30 -.11 -.33 
Time since most 
recent gamble .52* .17 .30 -.10 
*p < .025; ** p < .01 
Note that, as the interval between categories on each gambling-behaviour variable 
are not equal (for example, the response categories for ‘gambling frequency’ are 
‘most days’, ‘more than once a week’, ‘more than once a month’, ‘more than once a 
year’, and ‘less than once a year’), the variables are regarded as ordinal rather than 
continuous.  For this reason, Spearman’s rank-order co-efficient is used to examine 
correlations instead of Pearson’s correlation.  
For the action IAT, correlations of .20 or greater are observed for EGM-PGs only, on 
all gambling activity variables.  Urge shows correlations of at least .20 with all 
variables for EGM-NPGs, but only with session length for EGM-PGs.  For the 
evaluative IAT, correlations of at least .20 are seen for gambling frequency for 
EGM-NPGs, and for gambling frequency and time since most recent gamble for 
EGM-PGs.  Finally, for the L-BGBQ, a correlation of at least .20 is seen with 
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gambling frequency for EGM-NPGs, and with session length for EGM-PGs.  Hence, 
follow-up regressions are conducted with these variables as predictors only. 
Separate regressions are conducted for each outcome variable.  Where more than one 
variable shows a correlation of at least .20 with a particular outcome variable, there 
is more than one predictor in the regression for that outcome variable.  
As each outcome variable is ordinal, a non-parametric regression, such as logistic, 
ordinal, or probit regression, is appropriate.  One necessary condition of non-
parametric regressions is that none of the cells are empty (‘cells’ are the intersecting 
levels of the predictor and outcome variables; for example, if there are four 
categories on the predictor variable, and two categories on the outcome variable, then 
there are eight cells in the analysis).  While this condition can be relaxed somewhat 
when there is a continuous predictor (Pallant, 2010), as there are only 24 EGM-PGs 
in the analysis, more than 80% of the cells are empty.   Such a large proportion of 
empty cells can result in unstable and overestimated parameters (Tabachnik & Fidell, 
2013).   For these reasons, the non-parametric bootstrapped regression is used for all 
regressions with EGM-PGs in this section.  In order to foster consistency, the non-
parametric bootstrap regression is used with EGM-NPGs as well.  The bootstrap 
regression is described in Section 4.3.11. 
For each bootstrap regression, 2000 iterations are conducted (that is, 2000 sub-
samples are taken, and a regression is conducted with each sub-sample).  For all 
regressions, solutions are found for all 2000 iterations (that is, none of the sub-
samples resulted in a singular covariance matrix, in which an inverse covariance 
matrix could not be found, leading to no solution).   
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The results are shown in Table 51.  Note that, when calculating associated p-values, 
the bias-corrected percentile method is used.  As noted in Section 4.3.1.1, this 
corrects for the fact that the sampling-distribution is calculated empirically using 
sub-samples from a sample of the population, rather than using samples from the 
actual population (Efron, 1987).   
Table 51. Results of non-parametric bootstrapped regressions (significant results are 
bolded). 
EGM-NPGs      
Outcome variable R2 Predictor B-weight β p 
Gambling 
frequency 
.25 Urge .04 .32 .014 
Evaluative IAT .57 .18 .15 
L-BGBQ .02 .26 .030 
Session Length  Urge .03 .21 .17 
Time since most 
recent gamble 
 Urge .06 .39 .009 
EGM-PGs 
Outcome variable R2 Predictor B-weight β p 
Gambling frequency .05 Action IAT .42 .16 .49 
Evaluative IAT .46 .16 .33 
Session Length .31 Action IAT -1.36 -.41 .047 
Urge -.01 -.11 .46 
L-BGBQ -.02 -.33 .16 
Time since most 
recent gamble 
.24 Action IAT 1.53 .41 .033 
Evaluative IAT .94 .24 .16 
 
The results show that, for EGM-NPGs, urge, but not the action IAT, predicts 
gambling frequency and time since most recent gamble, and L-BGBQ scores predict 
gambling frequency.  These findings support the hypothesis that both evaluative 
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measures, and measures of cue-triggered wanting, predict gambling behaviour for 
EGM-NPGs, albeit, only on some indices of gambling behaviour.  
For EGM-PGs, by contrast, only the action IAT is a significant predictor of any 
index of gambling behaviour (specifically, session length and time since most recent 
gamble).  None of the expectancy measures significantly predict any index of 
gambling behaviour for EGM-PGs.  This is consistent with the prediction that 
measures of cue-triggered wanting, but not evaluative measures, will predict 
gambling behaviour for EGM-PGs.  The results for both gambling groups are 
discussed below in Section 5.8.3. 
 
In sum, the data support Hypothesis 1 for EGM-NPGs (their gambling evaluations 
are positive, as predicted), but there was no evidence either way on Hypothesis 2 for 
EGM-NPGs, or for either hypothesis for EGM-PGs. By contrast, for Hypothesis 3, 
the evaluative measures correlate as predicted for EGM-PGs, but not for EGM-
NPGs. 
Hypothesis 4, that EGM-PGs will exhibit a stronger mean urge overall than EGM-
NPGs, and a greater proportion of EGM-PGs will exhibit a strong urge compared 
with EGM-NPGs, is also supported. Hypothesis 5, that strong-urge EGM-PGs will 
exhibit a neutral score on the action IAT, whereas mild-urge EGM-PGs will exhibit a 
negative score on the action IAT, is supported for strong-urge EGM-PGs, but there 
are too few mild-urge EGM-PGs to draw any conclusions. Hypothesis 6, that strong-
urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit a positive mean score on the action IAT, while mild-
urge EGM-NPGs will exhibit a neutral mean score on the action IAT, is also 
supported.  
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There are too few mild-urge EGM-PGs to examine Hypothesis 7 (that mild-urge 
EGM-NPGs will exhibit a more positive mean score on the action IAT than mild-
urge EGM-PGs, and so too for strong-urge EGM-NPGs compared with strong-urge 
EGM-PGs). However, Hypothesis 7 is supported when comparing all EGM-NPGs to 
all EGM-PGs. Finally, Hypothesis 8, that expectancy measures and measures of cue-
triggered wanting will predict gambling behaviour for EGM-NPGs, but only 
measures of cue-triggered wanting will predict gambling behaviour for EGM-PGs, 
received support on some indices of gambling behaviour. These findings are 
discussed in the next section.  
5.8  Discussion 
5.8.1  Expectancies 
In this section the findings regarding expectancies are discussed. Attention is given 
to whether the data fit with the dual-process model, and to any difference in findings 
across Study 2 and 3.  
5.8.1.1  Hypothesis 1 and 2: Valence of expectancies   
The data in Study 3 are consistent with the hypotheses for EGM-NPGs, but evidence 
was lacking on the evaluative-IAT for mild-urge NPGs due to insufficient power.  
Hence, it may be concluded that EGM-NPGs tend to exhibit positive deliberative 
expectancies overall (as measured on the L-BGBQ) regardless of the degree of 
concurrent urge, and strong-urge EGM-NPGs exhibit positive automatic 
expectancies overall (as measured on the evaluative IAT).  These findings are 
consistent with those from Study 2.  
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For EGM-PGs, no analyses were conducted to examine the hypotheses with those 
experiencing a mild-urge, as there are too few participants in the group (n = 3).  For 
PGs experiencing a strong-urge, the findings are not consistent with the hypotheses. 
Their mean score on both expectancy tasks does not differ significantly from neutral, 
indicating that mean expectancies cannot be regarded as either positive or negative. 
This lack of significant difference may be because the population mean is neutral, or 
it may be because the study lacked sufficient power.  As there were few strong-urge 
EGM-PGs (n = 24), the study did lack power, so the latter explanation is credible.  
However, that said, the mean on each task is close to neutral, so it is also possible 
that the population mean is close to neutral as well.  
The neutral mean scores exhibited by strong-urge EGM-PGs contrast with the 
negative mean scores observed on both expectancy tasks for strong-urge PGs in 
Study 2 (on the free-association task and the BGBQ).  This is discussed in the next 
sub-section. 
Differences in findings regarding expectancies across Studies 2 and 3 
The difference in findings regarding the valence of expectancies across the studies 
for PGs requires some discussion.  One explanation may regard differences in current 
affect during each study, as research has shown that current affect may bias 
evaluative judgments (Boden & Berenbaum, 2010).  In Study 2, both mean affect 
and mean expectancies are negative for PGs, whereas in Study 3 they both do not 
differ significantly from neutral.  For NPGs, on the other hand, both mean affect and 
mean expectancies tend to be positive in both Study 2 and 3.  Thus the neutral 
expectancies reported by EGM-PGs in Study 3 may be partly due to their neutral 
affect, the negative expectancies reported by PGs in Study 2 may be partly due to 
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their negative affect, and the positive expectancies reported by NPGs in both Study 2 
and 3 may be partly due to their positive affect.  
The differences in affect across the studies for PGs may be related to the different 
tasks completed across the studies.  The free-association task asks PGs to list the first 
words that come to mind when they think about how their gambling makes them feel. 
Participants may use the affect heuristic when answering this question.  That is, they 
may consider how they feel when thinking about their gambling, rather than how 
their gambling makes them feel (Slovic et al., 2005).  PGs may have felt negative 
when thinking about gambling during the free-association task, which may have led 
to negative responses on that, and subsequent tasks, including their rating of affect 
and their responses on the BGBQ.  
The negative expectancies on the free-association task in Study 2 may have primed 
negative deliberative responses (as possibly evidenced by subsequent negative 
ratings on the BGBQ in Study 2, but not on the L-BGBQ in Study 3 which omitted 
the free-association task).  Such priming is also likely to emulate real-life decision 
making, because automatic negative thoughts about gambling would precede 
deliberative evaluation, such that deliberative evaluations are likely to be biased by 
automatic thoughts.  
By contrast, no measure asks gamblers to consider how their gambling makes them 
feel in Study 3.  Hence, negative affect may not have been elicited in Study 3, which 
may account for the neutral affect, and neutral mean scores reported by EGM-PGs in 
Study 3.  
It must be noted, however, that affect shows only a mild correlation with the free-
association task in Study 2 for both PGs and NPGs, which may undermine this 
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argument.  That said, mild correlations may be evident because the scoring in the 
free-association task is rather crude (as noted in Section 4.4.1.2), which may increase 
error variance, and so reduce its relationship with other variables.  Hence, the mild 
correlation between affect and the free-association task does not necessarily 
undermine the proposition that differences in mean scores on expectancy measures 
across Studies 2 and 3 may be due to differences in mean affect across the studies, 
and that this may in turn be due to completion of the free-association task only in 
Study 2. 
Alternatively, differences in the psychological processes required to complete the 
different tasks across Study 2 and 3, rather than differences in affect, may account 
for the different findings across the studies relating to the expectancy tasks for PGs. 
When completing the free-association task in Study 2, participants had to think about 
how their gambling makes them feel, whereas the evaluative IAT in Study 3 required 
participants to categorise evaluative stimuli when paired (or not) with gambling 
stimuli.  As these task requirements differ considerably, the psychological processes 
underlying their execution are likely to differ as well.  Hence, this may account for 
differences in the means on each task for EGM-PGs in each study.  
A further alternative explanation for the differences in mean expectancies across 
Study 2 and 3 may be to do with differences between the samples in the two studies.  
Study 2 comprised several different types of gamblers, whereas Study 3 comprised 
only EGM gamblers.  It may be that other gamblers, but not EGM gamblers, tend to 
report negative expectancies, whereas EGM gamblers tend not to report negative 
expectancies.  Hence, the differences in mean expectancies between the studies may 
be due to differences in the samples that comprise each study.  However, most of the 
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sample of PGs in Study 2 primarily play EGMs, similar to the EGM-sample in Study 
3, so this explanation is not convincing.  Also, the EGM-PGs in Study 2 show 
negative mean scores on the expectancy measures (Section 4.3.4). 
In sum, the free-association task may have elicited negative responses (possibly by 
eliciting negative affect), which then biased responses on tasks in Study 2, thereby 
accounting for the negative means observed on both expectancy measures and ratings 
of affect for PGs.  The absence of the free-association task in Study 3 may have 
prevented such negative responses across the tasks in that study.  
Discussing the findings from a dual-process perspective 
The findings related to expectancies need to be discussed from a dual-process 
perspective.  The dual-process model differs from a consequentialist model in that 
the latter assumes strong positive expectancies account for excessive behaviour 
(Schoemaker, 1980), whereas the former argues that strong cue-triggered wanting 
may account for excessive behaviour, regardless of the valence of concurrent 
expectancies (Berridge & Aldridge, 2009).  The former also argues that aggregate 
outcome expectancies can be negative due to impaired control (Berridge & 
Aldridge), and unstable (that is time-inconsistent;  Loewenstein et al., 2001).  
The findings in Study 2 and 3 contrast with the consequentialist model, as neither 
study found positive expectancies for PGs.  They also suggest that PGs exhibit 
negative expectancies sometimes, and neutral expectancies at other times.  This is 
consistent with the notion that PGs may exhibit negative expectancies, but that these 
differ according to contextual factors.  That said, they did not differ with changes in 
concurrent cue-triggered wanting for PGs.  However, they may still differ with other 
factors such as affect.  In addition, differences in expectancies across the studies for 
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PGs may be due to the different tasks used to examine them.  Further research is 
required to examine expectancies with PGs.  
It may be argued that the processes underlying the free-association task are more 
likely to emulate those present when making gambling decisions than those that 
underlie the evaluative IAT.  This is because the IAT asks individuals to consider 
how their gambling makes them feel, which they are likely to do when making 
gambling decisions.  If processes present while completing the free-association task 
are similar to those present when making gambling decisions, and PGs show 
negative expectancies on the task, then it may be argued that PGs are more likely to 
exhibit negative, than neutral, expectancies when making real-life gambling 
decisions.  
In support of the proposition that the free-association task may emulate real-life 
decision-making processes, when Rooke and colleagues (Rooke, Hine, & 
Thorsteinsson, 2008) conducted a meta-analysis examining the ability of different 
implicit measures (including word-association tasks and IATs) to predict substance-
use behaviour, they found that word-association tasks (of which the free-association 
task is an example) produce the strongest effect-sizes.  This suggests that they show 
the strongest relationship with actual substance-related decision-making.  It is 
possible that this finding is relevant for problem gambling too. 
In sum, considering the data from Study 2 and 3, mean expectancies appear to be 
consistently positive for NPGs.  For PGs, by contrast, mean expectancies appear to 
differ according to context or measure, as they were negative in Study 2, but neutral 
in Study 3.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that expectancies are time 
inconsistent, so while they can be negative sometimes, they are not necessarily 
 288 
 
always so.  In addition, it may be argued that the negative expectancies measured on 
the free-association task are more likely to emulate those present when making ‘real-
life’ gambling decisions, which would support the dual-process proposition that PGs 
sometimes choose to gamble even when expectancies are negative overall.  This 
argument is supported by previous research which has found that word-association 
tasks show the strongest relationship with excessive appetitive behaviours.  
5.8.1.2  Hypothesis 3: Expectancies and concurrent urge 
The data from Study 3 support Hypothesis 3, and are consistent with findings from 
Study 2.  That is, once again, expectancies differ as a function of the degree of 
current cue-triggered wanting only for EGM-NPGs, and only on the L-BGBQ. 
Expectancies on the L-BGBQ do not differ as a function of current cue-triggered 
wanting for EGM-PGs, and expectancies on the evaluative IAT do not differ as a 
function of concurrent urge for either gambling group.  As this pattern of findings is 
consistent with that in Study 2, it has already been discussed and so requires no 
further discussion here.  
5.8.1.3. Hypothesis 4: The expectancy tasks will correlate 
It is interesting to note that Hypothesis 4 (that the two expectancy tasks will 
correlate) is supported for EGM-PGs only.  This contrasts with Study 2, where it is 
supported for both gambling groups.  
Perhaps implicit evaluative responses biased deliberative evaluative responses in 
Study 2, such that responses on the free-association task influence responses on the 
BGBQ;  hence, the two tasks correlate for both groups.  This fits with the dual-
process model, which proposes that automatic processes are elicited first (because 
they are automatic, so rapid) and then deliberative processes may affirm, adjust, or 
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attempt to inhibit them.  As the implicit evaluative task in Study 3 (the evaluative 
IAT) was completed after the deliberative task (the L-BGBQ), such biasing would 
not be possible in that study.  This may explain why the measures were related in 
Study 2, but not in Study 3.  
However, this does not explain why the tasks correlate for EGM-PGs in Study 3 but 
not for EGM-NPGs.  An observation made above (in Section 5.7) may help to 
account for this.  That is, affect correlates with both expectancy tasks in both studies 
for EGM-PGs but only with the BGBQ for EGM-NPGs.  The same pattern of 
observations is evident in Study 2.  Perhaps expectancies are automatically biased by 
current affect for EGM-PGs, but not for EGM-NPGs, whereas deliberative 
expectancies are biased by current affect for both groups.  This may help to account 
for why the tasks are related for PGs, but not for NPGs. 
 
Or it may be that the tasks in Study 2 (the free-association task and the BGBQ) are 
more similar than the tasks in Study 3 (the evaluative IAT and the L-BGBQ). The 
processes that underlie the free-association task may be more similar to those that 
underlie the BGBQ than are the processes that underlie the evaluative IAT. This 
seems possible, as the IAT is a reaction-time task, whereas the free-association task 
and the BGBQ both ask participants to actively evaluate gambling.  
5.8.2  Cue-triggered wanting 
Most of the hypotheses regarding cue-triggered wanting are supported.  These 
findings are re-iterated and discussed in this section. 
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5.8.2.1 Hypotheses 5 to 7: Comparing cue-triggered wanting across the 
groups 
First, the dual-process model predicts that PGs will exhibit strong cue-triggered 
wanting in relation to gambling, whereas NPGs will exhibit mild to moderate cue-
triggered wanting (as cue-triggered wanting is involved in ‘normal’ appetitive 
processes, as well as pathological ones).  This leads to the operationalised 
hypothesis, Hypothesis 5, that EGM-PGs will exhibit a stronger mean urge than will 
EGM-NPGs, and more EGM-PGs will be in the strong-urge group than will EGM-
NPGs.  This hypothesis is supported in Study 3.  
The operationalisation of this prediction into hypotheses on the action IAT is more 
complicated. This is discussed in detail in Section 5.3.1, but is briefly re-iterated 
here. 
It is proposed that the action IAT measures both automatic approach responses, and 
automatic semantic associations with avoidance.  For both gambling groups, the 
former is proposed to be stronger when cue-triggered wanting is more strongly 
active.  In addition, the latter is proposed to be stronger for PGs compared with 
NPGs, as impaired control is likely to lead to rumination about avoidance, and so 
strong avoidance semantic associations.  The combination of these predictions leads 
to the following hypotheses.  
For EGM-NPGs experiencing strong cue-triggered wanting, a positive mean on the 
action IAT is predicted (indicative of approach associations), while for EGM-NPGs 
not experiencing strong cue-triggered wanting, a neutral mean on the action IAT is 
predicted (indicative of neither approach nor avoidance).  This comprises the first 
half of Hypothesis 6.  
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For EGM-PGs experiencing strong cue-triggered wanting, a neutral mean on the 
action IAT is predicted (as the approach associations cancel out the semantic 
avoidance associations), and for EGM-PGs not experiencing strong cue-triggered 
wanting, a negative mean on the action IAT is predicted (indicative of avoidance) 
due to their strong semantic avoidance associations.  This comprises the second half 
of Hypothesis 6.  Finally, it is proposed that EGM-NPGs will exhibit more positive 
scores on the action IAT than will EGM-PGs, due to their lack of avoidance 
associations.  All of these predictions are supported in Study 3, with the exception 
that there are too few PGs experiencing mild cue-triggered wanting to examine 
predictions relevant to them, and the neutral score on the action-IAT (d = 0.08) did 
not differ significantly from zero; as the analysis lacked power, this neutral score 
cannot actually be regarded as evidence. 
These predictions are unique.  Other researchers have not examined the action IAT 
with gamblers.  In addition, of those who have examined the action IAT in relation to 
other behaviours, different scores on the action IAT according to current cue-
triggered wanting have not been predicted.  Neither have other researchers predicted 
that EGM-PGs will exhibit both approach and avoidance on the action IAT due to 
semantic avoidance associations.   
It is interesting to note that there were several PGs in both the mild-urge and the 
strong-urge group in Study 2, whereas almost all PGs in Study 3 were experiencing a 
strong urge. This may be related to the order in which the questions are asked.  In 
Study 2, participants completed the free-association task before rating their current 
urge.  By contrast, in Study 3, participants rated their current urge as the first item in 
the study.  In Study 2, PGs mostly reported feeling negative about their gambling 
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when completing the free-association task.  It was noted above that PGs may have 
actually experienced negative affect when completing the free-association task. This 
may have negatively biased their response to the urge question (as well as other 
evaluative tasks, as noted above), so that PGs were more likely to report a mild urge 
in Study 2 compared with Study 3.  
Alternatively, this difference may be due to differences in the sample.  EGM-
gamblers may be particularly liable to report a strong urge, and Study 3 comprised 
only EGM-gamblers, whereas Study 2 comprised gamblers who primarily play 
several different games. 
5.8.3  Hypothesis 8: Predicting gambling behaviour 
As in Study 2, the data support the hypothesis that only measures of cue-triggered 
wanting will predict gambling behaviour for EGM-PGs, whereas both measures of 
cue-triggered wanting and expectancies will predict gambling behaviour for EGM-
NPGs.  However, while there is support for this hypothesis across both Study 2 and 
3, the details of these findings differ across the studies.  In Study 2, this hypothesis is 
examined with urge, the free-association task, and the BGBQ, whereas in Study 3, 
this hypothesis is examined with urge, the action IAT, the evaluative IAT, and the L-
BGBQ.  In order to facilitate a comparison of findings across the studies, the 
significant predictors are summarised for each group for each study in Table 52. 
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Table 52. Significant predictor variables for each index of gambling-activity across Study 2 
and 3 by gambling group. 
Measure 
 Study 2  Study 3 
 Session 
length 
Gambling 
frequency 
 Session 
length 
Gambling 
frequency 
Time since 
most recent 
gamble 
Urge 
 NPGs 
PGs 
   EGM-NPGs EGM-NPGs 
Action IAT  N / a N / a  EGM-PGs  EGM-PGs 
(L-)BGBQ  NPGs    EGM-NPGs  
Evaluative IAT  N / a N / a     
 
As shown in the table, urge predicts session length in Study 2 for PGs but not for 
EGM-PGs in Study 3;  however, in Study 3, the action IAT predicts session length 
for EGM-PGs.  For NPGs, urge and the BGBQ predict session length in Study 2, 
whereas they only predict session-frequency for EGM-NPGs in Study 3.  These 
differences across the studies may be accounted for by differences in the sample, or 
by differences in the measures, as now discussed.  
First, the reason that urge predicts outcomes for PGs and NPGs in Study 2, and for 
EGM-NPGs in Study 3, but not for EGM-PGs in Study 3 is discussed.  Almost all 
EGM-PGs in Study 3 report a strong urge, so there is little variation in urge scores 
for this group in Study 3.  This is likely to reduce the ability of urge ratings to 
discriminate between EGM-PGs on other measures.  By contrast, in Study 2, many 
PGs exhibit a mild urge as well as a strong urge.  So too for NPGs and EGM-NPGs 
in both studies.  This variation may facilitate the ability of urge level to predict other 
measures.  This may account for why urge ratings do not predict any indices of 
gambling activity for EGM-PGs in Study 3, whereas they do for PGs in Study 2, and 
for EGM-NPGs in both Study 2 and 3.  
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It must also be noted that while the action IAT is proposed to measure cue-triggered 
wanting, it is also proposed to measure avoidance associations.  Hence, the ability of 
the action IAT to predict gambling behaviour may be due to avoidance associations 
rather than cue-triggered wanting.  Thus, further research is required in order to 
establish whether the cue-triggered wanting component of the action IAT is 
contributing to the prediction of session length and time since most recent gamble.  
This research has already been conducted in Study 2, which indeed shows that cue-
triggered wanting (measured as rating of urge) predicts session length for PGs.   
Next, possible reasons are discussed as to why session length is predicted in Study 2 
for NPGs (urge significantly predicts session length in Study 2), but none of the 
variables in Study 3 predict session length for EGM-NPGs.  This may be due to the 
different way in which session length is measured across the studies.  In Study 2, 
session length is a continuous variable.  Participants typed in how long they usually 
gamble for in minutes.  By contrast, in Study 3, session length is a categorical 
variable with only seven categories.  Hence, session length is less accurate in Study 
3, compared with Study 2.  This may explain why none of the variables in Study 3 
predict session length for EGM-NPGs, but urge predicts session length for NPGs in 
Study 2.   
However, measures of motivational processes predict session length for (EGM-)PGs 
in both studies, which suggests that the way in which session length is measured in 
Study 3 does not prevent its prediction.  It may be that the ability of motivational 
processes to predict session length for PGs is particularly robust, and so is evident 
despite issues in the way session length is measured. 
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Finally, possible reasons as to why gambling frequency is predicted in Study 3 but 
not Study 2 are now discussed.  In Study 3, the sample comprises participants who 
primarily play the same game.  By contrast, in Study 2, participants played many 
different games.  As gambling frequency is likely to differ across game type (e.g., 
those who play weekly lottery may not be able to gamble as often as those who 
gamble on the horses online), error on the gambling frequency variable is likely to be 
greater in Study 2 compared with Study 3.  This may account for the absence of 
significant predictors for gambling frequency in Study 2.  
In sum, while there are differences across Studies 2 and 3, these may be accounted 
for by the different way in which some of the items are measured, or the different 
characteristics of the participants in each study.  Nonetheless, the findings in both 
studies are consistent with the dual-process proposition that cue-triggered wanting 
and evaluative measures predict gambling behaviour for NPGs, whereas only cue-
triggered wanting predicts gambling behaviour for PGs. 
5.8.4  Possible methodological limitations 
There are several design features that may act as limitations in Study 3.  First, the 
sample size is small.  This may be particularly a problem, given the counterbalancing 
that is used.  Counterbalancing is more effective if there are more participants in each 
counterbalanced group. 
In addition, participants only completed 24 trials each for each block, compared to 
the usual 50 trials that are completed in a more typical IAT-design.  Moreover, 
participants only complete one block for each IAT, whereas they usually complete 
two.  As noted above, these decisions are made as two IATs are completed by each 
participant, so fatigue and boredom are a concern.  In addition, as the study is 
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completed over the internet, attrition is a concern due to the absence of social 
pressure to complete the study (participants completing a study face to face are likely 
to find it difficult to withdraw from a study before it is completed for social reasons, 
whereas this pressure is not present when completing a study online).  Also, previous 
research has shown that the IAT-effect (the difference in reaction-time across 
contrasting blocks) is stronger in the earlier trials of an IAT than the later trials, so it 
is argued that too many trials may actually attenuate the IAT-effect, rather than 
enhance it.  However, fewer trials also means that an error on one trial (for example, 
momentarily forgetting the instructions) has a greater impact on the overall IAT 
score.  Hence, shorter IATs may comprise greater error-variance than longer IATs.  
A further methodological issue relates to the type of IAT used in Study 3.  The IAT-
design used in Study 3 has not been used before, as it is a combination of both the 
Brief-IAT (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009) and the single-target IAT (Bluemke & 
Friese, 2008).  Hence, there is no methodological support for the IAT used.  
Nonetheless, there is support for the Brief IAT and for the single-target IAT when 
used separately, and previous research informed all decisions made when designing 
the IATs used in Study 3.  Finally, in support of the validity of the IAT-design used 
in Study 3, most of the hypotheses are supported, which may suggest that the IATs 
are methodologically sound.    
In addition, it may be questioned whether the action IAT actually measures cue-
triggered wanting.  Although it has been used by researchers for this purpose, such 
research is relatively new.  Moreover, the action IAT only showed small to moderate 
correlations with ratings of urge for each gambling group, though this may be due to 
the proposed impact of avoidance associations.  Further research is required to 
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examine what the action IAT actually measures more closely.  Alternative measures 
of cue-triggered wanting are included in the next study, Study 4, which is described 
in the next chapter.  
In sum, the findings in this chapter tend to support the dual-process predictions, but 
not all findings do.  While the valence of expectancies in Study 3 are consistent with 
those in Study 2 for NPGs, the findings contrast for PGs.  However, it is argued that 
the negative expectancies observed in Study 2 are more likely to reflect those present 
when making ‘real-life’ gambling decisions than the neutral expectancies observed in 
Study 3.  Nonetheless, further clarifying research is necessary. 
The findings show that PGs exhibit stronger cue-triggered wanting than NPGs, as 
measured by ratings of current urge.  The findings also show that only measures of 
cue-triggered wanting predict actual indices of gambling activity for PGs, whereas 
both measures of cue-triggered wanting and evaluative measures predict gambling 
activity for NPGs.  These findings are all consistent with the dual-process model, and 
with the findings in Study 2.  It must be noted, however, that the only measure of 
cue-triggered wanting to predict gambling activity for PGs is the action IAT, which 
is predicted to be influenced by avoidance associations with gambling, as well as by 
automatic approach responses elicited by cue-triggered wanting.  Hence, it may be 
the avoidance associations, rather than cue-triggered wanting, that predict gambling 
activity for PGs.  This requires clarification in future research.   
 
So far, this thesis has examined cue-triggered wanting, expectancies, and cognitive 
errors, but these processes have all been examined in the absence of actual gambling 
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activity.  In the next chapter, cue-triggered wanting and evaluative processes 
(hedonic reward) are examined during actual gambling.  
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Chapter 6. Study 4: Examining cue-triggered wanting 
and hedonic reward during gambling 
6.1 Introduction 
One criticism of Study 2 and 3 is that they do not examine cue-triggered wanting 
during actual gambling.  Hence, in Study 4, EGM gamblers play an online EGM-
simulation, and then record their current urge to gamble during play.   Additionally, 
dual-process predictions outlined in Chapter 2 concerning the relative degree of 
hedonic reward exhibited by PGs and NPGs have not yet been examined in this 
thesis.  Hence, these are examined in Study 4. 
Chapter 6 is outlined as follows.  First, in the introduction section, the theoretical 
justification for each prediction is briefly re-iterated, and specific predictions are 
outlined.  Following this, methodological considerations, and testable hypotheses are 
presented.  Then, as is usual when presenting research, the methodology, results, and 
discussion sections follow.  
In order to contrast dual-process predictions with traditional consequentialist 
assumptions, the latter are now briefly outlined.  It would be argued from a 
consequentialist perspective that PGs gamble due to strong positive expectancies.  
One possible reason for such strong positive expectancies is that PGs may experience 
comparatively strong hedonic reward (i.e., pleasure) during gambling, which leads 
them to want to gamble more than other gamblers.  By contrast, from a dual-process 
perspective, greater gambling activity is proposed to be due to excessive cue-
triggered wanting, rather than greater hedonic reward.  This leads to the following 
dual-process predictions: 
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1. PGs will report stronger gambling-related cue-triggered wanting than will 
NPGs; 
2. Hedonic reward experienced during gambling will not differ by problem-
gambling status; 
3. PGs will exhibit greater cue-triggered wanting than hedonic reward, whereas 
hedonic reward and cue-triggered wanting will not differ for NPGs. 
In making these predictions it is necessary to re-iterate that the notion of ‘wanting’, 
as conceptualised by the term ‘cue-triggered wanting’, differs from the ordinary use 
of the term ‘wanting’.  ‘Wanting’ in the everyday sense usually refers to a 
deliberative appraisal of expected outcomes related to a behaviour or stimulus 
(Berridge & Aldridge, 2009; Dai, Brendl, & Ariely, 2010; Robinson & Berridge, 
2004);  this is termed ‘deliberative wanting’.  Cue-triggered wanting, by contrast, 
refers to the automatic approach action-tendency elicited by appetitive and associated 
cues (Berridge, 2004).  
In the following section, methodological issues related to measuring wanting and 
hedonic reward are discussed.  The predictions are then converted into testable 
hypotheses. 
6.2  Measurement issues 
Researchers have examined dual-process predictions regarding the relationship 
between cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward in other settings (e.g., in relation 
to substance use and eating; Dai et al., 2010; Finlayson, King, & Blundell, 2007; 
Goldstein et al., 2010; Hobbs, Remington, & Glautier, 2005).  In doing so, several 
different measures have been used to examine cue-triggered wanting and hedonic 
reward.  These are listed in Table 53.   
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Table 53. Measures of wanting and hedonic reward used in previous research. 
Authors Hedonic reward Wanting 
Dai, Brendl and 
Ariely (2010) 
‘Evaluative movement 
assessment’:  reaction-time 
to move stimuli towards or 
away from “self” 
(participant’s name) 
Effort expended to 
consume 
Finlayson, King, 
and Blundell 
(2007) 
Rate how ‘pleasant’ stimulus 
is on visual analogue scale 
(VAS) 
Forced choice 
Goldstein et al. 
(2010) 
Rate how ‘pleasant’ stimulus 
is on Likert scale 
Rate ‘wanting’ on Likert 
scale 
Hobbs et al. 
(2005) Rate liking on VAS Level of consumption 
Litt, Khan, and 
Shiv (2010) 
Willingness to trade for 
another item 
Willingness to pay to 
obtain an item 
Ostafin et al. 
2010 
Rate how ‘delicious’ and 
“satisfying” stimulus is 
Rate current urge on 
Likert scale 
Waugh and 
Gotlib (2008) 
Rate ‘enjoyment’ of 
stimulus, and compare 
preference 
Effort expended (number 
of clicks on moving 
square) 
Willner, James, 
and Morgan 
(2005) 
Rate expected reinforcement 
or punishment on sub-scale 
of questionnaire 
Rate mild and strong 
desires and intentions to 
consume on questionnaire 
 
In regards to measuring cue-triggered wanting, it can be seen that researchers have 
used conventional scaled-items (whereby wanting or current urge are rated on a VAS 
or Likert-scale), as well as behavioural measures.  As an example of the latter, 
participants rate the amount of one item they are willing to trade for access to another 
item or behaviour.  Alternatively, the effort participants are willing to expend to 
engage in a behaviour is measured.  Such measures were originally used with 
animals, but have been successfully adapted for use with humans (Waugh & Gotlib, 
2008).  
As participants are not aware that wanting is being measured, behavioural measures 
provide an indirect measure of wanting, whereas traditional item ratings provide a 
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direct measure.  Direct measures may entail some deliberative adjustment, as the 
rater is explicitly aware of what is being measured;  this is not the case for indirect 
measures.  As cue-triggered wanting is proposed to be an implicit, automatic process 
(Robinson & Berridge, 2003), indirect measures may allow cue-triggered wanting to 
be measured without deliberative adjustment of the measure.  
For this reason, both conventional item-rating and behavioural measures are used in 
Study 4.  For the former, participants rate how much they want to continue gambling.  
Additionally, two indirect behavioural measures of wanting are used.  For one of the 
behavioural measures, participants indicate how many gambling 'credits' they are 
willing to trade for the opportunity to continue gambling.  For the other behavioural 
measure, participants need to complete an effortful and dull task in order to gain 
access to a further ‘block’ of ten or 20 ‘spins’ on the slot simulation.  Hence, the task 
is used as an index of effort expended similar to that used by Dai et al (2010) and 
Waugh and Gotlib (2008) as noted in Table 53. Thus, three measures of wanting are 
used altogether in Study 4.  These are measured at various times during the study as 
outlined in Section 6.3.3.  
Similarly to cue-triggered wanting, when choosing measures of hedonic reward, 
consideration is given to the fact that it is an automatic (subcortical) process 
(Berridge, 2004).  Hence, items which measure automatic processes are more 
desirable than items which encourage deliberative consideration.  
When considering the previous measures used, as outlined in Table 53, it can be seen 
that most researchers asked participants to rate the stimulus, either in regards to how 
much they ‘like’ it, how ‘pleasant’ it is, or on other similar adjectives (e.g., how 
‘satisfying’ or ‘enjoyable’ it is).  These different measures are discussed, in turn.  
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Rating liking requires one to consider the stimulus or behaviour overall.  Research 
has shown that, in order to reduce task complexity and effort when asked to provide 
global ratings of a stimulus or behaviour, raters often use the ‘affect heuristic’, in 
which they rate how they feel when thinking about the stimulus or behaviour, rather 
than systematically considering the various features of the stimulus or behaviour 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  Hence, ratings of game liking may be influenced by 
the affect invoked when thinking about the game.  That said, as the game is 
mentioned in the question, there may be some deliberative adjustment of the rating, 
for example, due to motivated reasoning.  If one experiences strong cue-triggered 
wanting, they may adjust their rating of liking, in order to make their rating of liking 
and wanting more similar.  This may reduce cognitive dissonance between ratings of 
wanting and liking.  
Such deliberative adjustment may also be present when the game is rated on certain 
features, such as ‘pleasantness’ or ‘satisfaction’.  However, rather than encouraging a 
global response to the behaviour or stimulus (as may be the case when asked to rate 
overall liking of a behaviour or stimulus), these items may encourage consideration 
of individual features of the item or behaviour, such as those features which are 
particularly pleasant or satisfying, or those features which are particularly 
unpleasant, or unsatisfying.  Research has shown that consideration of individual 
features of a stimulus or behaviour invokes deliberative consideration of such 
features (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  As no studies have examined which items 
are most appropriate when comparing hedonic reward to cue-triggered wanting, both 
types of items are used in Study 4 – that is, an item which asks participants to rate 
overall liking, and an item which asks participants to rate how pleasant they find the 
game. 
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It must be noted, however, that both of these items suffer from a shared criticism.  
That is, all they are direct, and so may encourage some degree of deliberative 
consideration.  For this reason, a third item is added.  Participants are also asked to 
rate how they feel, at various times during play.  This question asks directly about 
hedonic experience during the game, but the game is not mentioned in the question, 
so it is less likely than the other measures to be influenced by deliberative 
consideration of the game.  
It must also be noted that differences in affect before play may cause differences in 
ratings of pleasantness during play.  Thus, participants must provide a baseline 
measure of pleasant feeling before play, in order to examine any baseline differences 
between the gambling groups.  
In sum, altogether, there are three different measures of hedonic reward in Study 4 
(game liking, game pleasantness, and pleasantness during play), and three different 
measures of wanting (ratings of wanting, the number of credits willing to be traded to 
keep playing the game, and effort expended to keep playing the game).  These are 
measured at various times during the study.  Multiple measures are used in Study 4 
as there is little consensus as to the most appropriate measures to be used when 
measuring cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward, and the processes involved 
when responding to each measure are likely to differ (as discussed above).   
A further issue when measuring cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward concerns 
the time at which they are measured.  Cue-triggered wanting is proposed to guide the 
decision to begin a gambling session, and ongoing decisions during a gambling 
session to continue gambling, whereas hedonic reward is a response to gambling 
(albeit, one that may reinforce gambling, and so impact on future gambling 
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decisions).  Thus, cue-triggered wanting should be measured before and during 
gambling, whereas hedonic reward should be measured during and after gambling.  
In Study 4, participants are awarded a voucher for their participation, and they are 
advised of this just before beginning the study (the value of the voucher awarded was 
linked to the outcome of bets during play in order to encourage ecological validity;  
Anderson & Brown, 1984).  Hence, it is proposed that estimates of cue-triggered 
wanting provided before the study may be influenced by the prospect of being 
awarded a voucher upon completion of the study (particularly as it can be assumed 
that many participants click through to begin the study in anticipation of receiving a 
voucher).  Alternatively, estimates of cue-triggered wanting during play are more 
likely to be governed by aspects of play, than the prospect of a voucher.  For this 
reason, only estimates of cue-triggered wanting during play are examined.  Estimates 
of hedonic reward are examined both during and after play.  Thus, the testable 
hypotheses are: 
1. Cue-triggered wanting during gambling will be greater for PGs compared to 
NPGs; 
2. Hedonic reward during and after gambling will not differ between PGs and 
NPGs; 
3. Cue-triggered wanting during gambling will be greater than hedonic-reward 
during gambling for PGs, whereas there will be no differences between the 
measures during gambling for NPGs.  
As already noted, cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward are measured at various 
times during play.  In order to reduce repetitiveness, and the burden on participants, 
some measures are repeated more than others.  Specific details are provided in 
Section 6.3.  
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A final prediction being tested in Study 4 regards the ability of hedonic-reward and 
cue-triggered wanting measures to predict gambling behaviour.  As noted previously, 
it is argued from a dual-process perspective that cue-triggered wanting will predict 
gambling behaviour for PGs, whereas both cue-triggered wanting and evaluative 
processes will predict gambling behaviour for NPGs.  This has been examined in 
Studies 2 and 3 in regards to gambling behaviour generally.  In Study 4, by contrast, 
this can be examined in regards to gambling behaviour within a gambling session.  It 
is predicted that measures of cue-triggered wanting will predict the number of blocks 
played in Study 4 for both gambling groups, whereas measures of hedonic reward 
will predict the number of blocks played for NPGs but not for PGs. 
6.3  Methodology 
6.3.1  Participants 
As for Study 2, participants were recruited from English-speaking countries through 
internet gambling forums, Google AdWords, and Facebook advertising.  Although 
140 participants were recruited, in order to reduce variation, only those who 
primarily play EGMs were retained for analyses, and two participants were excluded 
for endorsing ‘Does not apply’ to the Scale of Gambling Choices more than three 
times (see Section 4.2.3.1 for a discussion about this).  Thus, n=126 (39 males and 87 
females; mean age = 41.35).  As noted above, participants were offered a $10 
voucher (in their local currency) for their participation from a list of internet-based 
retail outlets.  These were emailed to participants within a week of their participation.  
The advertisement used to recruit participants can be seen in Appendix 14.   
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6.3.2  Measures 
Although the procedure is usually outlined before the measures, the order is reversed 
in this chapter.  This is because there are several different measures, and most are 
used more than once, so outlining the procedure without knowledge of the measures 
may be confusing.  Thus, the EGM-simulation is described in this section, followed 
by the various measures of wanting and hedonic reward.  The demographics and 
gambling questions used in Study 2 (Section 4.2.3) are replicated in Study 4, so they 
will not be described again.    
6.3.2.1  EGM-simulation 
As noted previously, participants are asked to play the EGM-simulation in Study 4.  
This allows participants to rate their degree of liking and wanting while gambling.  
This slot-machine is described in this sub-section. When using simulations in 
gambling research, a balance needs to be achieved between minimising error by 
keeping all extraneous variables as constant as possible, and maximising ecological 
validity by allowing a sense of randomness, which EGM players would be 
accustomed to when gambling on EGMs.  For example, ecological validity can be 
fostered by ensuring that participants feel they are gambling with their own money, 
the outcome of each bet feels random, and some user-controls are included in the 
game (as noted in Section 1.3, user-controls are associated with an illusion of 
control, an important psychological aspect of gambling that may linked with 
cognitive errors and gambling persistence;  Toneatto et al., 1997).  Such features 
introduce some variation between participants.  In order to minimise such variation, a 
complex design is employed for the EGM-simulation.  This is described below, 
along with an explanation as to why each design-feature is used.   
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In describing the slot-machine, the procedure for betting will first be explained.  This 
will be followed by an explanation as to how the outcome of each bet is determined.  
In this study, the outcome of each bet depends somewhat on the ‘win-ratio’, which is 
the number of pre-determined credits to be won (or lost) by the end of each block (a 
block is a set of ten or twenty bets;  participants play four to seven blocks of bets in 
Study 4).  Hence, describing the outcome of each bet will require some description of 
the study procedure.  
The betting procedure 
Participants begin with 100 ‘credits’ each, with which to gamble on the EGM-
simulation.  The EGM-simulation comprises a single line of three symbols.  For each 
bet, participants select how many credits (five or ten) they want to wager, and then 
press ‘Spin’.  Pressing spin initiates display of a new set of three symbols (the 
graphics show the reels ‘spinning’ before the new set of symbols display).   
Depending on the combination of symbols that display, participants are awarded no 
credits, or one, two, or three times the credits wagered (an explanation of the actual 
dollar value of the credits is provided later, in Section 6.3.2.1).  An image of the slot-
machine can be seen in Appendix 15. 
Number of bets played in each block and the win-ratio for each 
block 
All participants play four to seven blocks of bets.  After playing three blocks of 20 
bets, they have the option of playing up to four further blocks, each comprising only 
ten bets.  A summary of the blocks played is shown in Table 54.  For the first two 
blocks (Blocks 1 and 2), all participants win one block (that is, they end the block 
with more credits than they started the block with), and lose the other (that is, they 
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end the block with less credits than they started the block with);  the order is 
counterbalanced across participants.  The slot-machine is programmed so that 
participants will end the winning block with approximately 130 credits and the losing 
block with approximately 70 credits.  For the third block, the slot-machine is 
programmed so that participants will ‘break even’ (that is, they end the block with 
approximately 100 credits - the same number of credits that they started the study 
with).  
Table 54. Blocks of bets played in Study 4. 
Block 
Number 
Number 
of bets 
played 
Credits at the end of the 
block 
Required or 
optional block 
1 20 130 or 70 Required 
2 20 130 or 70 (the opposite to Block 1). Required 
3 20 100 credits Required 
4 10 90% or 110% of initial credits Optional 
5 10 90% or 110% of initial credits Optional 
6 10 90% or 110% of initial credits Optional 
7 10 90% or 110% of initial credits Optional 
 
For the remaining optional blocks, participants either lose slightly (they end the 
block with 90% of the credits that they start the block with) or they win slightly (they 
end the block with 110% of the credits that they start the block with).  The slot-
machine is programmed to randomly select whether the block is won or lost.  This 
allows the outcome of each of the remaining blocks to feel random (and different to 
the previous block) while minimising variation in experience across participants.  
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How the win-ratio is achieved for each block 
As noted above, when attempting to achieve the required final credits for each block, 
a balance is struck between uniformity of experience across participants, and 
ecological validity in making the game feel random and giving participants some 
user-controls.  As noted before, participants can select whether they wager five or ten 
credits for each bet.  Additionally, the outcome of each bet has some form of 
randomness while the final number of credits to be achieved by the end of each block 
is fixed.  How this is actually achieved in each block is now explained.  
Recall that Blocks 1 to 3 comprise 20 bets, while Blocks 4 to 7 comprise only ten 
bets.  The way in which bet-outcomes are determined for the first ten bets in Blocks 
1 to 3 differs slightly to the way in which bet-outcomes are determined for the 
remaining ten bets in Blocks 1 to 3, and to the ten bets in Blocks 4 to 7.  Hence, the 
former is explained first, followed by the latter.  
For the first ten bets in Blocks 1 to 3, the outcome of each bet is random (it is 
determined by a random-number generator).  There is a constraint on the outcome of 
the generator, however.  In order to ensure that participants end the block with the 
required number of credits, the maximum number of credits allowed at any one time 
is 160 credits, and the minimum number is 40 credits.  Without this constraint, the 
number of credits can become too high or low for the required number of final 
credits to be reached by the end of the block.  The EGM-simulation is programmed 
so that if a participant reaches 160 credits they will lose the next bet, and if they 
reach only 40 credits, they will win the next bet.  Other than this constraint, the 
outcome of each of the first ten bets in Blocks 1 to 3 is random.  
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The outcome of the remaining ten bets in Blocks 1 to 3, and the outcome of all ten 
bets in Blocks 4 to 7, is calculated differently.  When a participant hits ‘spin’ on the 
eleventh bet of Blocks 1 to 3, or on the first bet in Blocks 4 to 7, the simulation 
calculates every possible combination of ten-bet outcomes (termed ‘strings’), that 
would achieve the required number of final credits by the end of the block, given the 
current credits and the number of credits wagered on that spin (five or ten).  One of 
these possible strings is randomly selected, and is used to pre-determine the outcome 
of each remaining bet until the end of the block, or until the bet-size is changed, and 
the possible strings are re-calculated, and one string selected to pre-determine the 
outcomes of all remaining bets.  
While this process will not always result in the exact number of final credits required 
by the end of the block (for example, if a participant has 125 credits before their last 
bet, and they wager ten credits, they cannot end with exactly 130 credits), it achieves 
a balance between allowing the outcome of each bet to feel random, allowing 
participants some user-controls (the size of the bet), and providing some limitation in 
the diversity of experience across participants.  
6.3.2.2  Cue-triggered wanting 
As noted in Section 6.2, a conventional item-rating is used to measure cue-triggered 
wanting, and two behavioural measures are also used.  For the former, participants 
rate the following item after Blocks 1 and 2: 
Please rate how much you want to continue playing the game: 
Not at all--------------------------------------------------------------Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This measure is termed ‘direct wanting’, to contrast it with the remaining indirect 
behavioural measures of wanting.  As most measures are taken a couple of times 
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throughout the study, a number follows each measure to denote after which block the 
measure is rated.  For example, direct wanting is referred to as ‘direct wanting 1’ 
when measured after Block 1 and ‘direct wanting 2’ when measured after Block 2.  
For one of the behavioural measures, participants are asked, ‘How many tokens 
would you be willing to trade for the opportunity to continue playing the game right 
now?’.  This measure is termed ‘credit trade’, and is measured after Blocks 1 and 2 
(denoted ‘credit trade 1’, and ‘credit trade 2’, respectively).  
The other behavioural measure is ‘effort expended’ to continue gambling.  From 
Block 3 onwards, each time a block of bets is completed, participants are asked if 
they want to play a further block.  However, they are advised that to be eligible to do 
so, they first have to complete the ‘squares task’.  For this task, a square flashes on 
the screen in various random locations ten times. The participant has to press each 
square to make it disappear, whereupon a new square appears (until ten squares have 
been pressed).  As this task is dull and effortful, effort is expended in order to be able 
to play each additional block.  Thus, the number of blocks played is used an index of 
effort expended.  Note that all participants completed the squares task before playing 
Block 3 (a non-optional block) as well.  This ensures that participants are familiar 
with the task when deciding whether or not to play any additional optional blocks.  
As Block 3 comprises 20 bets, the square flashed on the screen 20 times (rather than 
ten) in order to ensure that the effort expended is relative to the number of further 
bets participants are subsequently eligible to play.  
6.3.2.3  Hedonic reward 
As discussed in Section 6.2, the items used to measure hedonic reward are ‘game 
liking’, ‘game pleasantness’, and ‘pleasant feeling’.  These are presented in order: 
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Please rate how much you like the game: 
Not at all-------------------------------------------------------------Very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please rate the game according to the following: 
Unpleasant ----------------------------------------Neutral-----------------------------------------------
Pleasant 
       -1      -2      -3      -4      -5      -6      -7      0       1      2       3        4        5        6        7 
 
Please rate how you feel right now: 
Unpleasant -------------------------------------Neutral--------------------------------------Pleasant 
 -1      -2      -3      -4      -5      -6      -7      0       1      2       3        4        5        6        7 
Note that ‘game liking’ is measured on a 7-point unipolar scale, whereas the 
remaining variables are measured on a 15-point bipolar scale.  A unipolar scale is 
chosen for game liking as it is not clear whether ‘disliking’ is the opposite of liking, 
and so whether the two represent opposing ends of a bi-polar continuum.  Moreover, 
‘disliking’ may merely be the absence of liking.  For these reasons, a bi-polar format 
is avoided.  That said, the bipolar format chosen for the remaining items requires 
explanation.  For these items, participants are asked to rate the game, and their own 
feelings while playing the game.  A bipolar format allows participants to rate the 
game and their own feelings from negative to positive.  Thus, a bipolar format is 
used for these items.   
All hedonic-reward items are measured after Blocks 1 and 2.  Pleasant feeling is the 
only hedonic reward item measured before play (to allow baseline pleasant feeling to 
be taken into account if necessary when examining pleasant feeling during play, as 
discussed in Section 6.2) and after every block.  Both pleasant feeling and game 
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liking are also measured after play.  As noted above, in order to indicate after which 
block each item is measured, the block number follows the item name (e.g., game 
liking measured after Block 1 is referred to as ‘game liking 1’).  In addition, pleasant 
feeling measured before play is referred to as ‘baseline pleasant feeling’.  The term 
‘final’ is used to indicate items measured after play (‘pleasant feeling final’ and 
‘game liking final’).  
6.3.3  Procedure 
Upon reading the advertisement, potential participants click a link that diverts them 
to the study.  The first page of the study is the Plain Language Statement (in 
Appendix 14).  After reading the statement, interested participants could click to start 
the study (participants are informed that consent is inferred from doing so). As noted 
previously, the study is conducted over the internet.   
Participants first complete the Scale of Gambling Choices, some demographic 
characteristics, gambling-involvement questions (these are described in Section 
4.2.3), and ‘baseline pleasant feeling’.  They are then provided with instructions for 
playing the EGM-simulation (shown in Appendix 16). 
Participants are provided with 100 credits with which to gamble.  They are advised 
that the minimum value of the voucher awarded upon completion of the study is $10, 
but this can be increased if they have more than 100 credits remaining at the end of 
the study.  Specifically, they are awarded an extra 50c for every 50 additional credits 
remaining at the end of the study.  
As noted above, measures of wanting and hedonic reward are taken at various times 
throughout the study.  The procedure followed is summarised in Figure 5.  
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Rate baseline pleasant feeling 
Participants are given 100 credits with which to gamble 
Play BLOCK 1: Participants play 20 bets  
After Block 1, rate pleasant feeling 1, wanting 1, liking 1, credit trade 1, and 
game pleasantness 1 
Play BLOCK 2: Participants play 20 bets 
After Block 2, rate pleasant feeling 2, wanting 2, liking 2, credit trade 2, and 
game pleasantness 2 
Complete Squares Task (square flashes on screen 20 times) 
Play BLOCK 3: Participants play 20 bets 
After Block 3, rate pleasant feeling 3. Participants have the option of ending 
play or completing the squares task and playing a further block. If the latter 
then: 
Complete Squares Task (optional; square flashes on screen 10 times) 
Play BLOCK 4 (optional; participants play 10 bets) 
Rate pleasant feeling 4. Participants have the option of ending play or 
completing the squares task and playing a further block. If the latter then: 
Complete Squares Task (optional; square flashes on screen 10 times) 
BLOCK 4 (optional; participants play 10 bets) 
Rate pleasant feeling 5. Participants have the option of ending play or 
completing the squares task and playing a further block. If the latter then: 
Complete Squares Task (optional; square flashes on screen 10 times) 
Repeat for each optional block up to a maximum of seven blocks 
BLOCK 7 (optional; participants play 10 bets) 
Rate pleasant feeling final, and liking final
 
Figure 5. The sequence in which items and tasks are completed for Study 4. 
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Upon completion of the study, participants provide their email address (if they want 
to) and select a gift voucher, which is emailed to them (who supplied their email 
address) within one week.  The voucher is provided from a list of internet retail 
services (e.g. iTunes, Amazon books, e-Bay).  Participants are also provided with the 
opportunity to provide feedback at the end of the study, and are given a list of 
gambling-help contacts for major English-speaking countries worldwide (where 
available).   
6.4  Results 
First, the demographic characteristics and gambling involvement for the whole 
sample, and each gambling group, are summarised and discussed.  This is followed 
by a preliminary description of the data for each dependent variable.  Finally, each 
hypothesis is analysed.   
6.4.1  Demographic characteristics and gambling 
involvement 
In this section, the sample is divided into problem-gambling groups, and 
demographic and gambling variables are examined for each group.  Prior to this, 
however, the Scale of Gambling Choices is examined.  
The values for skewness and kurtosis for the Scale of Gambling Choices are within 
the robust range (skewness < 2, and kurtosis < 7; Curran, West & Finch, 1996), so 
the assumption of normality can be regarded as satisfied.  The internal reliability of 
the scale with the sample is high (Cronbach’s alpha = .93).  Finally, a principal 
components analysis is conducted on the items. 
The principal components analysis reveals two components with eigen values greater 
than 1.  The first component comprises all items, has an eigen value of 6.73 and 
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accounts for 56.06% of the variance in the items.  The second component comprises 
six items, has an eigen value of 1.30, and accounts for only 10.84 percent of the 
variance in the items.  Cattell’s scree test suggests that the second item should be 
discarded, as there is a clear break in the scree plot after the first item.  The results of 
Horn’s Parallel Analysis supports this position, as now described.  As noted in 
Section 4.3.3.4, Horn’s (1965) Parallel Analysis shows whether or not a component 
and corresponding eigenvalue is likely to be obtained by chance.  A Parallel Analysis 
conducted on 100 randomly generated datasets of the same size as that in Study 4 
(that is, 126 cases and 12 items), shows that components with an eigen value less 
than 1.39 are likely to be generated by chance.  For these reasons, the second 
component is discarded.  In sum, preliminary analyses with the Scale of Gambling 
Choices shows sound psychometric properties for the sample used in Study 4.  
As for the previous studies, the Scale of Gambling Choices is used to divide the 
sample into NPGs (n = 87), and PGs (n = 39), using the conventional cut-off score of 
24.  Demographic data are compared across each gambling group.  Given the 
different sample sizes (NPGs = 87; PGs = 39; Ruxton, 2006), the unequal-variances 
t-test is used to compare the groups on age (the only metric variable), while a chi-
square test of independence is used to compare the groups on the remaining 
categorical variables (gender, highest level of education, usual country of residence, 
and ethnicity).  Before conducting the analyses, some categories of some variables 
are combined, in order to ensure satisfaction of the assumption of minimal cell 
numbers (see Section 4.3.2).  For ethnicity, all categories other than ‘Caucasian’ are 
collapsed into one ‘Other’ category;  for country of residence, the ‘United Kingdom’ 
and ‘Other’ categories are combined;  for education level, ‘Primary school’ and 
‘some High school’ are combined,  ‘Postgraduate degree’ and ‘Bachelor’s degree’ 
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are combined, and ‘Trade Certificate and Diploma’ and ‘Other’ are combined.  
Additionally, a Holm-Bonferroni adjustment of alpha for five analyses is applied.  
The distribution of participants in each group is shown in Table 55.  Results show no 
significant differences between the gambling groups on any demographic variables.  
Table 55. Demographic characteristics for each gambling group and for the whole 
sample. 
Measures 
Non-
problem 
gamblers 
n = 87 
Problem 
gamblers 
n = 39 
Whole 
sample 
N = 136 
Age Mean (SD) 42.16 
(12.02) 
39.47 
(10.89) 
41.35 
(11.72) 
Gender (%) 
Male  
 
28.7 
 
35.9 
 
31.8 
Highest level of education (%) 
Primary or some high school 
High school 
Trade certificate or diploma or other 
Some university 
Bachelor or Postgraduate degree 
 
12.9 
31.8 
23.5 
21.2 
10.6 
 
25.6 
35.9 
15.4 
12.8 
10.3 
 
16.5 
33.2 
22.0 
18.1 
10.2 
Usual country of residence (%) 
North America 
United Kingdom and other 
Australia or New Zealand 
 
69.8 
8.1 
21.1 
 
62.2 
5.4 
32.4 
 
68.3 
7.1 
24.6 
Ethnicity (%) 
Caucasian 
Other 
 
85.1 
14.9 
 
87.1 
12.8 
 
86.2 
14.3 
 
The data on each gambling variable (gambling frequency, time since most recent 
gamble, and internet-gambling status) for each gambling group, and for the whole 
sample, are shown in Table 56.  Possible differences between each gambling group 
are examined using the chi-square test of independence (as all variables are 
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categorical).  In order to meet minimum cell numbers, some categories on the ‘time 
since most recent gamble’ variable are collapsed:  ‘yesterday’ and ‘within the last 
week’ are combined into ‘within the last week’;  ‘within the last fortnight’ and 
‘within the last month’ are combined into ‘within the last month’;  and ‘more than a 
month ago’ and ‘ages ago, I hardly ever gamble’ are combined into ‘more than a 
month ago’.  Additionally, a Holm-Bonferroni adjustment of alpha for three analyses 
is applied.  
Table 56. Gambling variables for each gambling group and for the whole sample.  
Gambling variable 
Non-
problem 
gamblers 
Problem 
gamblers 
Whole 
sample 
Gambling frequency (%) 
A couple of times a year or less 
Less than once a month 
More than once a month 
More than once a week 
Most days 
 
16.1 
19.5 
19.5 
18.4 
26.4 
 
0.0 
7.7 
17.9 
25.6 
48.7 
 
11.1 
15.9 
19.0 
20.6 
33.3 
Time since most recent gamble (%) 
Today  
Within the last week 
Within the last month  
More than a month ago 
 
37.2 
25.6 
17.4 
19.8 
 
61.5 
28.2 
2.6 
7.7 
 
44.8 
26.4 
12.8 
16.0 
Internet-gambling status (%) 
Usually gambles on the internet 
Usually does not gamble on the internet 
 
61.4 
38.6 
 
47.4 
52.6 
 
57.0 
43.0 
 
Results show that only gambling frequency and last gamble differ significantly by 
gambling group, χ2 (4, N=126) = 13.39, p = .010, and  χ2 (3, N=125) = 10.70, p = 
.013, respectively.  As expected, compared to NPGs, a significantly greater 
proportion of PGs report gambling more frequently (e.g., ‘most days’ and ‘more than 
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once a week’), and more report that their most recent gamble was on the day of the 
study (‘today’) rather than less recently.  In sum, there are no demographic 
differences between the gambling groups, but there is evidence that PGs report 
gambling more frequently, and gambling more recently than NPGs, as would be 
expected.  
6.4.2  Preliminary analyses of measures 
In this section, the data pertaining to each set of measures (cue-triggered wanting and 
hedonic reward) are described, in turn.  To start with, the distributions for each 
variable are examined for each gambling group.  Following this, the proportion of 
missing cases for each set of variables is examined.  Where data are missing on more 
than 5% of cases for a given variable, a missing-data analysis is conducted.  Finally, 
as noted above, some participants won Block 1 and lost Block 2, while others 
experienced the opposite order.  That is, the ‘win-order’ is counterbalanced across 
groups.  Hence, possible differences on each variable according to win-order are also 
examined.  
Before beginning preliminary analyses, the inter-correlations between variables are 
briefly examined.  Table 57 shows a correlation matrix for all wanting and hedonic-
reward variables rated after Block 1, and Table 58 shows a correlation matrix for all 
wanting and hedonic-reward variables rated after Block 2.  The number of blocks 
played during the study is also included in both tables.  
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When inspecting the variables in the matrix, it must be noted that, due to the 
relatively small sample-size for PGs, correlations as high as .45 are not significant. 
Thus, in order to be consistent across both groups, any correlation that is moderate 
(≥.3; Cohen, 1988) is considered important (and is bolded in the table), regardless of 
whether it is significant or not.  However, inferences made about non-significant 
correlations are less reliable, as the correlation for the sample may differ 
considerably from the true correlation for the population, and the confidence interval 
will cross zero.  Hence, non-significant correlations are considered with caution.   
The correlations between all wanting variables are considered first, followed by 
those between all hedonic-reward variables.  Finally, the inter-correlations between 
wanting and hedonic-reward variables are considered.   
For both groups, the inter-correlations between wanting variables are similar, though 
for NPGs they tend to be strong, whereas for PGs they tend to be moderate.  Direct 
wanting 1 and credit trade 1 correlate at least moderately with each other for both 
groups, as do direct wanting 2 and credit trade 2.  Additionally, the number of blocks 
played correlates at least moderately with direct wanting 1 and 2 for both groups.  
However, the credit trade variable does not correlate with the number of blocks 
played for either group, with the exception of a strong correlation between credit 
trade 2 and number of blocks played for NPGs.  Overall, the wanting variables 
mostly correlate with each other.  However, although the inter-correlations between 
direct wanting and other wanting measures are moderate for PGs, they are not 
significant, and so must be considered with caution. 
In regards to the hedonic-reward variables, all show at least moderate inter-
correlations for each gambling group, except for game liking and pleasant feeling 
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after Block 1 for PGs.  By contrast, the inter-correlations between the wanting and 
game liking variables differ between the gambling groups.  These are now discussed, 
first for NPGs.  
For NPGs, most of the cue-triggered wanting variables correlate moderately to 
strongly with all of the hedonic-reward variables, except with pleasant feeling.  In 
addition, game pleasantness does not correlate with all measures of cue-triggered 
wanting.  
For PGs, all of the hedonic reward variables correlate only with direct wanting. 
Additionally, game liking correlates with credit trade, and so does pleasant feeling 
after Block 2 (note, however that these correlations are moderate, but not 
significant).  Other than that, there are no moderate correlations between wanting and 
hedonic reward for PGs.  Hence, there are more inter-correlations between wanting 
and hedonic-reward variables for NPGs than there are for PGs.  This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward tend not to be 
related for PGs but are for NPGs.  
 
6.4.2.1  Preliminary analyses of cue-triggered wanting measures 
In this section, the data pertaining to each measure of cue-triggered wanting are 
inspected and described.  As noted previously, there are three measures of cue-
triggered wanting in Study 4.  These are direct wanting (asking participants to rate 
how much they want to continue gambling on a 7-point scale), credit trade (how 
many credits participants are willing to trade for the opportunity to continue playing), 
and effort expended (this is measured as the number of blocks played because 
participants have to complete a dull and effortful task for each additional block they 
choose to play).  Both direct wanting and credit trade are measured after Blocks 1 
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and 2.  There is only one measure of the total number of blocks played (termed 
‘blocks played’ from here-in). 
The distribution of each variable for each gambling group is examined.  All values 
for skewness and kurtosis are within the robust range (as shown in Table 59), except 
for credit trade 1 and 2 for EGM-NPGs.  The remaining distributions can be 
considered sufficiently normal to justify the use of parametric analyses.  Non-
parametric analyses may be necessary for credit trade 1 and 2 for NPGs.  This is 
discussed when analyses are conducted in subsequent sections of this chapter.  
Table 59. Skewness and kurtosis values for the distribution of each measure of 
cue-triggered wanting for each gambling group. 
Variables 
 NPGs  PGs 
 Skewness Kurtosis  Skewness Kurtosis 
Direct wanting 1  0.94 -0.32  -0.84 -0.37 
Direct wanting 2  0.97 -0.35  -0.01 -1.54 
Credit trade 1  2.07 2.78  1.11 0.25 
Credit trade 2   3.01 8.99  1.41 1.00 
Number of blocks played  1.14 0.28  0.97 -0.45 
 
There are no missing cases on the number of blocks played.  For the remaining 
measures of cue-triggered wanting, less than 5% of cases have missing or invalid 
data, so no missing-data analysis is conducted.  However, on the credit trade 
variable, 24.8% of cases after Block 1, and 36.4% of cases after Block 2, have 
missing data.  This is likely to be due to the way in which the question rendered on 
the web page (at the top of a new page to the right).  Some participants may not have 
noticed the question, and so left it unanswered.  After altering the way in which the 
page render, there are few further cases with missing data (less than 5% of 
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subsequent cases) on either credit trade 1 or credit trade 2.  Given the considerable 
missing data on each credit trade variable, the pattern of missing data are examined.  
For the credit trade 1 variable, participants are divided into two groups, those with 
valid scores, and those with invalid scores on the variable.  For each group, possible 
differences on demographic characteristics, gambling variables, cue-triggered 
wanting and hedonic-reward variables are examined.  This process is repeated for the 
credit trade 2 variable.  
Due to the different samples sizes in each group (for credit trade 1, n=97 for valid 
scores, and n=32 for invalid scores; for credit trade 2, n = 82 for valid scores, and n= 
47 for invalid scores), homogeneity of variances is violated for several variables. 
Thus, the unequal-variances t-test is used for metric variables (age, Scale of 
Gambling Choices, session length, and the hedonic reward and wanting variables).  
The chi-square test of independence is used for categorical variables (ethnicity, 
education level, country of residence, gender, internet-gambling status, play 
frequency).  In order to satisfy the assumption of minimum cell numbers for the chi-
square test, the necessary categories are collapsed for each categorical variable, as in 
Section 5.7.1.1.  Although multiple analyses are conducted, no Holm-Bonferroni 
adjustment of alpha is applied, as reducing Type II errors (accepting the null 
hypothesis when it should be rejected) is considered more important than reducing 
Type I errors (rejecting the null hypothesis when it should be accepted).  
Results show that for credit trade 1, the data differ significantly on country of 
residence, χ2 (2, N =123) = 19.57, p < .001, and on education, χ2 (4, N =126) = 17.86, 
p = .001.  For credit trade 2, the data differ significantly on country of residence, χ2 
(2, N =126) = 11.06, p = .004.  Those with invalid scores are more likely to report a 
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lower education level than those with valid scores, and they are more likely to come 
from Australia.   The former finding may arise as those who are not so well educated 
may be less computer-literate, and so more likely to leave a question incomplete due 
to unclear rendering.  The latter finding may be due to the fact that advertising was 
targeted at Australian participants earlier in the study, when the rendering error had 
not yet been corrected.  Importantly, however, there are no differences on any of the 
wanting or hedonic-reward variables between those with invalid and valid scores on 
credit trade 1 and 2.  
Following this missing-values analysis, possible differences due to win-order are 
examined on each wanting variable after Blocks 1 and 2.  Participants are categorised 
into those who lost Block 1 and won Block 2 (Group 1; N = 58), and those who 
experienced the opposite win-order (Group 2; N = 68).  As scores on each wanting 
variable are expected to differ as a function of problem gambling status, Scale of 
Gambling Choices scores are included as a covariate in analyses.  Hence, a series of 
ANCOVAs are conducted with each wanting variable as the dependent variable, 
Scale of Gambling Choices as a covariate, and win-order as the grouping variable.   
With the exception of credit trade 2, preliminary analyses for each ANCOVA show 
satisfaction of the assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, 
homogeneity of regression slopes, and reliable measurement of the covariate.   
For credit trade 2, homogeneity of variances is violated.  However, ANCOVA is 
robust to this violation when sample sizes are similar, which they are for credit trade 
2 (n = 41 for those who won Block 1,and n = 38 for those who lost Block 2;  Stevens, 
1996).  Hence, the ANCOVA is conducted for credit trade 2 with no adjustments, 
despite the heterogeneity of variances.   
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Note also that although multiple analyses are conducted, no Holm-Bonferroni 
adjustment of alpha is applied, as reducing Type II errors (accepting the null 
hypothesis when it should be rejected) is considered more important than reducing 
Type I errors (rejecting the null hypothesis when it should be accepted).  The results 
are shown in Table 60. 
Table 60. Examining differences in cue-triggered wanting variables by win-order. 
DV 
Mean (SD) 
F df p Block 1 won Block 2 lost 
Direct wanting 1 3.29 (2.05) 3.11 (2.32) 0.44 1, 119 .51 
Direct wanting 2 2.58 (1.97) 3.11 (2.30) 1.52 1,119 .22 
Credit trade 1 18.19 (35.18) 23.79 (39.52) 0.20 1, 91 .89 
Credit trade 2 11.59 (25.51) 23.95 (40.64) 1.40 1,76 .24 
Number of blocks 4.05 (1.54) 3.91 (1.44) 0.32 1,121 .57 
Results show no significant differences on any measure of cue-triggered wanting by 
win-order.  Hence, analyses with cue-triggered wanting in Study 4 do not need to be 
adjusted for win-order.  
Overall, the assumption of normality is considered satisfied for all measures of cue-
triggered wanting, there are no differences on cue-triggered wanting and hedonic-
reward between valid and invalid cases on credit trade 1 or 2, and there are no 
differences on any measure of cue-triggered wanting by win-order.  The hedonic-
reward variables are described in the next section.  
6.4.2.2  Preliminary analyses of hedonic-reward variables 
In this section, the data pertaining to each measure of hedonic reward is inspected 
and described.  As noted previously, there are three measures of hedonic reward. 
These are game liking, game pleasantness, and pleasant feeling.  All are measured 
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after Blocks 1 and 2.  Pleasant feeling is also measured before play, after every 
block, and after play, and game liking is also measured after play.  
The distribution of each variable for each gambling group is examined. All values for 
skewness and kurtosis are within the robust range, so all distributions can be 
considered sufficiently normal to justify the use of parametric analyses.  
Additionally, less than 5% of cases are missing or invalid for each variable, so no 
missing data analyses are conducted.  
As noted above, possible differences on each hedonic-reward variable according to 
win-order are examined.  Consideration is given to including the Scale of Gambling 
Choices as a covariate in these analyses.  However, it is recommended that a 
potential covariate shows a correlation of at least r = .30 with the DV if it is to be 
included in an ANOVA (Pallant, 2010).  This condition is satisfied for game liking 1 
only.  Hence, an ANCOVA is conducted to examine game liking 1 by win-order.  An 
independent-samples t-test is used to examine most of the remaining variables 
(pleasant feeling 1 and 2, and game pleasantness 1 and 2) by win-order.  For game 
liking 2, homogeneity of variances is violated, so the unequal variances t-test is used.  
As above, no Holm-Bonferroni adjustment of alpha is applied, as reducing Type II 
errors (accepting the null hypothesis when it should be rejected) is considered more 
important than reducing Type I errors (rejecting the null hypothesis when it should 
be accepted).  Results are shown in Table 61. 
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Table 61. Difference in hedonic reward variables by win-order (significant 
differences bolded). 
Measures Won Block 1 Lost Block 1 
F df p Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Game liking  1* 3.15 (1.71) 3.24 (1.73) 4.42 1, 120 .038  
Game liking 2 2.38 (1.67) 3.00 (2.03) 3.41 1, 111 .07 
Pleasant feeling 1 1.94 (4.16) 0.72 (3.58) 3.62 1,122 .06 
Pleasant feeling 2 -0.12 (3.72) 1.29 (3.42) 4.21 1,122 .042 
Game pleasantness 1 -1.89 (3.53) 0.01 (3.77) 3.62 1, 121 .020 
Game pleasantness 2 -0.12 (3.72) -1.71 (3.76) 0.94 1, 121 .33 
*Scale of Gambling Choices is statistically controlled when comparing game liking 1 by 
win-order 
It can be seen in Table 61 that, compared to those who lost Block 1, those who won 
Block 1 exhibit significantly higher mean scores on ratings of game liking 1 (after 
controlling for Scale of Gambling Choices) and on game pleasant 1.  It can also be 
seen in the table that pleasant feeling 2 is higher for those who lost Block 1, but won 
Block 2.  Therefore, when examining hypotheses relating to the hedonic-reward 
variables after each block, win-order should be taken into account.  
Overall, the assumption of normality is considered satisfied for all hedonic-reward 
variables, there are few cases with missing data on each hedonic-reward variable, 
and there are some differences on ratings of hedonic-reward according to win-order. 
In the following sections the hypotheses are examined, taking win-order into 
account.  
6.4.3 Hypothesis 1: Comparing cue-triggered wanting across 
gambling groups 
Hypothesis 1 is that cue-triggered wanting during gambling is greater for PGs than 
for NPGs.  To examine this hypothesis, measures of cue-triggered wanting after 
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Blocks 1 and 2 (direct wanting 1, direct wanting 2, credit trade 1, and credit trade 2), 
and the number of blocks played, are compared across the gambling groups.   
It has already been noted that the distributions of credit trade 1 and 2 are not normal 
for NPGs.  Hence, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test is used to compare the 
rank-order of these two variables across the gambling groups.  In addition, 
preliminary analyses show that homogeneity of variance is violated across the 
gambling groups for direct wanting 2.  Hence, the unequal-variances t-test is used to 
examine differences on direct wanting 2.   
When comparing the remaining variables (direct wanting 1, and blocks played) for 
which there is no evidence of unequal variances or violation of normality, the 
independent-samples t-test is used. Additionally, a Holm-Bonferroni adjustment of 
alpha is applied to each pair of analyses (for the same measure taken after Blocks 1 
and 2).  Results are shown in Table 62.  
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It can be seen in the table that, as predicted, all measures of cue-triggered wanting 
are significantly greater for PGs than for NPGs, with moderate effect-sizes, other 
than the number of blocks played (note that, in the social sciences, an effect-size of 
.30 is considered moderate for the Mann-Whitney U-test, and one of .50 is 
considered large, while one of .50 is considered moderate and one of .80 is 
considered large for Cohen’s d;  Cohen, 1988;  Pallant, 2010).   
Given the non-significant finding for the number of blocks played, a power analysis 
is conducted to examine whether there is adequate power (80% power) to detect at 
least a moderate effect-size if there is one in the population.  This shows that there is 
adequate power (power is between 80% and 85%;  Francis, 2013).  Hence, if there is 
a difference in the number of blocks played, the effect-size for this in the population 
is most likely to be small.   
In sum, Hypothesis 1 is supported for most measures.  Note that as there is no 
difference in the number of blocks played between the gambling groups, no further 
analyses are conducted with this variable as a DV.  However, this variable is used as 
an IV in analyses below (Section 6.4.6), as the ability of hedonic-reward and cue-
triggered wanting variables to predict the number of blocks played is examined.  
Furthermore, given that the number of blocks played does not differ between the 
gambling groups, some analyses are conducted to examine any differences between 
those who choose to continue playing additional voluntary blocks after completing 
the first three additional blocks, and those who choose to stop.  Hence, participants 
are divided into those who stopped playing after Block 3 (‘continued gamblers’), and 
those who did not (‘ceased gamblers’).  This variable is termed ‘gambling choice’.  It 
is reasoned that perhaps some participants stopped playing after Block 3 as they 
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currently had more than 100 credits, and so would receive more than the minimum 
voucher value of $10, and did not want to risk losing this additional voucher value by 
continuing to gamble.  By contrast, others may have continued playing as they 
currently had less than 100 credits at the end of Block 3, and so wanted to try to 
increase their credits.  Hence, the number of credits left at the end of Block 3 is 
compared across the continued and ceased players.  The mean (SD) number of 
credits remaining for ceased players is 108.03 (17.30), while that for continued 
players is 110.63 (19.00).  An independent-samples t-test shows no significant 
difference in the mean number of credits remaining between these groups, t (122) = 
0.78, p = .44.  Thus, it seems that the decision to continue (or stop) gambling after 
Block 3 is not related to the number of credits remaining.  
Next, it is reasoned that perhaps there are differences in other factors that may 
contribute to decision-making such as degree of current cue-triggered wanting or 
hedonic reward.  There is no measure of cue-triggered wanting after Block 3, 
although there is a measure after Block 2.  There is a measure of hedonic reward 
after Block 3, which is ‘pleasant feeling 3’.  Hence, for each gambling group, direct 
wanting 2 and pleasant feeling 3 are compared between ceased and continued 
players, using an independent-samples t-test.  As the processes that contribute to 
gambling decisions are hypothesised to differ for PGs and NPGs, these analyses are 
conducted separately for each gambling group.  Homogeneity of variances is violated 
for direct wanting 2 for NPGs, so the unequal variances t-test is used for the analyses 
with NPGs instead of the independent-samples t-test.  The results are shown in Table 
63. 
 335 
 
Table 63. Comparing direct wanting 3 and pleasant feeling 2 across 
continued and ceased gamblers for each gambling group (significant 
results are in bold). 
NPGs 
Ceased 
players 
Continued 
players t df p 
Cohen’s 
d 
Direct wanting 2 
1.75 
(1.40) 
3.71 
(2.03) 4.83 46.91 <.001 1.15* 
Current 
pleasantness 3 
-0.88 
(3.61) 
1.30 
(4.05) 2.51 79 .014 0.56 
PGs 
Ceased 
players 
Continued 
players t df p 
Cohen’s 
d 
Direct wanting 2 2.82 (2.20) 
4.65 
(2.32) 2.52 37 .016 0.77 
Current 
pleasantness 3 
-0.79 
(4.06) 
-1.24 
(3.95) 
0.33 34 .74 0.11 
 
Results show that, for NPGs, the mean rating of direct wanting 2 and pleasant feeling 
3 is greater for continued players than for ceased players, with a large and moderate 
effect-size, respectively.  By contrast, for PGs, direct wanting 2, but not pleasant 
feeling 3, is greater for continued players than for ceased players, with a moderate 
effect-size.  Thus, the findings suggest that NPGs who choose to continue playing do 
so as they experience greater hedonic reward and greater cue-triggered wanting, 
whereas PGs who continue playing do so as they experience greater cue-triggered 
wanting only.  This provides some preliminary support for Hypothesis 4 (examined 
below in Section 6.4.6) that both cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward 
contribute to gambling decisions for NPGs, but only cue-triggered wanting 
contributes to the gambling decisions of PGs.  This is examined further below (in 
Section 6.4.6). 
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6.4.4 Hypothesis 2: Comparing hedonic reward across 
gambling groups 
Hypothesis 2 is that hedonic reward measured both during and after gambling will 
not differ between the gambling groups.  Hence, measures of hedonic reward after 
Blocks 1 and 2 (pleasant feeling 1 and 2, game liking 1 and 2, and game pleasantness 
1 and 2), and after gambling (pleasant feeling final, and game liking final) are 
compared between gambling groups.  Before doing so, however, it was noted in the 
introduction that any differences between the gambling groups may be accounted for 
by a difference in baseline pleasantness.  Thus, baseline pleasantness is first 
compared between the gambling groups.  Mean baseline pleasantness is slightly 
higher for NPGs (mean = 3.35; SD = 3.00) than for PGs (mean = 2.69; SD = 3.22) 
for PGs, but an independent-samples t-test shows that this difference is not 
significant, t (119) = 1.08, p =.28.  
In addition, the preliminary analyses conducted above (Section 6.4.2.2) show that 
some variables measured after Block 1 (game liking 1 and game pleasantness 1) 
differ significantly by win-order (whether Block 1 is lost and Block 2 is won, or the 
opposite order).  As win-order is a categorical variable, it cannot be used as a 
covariate in analyses (Pallant, 2010).  Instead, a blocking procedure can be used, 
where-in participants are further categorised according to win-order, and separate 
analyses are conducted for those who won the first block and for those who lost the 
first block.  However, this results in very few participants in each group (<20 for one 
group and <30 for another).  Another alternative may be to use the mean score on 
each measure after Block 1 and 2.  Both procedures elicit very similar results.  
Hence, only the latter analyses are described here.  
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For each hedonic-reward measure, the mean score after Blocks 1 and 2 is calculated, 
and possible differences between the gambling groups are examined using an 
independent-samples t-test.  The results are shown in Table 64. 
Table 64. Examining differences on hedonic-reward variables by gambling 
group using mean ratings after Block 1 and 2 (variables that differ 
significantly are in bold). 
Measures 
NPGs 
Mean (SD) 
PGs 
Mean (SD) t df p 
Game liking 2.50 (1.55) 3.38 (1.74) 2.81 122 .006 
Cohen’s 
d = 0.53 
Pleasantness 1.05 (3.23) 0.86 (3.31) 0.30 124 .77 
Game pleasantness -1.02 (3.41) -0.79 (3.36) 0.34 124 .73 
 
It can be seen in the table that the only measure of hedonic reward to differ 
significantly between the gambling groups is mean game liking, which has a 
moderate effect-size.  For all other measures of hedonic reward, a power analysis (set 
at 80%) shows that there is sufficient power (80% to 85%) to detect a moderate 
difference between the means for each gambling group if there is one in the 
population.  Thus, if these is a difference between the gambling groups, it is only 
small.  Hence, for all variables other than game liking, Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
It should also be noted in Table 64 that for both gambling groups, mean ratings of 
pleasant feeling and game liking are slightly positive, while mean ratings of game 
pleasantness are slightly negative.  Thus, neither group is rating the EGM-simulation 
as particularly enjoyable.  Moreover, while mean ratings of pleasantness are slightly 
positive, pleasant feeling declined during play from baseline pleasantness.  Formal 
analyses comparing baseline pleasantness to mean pleasantness after Blocks 1 and 2, 
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using a paired-samples t-test, shows that this decline in mean pleasantness during 
play is significant for each gambling group, t (84) = 9.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.74 
for NPGs, and t (35) = 4.83, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.56 for PGs. This finding is 
discussed in the Discussion in Section 6.5.4. 
6.4.5 Hypothesis 3: Comparing cue-triggered wanting to 
hedonic reward 
Hypothesis 3 is that PGs will exhibit stronger cue-triggered wanting than hedonic 
reward, whereas there will be no difference between cue-triggered wanting and 
hedonic reward for NPGs.  Hence, in this section, separate analyses are conducted 
for each group to compare cue-triggered wanting to each measure of hedonic reward.  
As ratings of game liking and direct wanting use the same scale, these can be directly 
compared.  However, ratings of direct wanting use a different scale to that used for 
the other measures of hedonic reward (ratings of game pleasantness, and pleasant 
feeling);  so too for credit trade. Thus, in order to compare these measures of hedonic 
reward to cue-triggered wanting, scores need to be standardized.  Hence, for these 
measures, standardised measures of hedonic reward are compared to standardised 
measures of cue-triggered wanting.  
Note also that analyses in Section 6.4.2.2 show that some of the ratings of hedonic 
reward differ according to win-order.  Hence, rather than comparing hedonic reward 
after each block to cue-triggered wanting after each block, the mean of each hedonic 
reward measure after Block 1 and 2 is compared to the mean of each measure of cue-
triggered wanting after Block 1and 2, as in the previous section.  Analyses with 
direct wanting are described first, followed by analyses with credit trade.  
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In order to compare the mean rating of game liking after Block 1 and 2 to the mean 
rating of direct wanting after Block 1 and 2 for each gambling group, a paired-
samples t-test is conducted for each gambling group.  This shows that the mean 
rating of direct wanting for PGs (mean = 4.00, SD = 2.12) is significantly greater 
than their mean rating of game liking (mean = 3.38, SD = 1.74), t (37) = 2.34, p = 
.025, as predicted, whereas there is no difference between these mean ratings for 
NPGs (mean wanting = 2.60, SD = 1.80; mean game liking = 2.50, SD = 1.55), t (85) 
= 0.87, p = .39, as predicted.  Thus, these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
It is possible that the lack of evidence of a difference for NPGs is due to insufficient 
power.  However, power tables show that, with 86 participants, there is more than 95 
percent power to detect a large effect size (.14).  A large effect-size for a repeated-
measures design is considered equivalent to a moderate effect-size for an 
independent-samples design, as there is minimal error due to individual differences 
(Francis, 2013).  Thus, the power analysis shows that there is sufficient power to 
detect a moderate difference, but one is not detected.  This suggests that, if there is a 
difference in ratings of game liking and direct wanting for NPGs, it is only small. 
Hence, the data suggest that there is minimal difference on ratings of direct wanting 
and hedonic reward for NPGs, consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
Next, a repeated measures ANOVA is conducted, comparing the standardised mean 
for pleasant feeling and the standardised mean for game pleasantness to the 
standardised mean for direct wanting for each gambling group.  There is no evidence 
for violation of sphericity for PGs, but there is such violation for NPGs, so a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction is used for their analysis. 
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For NPGs, results show that the multivariate omnibus F-ratio is not significant, F 
(1.73, 149.14) = 2.85, p = .068, so no follow-up analyses are necessary.  Again, a 
power analysis using the adjusted df due to the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment, 
shows enough participants to detect a large effect-size, which is equivalent to a 
moderate effect-size for an independent-samples design.  Hence, the data provide 
evidence that there is minimal difference in ratings of direct wanting and measures of 
hedonic reward for NPGs, consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
For PGs, the multivariate omnibus F-ratio is significant, F (2, 76) = 6.09, p = .004, 
partial eta-squared = .14.  The results of the contrasts comparing each standardised 
hedonic-reward variable to standardised ratings of direct wanting are shown in Table 
65.  A Holm-Bonferroni adjustment of alpha for two comparisons is applied when 
comparing the mean of each hedonic-reward measure to direct wanting.   
Table 65. Comparing the mean standardised measures of hedonic reward 
after Blocks 1 and 2 to the mean standardised rating of direct wanting after 
Blocks 1 and 2 for PGs (mean standardised rating of direct wanting = 0.47, 
SD = 1.04; significant results are bold). 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
F 
(1, 38) p 
Cohen’s 
d* 
Pleasant feeling 
Game pleasant 
-.04 (1.00) 
.05 (1.03) 
11.20 
7.54 
.002 
.009 
.50 
.41 
*Cohen’s d is used instead of partial eta-squared as the size of the difference 
is of greater theoretical interest than is shared variance 
Table 65 shows that the mean standardised rating of direct wanting is moderately and 
significantly greater than the mean standardised rating of pleasant feeling and game 
pleasantness 1.  Thus, overall, the findings suggest that, when cue-triggered wanting 
is measured as direct wanting, it is rated more strongly than is hedonic reward for 
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PGs. Alternatively, the findings suggest that there is minimal ]difference between 
such ratings for NPGs.  
Further analyses are conducted to compare the standardised mean rating of credit 
trade after Blocks 1 and 2 to the standardised mean rating of the hedonic reward 
variables after Blocks 1 and 2.  As the distributions of credit trade violate the 
assumption of normality for NPGs, Friedman’s non-parametric test for repeated 
measures is used.  In order to be consistent across the gambling groups, this test is 
used for PGs as well.  Friedman’s test compares the rank order of repeated measures 
for a given sample.  Hence, the rank order for standardised credit trade 1, 
standardised game liking 1, standardised pleasant feeling 1, and standardised game 
pleasantness 1 are compared for each gambling group, as are the same measures after 
Block 2 for each gambling group.  
For PGs after Block 1, Friedman’s test shows no significant differences between the 
standardised mean rating of credit trade after Blocks 1 and 2 and the standardised 
mean rating of pleasant feeling and game pleasantness after Blocks 1 and 2 for 
NPGs, χ2 (2, n = 78) = 5.86, p =.053, or for PGs, χ2 (2, n = 30) = 1.87, p = .39.  
Hence, no follow-up analyses are conducted for either group.  Thus, the hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 3) that there would be no difference in cue-triggered wanting and 
hedonic reward for NPGs is supported on credit trade, whereas the hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 3) that there would be a difference on cue-triggered wanting and 
hedonic reward is not supported for PGs on credit trade.  In sum, the data support 
Hypothesis 3 for NPGs, but only in relation to direct wanting for PGs.  This is 
discussed further in Section 6.5.2, when the results are discussed. 
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6.4.6  Hypothesis 4: Predicting gambling activity 
Hypothesis 4 is that only cue-triggered wanting will predict gambling behaviour for 
PGs, whereas both cue-triggered wanting and measures of hedonic reward will 
predict gambling behaviour for NPGs.  In Study 4, the gambling index predicted is 
the number of blocks played on the online EGM simulation.  Ratings of hedonic 
reward and cue-triggered wanting after Block 2 are used to predict the number of 
blocks played, as these are the last ratings before participants decide whether or not 
to play any further optional blocks.  One exception to this is pleasant feeling, which 
is rated after Block 3, right before participants decide whether to continue playing 
optional blocks.  Current pleasantness is then rated after every additional optional 
block played.  However, relatively few participants continue playing further blocks, 
so not many participants provide these additional ratings of pleasant feeling.  As 
pleasant feeling 3 is the last rating of pleasantness by all participants, this is used to 
predict gambling behaviour, instead of pleasant feeling after Block 2.  As just noted, 
for all other variables, ratings after Block 2 are the last ratings during gambling, so 
these are used to predict the number of blocks played.  A regression analysis is used 
to examine the hypothesis.   
In order to decide which predictors to include in the regressions, a correlation matrix 
is produced, showing the relationship between the predictors and the number of 
blocks played for each gambling group.  Spearman’s rank order co-efficient is used 
to examine the relationship between credit trade and the number of blocks played for 
NPGs, as the distribution of credit trade is not normal (as shown in Section 6.3.2.2).  
As the distribution of the remaining variables is normal for each group, Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient is used to examine their relationship with the number of 
blocks played.  The results are shown in Table 66.   
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Table 66. The correlations of the wanting and 
hedonic-reward variables with the number of 
blocks played for each gambling group 
(correlations greater than .20 are in bold). 
Predictor NPGs PGs 
Direct wanting 2 .61*** .45** 
Credit trade 2 .65*** .43* 
Current pleasantness 3 .15 .08  
Game liking 2 .41*** .26 
Game pleasant 2 .34** .26 
***<.001; **<.01; *<.05 
The correlation matrix shows correlations of at least .20 for direct wanting 2, credit 
trade 2, game liking 2, and game pleasantness 2 for NPGs, and for direct wanting 2, 
credit trade 2, game liking 2, and game pleasant 2 for PGs, though the latter two are 
not significant.  Nonetheless, this may be due to the small sample size, so these 
variables are included in follow-up regressions anyway.  
Note that separate regressions are conducted to examine hedonic-reward and cue-
triggered wanting, as there are too few participants in each group to permit more than 
two predictors in each regression (Pallant, 2010).  In addition, separate regressions 
are conducted to examine each hedonic-reward predictor as they show high inter-
correlations (>.70) with each other.  If such variables are examined within the same 
regression, issues with multicollinearity can cause instability (Tabachnik & Fidell, 
2013).  Hence, for each gambling group, a separate regression is conducted to 
examine each hedonic-reward predictor, while the cue-triggered wanting predictors 
are examined together.  
Preliminary inspection of the normal probability plots, residuals scatterplots, and 
Mahalanobis Distance (using a criterion of .001) shows some issues with residual 
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outliers for NPGs, and non-normal distribution of residuals for both gambling 
groups, when running a linear regression with credit trade. For NPGs, when the 
residual outlier is removed, and the analyses re-run, there is a new residual outlier. 
Identification and removal of a new outlier, and subsequent re-running of the linear 
regression, is repeated six times before achieving an analysis that does not contain 
any residual outliers. Given these issues, a bootstrap regression is conducted for 
analyses with the cue-triggered wanting variables, instead of a linear regression. As 
noted previously, because bootstrap regressions use a data-driven non-analytical 
approach to estimating population parameters, satisfaction of assumptions for linear 
regression is not required; moreover, the results are more stable. In order to be 
consistent, a boot-strap regression is conducted for analyses with the hedonic reward 
variables as well.  
For each bootstrap regression, 2000 iterations are conducted (that is, 2000 sub-
samples are taken, and a regression is conducted with each sub-sample) and solutions 
are found for all 2000 iterations (that is, none of the sub-samples resulted in a 
singular covariance matrix, in which an inverse covariance matrix could not be 
found, leading to no solution).  Note that, when calculating associated p-values, the 
bias-corrected percentile method is used.  As noted in Section 4.3.1.1, this corrects 
for the fact that the sampling-distribution is calculated empirically using sub-samples 
from a sample of the population, rather than using samples from the actual 
population (Efron, 1987).  The results are shown in Table 67. 
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Table 67. Results of bootstrap regressions using cue-triggered wanting variables, 
and hedonic reward variables, to predict the number of blocks played for each 
gambling group (note that no t-statistics are provided as the p-value for each 
predictor is calculated using bias-corrected percentiles). 
NPGs 'R2 
Zero-
order sr2 B β F p 
 
Direct wanting 2 
Credit trade 2 
.53  
.68 
.62 
 
.09 
.11 
 
.37 
.19 
 
.47 
.34 
30.85 <.001 
.025 
.024 
Game liking 2 .17 .41 .17 .34 .41 17.17 .031 
Game pleasantness 2 .12 .34 .12 .10 .34 11.40 .001 
PGs 'R2 
Zero-
order sr2 B β F p 
 
Direct wanting 2 
Credit trade 2 
.32  
.54 
.18 
 
.18 
.01 
 
.45 
-.01 
 
.68 
-.22 
4.80 .020 
.016 
.27 
Game liking 2 .08 .28 .02 .21 .28 3.14 .39 
Game pleasantness 2 .07 .26 .07 .14 .26 2.57 .12 
 
The table shows that direct wanting 2 and credit trade 2 are significant predictors of 
number of blocks played for NPGs, as is game liking 2 and game pleasant 2. Hence, 
the findings are consistent with the prediction that both cue-triggered wanting and 
hedonic reward will predict gambling behaviour for NPGs.  
The table also shows that direct wanting 2, but not game liking 2 or game pleasant 2, 
is a significant predictor of the number of blocks played for PGs. This is consistent 
with the prediction that cue-triggered wanting, but not hedonic-reward, will predict 
indices of gambling behaviour for PGs. The lack of evidence that credit trade 2 
predicts the number of blocks played for PGs is unexpected, and is discussed in the 
next section. Nonetheless, the remaining findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4 
for both groups, and consistent with the findings in Studies 2 and 3.  
 
 346 
 
In sum, the findings in Study 4 are consistent with hypotheses on the whole.  The 
study shows evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1, that cue-triggered wanting is 
stronger for PGs than for NPGs, and, with the important exception of game liking 
(which is discussed in the next section), there is no evidence of a difference in 
hedonic-reward between the groups, consistent with Hypothesis 2.  Study 4 also 
shows that, when cue-triggered wanting is measured as direct wanting, it is stronger 
than most measures of hedonic reward for PGs, consistent with Hypothesis 3, 
whereas there is no difference between measures of cue-triggered wanting and 
hedonic reward for NPGs, also consistent with Hypothesis 3.  For credit trade, 
findings are not consistent with Hypothesis 3 for PGs, as there is no evidence that it 
is stronger than measures of hedonic reward for PGs.  This is also discussed in the 
next section.  Finally, the findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4 as well.  That is, 
for PGs, direct wanting predicts gambling behaviour (the number of blocks played) 
but measures of hedonic reward do not, whereas both measures of cue-triggered 
wanting and hedonic reward predict gambling behaviour for NPGs.  However, 
contrasting with Hypothesis 4, credit trade does not predict the number of blocks 
played for PGs.  This is discussed in the next section.  
6.5  Discussion 
As noted throughout the results section, most of the results appear to support the 
hypotheses.  However, not all results do so.  Measures of cue-triggered wanting are 
stronger for PGs than for NPGs, except for the number of blocks played.  In addition, 
predictions regarding cue-triggered wanting are supported with direct wanting for 
PGs, but not with credit trade.  Finally, game liking is stronger for PGs than for 
NPGs, while none of the other measures of hedonic reward differed between the 
groups.  Possible reasons for these issues are discussed below, in turn.  In addition, 
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there are some possible alternative interpretations of some findings, which are also 
discussed.   
6.5.1 Examining the number of blocks played 
The data show that, on some measures, PGs exhibit stronger cue-triggered wanting 
than NPGs.  However, there is no evidence of a difference between the gambling 
groups on one supposed measure of cue-triggered wanting, which is the ‘number of 
blocks played’.  The number of blocks played is used as a measure of ‘effort 
expended’, as participants have to complete the squares task, which is dull and 
effortful, in order to be able to play each additional block of bets.  Effort expended 
has been used by researchers as a measure of cue-triggered wanting, initially in 
animal research, but more recently with humans as well (Waugh & Gotlib, 2008).  
One reason that the number of blocks played does not differ between the gambling 
groups may be due to differences in the perceived value of a reward.  Prior research 
(Linacre, 2007; Office of Economic and Statistical Research, 2012; Queensland 
Household Gambling Survey, 2006-07) has suggested that PGs are accustomed to 
gambling with larger amounts of money than NPGs.  Hence, compared with NPGs, 
PGs may perceive a given reward as smaller.  If so, the degree of effort that PGs are 
willing to expend to access the reward may be lower.  In Study 4, participants 
generally only won $1 or $2 at the end of a winning block of bets.  Winnings of this 
size may be regarded by many PGs as too small to bother expending effort to gain. 
Thus, although PGs exhibit greater wanting to gamble than NPGs, this may not have 
translated into a greater number of blocks played.  Instead, participants may have 
continued gambling elsewhere after the study, where the rewards are greater.  
However, this was not measured and so is not known.  
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A second reason may be that the dull and effortful task disrupted motivational 
processes.  Some researchers argue that regular EGM players may enter a trance-like 
state when playing EGMs (Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; Morasco et al., 2006; 
Pietrzak et al., 2007; Wood & Griffiths, 2007), which may encourage consistent, 
uninterrupted play (Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999; Dickerson et al., 1992).  In such 
instances, decision-making may be largely governed by automatic processes, such as 
cue-triggered wanting.  During Study 4, participants have to continually stop playing 
in order to complete the dull and effortful task before they can continue playing 
again.  Hence, automatic motivational processes may have been disrupted.  So, 
although the mean rating of wanting after Blocks 1 and 2 is stronger for PGs than for 
NPGs, the effortful task completed after Block 3, and subsequent blocks, may have 
prevented this wanting from manifesting as a greater number of blocks played.  
Finally, it may be that stronger cue-triggered wanting does not lead to longer 
gambling sessions for EGM players.  Perhaps instead, it leads to differences during 
the session, such as staking larger bets.  Alternatively, it may lead to more frequent 
gambling sessions.  If so, the comparatively stronger rating of direct wanting 
exhibited by PGs may not be evident as a greater number of blocks played.  In 
contrast to this argument, however, rating of direct wanting predicts the number of 
blocks played in Study 4 for both gambling groups, so there does seem to be some 
relationship between the ratings of wanting and the number of blocks played, which 
contradicts any suggestion that there is not.  Thus, the former two arguments 
presented above are perhaps more convincing. 
In sum, there are various possible reasons as to why the number of blocks played 
does not differ between the gambling groups, even though other measures of cue-
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triggered wanting in Study 4 do differ.  The data are the most consistent with the first 
two possible explanations.  One is that PGs do not expend more effort to play further 
blocks than NPGs as they perceive the rewards from doing so as smaller than do 
NPGs.  The other possibility is that PGs do exhibit stronger wanting than NPGs after 
Blocks 1 and 2, but the squares task disrupts these motivational processes, so 
wanting declines after Block 3, when the squares task is first completed.  Further 
research is required to determine which of these explanations is more convincing. 
6.5.2 Examining credit trade 
Consideration needs to be given as to what credit trade may actually be measuring. 
Although credit trade is greater for PGs than for NPGs, it does not predict actual 
gambling behaviour for PGs.  This suggests that there may be other reasons that 
credit trade is greater for PGs than for NPGs.  This is discussed in this section. 
It was proposed in Section 6.2 that credit trade may be a behavioural measure of cue-
triggered wanting.  Hence, the greater number of credits that PGs are willing to trade 
compared with NPGs for the opportunity to keep playing after Blocks 1 and 2 could 
be interpreted as evidence that PGs exhibit greater wanting than NPGs.  However, 
there are other possible interpretations.  For example, as argued above, it may be that 
PGs tend to gamble more credits than NPGs, so credits hold comparatively less 
subjective value for PGs.  As a result, PGs may be willing to give more credits away 
than NPGs for the opportunity to keep playing.  Hence, the greater number of credits 
that PGs are willing to trade to continue gambling may reflect differences in 
subjective perception of the value of the credits traded, rather than differences in 
their degree of gambling-related cue-triggered wanting.  The lack of evidence in 
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Section 6.4.6 that credit trade predicts the number of blocks played for PGs supports 
this argument. 
Alternatively, PGs may be thinking more strategically than NPGs about the number 
of credits they are willing to give away.  For example, PGs may be aware that they 
will receive a $10 voucher at the end of the study, regardless of how many credits 
they have lost.  Hence, they may be willing to give more of their credits away for the 
opportunity to keep playing (and hopefully win more credits), in the knowledge that 
they will receive a voucher worth at least $10 regardless of how many credits they 
risk.  Thus, their response to credit trade may be influenced by this specific feature of 
the study design.  If so, it may be argued that this is not related to motivational 
processes, and so credit trade may not be an effective measure of wanting.  
Nonetheless, even if both credit trade and number of blocks played are not effective 
measures of wanting, PGs still rate how much they want to keep playing the game 
more highly than do NPGs.  Moreover, rating of game wanting predicts actual 
behaviour (the number of blocks played) which suggests that it is a valid measure of 
motivational processes.  Thus, it may be argued that there is still evidence that PGs 
exhibit greater wanting than do NPGs during a gambling session.  Moreover, Studies 
2 and 3 show that PGs exhibit greater wanting than do NPGs, and that this predicts 
actual gambling behaviour.  Hence, all quantitative studies in this thesis have found 
that PGs exhibit greater wanting than do NPGs, and that this predicts gambling 
behaviour, which is consistent with dual-process predictions.  
6.5.3 Examining game liking 
It is predicted that hedonic reward will not differ between the gambling groups.  The 
results show that this prediction is supported on most measures of hedonic reward 
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used in Study 4.  However, PGs exhibit greater ‘game liking’ compared with NPGs, 
which contrasts with this hypothesis.  Possible reasons are discussed below.  This is 
followed by a more general discussion of the findings and the measures. 
There are a few different possibilities as to why PGs may have rated game liking 
more highly than NPGs.  One reason may relate to differences in the psychological 
processes proposed to underlie responses on each measure.  In the introduction 
(Section 6.1), the measures are distinguished according to whether the game is 
mentioned in the question or not.  It is proposed that, on measures which mention the 
game, the response provided may undergo deliberative adjustment.  For example, if 
participants exhibit strong wanting to play the game, but feel negative about the 
game, cognitive dissonance may lead to a positive adjustment of the negative 
evaluation of the game.  This would reduce the discrepancy between ratings of direct 
wanting and game liking.  By contrast, measures which do not mention the game 
(such as pleasant feeling) may not undergo such adjustment, as participants are not 
aware of what is being measured. This may explain why the mean rating of game 
liking is higher for PGs than for NPGs, whereas other ratings of hedonic reward do 
not differ.  As PGs report strong wanting to gamble, they may have adjusted their 
rating of game liking so there is less dissonance between ratings of game liking and 
direct wanting.  
However, if that is the case, ratings of game pleasantness would also be expected to 
undergo such a positive adjustment (not just ratings of game liking) as this measure 
also mentions the gambling game. As a result, it too should be significantly greater 
for PGs than for NPGs.  Methodological differences between ratings of game 
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pleasantness and game liking may explain why only game liking is greater, as now 
discussed. 
Direct wanting and game liking are the only two variables that comprise the same 
scale (a 7-point unipolar scale).  By contrast, game pleasantness and pleasant feeling 
comprise a 15-point bi-polar scale.  Research has shown that a response-bias can 
occur where responses on items with the same response-scale can be more similar 
than responses on items with different response-scales (Gehlbach & Barge, 2012; 
Peer & Gamliel, 2011).  As direct wanting and game liking are on similar scales, the 
stronger rating of direct wanting by PGs may have led to stronger ratings of game 
liking as well.  This may not be the case for game pleasantness and pleasant feeling 
as the response-scales on these items differ to that for direct wanting.  This may 
explain why game liking is stronger for PGs than for NPGs, but there is no evidence 
of a difference on other hedonic-reward measures.   
Finally, it may be that hedonic reward does not differ between the groups, but game 
liking does.  Although the findings show lack of difference between the groups on 
game pleasantness and feelings of pleasantness, PGs may like the game more than 
NPGs for cognitive reasons that are unrelated to feelings of hedonic reward.  For 
example, even though participants may not have enjoyed playing the game, they may 
like the game as it provided the opportunity to win a $10 voucher.  This may have 
led to some mildly positive ratings of game liking.  Further research is required to 
examine this proposition. 
6.5.4 Criticisms of ratings of hedonic reward 
So far in this Discussion section, some of the measures used in Study 4 have been 
critically examined, which has also involved a critical examination of features related 
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to the study design.  A further possible criticism is that, while some ratings of 
hedonic reward are positive, ratings of pleasant feeling are negative, and declined 
slightly from baseline during gambling.  Hence, it is arguable as to whether players 
experience hedonic reward while playing the EGM simulation in Study 4 or not.  
These observations may indicate that players tend not to experience hedonic reward 
when playing the EGM-simulation in Study 4, or, it may indicate more broadly that 
players tend not to experience hedonic reward during gambling generally.  It may be 
the former only, as the EGM simulation differs from typical EGMs is some 
important ways.  This may have elicited disappointment, and so a decline in feelings 
of pleasantness.  For example, the simulation comprised only one line of three 
‘reels’, whereas EGMs typically comprise five lines of five reels (Parke & Griffiths, 
2006).  The latter allows several different combinations of outcomes, and so several 
different betting options (e.g., all symbols on all lines or one line of symbols).  This 
encourages user-control, and may also make the game seem more interesting.  In 
addition, modern EGMs typically have other features that may make the game more 
interesting, such as the ‘hi-lo’ ladder (Parke & Griffiths), which is linked to the 
ability to earn a free spin.  
By contrast, the EGM simulation in Study 4 is intentionally simplified in order to 
reduce differences in experience between participants, and so reduce error variance; 
a similar simulation has been used in previous research (MacLin et al., 2007).  
Nonetheless, it may be worth repeating the study using a more typical EGM, in order 
to elicit more ecologically valid feelings.  That said, it is notable that PGs still report 
stronger cue-triggered wanting than NPGs when playing the EGM-simulation in 
Study 4, despite an apparent lack of hedonic reward.  This may provide further 
support for the importance of cue-triggered wanting for PGs.  
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In conclusion, the results of Study 4 provide some evidence for the dual-process 
prediction that cue-triggered wanting is stronger than hedonic reward for PGs, and 
that cue-triggered wanting is stronger for PGs than for NPGs. They also provide 
some evidence for the dual-process prediction that cue-triggered wanting predicts 
gambling behaviour for PGs, but evaluative processes, such as hedonic reward, do 
not. These findings are consistent with those from Studies 2 and 3. Similarly, the 
findings in Study 4 support the dual-process prediction that both cue-triggered 
wanting and evaluative processes such as hedonic reward predict gambling 
behaviour for NPGs. This is also consistent with findings from Studies 2 and 3. The 
findings across all studies are discussed and summarised in the next chapter, which is 
the final chapter in this thesis.   
In sum, the data in Study 4 support most of the dual-process hypotheses tested, and 
the findings are generally consistent with those from other studies in this thesis.  
Where the findings do differ, methodological explanations may, or may not, apply;  
further research is required before conclusions can be drawn.  Importantly, even 
though one of the three measures of hedonic reward (rating of liking) is higher for 
PG than for NPGs, which contrasts with the dual-process hypothesis, it does not 
predict gambling behaviour for PGs.  Only cue-triggered wanting does so, as 
hypothesised from a dual-process perspective.  In the next chapter, the findings from 
each study in this thesis are summarised and discussed.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion and implication of findings 
7.1 Rationale and aim of this thesis 
In this section, the critique of the previous approaches to problem gambling 
presented in Chapters 1 and 2 is summarised.  Then the dual-process model, and the 
related predictions relevant to gambling, are briefly re-iterated.  Finally, a summary 
of the findings from the empirical studies, and their novel contribution to the area of 
gambling research, are discussed, 
7.1.1  A summary critiquing the previous approaches to 
understanding problem gambling 
Previous models have tended to focus on the notion that various psychological 
processes converge to make gambling seem like a positive choice.  Behavioural 
models have attempted to show that gamblers persist with gambling as it is 
reinforcing (R.I.F. Brown, 1987; Dickerson et al., 1992; Haw, 2000, 2008). 
Cognitive models have attempted to show that cognitive errors lead gamblers to view 
gambling as a positive choice (Petry, 2005; Raylu & Oei, 2004b; Toneatto et al., 
1997).  Implicit in these models is the consequentialist notion of decision-making, 
whereby decision-makers are rational, and are guided by an appraisal of the likely 
outcomes of their choice, whether this be occurring implicitly (via behavioural 
reinforcement) or explicitly (via deliberative cognitive appraisal).  
By contrast, it is argued in this thesis that PGs are often aware that the negative 
consequences of gambling outweigh the positive consequences, and many want to 
stop or reduce their gambling, but certain psychological processes (namely 
excessively strong cue-triggered wanting) lead to the choice to gamble despite this.  
This results in ‘unsafe’ gambling decisions, and gives rise to a sense of impaired 
control.  These arguments are briefly re-iterated below, followed by a summary of 
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the findings in each empirical study, and whether these support the dual-process 
model.  The novel contributions of this thesis are then discussed, followed by 
suggestions for future research. 
7.1.1.1 Behavioural models 
Behavioural models have focused on the similarities between the variable-ratio 
schedule and the schedule operating in gambling games, the ‘ratio-reward schedule’.  
Previous research suggests that the intermittent nature of reinforcement in the 
variable-ratio schedule produces behaviours that are difficult to extinguish (Skinner, 
1948).  Hence, it is proposed that, due its similarity with the variable-ratio schedule, 
the ratio-reward schedule will also produce behaviours that are difficult to 
extinguish.  Such resistance to extinction is therefore presented as a possible 
explanation for gambling persistence (Dixon et al., 2000; Haw, 2000, 2008; MacLin 
et al., 1999).  
However, there is a major and important criticism of this assumption.  The ratio-
reward schedule assumes only intermittent reward.  It does not include the frequent 
punishment that occurs in gambling games.  As the odds typically favour the vendor, 
punishment (in the form of monetary losses) is actually more frequent than reward.  
According to behavioural models, this should lead to extinction of gambling 
behaviour.  Hence, it cannot be assumed that findings regarding intermittent operant 
reward schedules are applicable to gambling games, so these findings may not be 
able to account for the persistence of gambling behaviour.  
Some behavioural researchers argue that other reinforcers, such as hedonic reward, 
social benefits, or the negative reinforcement of removing aversive feelings, may 
maintain gambling behaviour.  However, many PGs report serious negative 
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consequences from their gambling behaviour that do not appear to justify these 
comparatively mild benefits.  Moreover, the observation in Study 1 that some PGs 
want to reduce or stop gambling suggests that they too believe that the ‘costs’ of 
gambling outweigh the benefits.  
Some behavioural theorists then proposed the notion of delayed discounting, wherein 
immediate positive consequences are proposed to have a greater impact on decision-
making than delayed negative consequences.  However, the negative consequences 
of gambling are both immediate (in the form of monetary losses) and distant (in the 
form of life consequences, such as marital breakdown, loss of employment, criminal 
activity, homelessness etc; Feigelman et al., 2006; Petry et al., 2005; Raylu & Oei, 
2009), so the notion of delayed discounting does not appear to account for gambling 
persistence.  
Finally, operant and classical conditioning models propose a direct-stimulus response 
relationship, so cognition, and other psychological processes such as affect, are not 
accounted for.  While this may be applicable to animals, this oversimplifies the 
decision-making process for humans (Robinson & Berridge, 2003).      
7.1.1.2  Cognitive models 
Given the possible shortcomings of behavioural models, researchers began to turn to 
cognitive models.  As gambling persists despite frequent punishment, perhaps 
cognitive processes distort the perception of reward, and gambling outcomes 
generally.  Cognitive models focus on the notion that cognitive errors may cause 
gambling to be seen as a positive choice, even if it may not be.  For example, a 
memory bias encourages gamblers to recall their wins more readily than their losses, 
so gamblers may believe they win more often than they lose.  Hence, it has been 
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argued that the stronger cognitive errors observed for PGs when compared with other 
gamblers may account for their more intense gambling activity (Baboushkin et al., 
2001; Raylu & Oei, 2004a; Toneatto et al., 1997).  
However, it is proposed in this thesis that the many cognitive errors observed during 
think-aloud studies (Baboushkin et al., 2001; Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; Toplak 
et al., 2007) may primarily be present only during gambling, which would make 
them unlikely to account for the increased frequency of gambling sessions (though 
they may contribute to ‘unsafe’ gambling during a session).  It is also proposed that 
the psychological processes present during gambling may give rise to cognitive 
errors, rather than the alternative assumption that cognitive errors encourage 
gambling activity (or that both causational directions may operate).  Moreover, in 
contrast to the view that cognitive errors make gambling seem positive, it is proposed 
in this thesis that many gamblers are aware that the consequences of their gambling 
are mostly negative, but they find themselves making the choice to gamble anyway.  
It is this paradox that this thesis attempts to explain.  In order to do so, an alternative 
model, the dual-process model is proposed, in conjunction with the notion of 
incentive-sensitisation.  This is now briefly re-iterated.  
7.1 2 The dual-process model briefly re-iterated 
The dual-process model proposes that two distinct but interacting cognitive 
processing systems operate in the human brain (J. Evans, 2003).  The ‘deliberative 
processing system’ is rational, future-oriented and can engage in analytical, abstract 
reasoning and problem-solving.  The ‘automatic processing system’ is affective or 
motivational, present-oriented, and responds automatically to internal and 
environmental cues.  As the latter system is the only system present in most other 
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animals, it has evolved to automatically guide animals towards behaviours that will 
maximise their chances of survival.  Hence, an automatic approach action tendency 
(termed ‘cue-triggered wanting’) is elicited in response to appetitive cues, such as 
those related to food, sex, and child-rearing (Bradley et al., 2001; Damasio et al., 
1996; Slovic et al., 2005) and an automatic defensive action-tendency is elicited in 
response to threatening cues, such as a predators (Bradley et al., 2001; Frijda, 2010).  
These systems are proposed to interact when making judgements and decisions (J. 
Evans, 2008; Goto & Grace, 2008; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991).  The automatic 
system responds automatically to immediate environmental cues.  This allows 
efficient interaction with the environment that incorporates previous experience 
(encoded in neural pathways; Bechara, 2011; Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007).  
The deliberative system can then analytically evaluate and flexibly problem solve, 
including consideration of long-term interests.  Upon doing so, it may concord with 
the automatic response, or it can attempt to adjust or inhibit it.  In this way, humans 
can interact efficiently with the environment, incorporating previous learning, as well 
as being able to problem-solve flexibly and consider long-term goals when making 
decisions (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  
Each system contributes to each decision to varying degrees, such that a different 
system will dominate a given decision on different decision-making occasions 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001).  This leads to time-inconsistent decision-making, 
whereby different decisions are made about the same issue, despite no obvious 
change in external factors related to the decision.  
Importantly, research suggests that overriding automatic processes is effortful, so 
individuals must be motivated enough to expend the effort required to do so.  If such 
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motivation is lacking, then the tendency is to defer to the automatic response without 
investing the deliberative effort required to check whether this response stands up to 
rational scrutiny, or whether the judgement or decision is in the decision-makers 
long-term interest.  This can result in reasoning errors and sub-optimal decision-
making (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  In regards to appetitive processes, it may be 
difficult for individuals to suppress automatic approach action tendencies (cue-
triggered wanting) once activated by appetitive cues.  Hence, one must be motivated 
to expend the effort required to suppress the urge to engage in an appetitive 
behaviour; moreover, even if such effort is expended, the appetitive response will not 
necessarily be suppressed (Berridge & Aldridge, 2008; Robinson & Berridge, 2003).   
It is argued that, in the presence of addictions, including problem gambling, cue-
triggered wanting undergoes a process of sensitisation that makes it particularly 
difficult to override once activated.  A body of research by neuroscientists Robinson 
and Berridge (e.g., 1993, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2004) suggests that neural pathways 
involved in cue-triggered wanting may undergo a process of ‘sensitisation’, where 
they become particularly sensitive to the appetitive cues that activate them.  
Consequently, such cues activate strong automatic approach responses that are 
particularly difficult to suppress.  
When activated, such strong cue-triggered wanting may dominate gambling 
decisions.  This can lead to the decision to gamble regardless of deliberative 
intentions to reduce or stop gambling.  As a result, gamblers may make the decision 
to gamble, even when negative consequences are anticipated.  Thus, negative 
consequences mount, as do negative expectancies, but strong cue-triggered wanting 
continues to elicit gambling activity.  
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Given this, it is proposed that the choice to gamble does not arise due to 
reinforcement or a ‘rational’ expectation of primarily positive outcomes.  Rather, it is 
proposed that it is the result of pathological motivational processes just described. 
Any positive judgements that arise temporarily during decision-making may be due 
to the biasing influence of cue-triggered wanting at that time. 
This process contrasts with ‘normal’ non-pathological appetitive decision-making, 
whereby cue-triggered wanting is only mild or moderate, and so may be ‘overridden’ 
by deliberative processes if the decision-maker is sufficiently motivated to do so.  
Thus, when primarily negative outcome expectancies are anticipated, the behaviour 
is unlikely to proceed.  The logical extension of this is that a behaviour will usually 
be enacted partially because primarily positive outcomes are anticipated.  In addition, 
(non-pathological) mild to moderate cue-triggered wanting may be present.  
A further distinction pertains to the experience of hedonic-reward, and how it relates 
to cue-triggered wanting.  In the absence of addiction, hedonic reward and cue-
triggered wanting are closely related, because appetitive behaviours elicit hedonic 
reward, which in turn sensitises cue-triggered wanting.  This occurs without cue-
triggered wanting becoming excessively sensitised.  By contrast, in the presence of 
addiction, cue-triggered wanting becomes excessively sensitised independent of 
hedonic-reward.  Hence, the two processes diverge (Robinson & Berridge, 2000, 
2001).  Thus, while cue-triggered wanting is predicted to be stronger for PGs than for 
NPGs, no differences are expected on hedonic reward.  Individual differences, such 
as differences in dopamine functioning and other relevant neurotransmitters, may 
cause some to be vulnerable to such hypersensitisation, but not others (Flagel et al., 
2008; Kalivas & Stewart, 1991; Robinson, 1988; Segal & Kuczenski, 1987).  
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The combined application of the dual-process model and incentive-sensitisation 
theory to gambling is novel.  To my knowledge, no other researcher has attempted to 
account for gambling behaviour utilising a model similar to that presented here, and 
no studies have attempted to test this model with gamblers.  
7.1.3 Brief re-iteration of predictions arising from the dual-
process model 
The application of these models to gambling leads to a number of testable 
predictions.  First, it is argued that PGs will exhibit strong cue-triggered wanting, 
whereas NPGs will exhibit mild to moderate cue-triggered wanting.  Second, as it is 
argued that strong cue-triggered wanting gives rise to impaired control, and so 
decisions that heighten negative consequences, it is predicted that PGs will exhibit 
negative gambling-related expectancies.  By contrast, as it is argued that NPGs can 
usually override gambling-related cue-triggered wanting when they believe it is 
necessary, it is proposed that they must gamble partly due to a positive evaluation of 
the likely outcomes of gambling; hence, positive expectancies are predicted for 
NPGs.  Third, it is predicted that expectancies are not stable, as the relative 
contribution of automatic and deliberative processes varies with internal and external 
context, and automatic processes such as affect and cue-triggered wanting can bias 
evaluative judgements.  In particular, it is predicted that expectancies become more 
positive as cue-triggered wanting strengthens.  Fourth, it is predicted that cognitive 
errors will be mild in the absence of a gambling session, but will strengthen when 
cue-triggered wanting is active, and again during gambling (due to a reliance upon 
automatic processes at that time).  Fifth, it is predicted that cue-triggered wanting 
will be stronger than hedonic reward for PGs but not for NPGs.  Relatedly, it is 
predicted that cue-triggered wanting will be stronger for PGs than for NPGs, but 
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there will be no differences in hedonic reward between the gambling groups.  These 
predictions were tested across the three empirical quantitative studies in this thesis 
(Studies 2, 3, and 4).  The findings relevant to these predictions, and their novel 
contribution, are summarised in the following sections. 
7.2 Expectancies: summary and discussion of novel 
findings 
The overall findings and implications regarding expectancies, and the novelty of 
these findings, are discussed in this section. This is followed by suggestions for 
future research. 
7.2.1 Brief summary of predictions regarding expectancies 
The dual-process model presented in this thesis argues that NPGs remain in control 
of their gambling as deliberative processes are mostly able to override automatic 
motivational responses when deemed necessary.  This, in turn, is because it is 
proposed that cue-triggered wanting is not excessive for NPGs.  Hence, when more 
negative than positive consequences are anticipated, gambling will not proceed.  It 
follows from this that when gambling does proceed, it is usually partly because more 
positive than negative consequences are anticipated.  For this reason, it is argued that 
NPGs will exhibit positive gambling-related expectancies overall (aggregate positive 
and negative expectancies).  
By contrast, it is argued that PGs continue to gamble due to excessive cue-triggered 
wanting, which leads to gambling regardless of concurrent aggregate expectancies.  
Hence, gambling proceeds even when negative outcomes are expected.  This leads to 
negative consequences and so negative expectancies overall (stronger negative than 
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positive expectancies).  This in turn leads to a sense of impaired control, which is 
proposed to be a central feature of problem gambling.  
Finally, as the dual-process model proposes that automatic and deliberative processes 
contribute to each judgement or decision-making occasion to varying degrees, it is 
argued that expectancies will be time-inconsistent.  That is, expectancies will vary 
with changes in internal and contextual features, such as current affect, anxiety, cue-
triggered wanting, environmental stimuli, and decision-making constraints, such as 
time limits.  This leads to the prediction that expectancies will alter as cue-triggered 
wanting alters.  In particular, it is proposed that the activation of strong cue-triggered 
wanting may bias expectancies, such that they become more positive, and so are 
more likely to endorse the desire to gamble.  In this way, automatic motivational 
processes may influence evaluative judgments.  These predictions are novel (as 
discussed further in Section 7.2.3), and they were examined in this thesis. 
7.2.3 Novel findings regarding expectancies, and their 
implications 
In this section the novelty of the findings regarding gambling-related expectancies 
are discussed, along with their implications, where relevant.  No previous studies 
known to the author have examined the overall expectancies of PGs and NPGs, 
where-in the aggregate strength of positive and negative expectancies are compared.  
Some studies have shown that PGs exhibit both positive and negative expectancies 
(Gillespie et al., 2007a, 2007b; Tiell, 2005), but no researchers have used bipolar 
items, anchored by negative and positive responses, which allow measurement of the 
overall degree of positivity or negativity regarding a particular expectancy.  As 
researchers have argued that individuals consider overall expectancies (the aggregate 
of positive and negative expectancies) when making decisions, it is important to 
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ascertain the aggregate valence and strength of expectancies (Schoemaker, 1980, 
1992; Tversky, 1967a, 1967b; Wallsten, 1971).  
The novel finding in this thesis that PGs can exhibit negative gambling-related 
expectancies overall, even during a strong urge, undermines the consequentialist 
view that individuals engage in excessive behaviours because they expect mostly 
positive consequences from doing so.  More broadly, this undermines the implicit 
assumption that PGs expect positive outcomes from gambling.  Instead, these 
observations fit with the dual-process notion that gambling persists due to impaired 
control, which leads to irrational decisions to continue with gambling despite an 
expectation of mostly negative consequences.  Hence, the findings in this thesis 
suggest that some of the assumptions implicit in the gambling literature can be 
challenged.  In addition, they support the application of a new model to problem 
gambling, namely, the dual-process model and the incentive-sensitisation theory.  
This is discussed further in Section 7.4.  
Furthermore, the free-association task presented in Chapter 4 is the first word-
association task known to the author to be conducted with gamblers.  As already 
noted, the task suggests that PGs tend mostly to automatically experience thoughts 
about sadness, anxiety, impaired control, or guilt, when thinking about their 
gambling.  Such thoughts fit with the notion of impaired control in that PGs are 
aware that their gambling produces negative consequences overall, but they continue 
to gamble anyway.  
In addition, the lack of evidence that escape (e.g. from aversive affect) acts as a 
motivation to gamble also contrasts with previous qualitative research (Ricketts & 
Macaskill, 2003; Wood & Griffiths, 2007).  This previous research has asked PGs to 
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explain why they gamble.  As PGs may not have insight into the notion that they 
gamble due to strong automatic motivational processes, they may attempt to account 
for their gambling in ways that may or may not be accurate.  This may lead them to 
report that they gamble as a means of ‘escape’.  By contrast, the qualitative study 
conducted in Study 1 asked gamblers to discuss the thoughts present at the time of 
making the decision to gamble, and few PGs mentioned a desire for escape.  
Moreover, very few PGs reported escape as an automatic thought that arose during 
the free-association ask in Study 2.  Hence, the findings in this thesis question the 
notion that PGs gamble to escape.  However, these findings are preliminary, so 
further research so necessary.   
The finding that NPGs exhibit positive expectancies overall is also novel.  Previous 
researchers have shown that NPGs tend to exhibit a positive mean on measures 
comprising unipolar positive and negative items (Gillespie et al., 2007a, 2007b), but 
I am aware of no published research that has examined overall expectancies using 
bipolar items with an adult sample of NPGs.  This finding fits with the notion that 
NPGs do not exhibit impaired control, but rather, gamble partially because they 
expect positive consequences overall from their gambling.  While this may seem 
fairly self-evident, it has not been explicitly demonstrated with overall expectancies 
before.  
In addition, the findings in this thesis suggest that the role of expectancies differs for 
PGs and NPGs.  For NPGs, expectancies appear to concur with motivational 
processes, and so encourage the decision to gamble.  For PGs, by contrast, 
expectancies appear to disagree with motivational urges, thereby heightening 
cognitive dissonance and discomfort regarding gambling choices, and giving rise to 
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impaired control.  Hence, the findings suggest that a uniform role for expectancies 
across gamblers with differing degrees of gambling problems cannot be assumed.  
7.2.4 Future research regarding expectancies 
Future research should attempt to replicate the findings in this thesis, particularly in 
regards to the negative overall expectancies observed for PGs, and especially for PGs 
reporting strong cue-triggered wanting.  This is an important finding which has not 
been shown before, and which has implications for understanding problem gambling.  
Furthermore, as the findings in this thesis differ according to the expectancy measure 
used, future research should attempt to determine the processes operating when 
completing expectancy measures, in order to gain insight into which measures are 
likely to be the most relevant to gambling-related decision-making.  The answers to 
these questions are likely to differ according to the type of gambling decision (e.g., 
whether to begin a session, continue a session, or increase bet-size during a session).  
Moreover, even though this thesis did not find evidence for a difference in overall 
expectancies as a function of cue-triggered wanting for PGs, it was noted above that 
it is possible that one particular expectancy becomes prominent when cue-triggered 
wanting is strongly active.  Indeed, the qualitative findings in Study 1 suggest that 
this may be the case (that is, PGs may focus on the possibility of winning when cue-
triggered wanting is strongly active), even when they acknowledge in the absence of 
an urge that this is unlikely.  Hence, further research should be conducted to examine 
this important proposition.  If one particular expectancy tends to emerge when cue-
triggered wanting is strongly active, and this particular expectancy helps to justify 
the choice to gamble, debunking this justification may be a helpful treatment tool.  
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It was also noted above that this thesis found little evidence for the proposition that 
PGs gamble to escape, and it was argued that this may be due to the different 
methodologies used in this thesis compared with previous studies (Ricketts & 
Macaskill, 2003;  Wood & Griffiths, 2007).  Hence, future studies may also focus 
directly on examining aetiological processes behind gambling decisions, in order to 
ascertain whether the need for escape appears to be a contributing aetiological factor.   
In addition, while the findings in this thesis are consistent with the proposition that 
expectancies alter with cue-triggered wanting for NPGs, the use of a between-groups 
design leaves open the proposition that processes other than cue-triggered wanting 
are responsible for these differences. Given this, as noted above, future research 
should examine change in expectancies over time, using a within-groups design. 
Moreover, research into the potential for expectancies to motivate positive change, 
such as a reduction in gambling, should be conducted.  Although this thesis suggests 
that PGs experience strong cue-triggered wanting despite negative expectancies, 
interventions may attempt to enhance the ability of negative expectancies to override 
motivational responses.  Previous research has shown that overriding automatic 
responses is effortful (Kahneman & Tversky, 2005), so a critical factor in overriding 
them is likely to be developing the explicit motivation to do so.   
Finally, one particularly interesting direction for future research relates to cue-
triggered wanting, anger and chasing.  Some research suggests that anger may be an 
automatic approach action tendency (Frijda, 2010; Harmon-Jones et al., 2010).  
Some PGs report experiencing anger when losing during gambling (Corless & 
Dickerson, 1989), and some gamblers in Study 1 appeared to link their chasing 
behaviour to feeling angry.  Hence, it may be that anger elicits an automatic 
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approach action tendency, which then elicits chasing behaviour.  Chasing may result 
in further losses, and so further anger, and further chasing, causing a destructive 
cycle. 
7.3 Cognitive errors: summary and discussion of 
novel findings 
7.3.1 Brief summary of predictions regarding cognitive errors 
It is predicted that cognitive errors will be mild in the absence of gambling.  This is 
because cognitive errors are associated with automatic processes, and deliberative 
processes are more likely to dominate judgements and decisions outside of gambling.  
Given this proposed relative absence of cognitive errors outside of gambling, it is 
hypothesised that cognitive errors will not predict gambling decisions at that time 
(that is, they will not predict the decision to begin a gambling session, and so will not 
predict ‘session frequency’).  That said, there are times when cognitive errors may be 
somewhat heightened in the absence of gambling.  For example, the activation of 
cue-triggered wanting (which is an automatic process) may elicit motivated 
reasoning, as well as enhancing reliance upon automatic processes, thereby 
strengthening cognitive errors.  
The findings in Study 2 support these predictions.  Both PGs and NPGs exhibit mild 
cognitive errors when they are not gambling (on average, only one to two cognitive 
errors were endorsed from a list of 14 possible errors).  This supports the dual-
process proposition that many of the cognitive errors observed during gambling are 
not present in the absence of gambling.  This, in turn, provides support for the notion 
that cognitive errors are elicited during gambling, which may be due to the activation 
of automatic processes at this time.  As cue-triggered wanting is an automatic 
process, this proposed link between automatic processes and cognitive errors is also 
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supported by the observation that cognitive errors tend to be stronger when cue-
triggered wanting is strongly active.  Finally, cognitive errors do not predict session 
frequency for either gambling group, which supports the proposition that cognitive 
errors tend not to influence gambling decisions outside of gambling.  
The observations in Study 2 that cognitive errors are relatively absent outside of 
gambling, and that they strengthen as cue-triggered wanting strengthens, may 
suggest that the greater cognitive errors observed during think-aloud studies for PGs 
compared with NPGs is due to stronger activation of automatic processes at this 
time.  If so, this may suggest that gambling activity elicits cognitive errors (via the 
activation of automatic processes), rather than that cognitive errors elicit gambling 
activity.  Hence, the findings in this thesis may challenge a causational role for 
cognitive errors in the development of problem gambling.  Longitudinal research is 
required, however, to establish the causational direction between gambling activity 
and cognitive errors. 
It must be noted, however, that the difference in the strength of cognitive errors in 
the absence of gambling activity (in Study 2) compared with the strength of cognitive 
errors observed during gambling in think-aloud studies (Baboushkin et al., 2001; 
Coulombe et al., 1992; Griffiths, 1994; Joukhador et al., 2003), may be due to the 
different measures used in the studies, rather than because cognitive errors are 
measured at different times (outside gambling and during gambling).  Articulating 
one’s thoughts while gambling (as is the case in think-aloud studies) may heighten 
information-processing ‘pressure’, thereby enhancing reliance upon automatic 
processes, and so strengthening cognitive errors.  By contrast, completion of a 
cognitive-errors questionnaire (as was the case in this thesis) may encourage careful 
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consideration of the validity of each error, thereby enhancing reliance upon 
deliberative processes, and so weakening cognitive errors.  Hence, in future, 
researchers may consider using the same measure on both occasions.  That said, 
measuring cognitive errors during gambling is likely to interrupt or alter the 
psychological processes usually present at that time, which may alter cognitive 
errors.  Hence, it may be difficult to find a methodology that can accurately ascertain 
the degree of cognitive errors typically present during gambling without interfering 
with psychological processes usually present at this time.  
7.3.2 The novelty and implication of the findings regarding 
cognitive errors 
This is the first study which has examined whether cognitive errors predict gambling 
activity.  As noted in Section 1.3.3, some studies have examined whether gambling 
activity alters when cognitive errors are elicited or suppressed, but only using NPG-
samples (Benhsain et al., 2004; Caron & Ladouceur, 2003; Dixon, 2000; Dixon et al., 
2000).  It is also the second study to find evidence in support of the argument that 
cognitive errors are not stable, but, instead, appear mild outside of gambling 
compared with during gambling.  The first study to show this was a much-
overlooked study by Gaboury and Ladouceur (1989), which demonstrated this with 
lottery players only.  Hence, this is the first study to demonstrate this with other types 
of gamblers.  
These novel findings challenge some of the assumptions in the gambling literature.  
One of these is the proposition by previous researchers (Raylu & Oei, 2004a; 
Toneatto et al., 1997) that the more numerous cognitive errors observed during 
gambling for PGs may be partially responsible for their greater gambling activity 
compared with NPGs.  This, in turn, is implicitly premised on the assumption that 
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cognitive errors precede, and help to elicit, gambling activity.  By contrast, the 
findings in this thesis suggest that cognitive errors are mild outside of gambling, and 
so do not precede gambling activity.  In addition, the findings suggest that gambling 
may elicit cognitive errors, rather than the reverse (though, once elicited by gambling 
activity, they may help to elicit further gambling activity).  Hence, cognitive errors 
may be a ‘symptom’ of other processes operating during gambling, rather than a 
primary aetiological process underlying gambling activity.  
Relatedly, these findings also challenge the assumption that, just because PGs exhibit 
greater cognitive errors than do NPGs, these account for their greater gambling 
activity.  Instead, greater cue-triggered wanting may account for their greater 
gambling activity, while their strong cognitive errors may be accounted for by the 
presence of features during gambling, such as cue-triggered wanting, that activate 
automatic processes and so strengthen cognitive errors.  These features may be 
particularly present for PGs compared with NPGs.  For example, they experience 
stronger cue-triggered wanting, and they tend to gamble less safely, which may cause 
them to experience stronger anxiety and affect during gambling, than NPGs. 
7.3.3 Recommendations for future research regarding 
cognitive errors  
It was noted in Section 7.4.1 that a between-groups design was used in Study 2, so 
the findings regarding differences in cognitive errors as a function of differences in 
cue-triggered wanting need to be replicated using a within-subjects design.  In 
addition, an experimental study that manipulates cue-triggered wanting and observes 
subsequent chances in cognitive errors (and vice-versa) will allow an examination of 
the causal direction between the two constructs.  Furthermore, it was also noted in 
Section 7.3.1 that future researchers should compare cognitive errors during 
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gambling, and in the absence of gambling, using the same measure, as the use of 
different measures may partially account for differences in the strength of cognitive 
errors across different occasions.  However, for reasons noted above, this may be 
problematic. 
Finally, only two measures of gambling activity were used in Study 2 (session length 
and session frequency).  In future, research should examine the relationship between 
cognitive errors and gambling activity using other measures, such as session 
expenditure, number of bets, average and maximum bet size, and so on.  
In sum, the findings of this thesis suggest that a revision of the role of cognitive 
errors is necessary.  In particular, they suggest that cognitive errors may be elicited 
by gambling activity, rather than that cognitive errors elicit gambling activity.  Thus, 
the difference in the strength of cognitive errors during gambling as a function of 
problem gambling severity may be due to differences in the strength of automatic 
processes during gambling, rather than stable differences that precipitate differences 
in gambling activity.  However, once cognitive errors are elicited during gambling, 
they may encourage further gambling activity.  This has not been examined in this 
thesis.  In addition, a within-subjects design is necessary in order to examine the 
causational direction between cue-triggered wanting, other automatic processes, 
gambling activity, and cognitive errors.  
7.4 Comparing cue-triggered wanting to other 
measures: summary and discussion 
In this section, the predictions and related findings in regards to cue-triggered 
wanting are discussed, as are their novelty and implications.  Results regarding the 
comparison of cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward are discussed first, and 
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then those examining how well these measures predict gambling activity for each 
gambling group are discussed next.  Recommendations for future research will 
follow in a separate section. 
Before discussing these findings, those regarding the strength of cue-triggered 
wanting are briefly discussed.  A central feature of the dual-process model is that 
PGs exhibit stronger cue-triggered wanting than do NPGs.  This proposition is 
supported on all measures of cue-triggered wanting across Studies 2 to 4, except on 
the number of blocks played.  Possible explanations for the lack of findings 
regarding the number of blocks played are provided in Section 6.5.1.  Overall, 
however, the prediction is supported. 
7.4.1 Comparing cue-triggered wanting to hedonic reward 
It has been argued (Section 7.1) that an implicit assumption in previous models of 
problem gambling is the view that PGs gamble excessively as they perceive their 
gambling to be a beneficial choice.  Hence, some researchers have argued that PGs 
may gamble more than NPGs as they experience greater hedonic reward (pleasure) 
during gambling, such as a ‘hit’ from an arousal ‘high’, or excitement (Diskin & 
Hodgins, 2003; Linnet et al., 2010; Sharpe et al., 1995).  By contrast, it is proposed 
in this thesis that exceptionally strong cue-triggered wanting elicits greater gambling 
activity for PGs, not stronger hedonic reward.  This leads to predictions comparing 
the strength of cue-triggered wanting and hedonic reward between the gambling 
groups (a between-groups prediction), and when comparing the ratings of each 
construct to each other within each gambling group (a within-groups prediction).  
The empirical findings relating to these predictions are now briefly re-iterated. 
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In regards to the former (the between-groups prediction), it is predicted that PGs 
exhibit stronger mean cue-triggered wanting than NPGs, but there is no difference 
between the groups in mean hedonic reward experienced during gambling.  In 
regards to the latter (the within-groups prediction), it is predicted that mean ratings of 
cue-triggered wanting will be greater than mean ratings of hedonic reward for PGs, 
but there would be no difference between these ratings for NPGs (note that, in order 
to allow comparison between measures, those which use a different scale are 
standardised).   
Evidence is found for the between-groups prediction when participants rate how 
much they want to continue gambling as an index of current cue-triggered wanting.  
Although there was no difference in standardised ratings of credit-trade and hedonic 
reward for PGs, which contrasts with the prediction, particular features of the study 
design may have invalidated the use of credit trade as a behavioural measure of cue-
triggered wanting.  This requires further examination in future research.  In regards 
to the within-groups prediction, evidence was found in support of the model when 
cue-triggered wanting is measured in two ways: when participants rate how much 
they want to continue gambling, and when they indicate how many credits they are 
willing to trade for the opportunity to continue gambling.  Overall, the findings in 
Study 4 provide some evidence that ratings of cue-triggered wanting and hedonic 
reward diverge for PGs, such that the former is strong even when the latter is 
relatively absent, which is consistent with dual-process predictions.  Moreover, the 
findings suggest that the ratings do not differ for NPGs, which is also consistent with 
dual-process predictions.  
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These findings undermine the proposition that PGs gamble more than NPGs due to 
greater hedonic reward.  Rather, they support the dual-process proposition that PGs 
gamble more than NPGs because they experience strong appetitive impulses to do so.  
These findings suggest that interventions should focus particularly on how to 
minimise activation of cue-triggered wanting and how to suppress the desire to 
gamble once cue-triggered wanting is activated.  Such interventions may encourage 
PGs to regain control of their gambling, and so allow them to make decisions in line 
with deliberative judgments and long-term goals.  Recently, Avena has suggested 
using medication in food-related addictive disorders that may act upon the 
dopaminergic pathways in the mid-brain implicated in addiction (Avena, Murray, & 
Gold, 2013).  Such medications may help patients regain control of their excessive 
eating behaviour.  This approach may also be relevant to problem gambling.  
Note, however, that these findings do not show that cue-triggered wanting predicts 
gambling behaviour.  Such findings are summarised in the next section.   
7.4.2 Predicting indices of gambling activity 
The ability of different constructs to predict gambling activity for each gambling 
group is also examined in this thesis.  As the dual-process model argues that cue-
triggered wanting dominates the gambling decisions of PGs, it is argued that cue-
triggered wanting will predict gambling activity, but overall expectancies, cognitive 
errors, and hedonic reward will not.  By contrast, since it is proposed that both 
motivational processes and cognitive appraisals contribute to the gambling decisions 
of NPGs, it is predicted that cue-triggered wanting, hedonic-reward, cognitive errors, 
and overall expectancies will all predict gambling activity for NPGs.  
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The findings in this thesis support both of the predictions for each gambling group, 
though there are variations across studies as to which measure of cue-triggered 
wanting predict which measures of gambling activity.  In particular, various 
measures of cue-triggered wanting predict session length for PGs, but not session 
frequency, whereas for NPGs such findings are mixed.  It was proposed that other 
factors that influence session frequency for PGs (in particular, the availability of 
money with which to gamble) may disguise any relationship between cue-triggered 
wanting and session frequency.  Hence, more sensitive study designs may be 
required.  
These are novel propositions.  No other study has examined whether cue-triggered 
wanting predicts actual gambling behaviour, or has compared the predictive utility of 
cue-triggered wanting to that of other measures.  This is partly because no other 
study has examined the notion of cue-triggered wanting in relation to gambling.  
Previous studies have also not examined whether overall (bipolar) expectancies, or 
hedonic reward, predict gambling behaviour either, and this thesis comprises one of 
few studies known to me (Miller & Currie, 2008; Toplak et al., 2007) that have 
examined whether cognitive errors actually predict gambling behaviour.  
The novel findings outlined in this section represent a major departure from previous 
approaches to understanding gambling.  As noted above, previous researchers have 
attempted to show that gambling behaviour is excessive for PGs as cognitive errors 
or reinforcement lead them to view gambling positively.  Hence, researchers have 
focused on cognitive errors, which make gambling seem more positive than it is, or 
on demonstrating that PGs experience gambling as particularly rewarding, either due 
to hedonic reward (such as excitement or arousal), or due to the removal of aversive 
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affect (Blaszczynski et al., 2003; Griffiths, 1993a; Jefferson & Nicki, 2003; 
Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Ricketts & Macaskill, 2003; Wood & Griffiths, 2007).  
These arguments are undermined by the novel findings in this thesis which suggest 
that neither hedonic reward, cognitive errors, nor overall expectancies predict 
gambling behaviour for PGs; instead, only cue-triggered wanting is predictive.  By 
contrast, this supports the dual-process proposition that PGs gamble because strong 
cue-triggered wanting elicits gambling, rather than due to some expectation of 
benefit.  On the other hand, the findings are consistent with the notion that NPGs 
gamble both in response to cue-triggered wanting, and because they appraise 
gambling positively. 
These findings suggest that gambling interventions would benefit from focusing on 
developing the ability to overcome strong cue-triggered wanting, in order to 
encourage decisions in line with deliberative intentions and long-term goals.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s (2005) research suggests that inhibiting or overcoming 
automatic processes is effortful, so one must feel explicitly motivated to override 
such responses  with executive control.  Enhancing the ability to override automatic 
responses with executive control, and the diligence and discipline to do so, is likely 
to be an important start for any problem gambling interventions.  As noted above, 
interventions may also focus on minimising the activation of cue-triggered wanting 
(for example, by identifying situations where it is strongly activated, and avoiding 
such situations), and on developing strategies to inhibit or overcome cue-triggered 
wanting when it is activated.  Ostafin and colleagues’ recent research (Ostafin et al., 
2012) showed that automatic motivational associations with alcohol cues can be 
weakened using a mindfulness intervention, which suggests a promising start to 
developing such interventions.   
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7.4.3 Future research regarding cue-triggered wanting in 
gamblers 
The findings in this thesis support the proposition that cue-triggered wanting predicts 
indices of gambling behaviour.  In future, this relationship could be examined more 
closely.  It would be beneficial to examine the influence of cue-triggered wanting on 
decisions to begin a gambling session, and on gambling decisions during a session 
(for example, increasing bet size, continuing to gamble beyond one’s pre-set limit, 
re-gambling money won, and so on), while the decisions are actually being made. 
Developing a more refined understanding of the influence of cue-triggered wanting 
may enhance understanding of impaired control.  This in turn may encourage the 
development of interventions that help gamblers suppress cue-triggered wanting, so 
they can adhere with deliberative intentions and long-term goals. 
As part of this endeavour, future research could also examine more closely the way 
in which cue-triggered wanting is measured.  As noted in Section 6.2, several 
different measures of cue-triggered wanting have been used, and it is not clear which 
one best captures the underlying neuropsychological processes operating, or the 
subjective experience of the motivational impulse that characterises cue-triggered 
wanting.  Hence, this needs to be established more clearly. 
Furthermore, research could examine how cue-triggered wanting is initially elicited 
in relation to gambling.  It was argued in Chapter 2 that motivational processes 
linked with gambling may arise because gambling usually allows the opportunity to 
earn money, and money is likely to act as an appetitive stimulus in the modern world.  
Some limited research evidence for this was presented in Chapter 2 (Knutson, 
Adams, et al., 2001; Knutson, Fong, et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2008).  In addition, 
some PGs in Study 1 appear to focus on the possibility of winning money when 
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deciding to gamble (even if they are aware, at other times, that winning is unlikely).  
This may concord with the notion that money acts as an appetitive stimulus that 
elicits cue-triggered wanting.  However, further research which examines whether 
money does act as an appetitive stimulus is clearly required.  
Additional research is also needed to ascertain why cue-triggered wanting becomes 
excessive for some gamblers but not others.  There is some evidence to suggest that 
there are genetic factors that may put some individuals at particular risk for 
developing excessive cue-triggered wanting (Glick, Shapiro, Drew, Hinds, & 
Carlson, 1986; T. Phillips, Roberts, & Lessov, 1997; Robinson, 1988), although this 
research has not been conducted in the context of gambling.  In addition, animal 
research in the context of substance dependence suggests that certain environmental 
features may elicit incentive-sensitisation more readily than other environmental 
features.  For example, stronger doses of an addictive psychoactive substance elicit 
sensitisation more readily than weaker doses of the substance (Robinson & Berridge, 
2000).  In the context of gambling, some research has shown that many PGs have 
had an early big win (Kassinove & Schare, 2001; Weatherly, Sauter, & King, 2004), 
which may be analogous to a strong dose in the context of drug dependence.  An 
early big win may strengthen cue-triggered wanting early on, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of develop a problem with gambling.  Further research could examine 
environmental features that encourage the development of cue-triggered wanting in 
gambling.  
In sum, the novel finding that cue-triggered wanting, but not other processes, predicts 
gambling activity for PGs is consistent with the dual-process proposition that cue-
triggered wanting guides gambling choices for PGs.  This in turn supports the notion 
 381 
 
that problem gambling persists due to impaired control, rather than due to an 
expectation of benefits from gambling.  These novel findings challenge the 
supposition that PGs exhibit greater gambling activity than other gamblers because 
they experience particularly strong hedonic reward (such as excitement), or due to 
particularly strong positive appraisals about the benefits of gambling.  
By contrast, the novel findings with NPG support the proposition that they gamble in 
response to both cue-triggered wanting and cognitive appraisals of the benefits of 
gambling.  That is, while they may experience some impaired control in response to 
motivational processes sometimes, for the most part, they are able to make more 
controlled decisions in line with deliberative appraisals and long-term goals.  
7.5  Conclusion 
In sum, the findings in this thesis challenge the consequentialist view of decision-
making that is, arguably, implicit in other models of gambling behaviour, such as 
behavioural or cognitive approaches.  The dual-process model and incentive-
sensitisation theory propose that those who experience substance addiction undergo 
changes to motivational pathways in the mid-brain that automatically guide 
behavioural choice.  This leads addicts to repeatedly engage in a behaviour even 
though their explicit evaluation of the outcomes of that behaviour are negative.  This, 
in turn, may account for impaired control, a central feature of addiction.  In addition, 
as the changes to the brain are long-lasting, this may also account for the chronic 
relapsing nature of addictive behaviours.  It is argued in this thesis that this model 
can apply to problem gambling as well. The application of this model to problem 
gambling is novel, and the studies in this thesis have found some empirical support 
for the model.  These findings suggest a new approach to understanding problem 
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gambling which can account for features of problem gambling (such as impaired 
control and chronic relapse) that other models cannot convincingly account for.  The 
model presented in this thesis also offers new directions for future research, and for 
future gambling-related interventions.  
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GAMBLING 
RESEARCH 
Have you ever started a gambling 
session even though you felt you 
should not? 
If so, you are invited to participate in a study. 
The research aims to see what makes people gamble even though they feel 
they should not.  
Participation will involve an interview of about 1 hour, at a time and place 
suitable to you.  In the interview you will be asked to recreate the feelings, 
thoughts and situations that led you to gamble even though you felt you 
shouldn’t.  
Please contact Belinda Davey by phone: 9244 6863 or email: 
bcdave@deakin.edu.au to express your interest. 
Belinda Davey is a PhD Candidate at Deakin University. 
You will be reimbursed with a $20 
ColesMyer voucher for your participation. 
  
  
GAMBLING 
RESEARCH 
Have you ever been in a gambling session and: 
i) continued even though you felt you should stop, 
OR, ii) laid a larger bet than you felt you should, 
OR, iii) spent more money overall than you felt you 
should? 
If so, you are invited to participate in a study. 
The aim of the research is to discover what makes people decide to gamble in 
a way that they feel you should not.  
Participation will involve an interview of about 1 hour, at a time and place 
suitable to you. In the interview you will be asked to recreate the feelings, 
thoughts and situations that led you to gamble in a way that you felt you 
should not.  
Please contact Belinda Davey by phone: 9244 6863 or email: 
bcdave@deakin.edu.au to express your interest. 
Belinda Davey is a PhD Candidate at Deakin University. 
You will be reimbursed with a $20 
ColesMyer voucher for your participation.
  
Appendix 3. Plain Language Statement for Study 1 
  
  
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO: Participant   
 
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date: 
Full Project Title: Preliminary investigation of “heat of the moment” situational and 
cognitive factors that lead to unsafe gambling 
Principal Researcher:   Assoc. Prof. Ron Gold 
Student Researcher: Belinda Davey 
 
This Plain Language Statement and Consent Form is 7 pages long. Please make sure you 
have all the pages.  
1. Your Consent 
You are invited to take part in this research project. 
This Plain Language Statement contains detailed information about the research project. Its 
purpose is to explain to you the procedures involved so that you can make a fully informed 
decision whether you are going to participate.  
Please read this carefully. Feel free to ask questions about anything in the document.  You 
may also wish to discuss the project with someone else (such as a relative or friend). Feel 
free to do this. 
Once you understand what the project is about and if you agree to take part, you will be 
asked to sign the Consent Form. By signing the Consent Form, you indicate that you 
understand the information and that you give your consent to participate in the research 
project. 
You will be given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep as a 
record. 
2. Purpose and Background 
The purpose of this project is to create a list of the types of thoughts, feelings and situational 
factors that occur when people decide to begin a gambling session even though they felt 
they shouldn’t.   
This is a student project which will contribute to Belinda Davey’s PhD thesis.   
45 people will participate in this project. 
Previous experience has shown that, although initially people may make a decision not to 
take a particular risk, certain thoughts, feelings and situational factors can sometimes lead to 
risk-taking when the opportunity to take that risk arises. Focusing on these may be 
successful in reducing excessive gambling.  
  
You are invited to participate in this research project because some time in the past six 
months you began a gambling session even though you felt you shouldn’t.  You can only 
participate if you do not have a history of mental or intellectual impairment.  
3. Funding 
This research is totally funded by the School of Psychology, Deakin University. 
4. Procedures 
Participation in this project will involve two procedures: 1) answering some demographic 
questions, such as your age and level of education, and some questions about your level of 
gambling involvement, and 2) an audio-taped interview with Belinda Davey where you will 
reconstruct a time when you chose to begin a gambling session even though, at the time, 
you felt you shouldn’t, and/or chose to continue a gambling session, bet more on an 
individual bet, or bet more during the whole session that you thought you should at the time. 
You will be asked questions such as, “Where were you?”, “What were you feeling?” and 
“What were you thinking?”  You will also be asked if you had been drinking alcohol or taking 
mind-altering substances.   
The entire procedure will take about one hour.    
Participant feedback will be used to monitor the progress of the study and any untoward 
effects.  
5. Possible Benefits 
Possible benefits are reflecting on and gaining insight into your own gambling behaviour. 
However, the main benefits are contributing to research that aims to help gamblers reduce 
excessive gambling. This will not only benefit gamblers but also many other people in their 
social network and the larger community that are affected by excessive gambling.  
We cannot guarantee or promise that you personally will receive any benefits from this 
project. 
6. Possible Risks 
Possible risks include the interview making you feel concerned about your level of 
gambling, or making you feel like gambling.  A separate information sheet will be 
provided to give you information about who to contact in this case.   
 
You are free to end your participation at any time.  
 
There may be additional unforseen or unknown risks. 
7. Privacy, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Information 
Any information obtained in connection with this project and that can identify you will 
remain confidential. It will only be disclosed with your permission, subject to legal 
requirements.  
 
The only identifiable information obtained in this project about you will be your consent 
form and contact details. The audio-taped interview is potentially identifiable.  Your 
contact details will be kept in a password-protected computer-file and will be deleted 
upon completion of the interview (today). All other information will be stored in a locked 
filing cabinet at Deakin University during the project and for six years following 
completion of the project or project publications, at which time it will be destroyed.  
Identifiable information will be stored separately from other information.  Digital files will 
be password-protected and destroyed upon completion of the project.  
  
 
In any publication, information will be provided in such a way that you cannot be identified. 
No individual data will be published or presented, except when a participant is quoted.  Only 
quotes which cannot identify an individual will be used.   
8. Results of Project 
You can contact Belinda Davey for a copy of the results if you wish.  
Results of the study may be published in a peer-reviewed journal, or presented at a 
conference.   
9. Participation is Voluntary 
Participation in any research project is voluntary. If you do not wish to take part you are 
not obliged to. If you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are free to 
withdraw from the project at any stage until the data are processed.  Any identifiable or 
potentially identifiable information obtained from you to date will not be used and will be 
destroyed.   
Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part and then withdraw, will 
not affect your relationship with Deakin University. 
Before you make your decision, please feel free to ask Belinda Davey any questions you 
would like about the research project. You can ask for any information you want.  Sign the 
Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask your questions and have received 
satisfactory answers. 
If you decide to withdraw from this project after signing the consent form, please notify 
Belinda Davey or complete and return the Revocation of Consent Form attached.  
10. Ethical Guidelines 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research (2007) produced by the National Health and Medical Research Council of 
Australia. This statement has been developed to protect the interests of people who agree to 
participate in human research studies. 
The ethics aspects of this research project have been approved by the Human Research 
Ethics Committee of Deakin University. 
Permission to conduct this project has been granted from all other institutions involved.  
11. Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or 
any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:   
The Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Deakin University, 221 Burwood 
Highway, Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7123, Facsimile: 9244 6581; research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au. 
Please quote project number EC 7-2008. 
12. Reimbursement for your costs 
You will not be paid for your participation in this project.  
However, you will be given a $20 gift voucher to reimburse you for your time 
and travel.  
  
13. Further Information, Queries or Any Problems 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have any 
problems concerning this project (for example, any side effects), you can contact Belinda 
Davey or Assoc. Prof. Ron Gold.  
The researchers responsible for this project are: 
Belinda Davey  
School of Psychology, Deakin University, 
221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood, 3125 
03 9244 6863 
 
Assoc. Prof Ron Gold, 
School of Psychology, Deakin University, 
221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood, 3125 
03 9244 6477 
 
If you feel you would like to seek help for your gambling, please call the 
Gamblers Helpline on 1800 156 789 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 4.  Participant Summaries 
  
  
Problem gamblers 
P1 - EGM 
She says: 
x she gambles because she has lost control of her gambling 
x when she has an urge to gamble she comes up with justifications (e.g. about 
playing in a controlled way this time) which allow her to gamble even though 
‘deep down’ she knows she shouldn’t gamble  
x she inhibits any thoughts about the negative consequences of gambling 
x the negative consequences outweigh the positive consequences by far and she 
wants to stop gambling 
x when asked to give an explanation as to why she gambles, she says to escape, 
and for enjoyment (only when asked directly; this ‘explanation’ is not 
volunteered) 
 
P2 - EGM 
She says: 
x she gambles only when she has time and money (it was not related to any 
feeling or environmental trigger) 
x that thoughts that would ‘trick’ her would pop into her head, such as, ‘I could 
win today’; ‘I could win the money back’ 
x she never tried to gamble in a controlled way because she knew she was 
unable to 
x she would experience euphoria from winning sometimes, but most the time 
she'd lose and experience pure frustration (that is, gambling was not 
enjoyable despite her persistence) 
x she would chase losses or an elusive win during a session 
x she would work out ‘crazy’, irrational scenarios during a session if she'd run 
out of money, about borrowing money from friends etc - she said she made 
decisions that she would never experience outside of a gambling context 
x she said she felt ‘taken over’ by the machines during gambling 
x she'd be very happy when she was able to gamble (which was whenever she 
had the time and the money), as she was probably thinking about it other 
times, and wanting to gamble, but was not able to 
 
P4 - EGM 
She says:  
  
x she enjoys gambling and would like to continue if she could gamble in a 
controlled way 
x however, she cannot gamble in a controlled way, and so knows that she must 
stop gambling, as it brings her so much misery 
x she can only gamble when she receives her wages, and then gambles herself 
into abject poverty 
x she is rational after gambling, and well before pay day, but as pay day arrives 
she experiences tension between her rational self which tells her not to 
gamble, and her irrational self which really wants to gamble and tries to 
justify it 
x sometimes she doesn't bother to talk herself out of gambling on pay day, as 
she knows it's useless, while other times she does try to talk herself out of it 
(even while she's walking to the pokies venue) but she knows this is 
ineffective 
 
P5 - EGM 
She says: 
x she gambles because she is addicted 
x she has no decision-making process, she just gambles every day 
x she sometimes plays mind games with herself by telling herself that it’s fun, 
or that she is just only going to play for an hour 
x she says "the buzz is gone" but she gambles anyway 
x during gambling, adrenaline maintains her concentration 
 
P7 - Baccarat 
He says:  
x he gambles for the excitement and the adrenaline most of the time, but he will 
still gamble even when it's boring and he's over it 
x he can experience intense anxiety and unpleasantness, but will still continue 
to gamble 
x he is never comfortable with the way he gambles 
x when he wants to gamble he uses "rationalisations" that allow him to "trick" 
himself 
x he has given up trying to resist gambling, so he gambles whenever he wants 
to  trying to resist the urge makes his gambling problems worse 
x he is always trying to exercise control over his gambling during a gambling 
session 
x the thought to gamble is always present 
  
x the choice to begin a gambling session is completely unrelated to any feeling 
(he can be feeling good, bad, or neutral before gambling) 
x during gambling he can get obsessed with chasing his losses, and the future 
negative consequences of continuing with his gambling do not occur to him 
 
P8 – Various including EGM 
P8 appears to be co-morbid for other mental illnesses.  
The interview is unclear, and she made contradictory comments 
She says 
x she gambles as a form of self-destruction, self-hatred, escape, and coping 
mechanism 
x she worked as a sex worker to support her gambling 
x she neglected herself to feed her gambling habit 
x she says it was an emotional pull that drew her there; it was automatic for her 
to go and gamble 
x she felt guilt, remorse, shame, regret and sadness about her gambling and 
about herself and her life 
x she could not see the impact of her gambling and what was going in with her 
addiction to gambling 
x that during gambling, she'd justify staying for longer and spending more by 
telling herself it was only going to be another $50 
x she felt the machines took over her during a session 
x she also continued during a session in the hope of winning, and by being 
optimistic. 
 
P10 – Horse-race gambling 
He says: 
x every pay day, or any other source of money, is interpreted as an opportunity 
to gamble 
x he knows he's going to gamble when there's money coming in so the decision 
is already made (there is no trying to talk himself out of it) 
x he feels anxious and scared before he gambles, mostly bored during gambling 
except ten percent of the time when he wins, and guilty and disgusted with 
himself after he gambles 
x he hates gambling and does not understand why he continues to do it 
x he is a chronic gambler who has been doing it for years 
  
x he has some thoughts when deciding to continue during a session, but he says 
they are purely to justify an already made decision, as he spends all money 
available during a session, except for the occasional large win 
x he chases losses during a session  
 
P11 - EGM 
She says: 
x the negatives outweigh the positive 
x she is lonely, bored, depressed and unhappy, and she gambles for something 
to do, and for human contact 
x however, she thinks her gambling is bad, and she'd like to not do it, if she can 
solve her problems in some other way 
x during a gambling session she says the machines hypnotise her and make her 
irrational 
x she experiences adrenaline during a session, but this is not why she feels she 
gambles 
x the thought to gamble is always there 
 
P13 - EGM 
She says: 
x she is a very disturbed lady who suffers from addiction, alcoholism, a valium-
use disorder, depression and suicidal ideation 
x she sits at home doing nothing with the blinds down most of the day 
x she is at risk of gambling whenever she leaves the house 
x she gambles for something to do without having to socialise properly 
x she says she gambles as an escape, and as an alternative to alcohol  
x she gambles whenever she has the urge (which is when she has time and 
money, as the venue is very close) without considering whether to do so or 
not  
x she finds it very difficult to walk out of a gambling session before a certain 
length of time, or before spending all of her money 
x she uses strategies to help her not spend all the money available to her, such 
as not having an ATM card 
x at one stage she says she gets a little bit of a lift from gambling, but she also 
says she's bored while she's gambling  
x she says the cons of gambling outweigh the pros and she wants to stop but is 
finding it difficult as she gambles when she has the urge 
x she doesn't expect to win when she gambles 
  
 
She expressed an irrational cognition: “I know it's my last few dollars but there's 
food in the fridge so it doesn't matter if I spend it on gambling”. She said she knows 
this is a ridiculous thing to think, but during an urge to gamble she uses such 
thoughts to justify gambling with her last few dollars. 
 
P14 - EGM 
She says: 
x she gambles only when depressed 
x she does not bother with trying to talk herself out of gambling because she 
knows she's going to gamble when she feels an urge to do so 
x however, she always feels she shouldn't be gambling 
x she comes up with justifications during an urge that allow her to gamble 
x she gambles to escape or cope 
x that is she gambles in a controlled way, it is a big achievement 
x she experiences some excitement during gambling 
x she chases her losses during a session, which can lead to a sense of loss of 
control 
 
P16 - EGM 
She says:  
x if she knows some money is coming into her bank account, she will 
experience a strong urge to gamble 
x she tries to resist the urge by telling herself all of the negative consequences 
of gambling, but she finds "the urge is too strong" 
x she convinces herself that she “might win today”, so she should gamble 
x once she’s gambling she chases the feature, and then chases her losses 
x there is something about the machine and the environment that is hypnotic - 
the lights, the sounds, the calming background music 
x she likes to gamble as an escape and for leisure and time out 
x she was absolutely "petrified" when she first started to gamble because she 
knew it was wrong, and she knew if her boyfriend found out he would be 
really upset; but she convinced herself she was going to win 
x once she starts gambling she "can't stop"  
x starts gambling by telling herself she will only spend $40 but then keeps 
adding another $40, until she has spent over $200) 
  
 
P23 – Poker player 
He said that on this particular occasion of unsafe gambling he couldn't sleep so was 
bored and a bit restless, and: 
x it was a "snap" decision, and while taking money out of the ATM he knew it 
was wrong, but he wanted to do it 
x he felt like it was a chance to play in the big leagues 
x he felt like an idiot while driving there, and he felt guilty already, he felt 
dread, and he knew it was a stupid decision 
x possibly qualifying to play in a big tournament meant as much as the money 
x he felt nervous once he'd started and he played horribly and got knocked out 
straight away 
x he said there was no positive feeling during play 
 
Usually when making the choice to start a session even though he feels he shouldn’t, 
he says: 
x he thinks he may win, even though he is usually aware that he loses more 
often than he wins 
x he normally doesn't think that he's going to lose at the time of making the 
decision 
x later he thinks he shouldn't have made the decision 
x he thinks he deserves to win more than he does (irrational cognition) 
x once he's decided to gamble he "throws all the negative thoughts out" 
x he doesn't play to win money, he plays to feel like the "big man" and increase 
his chance of getting to the big tournaments 
 
P26 – Internet gambler (sports) 
He was an internet sports gambler for 20 years 
He gambled non-stop for 12 years 
He accrued such large debts, he thought gambling was the only way out - this largely 
maintained his gambling 
He knew that the odds were negative, but because he was really into sport, he 
thought he knew enough to beat the odds 
 
  
He speaks of how his thoughts change when he has an urge: 
x when he has no urge to gamble, he knows that gambling gets him into more 
debt 
x when he had an urge he felt it was the only way out 
He says he can see the pros and the cons when he has an urge to gamble. 
Cons: gambling gets him nowhere, but into more debt, and he doesn't know how to 
stop 
Pros: gambling feels like the only way to get out of debt 
However, he would also convince himself that he had just had a bad run, and that 
gambling would get him out of debt 
He said his gambling was a downward slope with periods of large peaks (wins) that 
would maintain his gambling for long enough for him to continue 
 
P27 – Sports bettor 
He experiences many similar struggles as PGs 
E.g. He has pros and cons that go through his head, yet he experiences wanting so 
that he ignores the cons (I had all the rational reasons not to do it, but there was some 
sort of drive") 
He gives himself permission to gamble by telling himself that he'll only spend $20, 
even though he knows at the time that he's going to spend more, and he does (in $10 
or $20 increments) 
He experiences irrational cognitions during gambling, that actually seem to 
contribute to his gambling, instead of acting only as rationales - e.g. I felt close to 
winning; There'd been close calls; Surely another $20 will get me there; I was feeling 
a bit lucky 
He says he wouldn't of done it if his friends hadn't - some control over this gambling 
 
Current NPGs, but talked about occasions when PGs 
P6 - EGM 
She says:  
x she now gambles as an escape, coping mechanism, and to relax 
x she gambles when she's in a negative or a happy mood 
  
x she sets herself spending limits when she goes, but spends beyond this  
x she does not allow herself to go on her own, as she associates that with being 
a PG 
x however, she consequently encourages her de facto partner to go to the pokies 
with her, so she can still go 
x she still gets urges to gamble 
x she considers the pros and cons when she gets an urge 
x however, although the cons far outweigh the pros, she gambles anyway as she 
"lacks will power" 
x she is plagued by the irrationality and feels it is the wrong choice the whole 
way to the venue 
 
P12 Horse-race gambler (and EGM) 
She says: 
x tends to gamble with less control at the time of year in which her son was 
killed in a car accident, and her mother died 
x she has undergone treatment and so she knows how to gamble in a more 
controlled way, and to be less bothered about times when she loses control 
x she gambles in response to urges to gamble;   
x she doesn't bother weighing up the pros and cons - if she has an urge to 
gamble, she just gambles 
x she uses strategies to help herself to control her gambling (e.g. having only a 
small amount of money in her phone account for horse race gambling 
 
On the occasion she chose to discuss, she says: 
x she drove a certain way home, knowing there was a gambling venue there, so 
she could "accidentally" drive in 
x she would say to herself, "I know I shouldn't be doing this", but she'd 
convince herself that she might win (e.g. "I haven't gambled for such a  long 
time, maybe this time I'll win something") 
x she says she knows such thoughts are irrational when she doesn’t have an 
urge to gamble  
x she says she gambles as an escape and as a coping mechanism, but she says 
she gets tense, frustrated and angry during gambling, because she knows she 
can't win and that she shouldn't be gambling, which doesn’t sound like much 
of an escape 
x if she wins she feels good, but overall her gambling makes her feel "terrible"  
  
x she chases her losses, and she finds it very difficult to walk away when she 
wins something (something always says "come back")   
x she said, "I wish I could walk away. I wish I could say to the person behind 
me, "Could you just take me out to my car?" 
x she said she's better at walking away now - in the past she used to be 
mesmerised, and could not think rationally 
 
NPGs 
P17 – Internet gambler (horse-race) 
He has ongoing gambling sessions on the internet. 
He says 
x he tells himself he'll limit his gambling, or he might win, as a "rationale" to 
permit gambling 
x the negative consequences of gambling are not present at all when deciding 
whether or not to gamble, though he says he knows "deep down" he shouldn't 
be gambling, and that he will lose (or “put back” all winnings)   
x he says the actual gambling decisions are so quick with Bet Fair (the online 
gambling website that he uses) that he doesn't think that much about it, it's 
more of a feeling of wanting to gamble 
x bets in $30 amounts because he tells himself that's all he's going to spend; he 
then spends 7 x $30 
x he gambles in response to an urge to gamble, but (when I pushed him further 
for an explanation) he also says that he gambles because he's bored, or to try 
to win money 
x he does not experience excitement when he gambles 
x he chases his losses, and continues to gamble when losing to try to experience 
a win 
x he does not tend to take winnings (it is a difficult process to get winnings 
back from Bet Fair) 
x he feels guilty and uneasy during gambling which is associated with losing 
 
P24 – Casino gambler 
Says he enjoys gambling, but then it emerges that he loses more than wins, and that 
he finds it more stressful than enjoyable most of the time. 
 
He says 
  
x he had an early win, and he gambles to win, and to re-live the experience of 
winning 
x he sets limits and uses strategies to stick to limits, such as leaving his wallet 
and/or ATM card in the car 
x he says he is not aware of the consequences at the time of making the 
decision - he convinces himself that he will win, it will be his lucky night,  
x he says he's never had an urge and not gone 
x as soon as the thought to gamble enters his heads, and he is able to gamble, 
he knows he's going to go 
x he also gambles for ego and for identity - he thinks its sexy and glamorous 
x when he's losing during gambling he gets angry and he is overwhelmed with 
a need to try to win the money back  
x he bets more than he should chasing 
 
P3 – Horse-race gambler 
He says: 
x he has a system where he gets $100 to bet with each week, and any winnings 
that he had won previously (as he keeps all his winnings from one session to 
bet with in future sessions). 
x he gambled once when he normally wouldn't after having a fight with his 
wife, and feeling upset, but it is rare for him to break his system of gambling 
only once a week 
x he was not concerned about this however 
 
P15 – Poker player 
He was at a friend’s house when they all decided to play poker. 
He forked out $25 happily for the first game, and lost, but then was asked to play 
another hand and agreed, to his later regret. 
He didn't want to be "a wet blanket", by saying no to further play.  
He made comments indicative of some momentary impaired control, such as "it's like 
my brain's reasoning centre only works whilst I'm playing and after I've already 
forked out the $25, because it's not as if I wanted to play". 
He said he felt like an idiot for agreeing to play the first $25 and losing. Then once 
he felt the peer pressure from his friends, he forgot about feeling like an idiot, and 
instead focused on the possibility of winning, and so decided to play again. Then he 
  
felt like an idiot as soon as he'd agreed, and again when they first started playing 
again. 
He kept saying as his reason to play "It doesn't matter", which is not really a reason 
He exhibited some possible irrational cognitions, such as he thought he wins more 
often than his friends.  
 
P18 – Horse-race gambler 
He says: 
x he never begins a gambling session unless he has the money to afford it, but 
he often spends too much once he's playing 
x he knows the odds are negative, and that gambling "systems" don't work, yet 
on this occasion he thought he was on a "lucky streak" that would somehow 
keep him winning 
x he had a big early win on the pokies, before that he didn't understand why 
people gamble 
x he can enjoy the excitement, but said on that day he didn't gamble for 
excitement, only to try to win money for his girlfriend 
x the pros that went through his head were about being on a lucky streak, he 
might be able to help his girlfriend, and it's not really "his" money as he won 
it, 
x he was weighing up whether to bet or not right up to the time of placing the 
bet 
x he ended up saying "just do it" or "stuff it" 
x he felt excited, nervous and motivated until the session started when he felt 
regret, remorse and anxiety 
 
P21 – Poker player 
He says: 
he gambled because his friend rang him up and asked him if he wanted to play 
he felt excited so said yes, even though he knew he would regret it in the morning as 
he would be tired and he would have lost money 
he is attracted by the lights and stimulation, the opportunity to go out and have fun, 
and the chance to win money 
 
P22 – Horse-race gambler 
  
Occasion1 
He says: 
x he was bored and his family was out, which gave him the opportunity to 
gamble 
x he thought he could win - he was confident (horse-racing) 
x he wanted the excitement, to feel good, and an ‘escape’ 
x he could not afford to lose because money was tight 
x he felt excited once he'd made the decision, and nervous, anxious and excited 
once the race started 
x he says he also gambles for ego, and to feel good about himself, and he feels 
angry, down, and lacking in self-esteem when he loses - he feels losing is a 
reflection on his own capabilities 
 
Occasion 2: 
He says:  
x his emotions override his logical thoughts;  logical thoughts don't come into 
his decisions during gambling  
x he just convinces himself he's going to win when making decisions during 
gambling  
x he knows he shouldn't gamble, but he can't help it - the "voice" to do so is 
very strong, whereas the "voice" not to is very weak 
x he justifies the choice to continue with:  "Have some balls"; "Greed and ego", 
and ‘it is not often that you feel confident, so you should take the 
opportunity’ 
If he loses, he says the only way he can feel better again (get his ego back, and lose 
his anger) is to bet again to chase his losses. 
He says he is different to a PG as only bets small amounts. 
 
P25- Roulette 
Occasion 2 only 
He says: 
x he gambled with friends 
x he spent more than intended as he started spending his winnings in order to 
chase losses 
  
x he knows the odds are negative, but feels he can get even odds playing 
roulette due to the ‘dealers signature’ (the way the dealer spins the ball; this is 
likely to be an irrational cognition) 
x he also believes in lucky streaks (e.g. he says sometimes your numbers just 
come up) 
x but when probed further, this belief does not appear very strong (e.g., he 
wouldn’t spend money put aside for bills on gambling because of confidence 
in his lucky streak) 
he has fun playing and he enjoys the entertainment. 
  
  
Appendix 5. Canadian Problem Gambling Index 
 
Section 1 
First, we’d like to ask some questions about activities you may participate in.  
People bet money and gamble on many different things including buying lottery tickets, 
playing bingo, or card games with their friends. I am going to list some activities that you 
might have bet money on.  
Q1.  
Have done any of the following in the past 12 months? a) to r)   If so, how often? 
a. bet or spend money on Lotto or Superball tickets, or similar competitions?  
b. bought instant win or scratch tickets?  
c. bought raffle or fundraising tickets?  
d. bet on horse races (i.e. live at the track and/or off-track)?  
e. played bingo?  
Screen for casino gambling:  
In the past 12 months, have you gambled at any type of casino, not including pokies?  
If yes, have you … 
f. played poker in a casino?  
g. played blackjack in a casino?  
h. played roulette in a casino?  
i. played keno in a casino?  
j. played craps in a casino?  
k. played pokies?  
l. played a sports lottery?  
m. bet or spent money on sports pools?  
n. bet on cards, or board games with family or friends?  
o. bet or spent money on games of skill such as pool, bowling, or darts?  
p. bet on arcade or video games?  
q. gambled on the Internet?  
r. bet on sports with a bookie?  
Q. 2  
How much money, not including winnings, do you spend on … in a typical month? 
[repeat relevant items from Q1] 
Q. 3 
  
In the past 12 months, what is the largest amount of money you ever spent on… ? 
[repeat relevant items from Q1] 
 
Section 2  
Answer never, sometimes, often, or very often to the following questions. 
Thinking about the last 12 months, when you have gambled… 
Q1.  
Have you bet more than you could really afford to lose?  
Q2. 
Have you needed to gamble with larger amounts of money to get the same feeling of 
excitement?  
Q3. 
When you gambled, did you go back another day to try to win back the money you lost?  
Thinking about the last 12 months … 
Q4.  
Have you borrowed money or sold anything to get money to gamble?  
Q5.  
Have you felt that you might have a problem with gambling?  
Q6.  
Has gambling caused you any health problems, including stress or anxiety?  
Q7.  
Have people criticized your betting or told you that you had a gambling problem, regardless 
of whether or not you thought it was true?  
Q8.  
Has your gambling caused any financial problems for you or your household?  
Q9.  
Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble?  
 
  
Section 3 (omitted) 
  
Section 4  
Finally, we would like to ask you some basic background questions. Like all your other 
answers, this information will be kept strictly confidential.  
Q1.  
In what year were you born?  
Q2.  
What is your current marital or living status? 
<1> Married  
<2> Living with a partner  
<3> Widowed  
<4> Divorced  
<5> Separated  
<6> Never married  
<9> Refused  
 
Q3.  
What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
<1> Completed elementary school  
<2> Completed high school  
<3> Completed technical education / diploma / apprenticeship 
<4> Completed an undergraduate degree 
<5> Completed a postgraduate degree 
 
Q4.  
What is your present job status? Are you employed full-time, employed part-time, 
unemployed, a student, retired or a homemaker?  
<1> Employed full-time (30 or more hrs/week)  
<2> Employed part-time (less than 30hrs/week)  
  
<3> Self-employed  
<4> Unemployed (out of work but looking for work)  
<5> Student  
<6> Retired  
<7> Homemaker  
<0> Other (Specify)  
 
Q5.  
To which income bracket does your TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME belong, before taxes and 
other deductions were made?  
<1> less than $20,000  
<2> between $20,000 and $30,000 ($29,999.99)  
<3> between $30,000 and $40,000  
<4> between $40,000 and $50,000  
<5> between $50,000 and $60,000  
<6> between $60,000 and $70,000  
<7> between $70,000 and $80,000  
<8> between $80,000 and $90,000  
<9> between $90,000 and $100,000  
<10> between $100,000 and $120,000  
<11> between $120,000 and $150,000,  
<12> or more than $150,000?  
 
 
  
  
Appendix 6. Participant Summaries 
  
Problem gamblers 
P1 - EGM 
She says: 
x she gambles because she has lost control of her gambling 
x when she has an urge to gamble she comes up with justifications (e.g. about 
playing in a controlled way this time) which allow her to gamble even though 
‘deep down’ she knows she shouldn’t gamble  
x she inhibits any thoughts about the negative consequences of gambling 
x the negative consequences outweigh the positive consequences by far and she 
wants to stop gambling 
x when asked to give an explanation as to why she gambles, she says to escape, 
and for enjoyment (only when asked directly; this ‘explanation’ is not 
volunteered) 
 
P2 - EGM 
She says: 
x she gambles only when she has time and money (it was not related to any 
feeling or environmental trigger) 
x that thoughts that would ‘trick’ her would pop into her head, such as, ‘I could 
win today’; ‘I could win the money back’ 
x she never tried to gamble in a controlled way because she knew she was 
unable to 
x she would experience euphoria from winning sometimes, but most the time 
she'd lose and experience pure frustration (that is, gambling was not 
enjoyable despite her persistence) 
x she would chase losses or an elusive win during a session 
x she would work out ‘crazy’, irrational scenarios during a session if she'd run 
out of money, about borrowing money from friends etc - she said she made 
decisions that she would never experience outside of a gambling context 
x she said she felt ‘taken over’ by the machines during gambling 
x she'd be very happy when she was able to gamble (which was whenever she 
had the time and the money), as she was probably thinking about it other 
times, and wanting to gamble, but was not able to 
 
P4 - EGM 
She says:  
x she enjoys gambling and would like to continue if she could gamble in a 
controlled way 
  
x however, she cannot gamble in a controlled way, and so knows that she must 
stop gambling, as it brings her so much misery 
x she can only gamble when she receives her wages, and then gambles herself 
into abject poverty 
x she is rational after gambling, and well before pay day, but as pay day arrives 
she experiences tension between her rational self which tells her not to 
gamble, and her irrational self which really wants to gamble and tries to 
justify it 
x sometimes she doesn't bother to talk herself out of gambling on pay day, as 
she knows it's useless, while other times she does try to talk herself out of it 
(even while she's walking to the pokies venue) but she knows this is 
ineffective 
 
P5 - EGM 
She says: 
x she gambles because she is addicted 
x she has no decision-making process, she just gambles every day 
x she sometimes plays mind games with herself by telling herself that it’s fun, 
or that she is just only going to play for an hour 
x she says "the buzz is gone" but she gambles anyway 
x during gambling, adrenaline maintains her concentration 
 
P7 - Baccarat 
He says:  
x he gambles for the excitement and the adrenaline most of the time, but he will 
still gamble even when it's boring and he's over it 
x he can experience intense anxiety and unpleasantness, but will still continue 
to gamble 
x he is never comfortable with the way he gambles 
x when he wants to gamble he uses "rationalisations" that allow him to "trick" 
himself 
x he has given up trying to resist gambling, so he gambles whenever he wants 
to  trying to resist the urge makes his gambling problems worse 
x he is always trying to exercise control over his gambling during a gambling 
session 
x the thought to gamble is always present 
x the choice to begin a gambling session is completely unrelated to any feeling 
(he can be feeling good, bad, or neutral before gambling) 
x during gambling he can get obsessed with chasing his losses, and the future 
  
negative consequences of continuing with his gambling do not occur to him 
 
P8 – Various including EGM 
P8 appears to be co-morbid for other mental illnesses.  
 
The interview is unclear, and she made contradictory comments 
 
She says 
x she gambles as a form of self-destruction, self-hatred, escape, and coping 
mechanism 
x she worked as a sex worker to support her gambling 
x she neglected herself to feed her gambling habit 
x she says it was an emotional pull that drew her there; it was automatic for her 
to go and gamble 
x she felt guilt, remorse, shame, regret and sadness about her gambling and 
about herself and her life 
x she could not see the impact of her gambling and what was going in with her 
addiction to gambling 
x that during gambling, she'd justify staying for longer and spending more by 
telling herself it was only going to be another $50 
x she felt the machines took over her during a session 
x she also continued during a session in the hope of winning, and by being 
optimistic 
 
P10 – Horse-race gambling 
He says: 
x every pay day, or any other source of money, is interpreted as an opportunity 
to gamble 
x he knows he's going to gamble when there's money coming in so the decision 
is already made (there is no trying to talk himself out of it) 
x he feels anxious and scared before he gambles, mostly bored during gambling 
except ten percent of the time when he wins, and guilty and disgusted with 
himself after he gambles 
x he hates gambling and does not understand why he continues to do it 
x he is a chronic gambler who has been doing it for years 
x he has some thoughts when deciding to continue during a session, but he says 
they are purely to justify an already made decision, as he spends all money 
available during a session, except for the occasional large win 
x he chases losses during a session  
  
 
P11 - EGM 
She says: 
x the negatives outweigh the positive 
x she is lonely, bored, depressed and unhappy, and she gambles for something 
to do, and for human contact 
x however, she thinks her gambling is bad, and she'd like to not do it, if she can 
solve her problems in some other way 
x during a gambling session she says the machines hypnotise her and make her 
irrational 
x she experiences adrenaline during a session, but this is not why she feels she 
gambles 
x the thought to gamble is always there 
 
P13 - EGM 
She says: 
x she is a very disturbed lady who suffers from addiction, alcoholism, a valium-
use disorder, depression and suicidal ideation 
x she sits at home doing nothing with the blinds down most of the day 
x she is at risk of gambling whenever she leaves the house 
x she gambles for something to do without having to socialise properly 
x she says she gambles as an escape, and as an alternative to alcohol  
x she gambles whenever she has the urge (which is when she has time and 
money, as the venue is very close) without considering whether to do so or 
not  
x she finds it very difficult to walk out of a gambling session before a certain 
length of time, or before spending all of her money 
x she uses strategies to help her not spend all the money available to her, such 
as not having an ATM card 
x at one stage she says she gets a little bit of a lift from gambling, but she also 
says she's bored while she's gambling  
x she says the cons of gambling outweigh the pros and she wants to stop but is 
finding it difficult as she gambles when she has the urge 
x she doesn't expect to win when she gambles 
 
She expressed an irrational cognition: “I know it's my last few dollars but there's 
food in the fridge so it doesn't matter if I spend it on gambling”. She said she knows 
this is a ridiculous thing to think, but during an urge to gamble she uses such 
thoughts to justify gambling with her last few dollars. 
  
 
P14 - EGM 
She says: 
x she gambles only when depressed 
x she does not bother with trying to talk herself out of gambling because she 
knows she's going to gamble when she feels an urge to do so 
x however, she always feels she shouldn't be gambling 
x she comes up with justifications during an urge that allow her to gamble 
x she gambles to escape or cope 
x that is she gambles in a controlled way, it is a big achievement 
x she experiences some excitement during gambling 
x she chases her losses during a session, which can lead to a sense of loss of 
control 
 
P16 - EGM 
She says:  
x if she knows some money is coming into her bank account, she will 
experience a strong urge to gamble 
x she tries to resist the urge by telling herself all of the negative consequences 
of gambling, but she finds "the urge is too strong" 
x she convinces herself that she “might win today”, so she should gamble 
x once she’s gambling she chases the feature, and then chases her losses 
x there is something about the machine and the environment that is hypnotic - 
the lights, the sounds, the calming background music 
x she likes to gamble as an escape and for leisure and time out 
x she was absolutely "petrified" when she first started to gamble because she 
knew it was wrong, and she knew if her boyfriend found out he would be 
really upset; but she convinced herself she was going to win 
x once she starts gambling she "can't stop"  
x starts gambling by telling herself she will only spend $40 but then keeps 
adding another $40, until she has spent over $200) 
 
P23 – Poker player 
He said that on this particular occasion of unsafe gambling he couldn't sleep so was 
bored and a bit restless, and: 
x it was a "snap" decision, and while taking money out of the ATM he knew it 
was wrong, but he wanted to do it 
  
x he felt like it was a chance to play in the big leagues 
x he felt like an idiot while driving there, and he felt guilty already, he felt 
dread, and he knew it was a stupid decision 
x possibly qualifying to play in a big tournament meant as much as the money 
x he felt nervous once he'd started and he played horribly and got knocked out 
straight away 
x he said there was no positive feeling during play 
 
Usually when making the choice to start a session even though he feels he shouldn’t, 
he says: 
x he thinks he may win, even though he is usually aware that he loses more 
often than he wins 
x he normally doesn't think that he's going to lose at the time of making the 
decision 
x later he thinks he shouldn't have made the decision 
x he thinks he deserves to win more than he does (irrational cognition) 
x once he's decided to gamble he "throws all the negative thoughts out" 
x he doesn't play to win money, he plays to feel like the "big man" and increase 
his chance of getting to the big tournaments 
 
P26 – Internet gambler (sports) 
x He was an internet sports gambler for 20 years 
x He gambled non-stop for 12 years 
x He accrued such large debts, he thought gambling was the only way out - this 
largely maintained his gambling 
x He knew that the odds were negative, but because he was really into sport, he 
thought he knew enough to beat the odds 
 
x He speaks of how his thoughts change when he has an urge: 
o when he has no urge to gamble, he knows that gambling gets him into 
more debt 
o when he had an urge he felt it was the only way out 
 
x He says he can see the pros and the cons when he has an urge to gamble. 
o Cons: gambling gets him nowhere, but into more debt, and he doesn't 
know how to stop 
o Pros: gambling feels like the only way to get out of debt 
  
 
x However, he would also convince himself that he had just had a bad run, and 
that gambling would get him out of debt 
 
x He said his gambling was a downward slope with periods of large peaks 
(wins) that would maintain his gambling for long enough for him to continue 
 
P27 – Sports bettor 
x He experiences many similar struggles as PGs 
x E.g. He has pros and cons that go through his head, yet he experiences 
wanting so that he ignores the cons (I had all the rational reasons not to do it, 
but there was some sort of drive") 
x He gives himself permission to gamble by telling himself that he'll only spend 
$20, even though he knows at the time that he's going to spend more, and he 
does (in $10 or $20 increments) 
x He experiences irrational cognitions during gambling, that actually seem to 
contribute to his gambling, instead of acting only as rationales - e.g. I felt 
close to winning; There'd been close calls; Surely another $20 will get me 
there; I was feeling a bit lucky 
x He says he wouldn't of done it if his friends hadn't - some control over this 
gambling 
 
Current NPGs, but talked about occasions when PGs 
P6 - EGM 
She says:  
x she now gambles as an escape, coping mechanism, and to relax 
x she gambles when she's in a negative or a happy mood 
x she sets herself spending limits when she goes, but spends beyond this  
x she does not allow herself to go on her own, as she associates that with being 
a PG 
x however, she consequently encourages her de facto partner to go to the pokies 
with her, so she can still go 
x she still gets urges to gamble 
x she considers the pros and cons when she gets an urge 
x however, although the cons far outweigh the pros, she gambles anyway as she 
"lacks will power" 
x she is plagued by the irrationality and feels it is the wrong choice the whole 
way to the venue 
  
 
P12 Horse-race gambler (and EGM) 
She says: 
x tends to gamble with less control at the time of year in which her son was 
killed in a car accident, and her mother died 
x she has undergone treatment and so she knows how to gamble in a more 
controlled way, and to be less bothered about times when she loses control 
x she gambles in response to urges to gamble;   
x she doesn't bother weighing up the pros and cons - if she has an urge to 
gamble, she just gambles 
x she uses strategies to help herself to control her gambling (e.g. having only a 
small amount of money in her phone account for horse race gambling 
 
On the occasion she chose to discuss, she says: 
x she drove a certain way home, knowing there was a gambling venue there, so 
she could "accidentally" drive in 
x she would say to herself, "I know I shouldn't be doing this", but she'd 
convince herself that she might win (e.g. "I haven't gambled for such a  long 
time, maybe this time I'll win something") 
x she says she knows such thoughts are irrational when she doesn’t have an 
urge to gamble  
x she says she gambles as an escape and as a coping mechanism, but she says 
she gets tense, frustrated and angry during gambling, because she knows she 
can't win and that she shouldn't be gambling, which doesn’t sound like much 
of an escape 
x if she wins she feels good, but overall her gambling makes her feel "terrible"  
x she chases her losses, and she finds it very difficult to walk away when she 
wins something (something always says "come back")   
x she said, "I wish I could walk away. I wish I could say to the person behind 
me, "Could you just take me out to my car?" 
x she said she's better at walking away now - in the past she used to be 
mesmerised, and could not think rationally 
 
NPGs 
P17 – Internet gambler (horse-race) 
He has ongoing gambling sessions on the internet. 
He says 
x he tells himself he'll limit his gambling, or he might win, as a "rationale" to 
  
permit gambling 
x the negative consequences of gambling are not present at all when deciding 
whether or not to gamble, though he says he knows "deep down" he shouldn't 
be gambling, and that he will lose (or “put back” all winnings)   
x he says the actual gambling decisions are so quick with Bet Fair (the online 
gambling website that he uses) that he doesn't think that much about it, it's 
more of a feeling of wanting to gamble 
x bets in $30 amounts because he tells himself that's all he's going to spend; he 
then spends 7 x $30 
x he gambles in response to an urge to gamble, but (when I pushed him further 
for an explanation) he also says that he gambles because he's bored, or to try 
to win money 
x he does not experience excitement when he gambles 
x he chases his losses, and continues to gamble when losing to try to experience 
a win 
x he does not tend to take winnings (it is a difficult process to get winnings 
back from Bet Fair) 
x he feels guilty and uneasy during gambling which is associated with losing 
 
P24 – Casino gambler 
Says he enjoys gambling, but then it emerges that he loses more than wins, and that 
he finds it more stressful than enjoyable most of the time. 
 
He says 
x he had an early win, and he gambles to win, and to re-live the experience of 
winning 
x he sets limits and uses strategies to stick to limits, such as leaving his wallet 
and/or ATM card in the car 
x he says he is not aware of the consequences at the time of making the 
decision - he convinces himself that he will win, it will be his lucky night,  
x he says he's never had an urge and not gone 
x as soon as the thought to gamble enters his heads, and he is able to gamble, he 
knows he's going to go 
x he also gambles for ego and for identity - he thinks its sexy and glamorous 
x when he's losing during gambling he gets angry and he is overwhelmed with 
a need to try to win the money back  
x he bets more than he should chasing 
 
P3 – Horse-race gambler 
He says: 
  
x he has a system where he gets $100 to bet with each week, and any winnings 
that he had won previously (as he keeps all his winnings from one session to 
bet with in future sessions). 
x he gambled once when he normally wouldn't after having a fight with his 
wife, and feeling upset, but it is rare for him to break his system of gambling 
only once a week 
x he was not concerned about this however 
 
P15 – Poker player 
He was at a friend’s house when they all decided to play poker. 
He forked out $25 happily for the first game, and lost, but then was asked to play 
another hand and agreed, to his later regret. 
He didn't want to be "a wet blanket", by saying no to further play.  
He made comments indicative of some momentary impaired control, such as "it's like 
my brain's reasoning centre only works whilst I'm playing and after I've already 
forked out the $25, because it's not as if I wanted to play". 
He said he felt like an idiot for agreeing to play the first $25 and losing. Then once 
he felt the peer pressure from his friends, he forgot about feeling like an idiot, and 
instead focused on the possibility of winning, and so decided to play again. Then he 
felt like an idiot as soon as he'd agreed, and again when they first started playing 
again. 
He kept saying as his reason to play "It doesn't matter", which is not really a reason 
He exhibited some possible irrational cognitions, such as he thought he wins more 
often than his friends.  
 
P18 – Horse-race gambler 
He says: 
x he never begins a gambling session unless he has the money to afford it, but 
he often spends too much once he's playing 
x he knows the odds are negative, and that gambling "systems" don't work, yet 
on this occasion he thought he was on a "lucky streak" that would somehow 
keep him winning 
x he had a big early win on the pokies, before that he didn't understand why 
people gamble 
x he can enjoy the excitement, but said on that day he didn't gamble for 
excitement, only to try to win money for his girlfriend 
x the pros that went through his head were about being on a lucky streak, he 
might be able to help his girlfriend, and it's not really "his" money as he won 
it, 
x he was weighing up whether to bet or not right up to the time of placing the 
  
bet 
x he ended up saying "just do it" or "stuff it" 
x he felt excited, nervous and motivated until the session started when he felt 
regret, remorse and anxiety 
 
P21 – Poker player 
He says: 
x he gambled because his friend rang him up and asked him if he wanted to 
play 
x he felt excited so said yes, even though he knew he would regret it in the 
morning as he would be tired and he would have lost money 
x he is attracted by the lights and stimulation, the opportunity to go out and 
have fun, and the chance to win money 
 
P22 – Horse-race gambler 
Occasion1 
He says: 
x he was bored and his family was out, which gave him the opportunity to 
gamble 
x he thought he could win - he was confident (horse-racing) 
x he wanted the excitement, to feel good, and an ‘escape’ 
x he could not afford to lose because money was tight 
x he felt excited once he'd made the decision, and nervous, anxious and excited 
once the race started 
x he says he also gambles for ego, and to feel good about himself, and he feels 
angry, down, and lacking in self-esteem when he loses - he feels losing is a 
reflection on his own capabilities 
 
Occasion 2: 
He says:  
x his emotions override his logical thoughts;  logical thoughts don't come into 
his decisions during gambling  
x he just convinces himself he's going to win when making decisions during 
gambling  
x he knows he shouldn't gamble, but he can't help it - the "voice" to do so is 
very strong, whereas the "voice" not to is very weak 
x he justifies the choice to continue with:  "Have some balls"; "Greed and ego", 
  
and ‘it is not often that you feel confident, so you should take the 
opportunity’ 
If he loses, he says the only way he can feel better again (get his ego back, and lose 
his anger) is to bet again to chase his losses. 
He says he is different to a PG as only bets small amounts. 
 
P25- Roulette 
Occasion 2 only 
He says: 
x he gambled with friends 
x he spent more than intended as he started spending his winnings in order to 
chase losses 
x he knows the odds are negative, but feels he can get even odds playing 
roulette due to the ‘dealers signature’ (the way the dealer spins the ball; this is 
likely to be an irrational cognition) 
x he also believes in lucky streaks (e.g. he says sometimes your numbers just 
come up) 
x but when probed further, this belief does not appear very strong (e.g., he 
wouldn’t spend money put aside for bills on gambling because of confidence 
in his lucky streak) 
x he has fun playing and he enjoys the entertainment.  
  
Appendix 7. Ethics approval for Study 2 
  
  
Human Ethics Research 
Office of Research Integrity 
Research Services Division 
70 Elgar Road Burwood 
Victoria   
Postal: 221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood Victoria 3125 Australia 
Telephone 03 9251 7123  
Facsimile 03 9244 6581   
research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Memorandum 
To: A/Prof Ron Gold 
School of Psychology 
cc: Ms Belinda Davey 
From: Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DU-HREC) 
Date: 29 June, 2010 
Subject: 2010-097 
On vs off line gambling cognitions 
Please quote this project number in all future communications 
The application for this project was considered at the DU-HREC meeting held on 
28/06/2010. 
Approval has been given for Ms Belinda Davey, under the supervision of A/Prof Ron Gold, 
School of Psychology, to undertake this project from 28/06/2010 to 28/06/2013. 
The approval given by the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee is given 
only for the project and for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility to 
contact the Human Research Ethics Unit immediately should any of the following occur: 
• Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants 
• Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time. 
• Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the 
project. 
• The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion. 
• Modifications are requested by other HREC's. 
  
In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once every 
year and at the conclusion of the project. Failure to report as required will result in 
suspension of your approval to proceed with the project. 
DU-HREC may need to audit this project as part of the requirements for monitoring set out 
in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). 
Human Research Ethics Unit research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au 
Telephone: 03 9251 7123 
  
  
Appendix 8. Advertisement and Plain Language 
Statement for Study 2 
  
  
INTERNET GAMBLING STUDY 
Do you ever gamble on the internet?  
If so (and you are over 18 years old), you are invited to complete a short questionnaire 
online.   
It will concern your thoughts and feelings, and will take no more than 10 minutes to do.  
Please press here for more information.  
 
  
  
 
 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
 
 
RESEARCH STUDY 
My name is Ron Gold.  I am Associate Professor in the School of Psychology at 
Deakin.   
I am carrying out a study on the feelings and thoughts of gamblers.  We need about 
200 gamblers to take part in the study.  Participation requires completion of two 
questionnaires, one task, some demographics questions, and some questions about 
how you feel.  These will take about 5 minutes to complete.   
The project is funded by Deakin.   
Study findings may be used to improve our understanding and treatment of problem 
gambling.   
Unfortunately, we cannot pay you for your participation.  While you may not get any 
personal benefit from taking part, your participation may benefit the wider 
community by improving knowledge of problem gambling.  We foresee no particular 
discomfort or risks for you in taking part. 
Participation is voluntary;  if you decide not to take part, there will be no negative 
consequences. 
All responses will be anonymous; your name will not be recorded.   
No individual responses will be reported;  only group results will be used.  If you would like 
a copy of the results, please email Belinda Davey at bcdave@deakin.edu.au or check the 
web site in December, 2010. 
You may withdraw from the study at any time.  If you withdraw, your responses will not be 
used. 
The data will be kept securely (in a locked filing cabinet) at Deakin University, in Melbourne, 
Australia, for 6 years after the publication of any reports or papers arising from the study;  
the data will then be destroyed. 
If you have any further questions, feel free to contact me, on (03) 9244 6477 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the research, the way it is being conducted or 
any questions about your rights as a participant then you may contact Secretary HEAG-H, 
Dean's Office, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural Sciences, 221 Burwood 
Hwy, Burwood, VIC 3125, Telephone: (03) 9251 7174,  
Email hmnbs-research@deakin.edu.au 
  
  
Appendix 9. Measures used in Study 2 
  
  
PAGE 1 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.  You can answer the questions 
now.  Please click on “Continue” 
 
 
 
PAGE 2 
You need pen and paper for your first task. Please take a moment to get them now. 
Please have your pen and paper ready.   
This is a free-association task. You will be asked a question and we want you to 
write down as many words as you can in response to that question.  Please do not 
think too deeply, but rather, just write down the words, in order, as they arise.  When 
you are ready to begin, click on “See question”. 
 
 
 
PAGE 3 
Please write down as many words or phrases as you can that describe how 
gambling makes you feel.   
 
When you have finished this, please type these into the box below. 
 
 
 
Click on “Continue” when you are ready. 
 
 
 
PAGE 4 
Now, please indicate on the following scale how you feel right now.  
-7    -6 -5    -4 -3    -2 -1    0 1     2 3     4 5     6 7 
Sad                    Neutral                         Happy 
 
CONTINUE 
 See question 
CONTINUE 
 
  
PAGE 5 
The next questions ask further about your feelings right now. 
  Right now, I have… 
No urge to 
gamble      
Very strong 
urge to 
gamble 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
PAGE 6 
The next group of questions ask about your gambling. Please indicate how much 
you agree with each statement right now. 
 
Right now, I think … 
[The following questions will be presented in random order] 
1. Praying can help me win. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
2. Betting on particular numbers or colours (or something similar) can 
increase my chance of winning. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
3. Having a particular object (e.g. a lucky charm) can increase my chance of 
winning. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
4. Certain behaviours or rituals (e.g. kissing the dice) can increase my chance 
of winning. 
CONTINUE 
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
5. After losing many times, I am more likely to win. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
6. I can learn how to win from the losses I have. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
7. Having one win makes another win more likely. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
8. I am more likely to win if I feel lucky. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
9. I have some control over when I win. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
10. I have more chance of winning if I keep to the same numbers/colours/choices 
for each bet. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
  
 
 
11. My wins are usually due to my skill/ability.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
12. I can win more if I use a certain strategy or system. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
13. Having a near miss (i.e. almost winning) means I’m likely to win soon  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
14. If I have lost money it is better to keep playing so I can try to win it back. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Mildly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
  CONTINUE 
  
PAGE 7 
The next group of questions ask about you.  
Please either select or write in the response which best describes you. 
 
1. What is your age? 
 
2. What is your gender?    __Male  __Female 
 
3. What is your highest level of education? 
 
Primary / elementary school  
High school (or Junior High school) 
Trade Certificate or Diploma (e.g. Hairdressing or Electrician) 
College / University - Undergraduate  
University - Postgraduate  
Other (please specify): 
 
 
4. In what country do you usually live? 
 
 
5. With which ethnic group do you most identify? 
Caucasian (or European)  
Asian  
African 
Hispanic  
Arab 
Other (please specify): 
 
 
  
 
 
6. What do you consider your main gambling game? 
 
 
7. Where do you mostly play this game? 
Internet 
Not the internet 
 
8. How often do you gamble overall?  
Most days  
More than once a week  
More than once a month  
Less than once a month 
 
9. Approximately how many hours do you gamble in a usual session? 
 
  
CONTINUE 
  
PAGE 8 
The next group of questions ask about your experience of gambling during the last 
six months.   
 
Please indicate: 
Over the last six months … 
[The following questions will be presented in random order] 
1. I have found it difficult to limit how much I gamble 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
2. Once I have started gambling I have an irresistible urge to continue 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
3. When I have been on or near a gambling venue or the internet I have found it 
difficult to resist gambling 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
4. Even for a single day I have found it difficult to resist gambling 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
5. I have been able to stop gambling before I spent all cash available to me 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
  
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
6. When I have made up my  mind not to gamble, I have stuck to it 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
7. I have been able to stop gambling easily after a few bets 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
8. I have been able to gamble less often when I have wanted to 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
9. I have been able to stop gambling before I got into debt 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
10. When I have wanted to I could stop gambling for a week or more 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
  
  
11. I have been able to resist the opportunity to start gambling  
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
12. When I have wanted to I have been able to gamble less  
 
1 2 3 4 5  0 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
 Does not 
apply to me 
 
 
CONTINUE 
  
PAGE 9 
The next group of questions ask about how you feel about your gambling overall / in 
general. 
Please indicate: 
For me, gambling is mostly … 
 
Destructive  7    -6      -5     -4      -3     -2      -1              0 1      2    3     4     5     6    7  Constructive 
 Neither 
/ not sure 
 
 
Boring  7    -6      -5     -4      -3     -2      -1          0 1      2    3     4     5     6    7  Entertaining 
/ Exciting 
 Neither 
/ not sure 
 
 
When I gamble I most often … 
Lose   7    -6      -5     -4      -3     -2      -1             0 1      2    3     4     5     6    7    Win 
 Neither 
/ not sure 
 
 
Feel tense  7    -6      -5     -4      -3     -2      -1             0 1      2    3     4     5     6    7    Feel relaxed 
 Neither 
/ not sure 
 
 
Feel sad / depressed  7    -6      -5     -4      -3     -2      -1          0 1      2    3     4     5     6    7    Feel happy 
 Neither 
/ not sure 
 
 
 
 CONTINUE
  
PAGE 10 
FEEDBACK 
 
You have finished.  You now have the chance to give some feedback if you want to.  
Please do so in the box below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now please click the button below to submit your answers.  
 
 
 
Your answers have been submitted.  Thank you very much for your 
participation.  
It is very helpful to us. 
 
 
LIST OF CONTACTS IF YOU NEED TO TALK TO SOMEONE 
 
Canada 
www.problemgambling.ca 
 
USA 
http://www.ncpgambling.org 
 
Australia 
http://www.betsafe.com.au 
 
 
SUBMIT ALL ANSWERS  
  
New Zealand 
www.gamblingproblem.co.nz 
 
Republic of South Africa 
http://www.responsiblegambling.co.za 
 
United Kingdom 
http://www.gamcare.org.uk 
 
Singapore 
http://www.stopproblemgambling.org.sg 
http://www.nams.org.sg 
 
  
  
Appendix 10. Ethics approval for Study 3 
  
  
Human Ethics Research 
Office of Research Integrity 
Research Services Division 
70 Elgar Road Burwood Victoria  
Postal: 221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood Victoria 3125 Australia 
Telephone 03 9251 7123  
Facsimile 03 9244 6581   
research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Memorandum 
To: A/Prof Ron Gold 
School of Psychology 
cc: Ms Belinda Davey 
From: Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC) 
Date: 31 May, 2011 
Subject: 2011-110 
Comparing implicit and explicit liking and wanting in problem and non-
problem gamblers 
Please quote this project number in all future communications 
The application for this project was considered at the DU-HREC meeting held on 
30/05/2011. 
Approval has been given for Ms Belinda Davey, under the supervision of A/Prof Ron Gold, 
School of Psychology, to undertake this project from 30/05/2011 to 30/05/2015. 
The approval given by the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee is given 
only for the project and for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility to 
contact the Human Research Ethics Unit immediately should any of the following occur: 
• Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants 
• Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time. 
• Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the project. 
• The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion. 
• Modifications are requested by other HRECs. 
  
In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once every 
year and at the conclusion of the project. Failure to report as required will result in 
suspension of your approval to proceed with the project. 
DUHREC may need to audit this project as part of the requirements for monitoring set out 
in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). 
Human Research Ethics Unit research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au 
Telephone: 03 9251 7123 
 
   
  
Appendix 11. Advertisement and Plain Language 
Statement for Study 3 
  
  
ONLINE GAMBLING STUDY 
Do you ever gamble? If so, you are invited to complete some questions and a short task 
online about your attitudes and expectations. Please press here for more information. 
  
  
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
 
RESEARCH STUDY 
 
My name is Belinda Davey.  I am a PhD student at Deakin University, Melbourne, 
Australia.  
I am carrying out a research study under the supervision of Assoc. Prof. Ron Gold, of 
the School of Psychology.  
The study aims to examine your attitudes and beliefs about gambling.  
You will be asked to complete a questionnaire about control over gambling (where 
relevant), some questions about gambling involvement and beliefs, some brief 
demographics questions, a few questions about current feelings, and a final task.  
These will take no more than 20 minutes to complete.  
The project is funded by Deakin University.   
Participation is voluntary; if you decide not to take part, there will be no negative 
consequences for you.   
All responses will be anonymous;  your name will not be recorded.   
You may withdraw from the study at any time, until you submit your answers.  If you 
withdraw, your responses will not be used. 
The data will be kept securely (in a password protected computer file) at Deakin 
University, for 6 years after the publication of any reports or papers arising from the 
study.  The data will then be destroyed. 
A summary of the final results will be posted on this web page by December, 2011. 
There is a list of contact details at the end of the study for gambling help services in 
several English-speaking countries.   
If you have questions regarding this study, please contact: 
Belinda Davey Assoc. Prof. Ron Gold 
bcdave@deakin.edu.au  ron.gold@deakin.edu.au  
+61 3 9244 6863 +61 3 9244 6477 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the research, the way it is being conducted 
or any questions about your rights as a participant then you may contact Secretary HEAG-H, 
Dean's Office, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural Sciences, 221 Burwood 
Hwy, Burwood, VIC 3125, Telephone: (03) 9251 7174, Email hmnbs-
research@deakin.edu.au  
  
Note that by completing and submitting the questionnaire you are consenting 
to take part. 
Click here to start  
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Appendix 13. Ethics approval for Study 4 
  
  
Human Ethics Research 
Office of Research Integrity 
Research Services Division 
70 Elgar Road Burwood Victoria  
Postal: 221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood Victoria 3125 Australia 
Telephone 03 9251 7123  
Facsimile 03 9244 6581   
research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Memorandum 
To: A/Prof Ron Gold 
School of Psychology 
cc: Ms Belinda Davey 
From: Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DUHREC) 
Date: 04 January, 2011 
Subject: 2010-262 
Can wanting be independent of liking? An examination with slot-machine 
gamblers 
Please quote this project number in all future communications 
The application for this project was considered at the DU-HREC meeting held on 
06/12/2010. 
Approval has been given for Ms Belinda Davey, under the supervision of A/Prof Ron Gold, 
School of Psychology, to undertake this project from 4/01/2011 to 4/01/2015. 
The approval given by the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee is given 
only for the project and for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility to 
contact the Human Research Ethics Unit immediately should any of the following occur: 
• Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants 
• Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time. 
• Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the 
project. 
• The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion. 
• Modifications are requested by other HRECs. 
  
In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once 
every year and at the conclusion of the project. Failure to report as required will result in 
suspension of your approval to proceed with the project. 
DUHREC may need to audit this project as part of the requirements for monitoring set out 
in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). 
Human Research Ethics Unit research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au 
Telephone: 03 9251 7123 
  
  
Appendix 14. Advertisement and Plain Language 
Statement for Study 4 
  
  
Facebook and Google advertisement: 
Do you gamble? Earn a $10 voucher for ten minutes of online study 
participation. 
  
  
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
 
RESEARCH STUDY 
 
My name is Belinda Davey.  I am a PhD student at Deakin University, Melbourne, 
Australia.  
I am carrying out a research study under the supervision of Assoc. Prof. Ron Gold, of 
the School of Psychology.  
The study aims to examine your response to gambling on slot-machines. 
Participation involves playing a computerized version of a slot-machine, and 
answering some related questions;  this will take no more than 15 minutes.   
Your time will be reimbursed with a $10 voucher of your choice from various internet 
sites (e.g. iTunes, e-Bay, Greater Union, Amazon).    
Participation is voluntary; if you decide not to take part, there will be no negative 
consequences for you.   
All responses will be anonymous;  your name will not be recorded.  However, in order 
to receive the voucher, you will need to provide a contact email.  This email address 
will not be stored with other information you provide in the study, and it will be deleted 
once the voucher has been sent to you.  You have the option of not receiving the 
voucher. 
You may withdraw from the study at any time, until you submit your answers.  If you 
withdraw, your responses will not be used. 
The data will be kept securely (in a locked filing cabinet) at Deakin University, for 6 
years after the publication of any reports or papers arising from the study;  the data 
will then be destroyed. 
A summary of the final results will be posted on this web page by July, 2011. 
There is some risk that your participation may encourage you to gamble.  There is a 
list of contact details at the end of the study for gambling help services in several 
English-speaking countries.   
If you have questions regarding this study, please contact: 
Belinda Davey Assoc. Prof. Ron Gold 
bcdave@deakin.edu.au ron.gold@deakin.edu.au 
+61 3 9244 6863 +61 3 9244 6477 
  
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the research, the way it is being conducted 
or any questions about your rights as a participant then you may contact Secretary HEAG-H, 
Dean's Office, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural Sciences, 221 Burwood 
Hwy, Burwood, VIC 3125, Telephone: (03) 9251 7174,  
Email hmnbs-research@deakin.edu.au 
 
Note that by completing and submitting the questionnaire you are consenting to 
take part. 
 
  
  
Appendix 15. Image of EGM-simulation 
  
  
 
 
  
  
Appendix 16. Instructions for playing EGM-
simulation 
  
  
In a moment, we would like you to gamble (20 bets) on a computerised slot-
machine game.   
You can increase the $10 voucher that you will receive for participating in this 
study by playing the slot-machine (however, you cannot lose the $10 
voucher).  
Each dollar is worth ten credits, so you will be given 100 credits to start with 
(as $1 x 10 credits = 100 credits).    
You will be asked to play a few blocks of 10 or 20 gambles during this study. 
At the beginning of each block, you will begin with the credits you had 
remaining from the previous block.  
Any credits remaining above $10 at the end of the study will be paid to you 
as extra voucher credit.  
Please read the following brief instructions on how to play.  
Choose a bet amount by pressing "5" or "10" (you can change this amount at 
any time during play) then press SPIN to play (please DO NOT press SPIN 
again until after the symbols display).  
Keep pressing SPIN until the BETS REMAINING box says "0". Then, press 
"RESTART" to return to the study.  
For each bet, you can lose the credits you bet, or win one, two, or three times 
the amount you bet (this depends on the combination of symbols displayed 
after you press SPIN). The rules of the game are slightly different to 
commercial slot-machines. 
  
  
 
 
